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Chapter 1
Overview
1.1 Market Structure and Efficiency
What is financial innovation? Although a large financial industry emerged in the last
decades claiming to be innovative there is no simple answer what financial innovation
is. Broadly financial innovation is often related to incompleteness and/or inefficiencies in
financial markets. Consider the extreme case where financial markets are complete and
perfect. Financial innovation then faces a Modigliani-Miller theorem type situation: In-
novation adds no value since in a complete market wealth can be transferred between any
desirable states of the world at a given date and also between states at different dates to
generate any desirable payoff at no costs (perfect markets).1 Whatever payoff at a given
date an agent wishes, he can construct this payoff at zero costs using market instruments.
We consider two incomplete markets: Home financing risk and demographic risk
markets.
Private individuals use mortgages to finance their houses. This often leads to a high
asset (house price) to equity ratio, i.e. a high leverage. High leverage means small equity
buffers to avoid insolvency, i.e. the asset value exceeds the liability value (the mortgage
in our case) only by a small amount. Can homeowners hedge their default risk? Although
the value of real estate is in most nations a multiple of the value of all listed stocks it
is almost impossible to trade pure real estate market risk: How can you protect your
balance sheet against a drop of the price of your house? There is no financial contract
(say a put option) which provides protection against specific real estate risk. Figure 1.1
shows a complete market case where one could protect against falling house prices. The
put option payoff at maturity is max(K − ST , 0) with K the strike price and ST the
price of the house. Fair pricing using no arbitrage then gives the option price today -
given the final payoff it must be proportional to a functional of the difference K − S02.
For the issuer of the option, the bank, this means that the trader has to be short the
amount S0. But how can you short a house price? This defines the supply side reason
1No transaction costs (bid-ask spreads), tax costs, information costs.
2The functional is the linear one. This is the result of the linear pricing theorem.
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for an incomplete market. Some proxy instruments for risk transfer exist but their hedge
State w1, 120 
State w2, 80 
100 
Real Estate Price Evolution 
State w1, 0 
State w2, 20 
? 
Put Option 
Figure 1.1: One-period model of house prices. The house price S today of 100 can either rise
or fall in one period. The protection is obtained by the put option, i.e. the option which pays in
this case max(K − S, 0) with K = 100 the strike price. The option never has a negative value
since the buyer of the option has the right but not the obligation to exercise the put. If house
prices increase, the option is not exercised and it is worthless in this state. If prices drop, the
option pays 20 = 100−80. This defines the protection. How much does one have to pay for such
a product today? That for, one has to develop a pricing theory. This theory is based on the
no arbitrage principle and mathematical logic. We discuss this in details below. The real estate
market is not complete in the sense, that no option contract exists for the two states, i.e. the
price process of real estate exists but no option process.
effectiveness is (very) limited. Why is there such a immature financial market for such
an important asset class? An asset class which is important both for the micro- and the
macro economy and the financial market stability. First, the construction of transparent
and trustful market instruments is not easy. This is due to the heterogeneity of the goods
- each house is unique. Today there exist solutions to this problem using hedonic price
indices. We consider this technical issue in Section 6.1. Second, many people fail to have
a reasonable estimate about the risk of mortgage financing. This has several reasons. To
buy a house is often an emotional event and people often spent time to find an appro-
priate object. The inhabitants then want to equip the house and live their. They do not
want to consider mentally the case that the object could lose value. Since houses are
physical goods social peer-group pressure is a further reason why risks are overlooked or
underestimated. We consider demand side reasons for market incompleteness. Interest
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rate risk is often overestimated and real estate market risk is underestimated. That is
a drop in the house price of 10 percent has due to the leverage for many individuals a
far more disastrous effect on their equity than a rise of interest rates by 1 percent. Why
do people often show this bias in risk identification? While interest risk is exogenous,
i.e. people cannot affect it, market risk of the house is endogenous: The decision to buy
that house depends on the preferences of the individuals. Furthermore, interest rate risk
has typically less severe impacts on homeowners than market risk has. People have more
possibilities to withstand increasing interest rate risks than to falling house prices. Again,
different leverage levels matter. But there is also a higher willingness on the lender’s side
to endure a period of high interest rate risk. Simply because the probability is larger that
the homeowner will recover in this risk scenario than in the case with falling house prices.
Demographic change. Demographic change is likely to turn some existing risk
sharing mechanism for retirement provision, such as pay-as-you-go systems, down. It
will be difficult to enforce the system in the future if the number of active workers
decreases more and more compared to the retired population. This possible evolution
raises several risks which so far cannot be structured, transferred or covered by financial
contracts. This shift in demography has several impacts on the stability of the retirement
system. Often risks in the first and second pillars of western social security systems are
not priced at all or mispriced. An example are guarantees which one generation provides
to another generation. Such guarantees are option contracts: Their value depends on
an underlying asset value and the payoff profile is not linear - a guarantee by definition
cuts at some point the underlying asset value. But for the seller of such non linear
contracts the pricing and hedge requires options: The price of a guarantee in social
security contract is the price of a derivative or more precisely an option. But the options
between the issuer of the contract - say a today young generation - and the buyer - the
today retired generation - is not done. The pricing of these options is mostly not done
using financial principles but solidarity between the generations is implicitly used. This
has two immediate effects for the society: First, there is intransparency about the price
of social security risk premia. Second, the premia are not allocated but exist in a diffusive
way in the retirement system. What many inhabitants fear is that due to the changing
demography and the still increasing life expectancy the hidden price of solidarity between
generations growth and will break due to no longer acceptable transfer payments between
the generations. Consider pension funds. There are basically two types of pension fund
plans. Defined benefit, where the employer promises future benefits and he invests to
meet the promise. In this case the firm bears capital market risk. In defined contribution
plans only the contribution but not the benefit is assured. The employee bears the capital
market risk. Figure 1.2 illustrate the present values of the two types of plans as a function
of the pension fund asset value.
The profile of a defined benefit scheme is the same as the payoff profile of a bond.
If interest rates are low the employer faces a problem that the payoff of the investment
is smaller than the promised payoff. This is a major reason that also in Europe the
defined benefit scheme are replaced by defined contribution ones. Given that the risk is
10 CHAPTER 1. OVERVIEW
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Figure 1.2: The present values of the two types of plans as a function of the pension fund asset
value. The figure shows that in the defined contribution case the risk bears is the employee and
in the other case the employer.
transferred to the employees the question is how stable is the market risk distribution
over time. While risk of stocks is in the short run not predictable if one introduces
demographic structures in the pricing of assets in equilibrium stock prices become to a
significant degree predictable. A key driver for the prediction are the relative numbers
of individuals in a population who are at the different stages of their life. The result
intuitively follows from the stable investment and consumption pattern over the life cy-
cle: People borrow when young, invest for retirement in middle age, and disinvest in
retirement. Geanakoplos et al. (2004)3 The authors divide the us population of the last
century in five cohorts of twenty years length. They then study if predictable changes
in demographic structure can lead to predictable future change in asset prices–and how
significant such prices changes can be. They use an overlapping generation model, i.e. a
model where the agents born at different dates overlap and where the general equilibrium
of the economy is determined. The variations in their price-earnings ratios approximate
the observed ones in the U.S. over the last 50 years. A substantial fall in the price-
earnings ratio is likely in the next 20 years (seen from 2000-vista time) due to the baby
boomer generation starting to retire. In this sense the risk transfer to defined contribu-
tion plans coincides with a period where due to the demographic change price-earnings
ratios are decreasing. How could agents hedge against this risk? They could for example
invest in stocks of economies which do not face the demographic risk. But workers or
employees face strong firm and home biases: They hold lots of company stocks and think
3Other work in this direction are Abel (2002), Kuznets (1958), Mankiw and Weil (1989), Poterba
(2004), Malmendier and Nagel (2011).
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it’s safe, see Mitchell and Utkus (2004). An other solution are risk sharing contracts be-
tween different generations in different economies, see Padovani and Vanini (2011). But
such contracts do not exist, i.e. the market is not complete. Finally, one could imagine
long term put options. But again the long term put options either not exist or they are
not liquid. This then leads to large bid-ask spreads which makes investments too costly.
Incompleteness roughly means that there are more states than independent assets
or risk sources to span these states, i.e. to generate arbitrary payoff profiles. This leads
to limited risk transfer across states at a given date and between states at different
dates. People cannot distribute consumption or investment at a given date or they face
constraints in savings and cumulation of wealth over time. A market is complete, if
any payoff can be replicated by the existing financial products spanning the financial
markets. Replication means that one can form a portfolio of financial instruments such
that the payoff of the portfolio equals the payoff of the replicated product at each date
and in each possible future state of the world.
But financial innovation often follows from regulatory interventions into a complete
market structure: The intervention either makes the market incomplete by eliminating
products spanning states of the world or they transform the costs of products and their
hedge. We consider regulation and the possible impact on innovation in Section 1.2.
1.1.1 Market Evolution
What is a financial market? Financial markets undergo different maturity levels reflecting
different states of completeness, see Figure 1.3.
In a simple model there are three states:
• Back-to-back. At this earliest stage there is no liquid market. Banks can and will
not enter into a risk taking position. They will search for two parties which match.
One position is long and the other one is short.4 The financial intermediary takes
a non-risk position in a zero-sum game and matches the supply and demand side.
Incompleteness occurs if there exist no counter party for a back-to-back matching.
Risk transfer is then impossible.
• Risk warehousing. There are several counter parties and the bank takes itself risk
positions through a trading desk. To enter into a risk position several requirements
need to be satisfied. The bank needs risk capacity and risk appetite to use their
4One can be long or short a position. Being long a stock or a bond means the holder of the position
owns the security and profits if the price of the security goes up. Short selling is the practice of selling
assets that have been borrowed from a third party with the intention of buying identical assets back at a
later date to a lower price to return to the lender. The short seller borrows shares and immediately sells
them. He makes a profit is the stock price decreases. Shorting also refer to entering into any derivative
or other contract under which the investor profits from a fall in the value of an asset. The possibility to
sell short and in particular to sell ’naked short’, i.e. selling the asset without borrowing the security, is
in the focus of many regulatory initiatives.
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Figure 1.3: Evolutionary states of financial markets.
balance sheet for trading. If both are given, the trading desk receives a risk capital
allocation and a charge for this capital. Besides the risk governance, investments
in human capital (traders, sales, structurer, mid-office, back-office, risk function,
operations) and IT are needed. In such a market a first generation of financial
products exists but the market is not yet liquid. Financial market liquidity has two
dimensions:
– Time. Products can be exchanged or traded at any time.
– Price and Volume. The impact of any meaningful5 trade size on prices is
negligible.
Financial intermediaries start their market making function, i.e. bid-ask rates/prices
are set with appropriate sizes. Additional to the back-to-back status there exists a
chance that a bank enters into risk sharing with a single counter party. Although
the bank takes risk, this type of trading is not proprietary trading since the risk
follows from clients demand to trade and is not a stand alone decision of the bank
to put a fraction of their capital at risk. A banks trading activities can be clas-
sified in four types. First, the bank acts only on a best execution basis: A client
buys a stock via its bank which executes the transaction using a stock exchange or
a broker. This agency trading has only operational risks - the bank faces neither
market nor credit risk. The next type, principal trading, was described above
5The ratio of the trade volume has to be small enough compared to the average traded sizes.
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under risk warehousing. The clients demand for trading make it necessary for the
bank to face market and credit risk. The third type is proprietary trading: The
bank decides to enter into positions without any client flow behind it. Such trading
acts therefore fully and direct on the capital of the bank. The Volker Rule and the
Dodd Frank Act are two regulatory initiatives in the U.S. which focus to ban pro-
prietary trading. The final type is investment trading. This type of trading is of
a buy-and-hold type which is due to strategic reasoning, ownership of investments,
joint ventures, etc. Investment trading fully affects the bank’s balance sheet.
• In a liquidmarket supply and demand match automatically. The financial interme-
diary plays the market making function to ensure that at each date and theoretically
under any circumstances liquidity is provided. The intermediary earns money by
managing the flow. The market is complete in the sense that every payoff which
can constructed in the respective market is liquid for all market participants to
share their risks. We consider the creation of an option trading book in a liquid
market. Consider the liquid stock Holcim. We start with a short position of 1000
calls on Holcim with price 7.232 CHF. The option price is calculated using Black
and Scholes model. If Holcim stock moves, up to first order6 a loss of CHF −587
on the derivative position follows, see Table 1.1. This sensitivity is called Delta in
option pricing. The profit and loss so far is zero. To reduce risk (the Delta), we
next invest in the stock. We buy 620 Holcim stocks at the price 80. The Delta of
a stock is one.7 Hence a Delta of +33 remains. This means that an increase of
Holcim stock price by 1 CHF leads to a gain of 33 and opposite if the price falls.
Profit and Loss is still zero. To generate P&L different possibilities exist. First
(step three) one sells the options slightly at a higher price than their value is. This
gives a profit and loss of CHF 268. Second, price movements as described above
lead to profit and loss (step four where Holcim gains 1).
Step 5 describes how volatility movements generate profit and loss. Since call
options have an asymmetric payoff profile their option price is sensitive to changes
in volatility of the underlying. The first order sensitivity w.r.t. volatility is called
Vega.8 We assume that the portfolio V is Delta neutral, i.e. ∂V∂S ∼ 0 see Table 1.2.
Volatility is 20%. If volatility increases by 1 volatility point, the bank loses 304
CHF and the opposite occurs if volatility drops. Intuitively, if volatility increases
the chance that the call option is in the money increases (the value of Holcim stock
is larger than the strike price). This makes a call option more expensive. Since it is
a short position, an increase in volatility implies larger losses. If the trader hedges
the Vega exposure he needs to trade in different options. In step 6 it is shown
that if he trades in a second option, Vega of the position is reduced but Delta
increases away from zero. Is it possible to control both sensitivities? Yes. Risk
control means controlling first or second order sensitivities. But sensitivities are
6The first order option price C(S) sensitivity w.r.t. to the underlying S (Holcim) is given by ∂C
∂S
=: ∆.
7The Delta is the first order derivative of a position. The derivative of the stock S w.r.t. S is 1.
8 ∂C
∂σ
=: Vega.
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Step 1 Product Size B & S Tr.Pr. Pos.Val. Delta P & L
Option Holcim -1000 7.232 -7232 -587
Position -7232 -587 0
Step 2 Product Size B & S Tr.Pr. Pos.Val. Delta P & L
Option Holcim -1000 7.232 -7232 -587
Stock Holcim 620 80 80 49600 620
Position 42368 33 0
Step 3 Product Size B & S Tr.Pr. Pos.Val. Delta P & L
Option Holcim -1000 7.232 7.5 -7232 -587 268
Stock Holcim 620 80 80 49600 620 0
Position 42368 33 268
Step 4 Product Size B & S Tr.Pr. Pos.Val. Delta P & L
Option Holcim -1000 7.232 7.5 -7232 -587 268
Stock Holcim 620 81 81 50220 620 0
Delta 33
Position 42988 33 268
Table 1.1: Positions in the option portfolio construction. Tr.Pr. means Trading Price, B
& S the theoretical Black and Scholes model price and Pos.Val. Position Value.
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mathematical derivatives, i.e. the sensitivity of a portfolio is equal to the sum of the
position sensitivities. The requirement to be say Delta neutral, Gamma neutral,
Vega predefined, etc. then leads to a system of linear equations. If one adds enough
linearly independent products in the portfolio, the system has a unique solution.
Step 5 Product Size Price Pos.Val. Delta Vega in CHF
Option Holcim -1000 7.232 -7232 -587 -304
Stock Holcim 588 80 47040 588
Position 39808 1 -304
Step 6 Product Size Price Pos.Val. Delta Vega in CHF
Option Holcim -1000 7.232 -7232 -587 -304
Stock Holcim 588 80 47040 588 0
Option Holcim 2 400 7.232 2893 235 122
Position 42701 236 -182
Table 1.2: Position in the option portfolio construction. The figure Delta is expressed in
numbers of Holcim shares.
Besides market evolution from a risk and activity point of view, the evolution can be
considered from a technological side. From the first open outcry markets, the techno-
logical revolution of market places started in the 70s/80s of last century. In electronic
markets it is possible to trade longer, trade smaller volumes and trade faster. Automatic
trading has different operational risks than traditional trading.9 The probability that
events realize are smaller in the automated world; but is hard to compare the severity of
operational risk events in the two trading approaches. We consider an example.
The first trading day of the Facebook IPO stock listing in 2012 at NASDAQ showed
that realization of operational risk in electronic trading can have a serious severity (i.e.
loss and reputation) impact. Although NASDAQ simulated higher trading volumes than
actually occurred they were unprepared for increasing numbers of cancelled orders in the
hours leading up to Facebook’s debut. This caused a 30-minute delay in the start of
Facebook trading.
Automatic trading raises some questions. First, one often speaks about algorithmic
trading, electronic trading and high frequency trading. How are they defined, who
are the players, how do they interfere with the functioning of financial markets? Second,
how does regulation boosts or constrains these types of trading? How does the reduction
in risk capacity of the trading units in investment banks changes their business model?
We consider this in more detail in Section 1.3.
Given that markets are incomplete, equilibria are in general not Pareto optimal.
One might think that there will be a demand for increased opportunities to share risk
9Operational risks are risks due to failure, non-availability, error, fraud of people, systems and pro-
cesses.
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which then increases welfare of everyone. While this is true for single consumption
good economies it is not true for more complicated ones when not all missing markets
which complete the original incomplete market are added - by the First Welfare Theorem
adding all missing markets cannot lead to an overall reduction in welfare. Elul (1995)
shows that the addition of a new security can have almost arbitrary effects on agents’
utilities. The introduction of a new security can generically10 make all agents strictly
worse off or strictly better off or favor any group of agents over another. With several
goods there exist complicated feedback effect which counteract the intuition of the single
good economy. The result, however, does not states how difficult or easy it is to introduce
an asset which reduces or increases welfare of all agents in the economy.
We discuss innovation along several dimensions. We follow Tuffano’s (2002) struc-
ture.11 A must-read on Innovation is the book of Allen and Yaglo (2010).
• Information Asymmetries.
• Costs (transaction, search, marketing).
• Taxes and regulation.
• Globalization and innovation.
• Technological shocks.
• Who innovates?
• Impact of financial innovation on society.
We only sketch the asymmetric information and cost issues and refer to the paper of
Tuffano (2002) for details. The role of information asymmetries and the theory of
contracting or security design which analyze them changed during the last decades. The
primary role of innovations forcing the revelation of information switched to innovations
exploiting low information costs. A second observation is that contract theory provides
a rationale for some basic contracts such as equity or debt but not for more complicated
structures. Is there no rationale for such structures or are the methods of contract theory
to narrow to allow for them?
Costs and in particular transaction costs could be lowered by factors up to 100 in the
past due to innovations. As with information asymmetries further reducing transaction
costs is less important for liquid assets. Other characteristics of products and services
such as flexibility, customized design, low balance sheet impacts, compliance and trans-
parency are becoming more important.
10The technical term ’generic’ means that a property is stable and holds in almost all cases.
11Geanuracos and Millar (1991), Walmsley (1988) and Crawford and Sen (1996) are popular business
books about innovation.
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1.2 Taxes and Regulation
Miller (1986) states: ’The major impulses to successful innovations over the past twenty
years have come, I am saddened to have to say, from regulation and taxes.’ The list of tax
and regulatory induced products includes zero coupon bonds, Eurobonds, equity-linked
structures and trust preferred structures. The search to maximize after-tax returns has
stimulated much innovation. An analysis shows that in the U.S. taxes where yet a driver
for innovation a century ago Kane (1986) identified what he calls the “regulatory dialec-
tic” as a major source of innovation. Innovation responds to regulatory constraints, which
in turn are adjusted in reaction to these innovations. Bank capital requirements impose
costs on the affected banks. They then use innovation to optimize capital charges in light
of these constraints. The Eurobond market starting in 1966 was motivated by regulatory
concerns to circumvent reserve requirements. Given the many regulatory initiatives after
the financial crisis and the initiated innovations we can simply restate Miller’s statement
to hold true at present.
We can understand the impact of regulation on banks more formally. Let φ be
strategy a bank chooses to optimize its value function V (φ). The optimization is over
all strategies which are admissible, i.e. φ ∈ A with A the admissible set. This set is
the intersection of exogenous and endogenous constraints such as budget constraints,
liquidity constraints, risk constraints, market access constraints. Any new regulation
leads to a new set A′ ⊂ A. Finanical liberalization means A ⊂ A′. The optimization
of the value function given the smaller constraint set automatically implies a lower or
equal optimal value. Every new constraint has a positive shadow price. This holds for
a single bank in the regulation case and correspondingly in the liberalization case. If we
consider a system of banks new constraints do not necessarily have a uniform decreasing
impact on all bank’s value function. Typically, new regulations induce shifts in market
shares for the different banks: Although the restriction leads to smaller constraint sets
for all banks some end up with a larger optimal value since their market power increases
compared to other ones. The central counter party (CCP) issue is an example. This
initiative makes over-the-counter derivative trading less profitable if one does not clears
the trades in a central counter party (clearing house). To do this, one banks need access to
the central counter parties. This requires technology and a size of the trading unit which
medium or smaller sized banks do not meet - they have to clear their OTC contracts via
a larger bank in a clearing house. This provides earning to the larger institutions which
offer the clearing service to smaller ones. For these institution the net effect of additional
earning minus the cost of the new constraint might be positive.
1.2.1 Taxation
This section is based on Glauser (2011, 2012). Taxation is linked to tax law, accounting
law, finance and corporate law. The levying of tax requires a legal basis: The law must
clarify the tax subject, the tax object, the taxable basis and the tax rate. We consider
taxes in the sequel which are contributions paid without any specific consideration. Di-
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rect taxes mean that the taxpayer and the tax bearer are the same (income tax, wealth
tax). If the two types disagree, one speaks about indirect taxes (VAT, stamp tax). In-
come is typically taxed in two ways. Ordinary income taxation means that the taxes are
due to the person receiving the income. On the other side, withholding taxes (WHT)
means that taxes are due to the debtor paying a specific item. WHT is frequent on
salaries, dividends, interests and royalties. The legal form of companies, i.e. subsidiaries
vs. branches, has important impact on the WHT. While branch offices and the head
office form a single legal entity and no WHT is due for dividends etc. which flow to the
head office, in case of subsidiaries all entities are legal entities which pay the WHT. The
WHT serves as a guarantee for regular declaration of income by residents and it levies a
tax on income by non-residents. Figure 1.4 illustrates different taxations for Switzerland.
Income Tax Profit Tax Net Wealth Tax WHT Stamp Tax: 
Issuance 
Stamp Tax: 
Turnover 
Tax Subject Individuals liable 
pay tax in CH 
Corporations liable 
pay tax in CH 
Indiv./Corpor.  on 
net  
wealth in CH 
Payer of taxable 
income. Transfer  
to the beneficiary 
Shareholder 
contribution 
into corporation 
Transfer of ownership 
 
Tax Object Enrichment during 
tax period 
Enrichment during 
tax period 
Indiv: Wealth 
Corp: Equity 
Gross amount of  
invest. Income 
Entity receiving the 
contribution 
or issuing the bond 
Securities dealer 
involved 
in the deal 
 
Taxable Basis Private: All type of 
income but not  
capital gains  
Taxable profit  
determined by  
accounting law 
See Tax object See Tax object Fair market value or 
for bonds 
% p.a. of bond 
duration 
Consideration 
Tax Rate Progressive in % 
of taxable basis 
Fedearl: 8.5%.  
Varies between Cantons 
Varies between 
Cantons 
35% 1% for contributions 
Bonds more 
complicated 
 
0.15% of 
consideration 
for Swiss securities 
0.3% for foreign  
securities 
Figure 1.4: Taxation examples for Switzerland.
The main applicable tax law is the domestic one. Since most international tax law
relies on the concept of residency and not nationality (an exception is FATCA, see below),
domestic laws applies. Most important international tax laws are double tax treaties
(DTT). The OECD contract are used for most DTT. DTT cover direct taxes but not
VAT. Since they are an allocation tool, there is no legal basis: Domestic law applies for
the effective taxation.
We consider tax planing strategies for private investors. The first distinction in
taxation is whether the funds are declared or not declared. If they are not declared, no
taxes are due and no tax planning is necessary. But today taxation and penal conse-
quences for the clients, the banking institution and for the bank’s wealth managers are
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much more severe than in the past. What are the reasons for these changes? First, the
statements are true for western countries. Second, although penal consequences changed
drastically, it is doubtful that this is due to a change of social or political norms. Often
a government does not accept tax evasion of its citizen but may well be indifferent if
their jurisdiction allows citizens of other countries to evade taxation. It is not always
the norms which changed but the perception of norms of other nations and the determi-
nation to protect a nation’s norm changed. The U.S. for example started in the 70s of
last century to make sure that all U.S. persons pay taxes, independent where they were
living. In 2001, the IRS12 introduced the qualified intermediary program, see Section
FATCA for details. This program showed some loopholes which IRS wants to close using
the program FATCA. That is, to define taxation justice for U.S. persons worldwide is
not new to the U.S. policy although for many non U.S. financial intermediaries, which
are affected by FATCA, this might seem a new initiative. Different is the situation for
the Eurozone. There tax evasion is a much less severe punished activity which under-
went a regime shift after the financial crisis in 2008: Tax evasion in many countries of
the Euro zone is now pursued with a higher determination than before the crisis. Given
the economic status of the Euro Zone there is no need for policy makers to increse the
awareness in the population - it simply pays for the policy makers if they prove to restore
taxation fairness by pursuing tax evaders. Third, although in the past not declaration of
money was tolerated to a larger extend this is no reason per se why this should continue
in the future. Which of the explanations, including others, is the most important one to
explain the changes is irrelevant for us since we focus on declared funds only, i.e. where
tax planning is a crucial discipline in wealth management.
Tax planing has three main streams, see Glauser (2012) for further details:
• Choose the right tax jurisdiction.
• Choose the right products.
• Choose the right vehicle.
1. Choose the right tax jurisdiction. A first distinction is between unlimited and
limited tax liability, i.e. the obligation to pay taxes on worldwide income/net wealth
or whether taxation is limited to a specific presence in a jurisdiction. The first one
is linked to the physical presence in a country or to the nationality (U.S.). Figure
1.5 illustrates some cases. Exceptions are domestic law which for example applies
to foreign real estate exempted or double tax treaties. In any case, the location of
bank account is irrelevant, it is the residency of the tax payer which matters mostly.
One next has to distinguish between income and withholding taxes. The first one
are due by the person receiving the income, the second one frequently applies on
dividends, interests or royalties. Concerning the withholding tax one has to make
sure whether the tax is due by company distributing dividends or by borrower
12The IRS is the U.S. government agency responsible for tax collection and tax law enforcement.
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paying coupon on bond. or whether the tax is due by the paying agent. In the
first case, the location of the bank account is irrelevant. Tax planning is achieved
by transferring the taxpayer, in the second case the location of the bank account
is relevant and tax planning is achieved by transferring the bank account. Since
tax payers can improve their tax situation by moving to another tax jurisdiction
the question is, what determines good alternative domiciles? Besides preferences
where to live other taxation issues are: Age of the individuals, type of taxation
system in the potential new domiciles, what are the sources of income, are the
double taxation treaties to avoid double taxation, what is the impact on the asset
allocation, i.e. shifts between real estate asset class and traditional assets class,
capital gains vs. other incomes?
Country X Country Y 
Bank A 
Account of  B 
Bank A 
Branch 
Account of  B 
Mister B 
Domicile X 
Nationality X 
Mister B 
Domicile X 
Nationality X 
Bank A 
Branch 
Account of  B 
Mister B 
Domicile Y 
Nationality X 
Tax Law X 
Tax Law X 
Tax Law Y 
(except. US) 
Information  
Figure 1.5: Relationship between domicile, nationality, bank account location. A major discus-
sion between the countries is the first case. If in this case Bank A in country Y does not deliver
information to the tax authorities for country X and if the client does not want to declare his
wealth or income tax losses for country X follow. The debate is to force banks in country A to
provide information to country X’s tax authorities.
We consider double tax treatises (DTT) in more details. We state or recall, that
(for) Double tax treaties (DDT):
• overrule domestic law.
• function as an allocation tool, i.e. which state can tax what type of income?
• are useful to avoid double taxation.
• require that a person is resident at least in one of the two countries.
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DTT have further objectives:
• Legal and administrative cooperation, i.e. country X asks country Y for in-
formation about a citizen of country X. Such requests typically break banking
secrecy (here in country Y). The DTT defines the information which is ex-
changed.
• DTT define the tax jurisdiction which applies to specific individuals.
• DTT clarify what happens when two states can tax a part of an individual’s
wealth or income?
• DTT clarify what happens when there are conflicting views between the two
states?
As an example consider an individual investor, with domicile in Switzerland, which
owes stock of an U.S. based company. The company pays a dividend of USD 1’000
in 2010. The following table shows the tax calculation under a DTT agreement
between the USA and Switzerland.
Taxation U.S. and DDT
Gross Dividend 1000
Withholding Tax DTT US-CH 15 % -150
Net Dividend 850
Income Tax CH 25 % 250
Remaining Taxable Amount CH 100
Total Tax on Dividends
Withholding Tax DTT US-CH 15 % 150
Income Tax CH 25 % 100
Total Taxation 250
2. Choose the right products. A main issue are whether payments arise from invest-
ment vehicles (dividends, coupons) or from a third party such as buyers of shares
or bonds. In the first case the withholding tax applies; in the second case there
is in many jurisdictions no withholding tax on the capital gains. Since in many
jurisdictions capital gains are taxed with lower rates one tries to convert invest-
ment income into capital gains. One simply can sell bonds or share before they pay
the coupons or dividends, one can reinvest the dividends or structure the products
such that mostly capital gains realize. But such type of transactions are limited
by law and local countermeasures exist. A particular strategy regarding is divi-
dend washing. Consider an foreign investor in a Swiss stock paying dividends.
The foreign investor faces the withholding tax which is not refund but for a Swiss
investor, if he declares the investments, the WHT is refund contrary. Therefore the
foreign investor could sell the stocks just before dividend date to a Swiss investor.
This then declares the dividends and gets the WHT back. He then sells the shares
back to the foreign investor shortly after dividend date. This kind of transaction is
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illegal in Switzerland: Tax authorities will not refund the tax amount to the Swiss
investor since he fails to be the beneficial owner. Another form of conversion was
to use insurance wrappers: Client invests in a life insurance. Funds are however
invested by the insurance company in a specific bank account. Client can influence
the investment strategy. If payment is qualified as insurance payment: different
tax rates or even tax exemption follows. Besides conversion, deferral is a product
strategy since the moment of taxation can differ between products and tax jurisdic-
tions. In Switzerland: most investment funds are treated as transparent entities,
i.e. income is taxed when generated and not when distributed and capital gains
are not taxed.
3. Choose the right vehicle. The main question in Switzerland is: Do the investor
keep control (directly or indirectly) over the funds? In case of transfer to a third
party (trust or foundation), the transfer of ownership is possible but (in Switzer-
land) is looked at from an effective / economical point of view: The settlor is not
a beneficiary of the trust / foundation, the rust (foundation) is irrevocable and
discretionary; and tax authorities look at all documents (letter of wishes, etc.). If
the transfer is effective, the transferor does not need to report assets / income in his
tax return and no inheritance tax is due. Contrary, if the transfer is not effective
he needs to report assets / income in his tax return and inheritance tax upon death
becomes effective at this point of time.
1.2.1.1 FATCA
The Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA), a channel to finance the Hiring
Incentives to Restore Employment Act, is a tax initiative of the U.S. which affects ten
thousands of financial intermediaries in the world. What is the rationale? It is esti-
mated that out of 7 million U.S. Persons living outside the U.S. more than 6.5 million
have never filed a U.S. tax return and U.S. residents have undeclared offshore accounts
(Ernst&Young (2012)). Why? First, there are U.S. persons using legal vehicles to hide
that they are U.S. persons. Since there is no look through by the IRS, these individuals
will not pay taxes. Second, there are U.S. individuals which only invest in non-U.S. as-
sets. Since the 2001 initiative by the IRS only focus on U.S. persons holding U.S. assets,
the IRS intends to close the two mentioned loopholes, see Figure 1.6. More precisely, after
2001 the IRS has relied on non-U.S. banks and other Qualified Intermediaries (QI)13
to enforce compliance with specific U.S. withholding tax and information reporting re-
quirements. Under a QI agreement with the IRS the QI assumes certain documentation
and withholding responsibilities w.r.t. U.S. account holders and U.S. source income. The
IRS in exchange permits the QI to certify the status of its non-U.S. account holders using
13The term refers to a foreign bank that has entered into a special agreement with the USA IRS to
report information to the IRS on Americans with accounts at the bank. The bank also has a requirement
to withhold a percentage of the interest income paid to the account. The bank has an obligation to file
tax reportage forms to the IRS. If the bank fails to comply they can be prosecuted criminally. In 2005
there were about 5,000 banks participating in the program.
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anonymous pooled reporting without revealing the identity of the non-U.S. clients.
Figure 1.6: The IRS has information about the upper left cell. With FATCA, the IRS asks for
information about three more indicated cells. Source: Ernst&Young (2012).
Given that U.S. persons used legal constructs to hide that their are U.S. persons, IRS
would like to know all investments (US source and non U.S. source) and all revenues and
proceeds from investments undertaken by a U.S. person. They need to be reported to the
IRS, irrespective of the type of holding and booking location. That for foreign financial
intermediaries have to find any American account holders and disclose their balances,
receipts, and withdrawals to the IRS or be subject to a 30 percent withholding tax on
income from U.S. financial assets held by the banks. Owners of these foreign-held assets
must report them if they are worth more than USD 50’000. Account holders would be
subject to a 40 percent penalty on understatements of income in an undisclosed foreign
financial asset. Figure 1.6 shows that U.S. accounts can belong to natural persons as well
to legal entities which are US-owned, i.e. more than 10 percent of the entity is owned by
U.S. persons.
For the foreign financial institutions the fulfillment of the FATCA requirements has
four main steps: First, identification of U.S. accounts. Second, a waiver by U.S. client. If
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the U.S. client is recalcitrant the financial intermediary (FI) will terminate the client
relationship. Else, step three, annual reporting to the IRS takes place. The fourth step
are penalties for non-participating foreign financial institutions and recalcitrant account
holders. Figure 1.7 shows the different parties and information flows. At the beginning
Figure 1.7: FATCA on one page. FFI are the Foreign Financial Intermediaries, i.e. one the
estimated 100’000 intermediaries which need to apply FATCA, WHT means Withholding Tax,
FDAP means fixed or determinable annual or periodical income and WA is the withholding
agent.Source: Ernst&Young (2012).
are payments FDAP14 which a withholding agent makes to a participating (’good’) for-
eign financial intermediary (FFI). The FFI identifies the clients. For those which
are recalcitrant (’bad ones’) the FFI transfers 30 percent of the income to the IRS. The
other ones are reported to the IRS.
One complexity for the FFI is the search for U.S. persons, i.e. what defines an U.S.
person? They have to search for U.S. residents/citizen, i.e. people with an U.S. passport.
But also individuals with an U.S. place of birth, U.S. address, U.S. mail address, U.S.
phone number, standing order in the US, c/o or holdmail as sole address need to be
14FDAP means fixed or determinable annual or periodical income.
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identified. If a person is indeed a U.S. person, the IRS requirs to fill out the W-9 docu-
ment15 and a waiver. If the person is not an U.S. person, the person has nevertheless to
document their non-U.S. status. Some persons will be recalcitrant to such requirements.
But this can be costly.
Consider the case of a recalcitrant bank client which is a non-US person. The recal-
citrant client has an account of CHF 100’000 within the bank which itself participates
as a FFI. Then the passtrhu concept applies, i.e. one assumes that a percentage of the
100’000 CHF are invested in U.S. and non-US assets. Assume that 20 percent is invested
in U.S. assets: the passthru payment percentage (PPP). Then FATCA charges 30
percent on the interest income of 20 percent of the assets. If total income is 2’000 on the
100’000 the WHT is CHF 120.16 But for the recalcitrant client the story does not end
here because the PPP can increase and hence the WHT. That for assume the following
relationships of the participating FFI to other three other FFI where the following PPP
apply to the 80’000 CHF (the 20’000 are yet attributed to he participating FFI):
• One to a bank (FI) which is participating with a PPP of 50 percent. Of the 80’000
non-US assets, 40’000 are invested in this bank.
• One bank fails to provide the PPP, i.e. since the PPP is not known, the PPP of
100 applies. 30’000 are invested in this bank.
• One bank is non-participating FFI, i.e. the PPP is zero. 10’000 are invested in this
bank.
For the original bank a PPP of
20′000 + 1/2 ∗ 40′000 + 1 ∗ 30′000 + 0 ∗ 10′000
100′000
= 70%
applies. Therefore, the recalcitrant client has to pay the 30 percent withholding tax on
CHF 1′400 = 0.7× 2′000 income, i.e. he pays CHF 420.
1.2.2 Investor Protection
Financial institutions face conduct-of-business risk. The FSA for example charged
fines of about 50 Mio. Pounds to different institutions in 2011-2012 without a 290 Mio.
Pound fine for attempting to manipulate LIBOR. The conduct-related fines can be clas-
sified into the categories ’product governance’ (Failure to inform clients), ’fair customer
treating’ (Excessive charges) and ’client assets’ (Failure to protect and/or segregate client
money). What is an investor? What are investment firms? From an economic and legal
perspective investment firms can
15The form W-9 is a tax form of the IRS for taxpayer identification certification. It is used by third
parties to collect identifying information to help file information returns with the IRS and it helps the
identified person to avoid backup withholding.
1620 percent times 30 percent of 2’000.
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• execute orders from investors,
• provide advisory to investors,
• manage wealth of investors in a delegated form.
Central for investment firms operating in the Euro Zone is MIFID17 (Market in
Financial Instruments Directive). This directive allows banks, brokers, and other finan-
cial intermediaries to provide financial advisory in the European Economic Area (EEA)
without the need to comply with the local regulatory requirements (consistent market
access), they can sell in the EEA products and services without the local authorization
and the directive sets forth prescriptive obligations upon the firms considering organiza-
tion and conduct of business (investor protection rules, improved transparency in trading,
increased product reporting and documentation, limitations of inducements such as kick-
backs). MIFID categorizes the investors as follows: Investment firms must define written
policies and procedures to the categorize their clients:
• Eligible counter parties, i.e. institutional clients such as investment firms, pen-
sion funds, national governments.
• Professional clients. A client classifies as a professional one if he possesses expe-
rience, knowledge and expertise to make its own investment decisions and properly
assess the risks that he incurs. A client can be classified a professional one per se
or at their request. Per se applies to entities which are required to be authorized or
regulated to operate in the financial markets and which satisfy a certain size (for
example a balance sheet which is not less than 20 Mio. Euro). A client classifies as
professional on request if he shows an experience and activity level in the financial
markets in the near past, if the value of cash deposits and financial instruments
exceeds a half-million Euro and if he worked in the financial sector. If two out of
the three criteria are met classification as a professional investor is possible. We
note that the standard segmentation approach using wealth as unique variable is
not sufficient.
• Retail clients. By MIFID, all other clients are retail clients.
The investment firms have to notify the clients of their right to request a different cat-
egorization and clients can both, opt up and down, i.e. choose a less or more severe
protection category than the bank itself would define.
Given how in the EEA client protection is regulated by the MIFID, several questions
arise. First, why should one protect investors? Second, how can regulation with the goal
of investor protection be defined? Third, how can a theoretical client protection concept
be implemented to act effectively?
17There are two directives, MIFID I and MIFID II. MIFID II will be effective July 2015.
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We consider the first question. If investors are not protected but think they should
have been they will stop to invest. But if there are no investors there are no financial
markets. Hence it is also in the self-interest of finanical intermediaries to possess efficient
and effective client protection procedures. Financial instruments are different to many
other goods. We compare the decision problem to buy a car and to invest into a simple
derivative, say a call option on Nestle. Cars are often termed experience of goods whereas
the call option is a credence good, i.e. a good the agent has to believe in. Clearly, he
also has to believe in the car but as a physical good the agent can value without risk
today many characteristics of the good - functionality, design, security standards and so
on. The time when the agent can value the option lies in the future and is uncertain. To
buy the option today requires the client to understand what will happen to the option
under different scenarios. This is a much more abstract exercise and also bears much
more risk for the seller (bank) than for the car seller: The client relationship manager
has to show the financial consequences in a as comprehensive way to the client. The
new technologies allow to address this question radically different than in the past, see
Section 1.3.1. Clients also need protection since they often do not have the means to
validate the products. This can be missing data (where should a retail client obtain a
correlation parameter?), knowledge or time. Comparing the call on Nestle with the car
case, in the latter one a driving licences is necessary and sufficient to buy a car from
a legal perspective (unless other legal restrictions apply to a specific person). For the
financial instrument so far a test where the client proves that he understands the product
is not required, at least not for retail clients. Contrary to a driving licence such a test
turns out to be more demanding and needs to be updated on a regular basis given the
financial product innovations. Financial intemediaries often reject the idea to ask for
tests for their clients since they fear that most clients will not be able or willing to pass
the tests. As a consequence a large part of the product offering can no longer be offered
to a assumed large fraction of retail clients.
A major concern why clients need to be protected are conflicts of interest. It is
difficult without any protection for the client to control that the products offered are
the best suited for him and not for the benefit of the relationship manager. The client
does not knows the incentives of the relationship manager and he does not know whether
there is any strategy behind the product offering. But this also applies to other types of
products: We do not know the incentives of a car dealer in the above example neither.
Contrary to the financial situation we accept that this might be conflicting. Although
it is evident that it is impossible to have a long term client relationship if the bank acts
not in the client’s interest the history of banking or investment is full of examples where
ruthless advisors or such with a short horizon did not acted in their client’s interest.
The difficulty with investor protection is that the advisor has to make transparent the
product, has to make transparent his incentives, has to elicit the knowledge and expe-
rience level of the client and finally process all this information such that the output is
that a product is suitable for a client or not. This kind of view which is in some form
or other underlying many initiative for client protection is likely to fail since it is too
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demanding to be implemented. We discuss in Section 1.3.1 how using new technologies
some of the above duties or responsibilities can be changed: The client can explore the
products himself and then decide whether a product is suitable or not for him. The client
relationship manager takes in this approach the position of a coach.
How can regulation be defined? There are self-regulation and regulation by the state
or regulators, direct and indirect regulation, principle based and detailed regulation.
While there are many pros for self-regulation, the recent banking history shows that the
interference of compensation incentives and self-regulation destroyed in many jurisdiction
the legitimacy of this approach. In other words self-regulation is more and more replaced
by ordinary regulation. A part of regulation is suitability, i.e. the test of a financial
firm, when advertising a retail client to purchase a particular financial instrument, that
the product is appropriate for the client. That is the product or service offered should
match the client’s financial situation, investment objectives, level of risk tolerance, finan-
cial need , knowledge and experience by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision
(2008). To provide an appropriate suitability process conduct of business rules are
required: Firms must ensure that they act honestly, fairly and professionally in accor-
dance with the best interests of the investor and treat investors fairly. Furthermore, the
rules regulate the behavior of the service provider and they ensure that the clients do not
suffer from the position of strength of the financial intermediaries and from asymmetry
of information. Both, suitability and conduct of business rules are key parts of investor
protection.
Following Oliver Wyman (2012) the following requirements are key in successfully
managing conduct of business rules:
• Specification of stakeholders roles. A common model of risk management, the three
line of defense model, is applied here too. The 1st line where the client relation-
ship manager acts needs to act such that the client is treated accordingly to the
regulatory requirements. This is implemented using appropriate incentive schemes,
compensation schemes and selecting people which act in line with the bank’s cul-
ture. The 2nd line defines the guidelines, monitors risk and tracks corrections.
This is the risk and compliance line of defense. Employees of this line need to be
separated from the first line w.r.t. their reporting lines and the incentive as well
the compensation schemes have to be disjoint. The 3rd line provides controlling
assurance. They review the activities of the first line.
• Firm processes for product approval and marketing material. This requires the
definition of incentives, compensation and a culture of product design which is
appropriate with the clients needs. Furthermore, the marketing material has to
be balanced, complete and understandable. This requires to avoid known pitfalls
from behavioral economics or finance research: Failure of people to apply the laws
of probability correctly and behavioral phenomena such as anchoring, prominent
numbers, overconfidence, etc. are well known, see Rabin (1998).
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• Tools demonstrating fair treatment. Fair treatment needs to be demonstrated pre-
and after-sale during the life cycle. Without powerful tools this is not feasible.
One should allow clients to generate at any time a full fledged report about their
portfolio. This report should state what the products are, how did they behaved
in the past, a profit and loss decomposition, etc. This provides transparency but
is this sufficient for fair treatment?
• High data quality and robust process to satisfy client assets requirement. This
requires the compilation of comprehensive and reconciled client lists, reduction of
workflows and processes, control process end-to-end and readily available manage-
ment information systems.
• Strong oversight over market abuse and financial crime. To insure this a basic
requirement is that senior management takes responsibility, to have continuous risk
assessments in place and to create clear documentation to tackle financial crime.
While most would agree with the intentions of suitability and conduct of business rules
the main question remains: How and to what extend can these theoretical advices/rules
be implemented in real life? Consider a client which today has a portfolio of securities
consisting of a single stock BMW in a securities account of a bank X. What is the client’s
financial situation? First, many clients have more than one bank relationship, say the
client has another securities account in a bank Y. Typically, bank X does not knows
about this account. Second, the client is a member of a pension scheme. The portfolio
composition of the client’s pension assets are also not known. Third, other assets such as
real estate buildings or possible legacys in the near future should be considered to obtain
a view on a client’s financial situation. But even if the client has only a single deposit in
bank X the situation becomes quite complex if he is actually also invested in funds and
structured products. To obtain a reasonable risk assessment the bank needs to unbundle
the funds and structured products: They can also contains BMW stocks. This is feasible
if the in the bank X securities deposit products issued by bank X are contained. But if
products of other issuers are part of the deposit it becomes likely impossible for bank X
to unbundle the products in their basic securities. Formally, the mentioned transparency
problems can be stated as follows. Let V be portfolio of the client where
V = V X + V h
is the portfolio part in bankX and V h the hidden part: Assets in bank Y or in the pension
fund system of the client. Hence, V is not observable to the bank-X client advisor. Next,
suppose that V X consists of BMW stocks, funds with investment in BMW and structured
products with BMW as (one) underlying value. Then,
V = ωS + F (S) + C(S) + V h
represents the portfolio value with S the BMW stock price, ω the observable fraction
of the client in Bank X, F (S) the fund value as a function of S and C(S) the value
of the structured products. Suppose the bank is able to determine the fraction of fund
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investment in BMW. This leads to ω1, i.e. the fraction of the client portfolio value at bank
X invested in the fund. Similarly, the structured products can be unpacked leading to
an exposure in BMW stocks and possibly other underlying values. The total exposure in
BMW can be written as ω2(t) which consists of a direct investment in S and a replication
of options on BMW in a time varying part proportional to BMW stock (Delta) plus a
remaining part18. Summarizing,
V = (ω + ω1 + ω2)S + V
X(not in S) + V h
is the decomposition of the client position if full information is available about the po-
sition in bank X. To analyze this decomposition several demanding task follow. First,
the fraction of wealth ω2 is not constant over time in that part which replicates options.
Second, not only the decomposition in the positions matter for future analysis but also
the dependencies, i.e. how does S statistically or analytically correlates with the non-S
positions.
If we consider the issue to capture the client’s need similar complexity matters arise
as before. To consider the needs basically means that one needs to start with an asset
liability analysis (ALM). That is, the client needs to define the liabilities over time (ed-
ucation for the children, investment in real estate, etc.) distributed over time, the assets
which can be used to finance the liabilities together with the expected income stream
over time. Fortunately, using modern IT technologies such programs can be designed in
a user friendly way. Given this information one has to analyze to what extend the ALM
plan is feasible - is it feasible risk free, how much market risk is required to finance the
liabilities with an acceptable shortfall, which projects does one needs to remove or post-
pone to reduce the financing risk. The drawback of such an analysis with a performing
IT tool is model risk. The scenarios which are needed to simulate to what extend the
liabilities can be financed require return, correlation and volatility estimates for the asset
dynamics. This is model risk due to the bank. On the client’s side the estimated future
income stream can be ex post largely different than the realized one.
Conjecture 1.2.1. The regulatory initiatives at the point of sale increase conduct of
business risk to a level where it becomes optimal for the intermediary to offer to eligible
and professional clients execution platforms and to use mandate contract for retail clients.
The third function of advise will become under heavy pressure. The first service means
that the autonomy and responsability are fully on the investors side. This service is made
possilbe by developing trading and analyse tools such that the investors can act as if they
were working in the bank’s asset management.
1.2.3 Regulation, Overview
Many regulatory initiatives are under way in 2012. Many of them were either triggered
by the financial crisis 2008 or their actions were enforced due to lessons learned in the
18An option is replicated by a linear combination of cash instruments and cash.
1.2. TAXES AND REGULATION 31
crisis. Some initiatives in the U.S. are Dodd Frank Act, Hire Act, Volcker-Rule. ,
in the Eurozone MIFID, EMIR and ’world wide’ Basel III. Fatca is a U.S. initiative
which impacts financial intermediaries outside the U.S. These initiatives
• impact the OTC derivative markets;
• consider cross border banking;
• impose trading restrictions, i.e. proprietary trading;
• strengthen client protection and client reporting;
• strengthen the capital basis and the liquidity status of the banks.
These changes will change the landscape of banking business: Some business will
be stopped, some business will be done different, some business will be done by other
institutions. It will undoubtedly also promote financial innovation - a prominent one is
the change in OTC business. Figure 1.8 gives an overview of some aspects of the different
initiatives.
Figure 1.10 shows the regulatory changes from two different perspectives. The first
one provides the hierarchy of the policy groups: The G20 is the leading organization
concerning the regulation of the financial industry. The Financial Stability Board (FSB)
is the know how center which elaborates solutions for the G20. The Basel Committee
regulates in its new regulation accord Basel III the whole balance sheets of the banks.
This requires not only the regulation of capital but also the consideration of the liquidity
dimension. On the lowest level are the binding national regulatory bodys which consider
the consultative packages and finalize them into binding law. The proposal Basel III for
example has a Swiss Finish and a UK finalization. The right panel in Figure 1.10 shows
the interplay between regulation and the banking industry response. It follows that most
institutions act such as to comply with the changing regulatory environment. Only few
according to Oliver Wyman head for the second step: Where are the strategic business
alternatives due to the regulatory change? There are many alternatives. One observes
that bankers are stronger to see the need and to define goals if the alternatives are in the
client relationship interface than if the back or middle office functions are considered, i.e.
so-called transaction banking. One observes more attention related to MIFID than
say CCP clearing.
Although a timeline exists for the different initiatives, most of them are finalized only
on a high level, see Figure 1.9 The next step of detailed rule making will lead to changes
in the content of regulation and/or also to changes in the timeline. The complexity
banks need to master will lead to institutions which are able to fulfill the requirements
maintaining the actual business activities and organization and it will also lead banks to
conclude that they cannot master the regulatory change without substantially changing
the scope and organization of the institution. For small banks it might become too ex-
pensive to comply with the regulatory rules. To make all their middle and back office
functions compliant is either not feasible or not economic meaningful. Such institutions
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Category Regulation Country Short Description 
Capital & Liquidity 
Basel III 27 Countries 
More & better capital quality 
Equal weight capital an liquidity management 
Conservative valuation of market and counter party risk 
Client Protection 
 
Client Reporting 
MIFID / FINMA EU-Zone / CH Improving client protection, best execution of all client orders 
FATCA World 
Increasing data and reporting requirements for US business applicable to  
non-US financial institution 
OTC Derivatives 
Clearing obligation 
Dodd-Frank/EMIR US / EU-Zone Clearing of OTC contracts via central counter parties (CCP) 
Reporting obligation 
Dodd-Frank/EMIR US / EU-Zone Reporting about OTC transactions out of centralized data bases 
Trading Obligation 
Dodd-Frank/EMIR US / EU-Zone 
Transferring execution of standardized OTC derivatives away from 
bilateral form onto  
organized trading platforms 
Crossborder 
Trading Giovannini, T2S EU-Zone 
Stronger integration and standardization of the European settlement and 
clearing infrastructure 
Trading 
Restrictions 
Volcker Rule US No proprietary trading 
Position limitation 
and short selling  
restrictions EU Zone / US 
Position limitation for commodity contracts 
Forbidden naked short selling and uncovered CDS 
Figure 1.8: Overview over regulatory initiatives. The Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act is a federal statute in the United States that was signed into law 2010.
MIFID (Markets in Financial Instruments Directive) is a European Union law that provides
harmonized regulation for investment services across the 30 member states. EMIR (European
Market Infrastructure Regulation) a major body of securities market regulation for the European
Union. FINMA is the Swiss Regulatory Authority. The Volcker Rule is a specific section of the
Dodd-Frank Act. FATCA (The Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act) is subtitle of the Hiring
Incentives to Restore Employment Act (HIRE) in the US. T2S is a Eurosystem service for
securities settlement setup by the ECB. Giovannini Group on is a group on cross border clearing
and settlement arrangements in the European Union.
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Figure 1.9: Timeline of international regulation. Source: Oliver Wyman (2012).
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then can become part of a larger entity or outsource some functions. If we consider all
activities related to the middle office and the back office as transaction banking, a pos-
sibility is to outsource this part of the bank while keeping the activities in the client-client
relationship manager interface. Transaction management includes operations, custody,
trading functions and product management among others. For Switzerland estimates are
that about one-third of all banks will come to such types of conclusions. This defines a
possible case for larger institutions which can offer transaction services to this smaller
banks. Some questions given these initiatives are:
Figure 1.10: Left Panel: Regulation from a policy group view. Financial Stability Board was
established in April 2009 as the successor to the Financial Stability Forum. Source: McKinsey,
2012. Right Panel: Industry regulatory response organization. Source: Oliver Wyman, 2012.
• Which initiative will indeed be implemented and to which extend? Whereas
Basel III has a deadline some issues are still not finalized. Lobbying against the
Dodd-Frank Act is that strong such that the outcome of the financial reform is
likely to be reduced.
• Complexity vs. effective and efficient regulation. There different types of
complexity issues:
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– Framework complexity, i.e. the size, connectivity and implementability
of a framework. The implementation of the Dodd-Frank Act requires that
regulators create 243 rules, conduct 67 studies, and issue 22 periodic reports.
The law itself consists of 2’300 pages. The final documents for the implications
are likely to contain a factor of 5 to 10 times the 2’300 pages. If a nation
intends to reshape the business model - here for the large U.S. banks - it is
doubtful whether this is meaningful done in the form of the Dodd-Frank Act.
First, the complexity of a systems generates also many loopholes. Second,
complexity has at its best an ambiguous effect on the effectiveness. Third,
despite the volume of the law it does not touches the key element of behavior
or even behavioral changes of the bankers: they are forced to some business
different, to stop some business, to search for alternative business ideas. But
they are not forced to think about values. The complexity also shows if one
consider the global structure of regulation, see Figure 1.12. The complexity of
the structure raises the question about lack of leadership. Figure 1.10 shows
that the pre crisis lack of leadership has changed to the present situation with
G20 as the leading policy group and The Financial Stability Board (FSB)
as the main coordination and standard setting body.19 The BRIC (Brazil,
Russia, India, China) states also are members of the FSB. This reduces the
risk that important financial markets of the future are staying on completely
the sideline in the regulation process. If we return to the Dodd Frank act,
a fundamental question is to what extend are the U.S. able to handle large
projects in the future due to the complexity of framework? This question is
not only related to the regulation of the financial markets but also to other
initiatives such as the Health Care Reform of the Obama administration.
– Channel complexity, i.e. the dependence between financial markets, gov-
ernments, monetary policy, global macro economy, etc. The financial crisis
2008 showed that risk can disperse with a speed and in different economic and
financial channels that make a global regulatory approach necessary. Figure
1.11 shows part of the dependencies related to the Greek-Eurozone crisis.
The figure shows that the European Central Bank (ECB) can buy Greek
bonds. This would guarantee that Greece will not pay to large credit spreads
or even worse, the ECB guarantees a demand function for Greek bonds. ECB
obtains the money to buy the bonds from the different central banks of the
Euro zone. If this amounts become considerable for the individual central
banks they will be recapitalized by the public budgets. The public also acts
as a lender of last resort in other channels. First, private banks which are
holding Greek bonds can run into problems if the bonds lose value and the
asset value shrinks. Second the IMF can define rescue packages for Greece.
But the IMF is funded by governments, i.e. public budget funding occurs also
19’...to coordinate at the international level the work of national financial authorities and interna-
tional standard setting bodies and to develop and promote the implementation of effective regulatory,
supervisory and other financial sector policies in the interest of financial stability.’ FSB homepage.
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Figure 1.11: Representation of a systemic event hitting Greece and related financial channels.
TARGET2 is an interbank payment system for the real-time processing of cross-border trans-
fers throughout the European Union. LTROs are Long Term Refinancing Operations of the
ECB.Source: McKinsey (2012).
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in this channel. Finally, the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) is
a special purpose vehicle financed by members of the Eurozone to address
the European sovereign-debt crisis. As an example ’A Greek importer, for
example, might place an order with a German company. Payments to and
from the accounts of the buyer and seller are channeled via central banks, so
the German exporter’s bank gets a credit with the Bundesbank, which in turn
has a claim on the ECB. The Greek importer’s bank owes its local central bank,
leaving the Bank of Greece with a debit at the ECB.’ Source: J. Glover, 2012..
– Financial market complexity describes the complexity of the web of link
in financial markets such as the interbank market for example. We provide
an overview over some questions in Section 1.2.4.
The different types of complexity impact different risks. Financial market com-
plexity and channel complexity both impact the stability of financial system. The
latter one is also a key factor for political stability. The key state variable to
regulate financial market complexity is the regulation of the balance sheet since
behavior, compensation and motivation of financial market participants strongly
follows from the success of the financials. Mastering channel complexity is much
more difficult since there is no clear cut target as the balance sheet for financial
market regulation.
• Competition between financial centers vs. global regulation. Competition is to
a large extend shaped by inconsistencies in international regulation between
different regions.
– US: Inconsistencies are a delayed introduction of Basel III, prohibition to hold
commodity assets, FATCA (i.e. U.S. persons abroad are taxed, see discussion
in the Tax Section), Volcker Rule and the Swap dealer registration are not
consistent with regulations in Europe and APAC. Foreign entities will exit or
scale back their onshore U.S. business.
– Europe: Inconsistencies compared to other regions are the short selling bans,
the introduction of financial transaction tax and the increasing political pres-
sure on compensation. Compared to U.S. banks, European banks on average
are overleveraged with capital and liquidity problems (US banks are cash
rich), the banking sector is concentrated and the majority of corporate debt
is retained on the bank balance sheet contrary to the U.S. where corpoartes
use the capital markets to a much stronger extend to raise capital. This will
lead to an asymmetric entrance of U.S. banks in Europe and given the U.S.
inconsistency to a higher market share increase in commodities.
– APAC (Asia and Pacific). Generally, the APAC states are lacking behind
Europe and the U.S. in the implementation of new regulations and their ap-
proach is less stringent. This will lead to a relocation of trading business to
Asia.
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Summarizing, APAC will be the winning region, the U.S. will move sideways in the
global competition and Europe will lose.
Figure 1.12: Topology of global regulation as of 2007. Source: Sloan and Fitzpatrick (2007).
1.2.4 First Approach to Systemic Risk
We consider systemic risk definition, - characteristics and some models types.
1.2.4.1 Empirical Studies
Most of the pre-crisis empirical studies on contagion in interbank networks are based
on partial information on the bilateral exposures (aggregate balance sheet data). They
estimate missing exposures with a Maximum Entropy method.20 A part of the literature
considered the network structure of the financial system in specific countries.21 However,
20See Sheldon and Maurer (1998), Upper and Worms, (2004) Wells (2004), Elsinger et al. (2006)
Degryse and Nguyen (2007) .
21See Furfine (2003) in the US, Upper and Worms (2004) in Germany, Agnes Lubloy (2006) in Hungary,
van Lelyveld and Liedorp (2006) in the Netherlands, Wells (2004) and Elsinger et al. (2006a) in Austria,
Wells (2004) in the UK, Mistrulli (2007) in Italy.
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the Maximum Entropy method is found to underestimate the possibility of default con-
tagion (Mistrulli (2007), van Lelyveld and Liedorp (2006)). Recent empirical studies are
based on complete data sets. The study of Boss et al. 2004 for Austria and of Moussa et
al. (2010, 2011) for Brazil. The findings of both studies are comparable. They have some
strong implication for statistical model building of systemic risk. First, the use of famous
Erdoes-Renyi, i.e. each edge is included in the graph with probability independent from
every other edge or equivalently, all graphs with the same nodes and edges/links have
equal probability to be drawn, leads to a Poisson node degree distribution. More pre-
cisely, consider a graph with n nodes and M edges. Each edge is included in the graph
with probability p independent from every other edge. Equivalently, all graphs with n
nodes and M edges have equal probability. For n to infinity with np = constant the
degree has a Poisson distribution:
P (degree = k) =
(np)ke−np
k!
.
The graph has no heavy tails. The analysis of the Brazilian and the Austrian network
leads to more heavy-tailed node degree distribution, i.e. both a power law distributions22
follows for the in-degree (the number of debtors in the nodes) and the out-degree (the
number of creditors) and a Pareto distribution for the exposures. The Erdoes-Renyi
networks also shows a too low clustering compared to the financial systems. Besides this
statistical arguments the fact that in an Erdoes-Renyi model links are formed independent
from any other link violates basic behavioral aspects in banking: Bank’s decision to whom
they connect for business is not a random process, neither in the formation of a link and
also not in the possible deletion of links in cases where interbank markets are under
stress. In summary, the Erdoes-Renyi model
• shows too low clustering,
• fails to produce the heavy-tailed node degree distribution.
The model of Minca in the next section allows for networks which generate these em-
pirical findings, i.e. he show the importance of taking into account the heterogeneity
of financial networks when discussing issues of financial stability and contagion. Figure
1.13 illustrates the topology of the UK and Brazil banking system. We stress that it is
important to describe what the links and nodes actually mean.
The financial system showed in the last decade three remarkable developments,
see Haldane (2009): The increase in complexity, trading speed and homogene-
ity. The increase in complexity has several dimensions. First, the scale and inter-
connectivity of the international financial network has increased significantly over the
past two decades. Haldane (2009) shows that the size of nodes if the network of coun-
tries is considered increased by a factor 14 and links have become both fatter and more
22A system exhibits a power or Zipf Law if the tails of the distributions exhibit a linear decay in
log-scale.
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UK Brazil 
Switzerland Austria 
Figure 1.13: UK: UK interbank market Q1 2008 of large exposures. A large exposure is one
that exceeds 10% of a lending bank’s eligible capital during a period. Eligible capital is defined
as Tier 1 plus Tier 2 capital, minus regulatory deductions. Each node represents a bank in
the United Kingdom. The size of each node is scaled in proportion to the sum of (1) the total
value of exposures to a bank, and (2) the total value of exposures of the bank to others in the
network. The thickness of a line is proportionate to the value of a single bilateral exposure.
Source: Bank of England (2009). Austria: scale-free structure Source: Boss et al., (2004).,
Switzerland: sparse and centralized structure. Source: Mueller, (2004). Brazilian interbank
network, December 2007. A scale-free structure. The number of financial conglomerates is n
= 125 and the number of links in this representation at any date does not exceed 1200. The
network has a heterogeneous and complex structure, some highly connected institutions playing
the role of hubs while others are at the periphery Source: Cont et al. (2010).
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frequent by a factor of 6 between 1985 and 2005. But not only the topology became
more complex also the information propagating in the network faced increasing complex-
ity. This is largely due to the industry approach of slicing, re-bundling and redistributing
risk, i.e. the structured finance approach. This wide spread risk transfer technique lead
to basic and enormous sized credit derivative markets such as the CDS market and also
to the complex structured finance securities such as CDO, CDO-squared and so on. This
risk transfer technique together with the ’originate and distribute’ business strategy in
the US led to long value chains in the network. The increase in homogeneity is due to
the follow-the-leader approach by the banking firms. Each new trend is adopted by the
whole industry, starting from leveraged loan business they switched to structured finance
(CDO) and all institutions started to hold risk in form of such complex assets instead
of taking the role of risk transformator. Not only the same business strategy was used
but also risk loading to the need to leverage the own balance sheet was standard. This
search for new assets led the institutions the way down from top rated and relatively
simple assets to assets of a lower creditworthiness and/or a higher complexity.
1.2.4.2 Risk Description: Probabilistic Network Modelling
A network consists of nodes and links. The nodes represent banks and each directed
link reflects a business relation between two nodes. Contrary to physical or biological
systems, financial system nodes are more complex. They are high dimensional objects
- the financial dimension given by the balance sheet and the income statement as well as
other dimensions such as intangible assets and reputation characterize a node. This com-
plexity of the nodes allows for different channels of risk migration in banking networks,
see Figure 1.14.
We consider the different channels of risk migration in a network.
First, there are directed links representing cash flows such as margin calls or fund-
ing cash flows. These links represent liquidity risk. The initial illiquidity and default
on payments may transmit to counter parties which may become also illiquid - a cascade
of illiquidity follows. Such margin runs can arise from margin payments on outstanding
derivatives due to large jumps in the mark-to-market values of the derivatives. Credit
default swaps are particularly prone to large jumps, even in absence of default of the
reference entity.
Second, balance sheet exposures, i.e. the expected loss on outstanding claims in
case of counter party default, are represented by directed links. Every interbank liability
is another bank’s asset. Hence unsecured interbank assets are endogenously determined
by the network links. This defines the insolvency channel: A bank becomes insolvent
(default) if its capital buffer cannot withstand the losses due to direct exposures. The
liquidation of an illiquid portfolio of a defaulted bank on the market has a price feedback
effect on the portfolios of other banks holding similar assets. They in turn may become
insolvent too leading to a potential insolvency cascade. To take into account different
markets and different links between assets and liabilities one needs to introduce a fine
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Figure 1.14: Different risk channels. Source: Minca, 2011
structure on both the asset and liability side, i.e. one has to distinguish between secured
and unsecured securities, liquid and illiquid assets.
Finally, a third kind of contagion is due to similarity links: Two banks are linked
in this way if they possess the same assets where the asset possession does not induce
any contractual obligation. This type of link has possible price spillover effects: Bank A
needs to sell the assets in a fire sale way where bank B owes the same assets. This is the
capital shock channel.
The mechanics of distress propagation in financial network through channels with a
financial measurable unit can be introduced as follows.23 Let eij represent any kind of
exposure, i.e. the maximum loss related to direct claims, of bank i to j. If eij < 0, then
j has a liability to i, see Figure 1.15. By the limited liability rule the capital Ei before
a shock of size i becomes
E˜i = max(Ei − i, 0) .
The set of default sequences Dk is defined as follows. D0 is the set which contains all
banks which are in a default status at initiation. If bank j defaults in the next step, i
faces a loss eij . Then,
D1(e, E) = {banks i| Ei <
∑
j∈D0
eij}
23The model is based on the thesis of A. C. Minca, (2011).
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is the next set of defaulted banks. Therefore, D1 consists of all initial defaulted banks
D0 plus all banks, where the capital puffer turns out to be low due to the losses of the
D0-banks. The insolvency cascade is represented by iterating the above procedure
which ends with the last possible default, i.e. we have in step k:
Dk(e, E) = {banks i| Ei <
∑
j∈Dk−1
eij} , (1.1)
all banks are considered such that their capital is smaller than the losses from connected
banks defaulted in step k − 1. One then considers a sequence (en, En) of financial net-
works, indexed by the nodes n and the in- and out-node degrees. We set Gn to be equal
to the set of all weighted directed graphs which match the sequence of financial networks.
The goal is then to study the behavior of the fraction of defaults
an(Gn, En) =
|Dn(Gn−1, En−1)|
n
for n to infinity (analytical) or numerically for finite n.
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Figure 1.15: A toy network which illustrates a solvency cascade. The links represent
exposures net of collateral and in the nodes the capital is shown.
In a similar way an illiquidity cascade is defined. The capital condition is replaced
by a liquidity condition in theD-sequence. To achieve this the assets are decomposed into
liquid and illiquid ones and in- and out-cash flows between counter parties are introduced.
These cash flows represent for example maturing loans, coupon payments, margin calls
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from OTC derivatives. Similar to the insolvency cascade a set of illiquid banksDk follows.
We consider as an example the model of Gai and Kapadia (2007). They consider n
banks with directed links: Interbank loans define links. Links are directed. The authors
use the following terminology and make the following assumptions:
• Incoming links = interbank assets.
• Outgoing links = interbank liabilities.
• In-degree: number of links that point into the node.
• Out-degree: number of links that point out of a node.
• They assume that: Average in-degree = average out-degree.
• Total liabilities of each bank are normalised to unity.
• The total interbank liability position of every bank is evenly distributed over each
of its outgoing links and independent of the number of links the bank has.
The distribution of the in-degree and out-degree are unspecified. The joint distribution
of in- and out-degree governs the potential for the spread of shocks through the network.
Degree distribution is arbitrary, i.e. the authors do not assume a particular topology.
This counteracts the critique many prior studis faced of using artifical or non realistic
network structures. They split the assets split in interbank assets AIB and illiquid assets
AM . They assume that the total interbank asset position AIB is evenly distributed
among the banks independent of the number of links: This mimics the diversification
motivation. Solvency for bank i means
(1− φ)AIBi + qAM − LIBi −Di > 0
with Di the deposits, φ the fraction of banks with obligations to bank i that have de-
faulted and q the resale price of the illiquid asset. We make a zero recovery assumption.
Using the capital buffer Ei the solvency condition reads:
φ <
Ei − (1− q)AMi
AIBi
.
Assume that at time 0 all banks are solvent and that at time 1 a single back i faces a
shock. Let ji be the number of in-links for i. Since linked banks each lose a fraction 1/ji
of their interbank assets when a single counter party defaults, the only way default can
spread is if there is a neighboring bank for which
Ei − (1− q)AMi
AIBi
<
1
ji
.
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Hence, D0 = {i| Ei−(1−q)A
M
i
AIBi
< 1ji }. Banks that are exposed in this sense to the default of
a single neighbor are called vulnerable and other banks as safe. Vulnerability of a bank
depends on its in-degree. Let vj be the probability that a bank with in-degree j is vul-
nerable and let pjk be the joint degree distribution of in-degree j and out-degree k. Why
is this joint distribution important? Contagion spreads via incoming links. For conta-
gion to spread beyond vulnerable first neighbours, those neighbours must have incoming
links from other vulnerable banks. Going via incoming links, we are interested in second
neighbours of vulnerable banks. The degree distribution of second order neighbours rjk
is proportional to kpjk. This is a result due to Feld (1991), see also Newman (2003).
Bank which are not vulenerable to liquidity hoarding behavior of their neighbours are
called safe. The quantities (v, p) are the basic objects to be analyzed: In large networks,
for contagion to spread beyond the first neighbors of the initially defaulting bank, those
neighbors must themselves have outgoing links to other vulnerable banks. To obtain
a condition for the transmission of shocks one works with the probability-generating
function for the joint degree distribution of a vulnerable bank
G(x, y) =
∑
j,k
vjpjkx
jyk .
The information content of this function is the same as for the degree distribution and
the vulnerability distribution. But it allows us to work with sums of independent draws
from different probability distributions and it generates all the moments of the degree
distribution of only those banks that are vulnerable. Since every interbank asset of one
bank is an interbank liability of another, the average in-degree z :=
∑
j,k pjk in the
network must equal the average out-degree. The single-argument generating function
G0(y) = G(1, y) can be used for the number of links leaving a randomly chosen vulnerable
bank. G0(1) =
∑
j,k vjpjk yields the fraction of banks that are vulnerable. The function
G1(y) defines the number of links leaving a bank reached by following a randomly chosen
incoming link. It is given by
G1(y) =
∑
j,k
vjrjky
k
where vjrjk is the degree distribution of a vulnerable bank that is a random neighbor of
our initially chosen bank. Finally, if H1(y) is the generating function for the probability
of reaching an outgoing vulnerable cluster of given size (in terms of numbers of vulner-
able banks) by following a random outgoing link from a vulnerable bank we obtain the
recursive equation
H1(y) = 1−G1(1) + yG1(H1(y)) .
That is, the total probability of all possible forms equals the sum of probabilities of hitting
a safe bank (1−G1(1)), hitting only a single vulnerable bank, hitting a single vulnerable
bank connected to one other cluster, two other clusters and so on. This sequence is equal
to
yG1(H1(y)) = y
∑
j,k
vjrjk(H1(y))
k .
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It is not possible to find a closed-form expression for the complete distribution of cluster
sizes but numerical analysis can be used. Using a Poisson model, the authors show using
simulations: ’We find that financial systems exhibit a robust-yet-fragile tendency: while
the probability of contagion may be low, the effects can be extremely widespread when
problems occur. The model also highlights how a priori indistinguishable shocks can have
very different consequences for the financial system, depending on the particular point
in the network structure that the shock hits. This cautions against assuming that past
resilience to a particular shock will continue to apply to future shocks of a similar magni-
tude. And it explains why the evidence of the resilience of the financial system to fairly
large shocks prior to 2007 (e.g. 9/11, the Dotcom crash and the collapse of Amaranth to
name a few) was not a reliable guide to its future robustness. The intuition underpinning
these results is straightforward. In a highly connected system, the counter party losses of
a failing institution can be more widely dispersed to, and absorbed by, other entities. So,
increased connectivity and risk sharing may lower the probability of contagious default.
But, conditional on the failure of one institution triggering contagious defaults, a high
number of financial linkages also increases the potential for contagion to spread more
widely. In particular, high connectivity increases the chances that institutions that sur-
vive the effects of the initial default will be exposed to more than one defaulting counter
party after the first round of contagion, thus making them vulnerable to a second-round
default. The effects of any crises that do occur can, therefore, be extremely widespread.’
1.2.5 Balance Sheet Regulation - Basel III
The Basel III accord requires more and better capital from the banks compared to
Basel II as a buffer against solvency risk, it gives equal weight to liquidity risk regulation
and the requirements for market and credit counter party risk are increased: Contrary
to Basel II not only capital but the whole balance sheet is regulated. To reduce the
impact of model risk in the calculation of the risk weighted assets, which matter for the
capital charge, a model independent maximum leverage of 3 percent is introduced for
systemic relevant banks by 2018. This means that the asset side length can be no longer
33 times the value of capital. than On the liquidity sides two measures are introduced.
One reduces the probability of a liquidity stress (going concern) and the other one is used
to increase the survival time once an institution is in a liquidity stress. The timeline for
the implementation starts 2013 and ends 2019. More precisely the Committee - the Basel
Capital Accord Committee - proposes a series of measures. These measures can act on
the state variable capital (smoothing and buffer stock formation) or decision variables
as provisions which can forced to be more forward looking. We have (McKinsey (2012),
Deloitte (2012)):
• Changes affecting the asset side:
– New market risk and securitization framework: Introduction of a stressed
value- at-risk (VaR) capital requirement and an increase of capital require-
ments for re-securitizations in both the banking and the trading book.
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– Counter party credit risk: Introduction of additional charges for counter party
credit exposures arising from banks’ derivatives, repo, and securities financing
activities (see CVA).
– Higher Risk Weighted Assets (RWA) for financial intermediary (FI) expo-
sures: About 30 percent higher RWA for FI exposures, for example interbank
exposures.
– Liquidity coverage ratio (LCR): Introduction of a global minimum short-
term 30-days liquidity standard, requiring banks to reach sufficient amount of
holdings of highly liquid assets. LCR is defined as:
High Quality Liquid Assets
Net Cash Outflows in 30d Period
> 100% .
The 30d period considered is a stress event: One assumes that the bank’s
debt is reduced by three notches using one of the official ratings, wholesale
funding is complete lost, a fraction of deposits is lost, collatal posted is valued
less (equivalently, the haircuts are raised, i.e. the bank has to deliver more
collateral) and the lines of credit are drawed down. LCR will be monitored
by both the Basel Committee and the supervisor in order to officially make it
mandatory with effect from 1 January 2015.
• Changes affecting the liability side:
– Net stable funding ratio (NSFR): Introduction of a long-term structural
ratio to address liquidity mismatches. This ratio is defined as:
Amount of Stable Funding
Required Amount of Stable Funding
> 100% .
The categories are defined as follows. The regulator defines categories of
funding for the numerator. Each funding is then attributed to a category
and multiplied by a category specific factor; the available stable funding
factor (ASF). Figure 1.18 shows the categories and the factors. NSFR will
be introduced as a minimum standard as from Jan 2018.
• Changes affecting capital:
– Minimum (core) tier 1 ratio: Increase of the minimum common equity
(CET1, i.e. shareholders equity and retained earnings) requirement from 2
percent to 4.5 percent. The capital ratio is defined by
Regulatory Capital
RWA
> x%,
i.e. the regulatory capital has to exceed x percent of the risk weighted assets.
The figure x is discussed below. The national implementation will start on 1
January 2013. From Jan 2013 onwards, banks will have to meet the following
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minimum capital requirements expressed in risk-weighted assets: 3.5% share
capital, 4.5% Tier-1 capital and 8% total capital. During the transitional
period from Jan 2013 up to and including 2019, these ratios will gradually be
stepped up to 4.5% share capital, 6% Tier-1 capital and 8% total capital.
– Conservation buffer: Introduction of an additional (counter-cyclical) capi-
tal conservation buffer between 0 % and 2.5 % to withstand periods of stress.
The buffer will be build up along gradual lines to a percentage of 2.5% from
Jan 2016 through Jan 2019. Thus, banks will ultimately have to hold 10.5%
of their total capital expressed in risk-weighted assets.
– Capital quality: Requirement to form tier 1 capital predominantly through
common shares and retained earnings.
– Capital deductions: International harmonization of capital deductions and
prudential filters. National supervisors will gradually introduce additional
allowable deductions from bank capital such as deferred tax assets and invest-
ments in financial institutions from Jan 2014 - Jan 2018.
– SIFI capital surcharges: Higher capital charges for systematically important
financial institutions (SIFIs).
• Changes affecting the whole balance sheet:
– Leverage ratio: Introduction of a non-risk-based measure of capital struc-
ture. The period from Jan 2013 through Jan 2017 will be a parallel run period.
During this period, the development of the Leverage Ratio will be monitored.
The intention is to migrate the Leverage Ratio into the Pillar 1 requirements
as from Jan 2018.
– Supervisory review of new remuneration policies: Closer review of remuner-
ation policies, especially in case of weakening capital buffers.
For to big-to-fail banks, i.e. the SIFIs, regulation will possibly introduce a counter
cyclical buffer (CCB). The counter cyclical buffer is different than the conservation
buffer which also shows some counter cyclical behavior. The goal of the CCB is increase
the resilence of the banking system and to act as a damping factor in times of excessive
credit lending (so called leaning against the wind): The objective of counter cyclical
capital standards is to encourage banks to build up buffers in good times that can be
draw down in bad ones. Buffers should not be understood as the prudential minimum
capital requirement. They are unencumbered capital in excess of that minimum, so that
capital is available to absorb losses in bad times. Counter cyclical capital buffer schemes
can be thought of as having the objective to limit the risk of large-scale strains in the
banking system by strengthening its resilience against shocks. As a model consider
Ratiot =
Creditt
GDPt
× 100%.
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Using a statistical filter, the Hodrick-Prescott filter for example, one extracts from the
Ratio the Trend at a given date. This defines the gap
Gapt = Ratiot − Trendt .
The buffer add-on of the CCB is then defined as a piecewise linear function. The add-on
is zero if the gap is below a given floor, the add-on increases linearly up to a maximum
level for the gap. Figure ?? illustrates the impact for the UK.
Figure 1.16: Counter cyclical buffer for the UK. The upper panel shows the evolution of the
credit to GDP ratio, the trend component and the gap. The figure shows the boom periods in
the 80s of last century and in the second half of the last decade up to the financial crisis. The
lower panel shows the relation between the gap and the capital buffer. The buffer is largest
during the boom period, where it even is often capped at its maximum level, and low or zero in
periods of weak or negative economic growth.Source: BIS, UK national data, BCBS.
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The methodology how regulatory capital is calculated follows the Basel II approach.
But some models are changed, new models are introduced or some model free regulation
(maximum leverage) is used in Basel III. First, for the different risk factors market
risk, credit risk and operational risk different approaches exist to calculate the Risk
Weighted Assets (RWA). Some are not risk sensitive, i.e. they are not derived from
a statistical model. They are applied by smaller banks. Statistical models are used by
larger banks. This means that larger banks can either develop own models (advanced
approach for operational risk) or use internal models to generate input parameters in
predefined statistical models (advanced models for credit risk). We note that it is at
the national regulatory authority discretion to decide whether a bank can use a more
sophisticated model or whether the bank has to. Further, internal models need to be
approved by the regulatory body. If one compares a mortgage portfolio and applies to
the portfolio the standardized approach (which is a non-statistical model) and then uses
an advanced credit risk model for the same portfolio one typically observes:
• The RWA are lower using the advanced model if the portfolio has a good credit
risk quality compared to the standardized model.
• The opposite is true if the credit worthiness of the counter parties in the portfolio
is low.
This raises the issue of regulatory aribtrage. A bank would like to choose an advanced
model in cases where the RWA are lower compared to a non-statistical model and vice
versa. But there is no such cherry picking: A bank which wants to use an advanced
credit risk model has to use this theoretically for all counter parties: For the mortgage
portfolio of retail clients, for the loans to corporate clients, for credit risk in the interbank
market relations, for counter party risk in the derivative transactions, etc. In practice, a
100 percent fullfillment is not possible: To develop a statistical model for credit risk in
start up financing is meaningless since there are no data to calibrate the parameter, to
backtest the model and to see how the model would have behaved in a stress scenario
- these are all requirements a bank has to fullfill in order to apply an advanced model.
Therefore, the regulator will allow to treat some parts of the portolio which are not rele-
vant from a solvency risk view using simpler, non-technical approaches. Finally, if a bank
fails to meet the standards for a part of the portfolio the regulator will use multiplier in
the calculation of the RWA.
We discuss one particular model for credit risk below. The logic of the capital re-
quirement is that
Regulatory Capital
RWA
> x%.
Basel III restricts the parts of capital which classify as regulatory capital: Tier 1 are
common shares and retained earnings, Tier 2 is harmonized and Tier 3 is no longer
allowable. All other equal the numerator decreases for an institutions which requires to
raise more Tier 1 capital or to reduce risks in the RWA calculation. Second, the risk
coverage will be strengthened. For example the capital requirements for counter party
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credit exposures arising from banks’ derivatives transactions are strengthened or capital
incentives are introduced to move OTC derivative contracts to central counter parties.
This might again affect the capital level, the OTC example, or the RWA increase, see
the Section Credit Risk for details. Finally, the x% which are under Basel II 8% increase
over time. This will have the effect that too risky business, i.e. business which leads to
high additional capital and/or high RWA will be no longer profitable. The capital accord
following Basel III and a national finalization, here the Swiss Finish for the to largest
banks UBS and Credit Suisse, are shown in Figure ??.
While the industry raised up to 80 percent of the required capital there is still much
potential to reduce the RWA (Oliver Wyman 2012). RWA can be decreased either by
technical mitigation of risks or strategic exits. Since currently in Europe only 20 % of
European mid-size companies have direct access to capital markets compared to the U.S.
(80 percent), it is expected that banks will first reprice their loans due to an increased
capital charge and offer European corporates the possibility to issue debt for financing.
Since this shift affects mid-size corporates this risk mitigation off the bank’s balance
sheet can be favorable for smaller, regional banks which already have long-term lending
relationship and have access to local bond markets.
Given the long period of implementation of Basel III, the existence of Basel 2.5 24
there will be confusions when capital adequacy is calculated. Confusion increases if
other capital charge definitions are used. As an example, we consider the Financial
Stability Report of the Swiss National Bank. The role of this report is:
In its Financial Stability Report, the Swiss National Bank presents its assessment
of the Swiss banking sector’s and financial market infrastructures’ stability. The Bank
publishes this report as part of its contribution to the stability of the financial system – a
task assigned to it under the new National Bank Act. In the Financial Stability Report,
the National Bank focuses on trends that are observable at the levels of the banking sys-
tem, the financial market infrastructures, the financial markets and the macroeconomic
environment. The main purpose of the report for the National Bank is to draw attention
to strains or imbalances which could pose a threat to system stability in the short or the
longer term. The Bank thus tracks developments in the banking sector from a macropru-
dential perspective. This task supplements that assigned to the Swiss Financial Market
Supervisory Authority (FINMA), which is responsible for supervision of the banks at the
level of the individual institutions (microprudential supervision). In addition, the Finan-
cial Stability Report provides information about its activities regarding the oversight of
financial market infrastructures. Source: Swiss National Bank, homepage.
24’Basel III builds upon and enhances the regulatory framework adopted by Basel II and Basel 2.5, which
now form integral parts of the Basel III framework: Basel II improved the measurement of credit risk and
included capture of operational risk, was released in 2004 and was due to be implemented from year-end
2006. Basel 2.5, agreed in July 2009, enhanced the measurements of risks related to securitization and
trading book exposures.2 Basel 2.5 was due to be implemented no later than 31 December 2011.’ Source:
BIS, 2012.
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Figure 1.17: Left Panel: Capital requirements for global systemically important banks (G.SIBs).
An additional 1% surcharge in the additional loss absorbency buffer might be applied to provide
a disincentive for banks to increase materially their global systemic importance in the future.
after Basel III. Right Panel: Capital accord (Swiss Finish to Basel III) for the two large Swiss
Banks UBS and Credit Suisse (status January 2012). Swiss Expert Commission requiring CET1
ratio of 10%, compared to a 8% to 9.5% ratio under Basel III. Additional buffer and progressive
component capital to achieve a Total Capital ratio of 19% . A requirement which can be met with
a combination of 7% high trigger and 5% low trigger contingent capital instruments. As Tier 1
and Tier 2 instruments under Basel III will require loss absorbency at the point of non-viability,
they will need to include contingent capital like features.Source: BIS, Credit Suisse Group.
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The report in 2012 then reports that the loss-absorbing capital of the two Swiss SIFIs
UBS and Credit Suisse below the level needed to ensure sufficient resilience. The Na-
tional Bank calculated the loss-absorbing figures by using all definitions of Basel III but
the low trigger contingent capital, see Figure ??. The reason is that
’... These are mainly intended for the Swiss emergency plan and the restructuring or
wind-down of the remaining bank units, and are therefore not considered in this ‘going
concern’ perspective. Source: Swiss National Bank’.
Although the two banks had at the end of first quarter 2012 a capital ratio following
Basel III of 5.9 and 7.5 percent the loss-absorbing capital was only 1.7 and 2.7 percent
respectively. The announcements of these figure put in particular Credit Suisse under
pressure - both in raising new regulatory capital at a faster pace than planned and by a
drop of the share price. Besides these actions, there were a lot of confusions since bankers
were pointing to the good-lucking Basel III figures but central bankers focused on the
lower loss-absorbing numbers.
The increased cost of capital may boost shadow banking . Strictly speaking, there
is no definition what the shadow banking area is since either an entity is a bank and
regulated or it is not a bank. One considers often Credit Hedge Funds, Special Pur-
pose Vehicles and Money Market Mutual Funds to be part of the shadow banking sector.
There is no consensus about other entities such as Credit Card Institutions, Hedge Funds,
Independent Asset Managers, Commodity Traders. The FSB (2011) released some rec-
ommendations for the shadow banking sector to mitigate systemic risk and regulatory
arbitrage. Basically the recommendations increase the costs of capital and liquidity for
banks when they reallocate resource to the shadow banking sector and they increase the
costs of operations such as increasing transparency and information requirements for the
end investors.
We consider the impact of some measures in more detail.
Before the financial crisis, regulatory capital was allowed to be smaller under the then
active Basel II regime than it will be under Basel III, see Figure 1.17. This led to high
leverage, i.e the ratio between assets and capital was large. Some investment banks faced
leverage ratios between 50 and 100. I.e. banks had only down to 1 percent risk buffer.
Among others, this leads to a high return on equity (RoE) value which in some banks
has a direct impact on compensation and the dividend policy. To show this consider two
dates 0 and T . The balance sheet reads at each date A = L + E with A the assets, L
the liabilities and E equity or capital. The Return on Assets (RoA) and the Return on
Equity (RoE) are defined by25
RoA =
AT
A0
− 1 , RoE = ET
E0
− 1 .
25We follow Beneplanc and Rochet (2010).
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λ = AE > 1 defines the leverage factor and R =
LT
L0
−1 interest income on the liabilities.
We get 26
RoE = R+ λ(RoA−R) . (1.2)
Excess return on capital is proportional to excess return on assets multiplied by the
leverage factor. This is also true if we replace the quantities by expected values. Let µX
be the expected value of a random variable X. We get:
µE = R+ λ(µA −R) .
Similarly for risk measured by volatility σ:
σE = λσA . (1.3)
Hence a higher leverage factor increases both RoE and risk. The latter one increases
solvency risk, i.e. the risk that the asset value falls below the liability value (P (A < L)).
The stronger A varies, the higher the risk that E vanishes. For a RoA of 8 percent,
R = 3% and a leverage factor of 4 the expected return is
µE = 3 + 4(8− 3) = 23% .
If the risk of the asset return is σA = 10, volatility of the capital increases to σE =
4×10%. Summarizing, an increasing leverage factor increases jointly RoE and insolvency
risk. But the story does not end here. So far, financing risk or the liability side of
a balance sheet was not considered. We analyze the relationship between interest rate
risk management of the balance sheet and leverage. We assume that both assets and
liabilities depend on a single interest rate r. For small changes in the rate r uniformly
for all maturities Macauley duration D is a first order risk management figure. It is
equal to the price weighted average time of receipt of cash flow. It is the time to maturity
D = T for a zero bond27 such that this bond has the same interest rate28 risk than a
given portfolio of bonds. The small change in interest rate is given by the first derivative
(dp(t,T )dr ) leads for a zero bond price p(t, T ) to
dp(t, T )
dr
= − T
1 + r
p(t, T ) =: −D∗p(t, T )
with D∗ the modified Macauley duration. The percentage price sensitivity dp(t,T )dr /p(t, T )
is proportional to the duration T = D of the zero bond. Since duration is given by the
26To prove this rewrite the RoE:
RoE =
ET
E0
− 1 = AT − LT
E0
− 1 = AT
A0
A0
E0
− LT
L0
L0
E0
− 1 .
Inserting the definition of leverage and interest income at time 0 proves the claim.
27A zero coupon bond (or zero) is a bond which pays no coupons, has price 1 at maturity T and price
p(t, T ) at any earlier time.
28More precisely, interest rate risk using the duration concept is defined as the risk if the term structure
is shifted parallel by a small amount.
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first derivative, the duration of a portfolio of bonds is equal to sum of weighted durations
of the bonds. We construct synthetic bonds for the assets, liabilities and equity such that
these bonds have the same duration as the assets, liabilities and equity. Since these three
quantities are related by the balance sheet, a relation between their duration measures
follows. To derive this, we note that from E(r) = A(r)− L(r) we get E′E = A
′−L′
E where
the prime denotes differentiation w.r.t. r. This is equivalent to
E′
E
=
A′
A
A
E
− L
′
L
L
E
.
Using A/E = λ, L/E = λ − 1 and defining the duration DX of an asset X by DX =
−(1 + r)X′X we get
DE = λDA − (1− λ)DL . (1.4)
The sensitivity of a banks equity has two sources. First, risk transformation. That is
typically the duration of the assets is longer than that one of the liabilities (lending long
term, refinancing short term). Second, leverage magnifies the duration of the assets.
Consider a highly leveraged bank which also heavily refinances using short term instru-
ments. Northern Rock is an example. Assume a leverage of λ = 50, DA = 5 years and
DL = 1 year short term refinancing. Then DE = 250 years follows. But this means that
a moderate interest rate increase from 3 % to 3.25 % reduces the market value of the
bank’s equity by
−E
′
E
dr =
DE
1 + r
dr =
250
1.03
× 0.25% = 60.6% .
How does Basel III measures act on these findings? First, the leverage ratio proves to be
a strong incentive for banks to reduce leverage. Most international active banks reduce
their length of the balance sheet. UBS for examples reduced its 2.8 Trillion CHF balance
sheet before the crisis 2007 down to 1.4 Trillion CHF value end of 2011. Since capital -
not the regulatory one - increased from 40 Billion CHF in 2008 to 54 Billion by the end
of 2011, the leverage ratio of 70 in 2008 dropped to 26. Hence 1 CHF in 2008 needed
to cover potential losses of 70 CHF on the asset sides while in 2011 this ratio is down
to 1:26. Second, the NSFR will also impact the duration risk above as follows. NSFR is
defined by
NSFR =
Available stable Funding
Required stable Funding
> 100%.
Figure 1.18 shows the different balance sheet positions and their weight in the funding
ratio.
The figure shows that on the asset side short term assets do not need stable fund-
ing since they fund themselves. The part which can not be monetarized expressed as
a haircut needs stable funding. The liability side offers stable funding by the positions
which are not at risk to be withdrawn. If follows that the longer the maturity of liability
the higher is their value in the NSFR (they can typically be considered fully or by 100
percent in the NSFR calculation). Hence, banks will pay or favorize longer term liability
business. But this reduces the difference between the duration of the asset and liability
side which reduces the duration of capital by (1.4). This counter acts a similar scenario
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Required stable funding Available stable funding 
Tier 1/2 capital 
           100% 
Retail/SME        < 1 y 
   stable    90% 
   less stable    80% 
Retail/SME        > 1 y 
   stable   100% 
   less stable   100% 
Wholesale        < 1 y 
   Non fin. Corp.   50% 
   Gov’t./CB/PSE   50% 
   Financial inst.     0% 
   Unsecured debt     0% 
Wholesale        > 1 y 
   Non fin. Corp.   100% 
   Gov’t./CB/PSE   100% 
   Financial inst.   100% 
   Unsecured debt 100% 
Other liabilities 
   Derivatives net repl. values / Provisions          0% 
Cash & short-term unsecured 
                 0% 
Level 1 & 2 assets < 1 y 
         0% 
Level 1 & 2 assets > 1 y 
          5% / 20% 
Loans           < 1 y 
   Retail/SME     85% 
   Corp./Gov’t.     50% 
   Financial inst.     0% 
Loans          > 1 y 
   35% risk weight    65% 
   > 35% risk weight  100% 
Other securities / Other assets 
                50% / 100% 
Rating A* securities / Equities / Precious metals 
                 50% 
Mortgages 
   35% risk weight            65% 
Off balance sheet items  
                      0% / 5% 
Secured funding   < 1 y 
   Repo & Pfandbr.       0% 
Secured funding  > 1 y 
   Repo & Pfandbr.  100% 
Figure 1.18: Required and available stable funding for the net stable funding ratio (NSFR).
The percentage values are the factors ASF. Source: Treasury, ZKB, 2012.
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which Northern Rock bank faced. The NSFR also reduces risk of a funding squeeze:
Banks prefer to use short term funding for the longer term asset side. If a a bank comes
under pressure the short term funding channel can evaporate since other banks for exam-
ple in the short term markets stop providing money to the specific bank under pressure,
i.e. the bank can fail to roll short term funding and faces a liquidty squeeze.
Fact 1.2.2. • Profitability (measured with RoE), solvency risk (measured by variance
or Value-at-Risk) and funding risk are linked by the leverage factor.
Several methods can be used to make the capital layer thicker relative to the asset
layer.
• Issue new equity. This is not preferred by the actual equity holders and it is
doubtful whether is works when a bank is already under stress.
• Reduce the balance sheet. Many large banks reduced considerably their balance
sheet after the last financial crisis. UBS for example reduced their balance sheet
from CHF 2.4 Trillion to 1.4 Trillion.
• The third possibility is to start with debt which in situation of stress for a bank
is converted into equity. This defines contingent convertible bonds (CoCo bonds).
CoCos solve a problem of hybrid bonds which popped up during the financial crisis.
Investors considered hybrids as bonds. Regulators or rating agencies considered
them due to their features to be equity pieces. This lead to conflict between the
parties in particular when banks were under stress. The conflict reflects the different
seniority between equity and bonds.
The new capital regulations in the Basel III require banks to deleveragea and they have
a substantial impact on new types of capital instruments. Contingent convertible eq-
uity (CoCo bonds) have started - in particular in Switzlerand - to replace the outgoing
instruments, see Oliver Wyman (2011) for details. FINMA has announced that the two
big-to-fail banks UBS and Credit Suisse have to hold capital equivalent to 19 percent of
RWA by the end of 2019, of which 9 percent may be held by CoCos. The subsequent
issuance of USD 8 billion of CoCos by Credit Suisse was significantly over-subscribed
allowing it to issue at the relatively low rate of 7.875 percent.
What is a CoCo? There are different structure: Equity conversion CoCos, where
the bonds convert into equity below a certain trigger level. Write-down CoCos which
involves a partial write down below a certain capital ratio are another type. There are
many more variants. CoCo transacttions are also called Tier 2 Buffer Capital Notes.
We consider equity conversion CoCos. These contingent capital instruments have
gained increasing support as a potential option to reduce the need for public bail-outs.
They are bonds with principal and scheduled coupon payments that can be automatically
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converted into equity or written down when a predetermined trigger event occurs, en-
abling a fresh injection of capital into a distressed bank. Typically a trigger is a threshold
level of Common Equity Tier 1 (CET1) .
If Tier 1 capital drops below a specified trigger value, the CoCo becomes equity
which then increases hopefully to a level above the critical level. Using CoCos, leverage
decrease in times of stress. Let λ = A/E be the pre-crisis leverage. If conversion event is
triggered, equity increases: λ∗ = A/(E + CoCo) < λ. Swiss regulated banks (see Figure
1.17) face a new capital charge between 13.6 and 14.4 percent starting in 2012 (up from 8
percent before the crisis). Common equity Tier 1 has a 7 percent charge, i.e. about half
of the total charge. If the capital buffer at 7 percent is breached, the regulator may start
to impose restrictions on ordinary dividends or staff bonuses or require the institution to
raise capital. CoCos are then written-down or converted to absorb losses with the aim
to rapidly stabilize the bank and avoid liquidation. Cocos can be defined for different
trigger values of Common Equity Tier 1 with different objectives:
• High trigger at 7 percent. The purpose of high trigger is to rapidly stabilize a bank
and keep it as a going concern.
• Low trigger at 5 percent. The Coco absorbs losses but may serve mainly to facilitate
resolution.
CoCos are perpetual products which pay a fixed coupon. The coupon is fixed for say
5 years and then reset every 5 years thereafter. The coupon payments are at the full
discretion of the issuer of the CoCo. The issuer will be mandatorily required to defer
interest payments if:
• There are not sufficient distributable items.
• A breach of a minimum capital requirement follows after a payment.
• The regulatory authority concludes this after the assessment of the financial and
solvency position of the issuer.
The coupon values vary between 3 and 8 percent for recent Swiss CoCo bonds. How
are the prices determined? Last year, markets were incomplete since no reference asset
existed. Therefore, the common approach of relative asset pricing - i.e. using no arbitrage
if there are enough assets in the market - failed. Absolute asset pricing is not used in
practice. That is, one prices a CoCo by virtually defining the whole economy which
matter for a CoCo and solves then the equilibrium model to obtain equilibrium prices.
Innovation in such a market status is a mixture of ad hoc measure to fix a price. This
includes
• to consider a reference bond which in some sense is close to the CoCo bond;
• reasoning based on experience in the structuring departments. That is there is
correction of the CoCo issuer compared to the reference bond in the dimensions
rating (easy), trigger event level, seniority, possible guarantees, etc.
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• speaking with potential investors and trying to find out the demand function,
• try and error and comparison with similar situations.
Beside their success in some markets, some fixed income investors find CoCos in their
actual form inappropriate: CoCos lack agency ratings, they violate the mandates of the
many funds that are prohibited from holding equities and lack a benchmark or index
against which managers can trade and measure performance.
Other actions large banks undertake to strenghten there capital basis are:
• Mandatory convertibles, i.e. hybrid securities (bonds linked to equities) that
automatically convert to equity (stock) at a pre-determined date.
• Exchange of deferred cash compensation of employees into shares.
• Focus of business, i.e. selling stakes in other companies.
• Divestments and investments more liquid strategies in asset management.
• Real estate sales.
• Lower threshold deductions and additional reductions in deferred tax assets on net
operating losses.
1.2.6 Credit Risk
We discuss some credit risk issues in the Basel I, II and III framework. A more detailed
and updated analysis is found in Hull (2012). The goal is to obtain a feeling about the
reasoning and the difficulties in the definition of regulatory standards for credit risk risk
management. The first accord in 1988 defined two requirements that bank capital had
to satisfy: The ratio of bank’s assets to its capital had to be less than 20, i.e. there
was a maximum leverage constraint which will be reintroduced under Basel III. Such a
constraint already existed in many countries and was therefore already fulfilled by many
banks. The second contraint is the Cooke ratio.. This ratio is used to calculate the
risk weighted assets on- and off-balance sheet. These assets are equal to the sum of the
on- and off-balance sheet risk weighted. The on-balance sheets risk weighted assets are
equal to the notional amounts of the assets times a risk weighting factor w. The factor
can be read-off from a table: 0 for cash, 50 percent for residential mortgage loans, etc.
For the off-balance sheet positions, the credit equivalent is calculated for a derivative
with current value E as:
C = max(E, 0)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=Current Exposure
+aN
with a the add-on factor and N the notional amount. The add-on factors vary with
the remaining maturity of the derivatives and the risk factor (i.e. equity, interest rates,
FX, etc.). They can also read-off from a table. Note that in case of default of the
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counter party, E > 0 means an asset to the bank and therefore the bank can lose E.
If E is negative, the derivative is an asset to the defaulting counter party. Hence, it
reflects neither a gain nor a loss to the bank. This defines the functional form of the
current exposure. Since the current exposure can grow over time, the add-on amount is
introduced. This definition of the credit equivalent (i) does not properly considers how
different future exposures of different derivatives can evolve, (ii) that many contracts
between two counter parties could be netted and (iii) that the exposure can be reduced
by collaterlization. The RWA then read:
RWA =
∑
i
wiNi +
∑
j
w∗jCj
where the first sum is over all on-balance sheet positions and the second one over all
off-balance sheet counter parties. The requirement was that the capital a bank had to
keep was at least x = 8% of the RWA, where capital consisted of Tier 1 and 2 capital
parts.
In the 90s of last century netting was introduced as follows. Netting means that
the gross claim between counter parties is replaced by a single net claim. Two types of
netting are of particular importance: payoff netting and close-out netting. Payment
netting means that positions in the same currency and the same date are offset. This
mechanism reduces settlement risk of derivative transactions. Close-out netting refers to
a bilateral arrangement where both parties agree to terminate all obligations, i.e. even
if they are not yet due, if default or another termination event occurs. The gross market
value is added up and a single payment is obtained by the party with a negative net
portfolio value. If there is at least one transaction with a positive market value then
close-out netting reduces credit risk. To see this, let Et(i) be the exposure at time t of
transaction i. Without any netting agreement the overall credit exposure between two
parties is ∑
i
max(0, E(i)) .
With close-out netting we have max(0,
∑
iE(i)) and
max(0,
∑
i
E(i)) ≤
∑
i
max(0, E(i))
shows the credit risk exposure reduction due to close-out netting. This is present time
view. Since netting has been successfully tested by the mid 90s the Accord of 1988 was
modified to allow banks to reduce their credit equivalent totals if enforcable nettings were
in place, i.e. typically if both counter parties were members of International Swap
Dealer Association (ISDA) which signed the corresponding credit risk documents.
This ment that institutions calculated the net replacement ratio (NRR), i.e. the
stretching factor between the exposure with and without netting:
NRR
∑
i
max(0, E(i)) = max(0,
∑
i
E(i)) .
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The credit equivalent was then changed to:
C = max(
∑
i
Ei, 0) +
(
4
10
+
6
10
NRR
)∑
i
aiNi .
The main change in Basel II in the quantification of the capital charge for credit risk is
the new way how credit ratings of counter parties enter in the RWA calculation. Besides
the Standardized Approach, which is a method based where the banks do not need to
run a statistical model but where the information for the RWA calculation follows from
classifying the transactions and reading off the risk weight from tables, two statistical
models can be chosen: The Foundation and Advanced Internal Rating Based
Approaches (F- and I-IRB). We consider the A-IRB model. We do not merely state
the model but provide a microeconomic foundation for ratings-based bank capital
rules.
This section is based on Gordy (2003), Heitfield (2003) and Pykthin and Dev (2002).
We consider the foundation of the capital rules in Basel II for credit risk for large institu-
tions choosing the Advanced Internal Rating Based (A-IRB) approach, i.e. a risk sensitive
model. The IRB approach relies on a bank’s own assessment of its counterparties and
exposures to calculate capital requirements for credit risk. The primary objectives are
risk sensitivity, i.e. capital requirements under an internal model are more risk sensitive
to the credit risk than in the standardized approach, and incentive compatability, i.e
banks must adopt better risk management techniques to control the credit portfolio risks
in order to reduce regulatory capital.
The approach is still valid under Basel III. Basel II extends the risk-based capital
ratio introduced in Basel I. Three approaches to calculating risk weights: Standardized
approach, IRB Foundation, IRB Advanced. Broadly, IRB Foundation considers the
default risk of the debtor while IRB advanced also considers the Loss Given Default
and the Exposure at Default. We focus on IRB Advanced. This approach maps - the
risk-weight functions - bank-reported risk parameters to exposure risk weights Bank-
reported risk parameters include, Probability of default (PD), Loss given default (LGD),
Maturity (M) and Exposure at default (EAD).29 The risk-weight functions differ by
exposure classes. Classes include corporate -, industrial -, qualifying revolving - (credit
cards), residential mortgages - and project finance exposures. The IRB approach is
based on measures of unexpected losses (UL) and expected losses (EL). The risk-weight
functions produce capital requirements for the UL portion. We identify UL with the
coundary of the solvency region. Solvency is defined as above, i.e. a portfolio is solvent
if the value of the assets exceeds the value of the liabilities. Risk is defined using the
Value-at-Risk (VaR) measure stick: We set a dollar value K so that capital exceeds
portfolio losses L at a one-year assessment horizon with probability α. K is the VaR for
29LGD is percentage of loss over the total exposure when bank’s counter party goes to default, EAD
is an estimation of the extent to which a bank may be exposed to a counter party in the event of, and
at the time of, that counter party’s default.
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the given time horizon and confidence level 1− α. K = V aR solves the inequality
P (L ≤ K) ≥ α .
Figure 1.19 illustrates the concept.
Figure 1.19: Value-at-Risk (VaR).
This shows that solvency risk measure is a limited liability concept - it is irrelevant
how far away losses are from the VaR given they are larger than VaR. This concept
is reasonable for an individual banking firm but it does not covers the requirements of
systemic risk management which is in the scope of Basel II. In other words the framework
does not takes into account the system aspect between the banks. Since the VaR directly
transfers into the risk weighted assets which together with the minimum capital charge
impact the necessary capital for the banks at least an add on to the VaR figures which we
calculate should added reflecting the systemic risk component. Adrian and Brunnermeier
(2011) propose a risk measure - CoVaR - for systematic risk. We report on this measure
later. Given VaR, we require a Decentralized Capital Rule (DCR). That is:
• The capital charge assigned to an exposure reflects its marginal contribution to the
portfolio-wide capital requirement.
• The capital charge assigned to an exposure is independent of other exposures in
the bank portfolio.
• The portfolio capital charge is the sum of charges applied to individual exposures:
KA+B = KA +KB.
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The rationale for this rule are manyfold. First, capital charge and risk have to be aligned.
Second, the capital charge attributed say to corporate banking is independent from the
investment banking capital charge. This requirement avoids difficult to measure depen-
dencies and also difficult to implement incentive schemes between different banking units.
But VaR in general is not additive, i.e. the marginal contribution of a single exposure
to portfolio risk depends on its correlation with all other exposures. Gordy (2003) shows
that under stylized assumptions a decentralized capital rule can satisfy a VaR solvency
target. The assumptions are called the asymptotic-single-risk-factor (ASRF) framework:
• Cross-exposure correlations in losses are driven by a single systematic risk factor
X.
• The portfolio is infinitely-fine-grained (i.e. idiosyncratic risk is diversified away).
• Exposures loss rates E[L|X] =: c(X) are increasing in the systematic risk factor
X.30
We define the α percentile Xα of X by
Xα = inf{X|P (X ≤ x) ≥ α}
and we set capital to the α percentile of L to ensure a portfolio solvency probability of
α:
K = inf{k|P (L ≤ k) ≥ α} = inf{k|P (E[L|X] ≤ k) ≥ α} = c(Xα) ,
we plug the α percentile of X into c(X). The expression inf{k|P (L ≤ k) ≥ α} defines
the smallest loss level k such that losses exceeding k occur only with a probability of
1− α. If we consider two subportfolios A and B it follows
K = c(Xα) = cA(Xα) + cB(Xα) = KA +KB ,
i.e. capital can be assigned separately to each subportfolio. We use this ASRF capital
rule to derive the IRB Advanced capital formula. That for we need a risk model for
credit risk. The model used in the Accord is is Merton’s model :31 Obligor i defaults
if its normalized asset return Ri falls below the default threshold z, i.e.
Ri = i
√
1− ρ− ρX ≤ zi = Φ−1(PDi)
with X,  both standard normal, Φ the standard normal distribution function and ρ the
asset correlation. X is the systematic risk factor and  the idiosyncratic risk factor. The
model assumes that (i) the asset return is driven by a global factor X and a obligor
30The assumptions read in mathematical terms:
P (LA < IA ∩ LB < IB |X) = P (LA < IA|X)P (LB < IB |X)
with IX a loss level and X1 > X0 ⇒ c(X1) = c(X0).
31The bank need not employ a single model. No particular form of model is required. Analytical models
are acceptable so long as they are subject to supervisory review and meet all regulatory requirements.
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specific risk, (ii) the two risk factors are related by the asset correlation, (iii) the asset
correlation is the same for all obligors and all type of loan products, (iv) that the threshold
level defining solvency is given by the probability of default of the debtor and (v) that
PD and the threshold level are related by the standard normal distribution Φ. Plugging
this risk model in the conditional expected loss function for exposure i given X gives:
ci(X) = P (Ri ≤ z|X)LGDi = P (i
√
1− ρ− ρX ≤ Φ−1(PDi)|X)LGDi (1.5)
= Φ
(
Φ−1(PDi) +X
√
ρ√
1− ρ
)
LGDi .
If we plug in the 99.9 percentile of X, which is the required percentile in Basel II, we get
the core part of the Basel II capital rule using IRB Advanced:
K(PD,LGD) = Φ
(
Φ−1(PD) + Φ−1(0.999)√ρ√
1− ρ
)
LGD .
The expected loss or capital is a function of the PD and the LGD. The crucial parameter
is ρ. One assumed that his parameter measures the importance of systematic risk. After
the financial crisis 2008 it became obvious that measuring systemic risk with a single
parameter is not adequate. The parameter is hard wired under Basel II. The parameter
was calibrated using data from various sources in Europe and the US. For corporate ex-
posures, the parameter depends on obligor characteristics: The asset correlation declines
with the obligor’s PD and SMEs receive a lower asset correlation. The functional form
chosen is
ρ(PD) = 0.12
(
1 + e−50×PD
)
.
This specification and the maturity adjustments are inserted in (1.6) to provide the
final formula. Maturity adjustments are necessary since the capital function reflects only
default losses over a one-year horizon. The parametric form of these adjustments captures
that the market value of longer maturity loans are more sensitive to declines in credit
quality short of default and higher PD loans are less sensitive to market value declines.
The adjustments capture incremental credit risk capital due to credit migration. Figure
1.20 provides an example.
The risk weighted assets are then given by
RWA = K(PD,LGD)× 12.5× EAD ,
i.e. with 12.5 representing 8 percent and EAD the exposure at default.
The change under Basel III which we consider here is the consideration of counter
party credit risk for derivatives. Credit exposures on derivatives are more complicated
than exposures on loans, since besides long only positions (such as for loans/bonds),
positions can be short or positions can change from long to short or vice versa over time.
In a long only instrument (bond), counter party risk is default risk. It can be judged by
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Figure 1.20: The A-IRB Capital Rule for Corporate Exposures. Maturity is M = 2.5 years and
the LGD is 45 percent. Source: Heitfield (2004).
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using models that can incorporate a discount curve shift. In an instrument which can
have positive and negative values (swap), the instrument is either an asset or a liability.
A default of a counter party then either leads to a loss or in case of a liability to an
unchanged position. This makes counter party risk calculations more complicated.
The most effective ways to reduce counter party credit risk for derivatives are:
• Clearing over CCPs.
• Collateralization.
• Netting and clearing OTC.
Consider a bilateral OTC clearing arrangement between two conter parties; a trader
and a company for example. The trader then calculates the credit value adjustment
(CVA). This is the estimate of its default if the company defaults. Since two thirds of
losses in the 2008 financial crisis have been due to CVA mark to market and only about
one third to actual defaults (see Nathanael (2010)), Basel III encourages institutions to
include CVA mark to market future simulations in Value at Risk type measures.
’In addition to the default risk capital requirements for counter party credit risk de-
termined based on the standardised or internal ratings-based (IRB) approaches for credit
risk, a bank must add a capital charge to cover the risk of mark-to-market losses on the
expected counterparty risk (such losses being known as credit value adjustments, CVA) to
OTC derivatives. The CVA capital charge will be calculated in the manner set forth below
depending on the bank’s approved method of calculating capital charges for counterparty
credit risk and specific interest rate risk.’ Source: Basel III, 2011.
The CVA risk capital should account for spread and migration risks. In the first mod-
elling approaches of the CVA and also in the bond equivalent approach of Basel III one
assumes that the counter party’s probability of default is independent of the dealer’s ex-
posure to the counterparty. A situation where there is a positive dependence between the
two, so that the probability of default by the counterparty tends to be high (low) when
the dealer’s exposure to the counterparty is high (low), is referred to as ’wrong-way
risk; i.e. p and S positively depend on each other.’ In case of a negative dependence one
speaks about ’right-way risk.’ Consider a counter party (AIG) selling credit protection
to the dealer. This situation allows for wrong-way risk as follows: When credit spreads
are high, the value of the protection to the dealer is high and as a result the dealer
has a large exposure to its counterparty. At the same time, the credit spreads of the
counterparty are also likely to be high indicating a relatively high probability of default
for the counterparty. Right-way risk tends to occur when a counterparty is buying credit
protection from the dealer. There are different models to account for wrong-way risk.
The α multiplier approach is the simplest one. Another method used is to set S(t) equal
to the present value of the exposure that is k standard deviations above the average
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exposure for some k.
We consider interest rate swaps (IRS) as an example for CVA calculation; we
follow Stein (2012). Assume a 3 year IRS in a flat interest rate environment. With V (t)
the value of the risk free swap at time t, R the constant recovery value and τ the default
time of counter party B. If B defaults at time τ , the payoff for A is RV (τ) if V (τ) > 0
and V (τ) if V (τ) < 0. Summarizing, the payoff for A is
Rmax(V (τ), 0) + min(V (τ), 0) = V (τ)− (1−R) max(V (τ), 0).
The second term is an optionality, i.e. to enter into a swap contract at default time
which pays what is then left V (τ) or 0. Such an option an a swap is called a swaption.
The decomposition shows that the exposure is a sum of a risk free part and a risky one.
What are the costs of the loss (1 − R) max(V (τ), 0)? Following first pricing principles
the loss - CVA - is equal to the risk neutral expected value under a numeraire measure
N , i.e.:
CVA(0) = N(0)(1−R)E[max(V (τ), 0)
N(τ)
χτ<T ] .
Using the delta function32, we can write33
CVA(0) = N(0)(1−R)
∫ T
0
E[
max(V (s), 0)
N(s)
δ(s− τ)]ds .
This shows that the CVA is a product of call max(V (s),0)N(s) and the default event δ(s− τ).
If they are independent, the expectation factors. The CVA then becomes the product
of the current value of the swaption S(s) to enter into the remainder of the swap at time
s and the default time probability density function p(s), i.e.
CVA(0) = (1−R)
∫ T
0
S(s)p(s)ds , CVA(0) = (1−R)
n∑
j=0
S(j)p(j)
with pj the probability of a default or credit spread unwind between times tj−1 and tj
and S(j) is evaluated at the midpoint of the interval [tj−1, tj ]. There are many subtleties
in the calculation of the CVA integral. We refer to the literature for details, see Stein
(2012) and references therein. The analysis shows that CVA are themselves derivatives
and must be managed similarly to other derivatives, they are complex derivatives since
it is contingent on the net value of the portfolio of derivatives outstanding with that
counterparty. Calculating CVAs is computationally intensive. Reuters (2008) reported
32The delta function is not a function in a strict mathematical sense but a so-called generalized
function. Nevertheless, physicists use since decades to work intuitiively with this and other generalized
functions. In economics, the delta function describes an Arrow-Debreu security in continunuous time:
δ(x− y) is zero if x 6= y and ’infinite’ if x = y. One uses that ∫ f(x)δ(x− y)dx = f(y). Setting f equal
to the identity, the delta function gives all its weight to a single point.
33The expectation is under a risk neutral measure to avoid arbitrage.
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that, at the time of its failure Lehman, had about 1.5 million derivatives transactions
outstanding with 8,000 different counterparties. It had to calculate 8,000 different CVAs
each with an average number of 200 derivative transactions.
We consider the Basel III formula for the CVA. An approximation of the average
hazard rate between time 0 and time t is s(t)/(1−R) with s(t) the credit spread of the
counter party at tenor t. The an estimate of the probability of no default between times
0 and ti is exp(−siti/(1−R)). This implies for the probability of default
q˜i = exp(−si−1ti−1/(1−R))− exp(−siti/(1−R)) .
This is one part of the Basel III formula for the CVA calculation in the advanced mea-
surement approach. The second part is to replace 1 − R by observed market LGDs,
i.e. the loss given default of the counterparty and should be based on the spread of a
market instrument of the counterparty. Finally, the swaption exposure S(j) is repre-
sented as the average expected expsoure at the dates j − 1 and j of the swaption:
S(j)  128EE(i − 1)D(i − 1) + EE(i)D(i)) with D the discount factor and EE(i) the
expected exposure to the counterparty at revaluation time i. The use of the above CVA
formula requires that the bank uses an IRB model and an internal market risk model for
interest rate risk. What happens to all other smaller banks? As for default risk, there is
a standardized CVA formula. The capial charge reads
K = 2.33
√
h
√
A+B (1.6)
A =
(∑
i
1
2
wi(MiEAD
tot
i −Mhedi Bi)2 −
∑
k∈ind
wkMkBk
)2
B =
∑
i
0.75w2i ∗ (MiEADtot −Mhedi Bi)2
with: h is the one-year risk horizon, wis the weight applicable to counterparty i, EADtoti
the total exposure at default of counter party i (after netting and including collateral),
Bi is the notional of purchased single name CDS hedges referencing counterparty i and
used to hedge CVA risk, ind refers to indices of indizes (CDS, counter party weights), Mi
is the effective maturity of the transactions with counterparty i andMhedi is the maturity
of the hedge instrument with notional Bi. We refer to Pykhtin (2012) for a foundation
of the formula (1.6).
1.2.7 Leverage
We have encountered the importance of leverage for RoE and funding. But leverage is a
broader concept in finance and accounting. In particular we want to tackle some aspects
of leverage and asset value which were important in the 2008 financial crisis. We consider
four different situations:
• Leverage for different types of investors.
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• Target leveraging and asset fluctuation
• The impact of exogenous shocks on individual balance sheets and its interplay with
leverage and regulatory capital charge requirements.
• Leverage and risk measurement from a systemic risk point of view.
1.2.7.1 Leverage and Investment
We consider the role of leverage for different types of investors. We have
• an optimistic or aggressive investor;
• a pessimistic investor.
• a long-only investor such as a pension fund.
We set S for the price of the risky asset (stock), φ the number of stocks in the portfolio,
A = φS the value of the risky asset, E capital and C cash. Figure 1.21 shows the balance
sheets at a fixed date.
Aggressive Assets Liabilities 
Stocks A -C Debt 
  E Equity 
Pessimistic Assets Liabilities 
Cash C A (<0) Debt 
  E Equity 
Long only Assets Liabilities 
Cash C     
Stocks A E Equity 
Time 0 Assets Liabilities 
House 555.5 500 Mortgage 
Cash 144.5 200 Equity 
Total 700 700 
Time 5y Assets Liabilities 
House 388.5 350 Mortgage 
Cash 0 5.5 Debt 
  33 Equity 
Total 388.5 388.5 
Types of Investors Homeowner 
Figure 1.21: Left Panel: Balance sheet for the three types of investors.Source: H. Shin,
2011. Right Panel: Balance sheets for a home owner.
The aggressive investor borrows cash C < 0 to buy the risky asset. The pessimistic
one is short the risky asset ( φ < 0). He makes a profit if the risky asset drops. For the
aggressive investor the asset side of the balance sheet is at risk; for the pessimistic one
the liability side. The third type holds both the risky asset and cash in his portfolio.
The leverage of the three types is different:
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• The optimistic investor has a leverage λ := A/E > 1. The more aggressive he is,
the higher borrowing, the more risky assets and the higher leverage.
• The leverage of the pessimistic investor CE = E−AE = 1− λ is smaller than 1. Note
that A < 0.
• The long only investor is not leveraged. The ratio between assets and capital is
always C+AE = 1.
1.2.7.2 Target Leveraging and Asset Fluctuation
We discussed the connection between leverage, RoE and risk in Section 1.2. Consider a
single home owner which bought a house for a price of 555.5 in a currency. Financing
was made with a fixed rate 5y mortgage with 90 percent LTV (loan-to-value) i.e. of
500, see Figure 1.21. The balance sheet after the house was bought shows that the
home owner has a capital of 200 which leads to the residual cash account of 144.5.
Assume that house prices drop by 30 percent in 5 years. The value of the house is then
388.5. The maximum LTV ratio of 90 percent implies that the value of the mortgage is
bound to 0.9 × 388.5 = 350. Therefore after 5y the house keeper has to inject capital
of 500 − 350 = 150. This is a large amount. In particular, the cash reserves vanishes
and the home owner faces additional debt of 5.5. In terms of leverage λ = A/E, he
starts at initiation with a leverage of 3.5 = 700/200. After the price decay leverage is
11.8 = 388.5/33. This is not an example for subprime mortgages since this home owner
hardly face a equity/house price ratio of 200/555.5. Such an increase in leverage triggers
home owners default since the probability of insolvency P (A < L) increase if leverage
λ increases. The impact of changing interest rates on leverage is much weaker as it is
for changing house prices. To understand the difference of falling house prices or raising
interest rates on leverage we proceed as follows. Setting xA = A′ with x < 1 the new
asset value after a drop of house prices where the factor x also scales capital the new
leverage after the shock λ′ reads up to first order (Taylor expanding the denominator
(capital) up to first order):
λ′ = λ+ λx
D
E
+ higher orders .
To consider the impact of an increase of the interest rate we by yD with y > 1 the
increase in debt due to higher interest rate payments. Using this in the definition of the
leverage, i.e. reducing capital in the denominator and again expanding the denominator
up to first order one gets:
λ′ = λ+ λy + higher orders .
Assuming that an investor has low equity D/E is close to A/E. Hence in the case of a
house price shock
λ′ ∼ λ+ λ2x ,
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i.e. a quadratic growth. Using figures λ = 4 and house price decrease of 20 percent
(x = 0.8) versus an increase of interest by 3 percent, y = 1.03, leads to a new leverage of
approximatively 16.8 for the first case and of 9 in the second case.
What happens to leverage as total assets fluctuate? Since leverage is inversely
related to total assets (λ = AA−D ), when the price of the house goes up, the net worth
increases, and the leverage goes down. The negative relationship between total assets for
households and leverage is clearly borne out. But this observation does not holds true
for companies, commercial banks and brokers or investment banks, see Figure 1.22.
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Figure 1.22: Relationship between assets and leverage. Source: Adrian and Shin, 2007.
For commercial banks a large number of the observations line up along the vertical line
that passes through zero change in leverage, i.e. commercial banks are targeting a fixed
leverage ratio. Financial institutions manage their balance sheets actively for several
reasons. They attempt to manage the key financial ratios so as to hit credit rating
targets and the cost of capital. Their models of risk and economic capital also dictate
active management of their balance sheets: Economic capital is related to performance
measures such as RoE. RoE increases with an increasing leverage. Increasing RoE can
lead in banks using this performance measure to increasing compensation. The scatter
chart for security dealers, brokers and investment banks show the reverse pattern of that
for households. There is a strongly positive relationship between changes in total assets
and changes in leverage. In this sense,
Fact 1.2.3. Leverage is pro-cyclical.
To illustrate this let λ = A/E be the leverage before a change in asset values. After
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a change of A→ A+ δA to restore the leverage, debt has to be changed to D → D+ δD
to trade on the asset side. I.e.
λ′ =
A+ δA+ δD
E + δA
= λ
implies
δD = δA(λ− 1) .
If asset prices fall (δA < 0), securities are sold. Contrary, an increase in the asset prices
leads to positive demand to buy assets. Hence, to target leverage leads to upward-sloping
demands and downward-sloping supplies. This atypical pattern of demand and supply
is reinforced if leverage λ is high. But leverage is high if asset prices are high i.e. in a
boom period and vice versa for a bust period, see Figure 1.23.
Figure 1.23: Target leverage in booms and busts.. Source: Adrian and Shin, 2007.
1.2.7.3 Leverage, Shocks and Regulatory Capital Charge
We consider the impact of exogenous shocks on the balance sheet, the regulatory
charges and its interplay with leverage. We follow Mele (2011). Consider again a balance
sheet where today we have:
• Asset side: Asset value A plus cash C.
• Liability side: Debt D plus capital E.
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We assume that equity has to be larger than a given percentage of the asset value, i.e.
E ≥ xA with x a percentage value. In Basel II x = 8% and A corresponds to the
risk-weighted-assets. For simplicity we assume that equality E = xA, i.e. the bank just
satisfies the minimal capital requirements (which is reality would not be accepted by
the regulators, i.e. they would intervene before this happens). Therefore the percentage
value x equals inverse leverage 1/λ. An increase in the capital ratio x is equivalent to a
decrease of the leverage ratio. Assume a shock −∆A on the asset value where the asset
value A and capital E are both reduced by this amount. Then,
E −∆A = x(A−∆A)
has to hold to maintain the regulatory requirement. This is impossible since equity
falls by a larger percentage than the asset side due to leverage, i.e. −∆AE <
−∆A
A since
E < A. Two solutions are available to the financial institution to restore regulatory
capital requirements: (i) to inject fresh capital; (ii) to sell some of the risky assets. The
first solution is not quite viable in the short-run. Let us analyze the second solution. We
are looking for a quantity X of the risky asset to sell, such that after a reduction in the
asset value the capital ratio target is still met. The balance sheet reads:
• Asset side: Assets A−∆A−X, cash C +X
• Liability side: Debt D plus capital E −∆A.
To maintain the regulatory capital adequacy rule, X solves
E −∆A = x(A−∆A−X) .
Solving, the number of risky assets to sell is proportional to the percentage loss in their
value:
X = ∆A
(
1
x
− 1
)
= ∆A (λ− 1) .
If we use this value for X, leverage before and after the shock are the same, i.e.
λ′ =
A−∆A−X
E −∆A =
A
E
= λ .
There is relation between leverage and risk measurement, i.e. the Value-at-Risk (VaR)
at a confidence level α.34 We assume that equity equals the VaR, i.e. the bank has no
reserve capital but all of its capital is allocated to measurable risks. Then
E = VaR = v ×A
34VaR is the smallest non-negative number such that
P (A−A0 < −VaR) ≤ 1− α
with A0 the base asset level and α the confidence level.
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with v the value-at-risk per dollar of assets implies that
λ =
1
v
=
1
x
.
Hence in this simple setup the regulatory capital asset ratio equals the value-at-risk of
one dollar which is inversely related to the leverage.
Consider an asset price shock A → A + δA, which also shocks the value-at-risk
v → v + ∆v. Then
1
λ
∼ v(1− δA
A
) + ∆v(1− δA
A
) +
δA
A
> v
holds if E = vA and if we develop the quotient in a power series dropping terms of second
order such as (δA)2/A2. It is an empirical regularity that if assets drop, volatility and
hence VaR increase (negative asset leverage). Hence, δA < 0 and ∆v > 0 hold. This
implies 1λ > v. Leverage is decreasing using a value-at-risk measure if markets fall.
The above models do not consider that there can be a price impact if say fire sales
of assets are needed to restore regulatory capital requirements. Cifuentes, Ferruci and
Shin (2005) consider the possible impact of a shock on asset prices (spiralling down).
They explore liquidity risk in a system of interconnected financial institutions
when these institutions are subject to regulatory solvency constraints and mark their
assets to market. The institutions are interconnected via their balance sheets - a bank’s
i asset are a bank j’s liabilities. There are n banks which form the interbanking market.
The liability of bank i to bank j is denoted Dij with D¯i =
∑
j Dij the total liability face
value of bank i. This notional value can be different from the market value Di of bank i’s
interbank liabilities. We assume equal seniority of all claims. Then bank’s payments are
proportional to the notional liability, i.e. D¯ipiij = Dij .
∑
j pijiDj are all payments bank
i receives from all other banks, i.e. it is an asset value. Furthermore, there is an illiquid
asset Ailli with price p.
35 The equity value for bank i is then equal to the difference
between the two asset values and the liability value:
Ei = pA
ill
i +
∑
j
pijiDj −Di ≥ 0 .
The positivity follows from limited liability of the bank. Priority of debt over equity
implies that equity value is strictly positive only when bank i’s payment is equal to its
notional obligation, i.e. D¯i = Di. Therefore bank i payment satisfies
Di = min{D¯i, pAilli +
∑
j
pijiDj} =: min{D¯i, w(p) +
∑
j
pijiDj}
where w(p) is the marked-to-market value of the illiquid asset. From a secured banking
view,
35The authors add a liquid asset too. Since this is not necessary for our discussion we leave this asset.
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• Di is the debt capacity;
• w(p) +∑j pijiDj is the collateral value;
• Ei is the haircut.
Writing Π for the payoff matrix of the interlinked claims, the vector D of all clearing
payments satisfies the system of n equations:
D = min{D¯, w(p) + Π′D} .
This is a system of realized debt values: Symbols which are not notional values are
realized values at future date. A vector D which satisfies this equation is a fixed point
of the function f(D) = min(D¯, w(p) + Π′d) = D. By Tarski’s fixed point theorem,
there is at least one fixed point or clearing vector D. A sufficient condition for the
existence of a unique fixed point is that, first, the system is connected in the sense that
the banks cannot be partitioned into two or more unconnected sub-systems, and that
there is at least one bank that has positive equity value in the system, see Eisenberg and
Noe (2001). We assume that uniqueness holds: There exists a unique clearing vector
L(p) as a function of the illiquid asset price p.
We add to the system the supervisory capital adequacy ratio, i.e. a lower bound
on the capital asset ratio of the bank. The constraint is given by
pAilli +
∑
j Djpiji −Di
pAilli − psi +
∑
j Djpiji
≥ x
with x the pre-specified capital ratio, si the units of the illiquid asset sold by bank
i. The numerator is the equity value of the bank calculated in terms of the expected
payments. The denominator is the marked-to-market value of its assets after the sale of
si units of the illiquid asset. Credit risk is not considered. The assumption of the model
is that assets are sold for cash, and that cash does not attract a capital requirement. By
selling its assets for cash, the bank reduces the size of its balance sheet and thus reduces
the denominator, i.e. it increases the capital ratio. We assume that the bank cannot
short sell the assets, i.e. si ∈ [0, Ailli ].
Definition 1.2.4. An equilibrium is a triple (D, s, p) with a clearing vector D, a vector
of sales of illiquid asset s and the price p of the illiquid asset such that:
• for all banks i, the smallest sale that ensures that the capital adequacy condition is
satisfied si the limited liability of equity holders, and the priority and equal seniority
of the debt holders holds, i.e. D satisfies the clearing fixed point equation..
• For all banks i, si is the smallest sale that ensures that the capital adequacy condi-
tion is satisfied. If there is no value of si ∈ [0, Ailli ] for which the capital adequacy
condition is satisfied, then si = Ailli : Either the bank is liquidated altogether, or
its sales of illiquid assets reduce its assets sufficiently to comply with the capital
adequacy ratio.
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• There is a downward sloping inverse demand function d−1(·) such that d(p) = s(p),
i.e the price of the illiquid asset is determined by the intersection of a downward
sloping demand curve and the vertical supply curve given by aggregate sales s(p) =∑
i si(p).
By re-arranging the capital adequacy condition, we get
si(p) = min
(
Ailli ,
Di − (1− x)(
∑
j Djpiji + pA
ill
i )
xp
)
.
Since interbank payments Dij are all functions of p, si itself is a function of p. Since each
si(·) is decreasing in p, the aggregate sale function s(p) is decreasing in p. Assuming the
inverse demand curve for the illiquid asset
p = e−α
∑
i si , α > 0
the maximum price p = 1 follows for zero sales. This is the status quo price where
the banking system has not suffered any adverse shock. We assume that if the entire
endowment of illiquid assets in the system is sold, there is at least one bank that has
positive equity value, i.e. for pˆ the price of the illiquid asset when the entire endowment
of the illiquid asset is sold supply at this price level is dominated by the demand. Figure
1.24 shows the price adjustment process starting with an intimal price p = 1 and a
shock which leads to a price p0 where forced sales of the banks puts quantity s(p0)
on the market. This pushes the price further down to p1 = d−1(s(p0)) which leads to
further sales and a supply s(p1). This process then continuous until the intersection
point between supply and demand. This shows how a shock can lead to a downward
spiraling of the illiquid asset prices in the interbanking market.
To consider the leverage and risk measurement in this setup we write for the marked-
to-market value of assets of bank i (see Figure 1.24)
Ai = A
end
i +
∑
j
pijiDj
with Aendi the loans to end users. The balance sheet is Ai = Ei + Di. Using matrix
notation for the n banks in the system, the vector of debt values D ∈ Rn satisfies
D = ΠD +A− E ∈ Rn
with Π the matrix with entries piij . Defining leverage λi = Ai/Ei for bank i and Λ the
diagonal matrix of all leverage factors, we get
A = E + E(Λ− I)(I−Π) (1.7)
with I the identity matrix. This follows from Di/Ei = λi − 1, D = E(Λ− I).
Fact 1.2.5. Total lending to the end-user borrowers depends on the interaction of the
distribution of equity E in the banking system, the profile of leverage Λ and the structure
of the financial system Π. Total lending to end users is increasing in equity and in
leverage.
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Figure 1.24: Left Panel: The price adjustment process can be depicted as a step adjust-
ment process in the arc below the s(p) curve, but above the d(p) curve. Right Panel:
Stylized financial system. Source: Cifuentes et al. 2005.
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To understand the impact of the structure of the banking system Π on lending we
write z = (I−Π)u with u′ = (1, 1, . . . , 1). Therefore zi = 1−
∑
j piij is the proportion of
bank i’s debt held by the outside claimholders. Multiplying (1.7) by u total lending to
end users reads: ∑
i
Ai =
∑
i
Ei +
∑
i
Eizi(λi − 1) . (1.8)
This is the balance sheet identity for the financial sector where all the claims
and obligations between banks have been netted out. The first term on the right-hand
side is total equity of the banking system. The second one is total funding to the bank-
ing sector provided by the outside claim holders. Hence, credit supply to end-users must
come either from the equity of the banking system or the funding provided by non-banks.
We consider the financial system leverage. We construct a financial system where
the aggregate equity, lending and leverage are all unchanged but where the debt to equity
ratio of all individual banks is µ times as large, i.e. D′ = µD,E′ = E,Π′ where the sum
over the entry of row j are 1− zj/µ. Assume first that all values are face values. The
balance sheet identity in this new system reads
A′ = E′ + L′(I−Π′) .
Multiplying with the vector u leads for aggregate lending∑
i
A′i =
∑
i
Ai .
The aggregate leverage is unchanged but the debt to equity ratio of all individual banks
is larger in the second financial system. There is only one restriction 1 − zj/µ > 0, i.e.
a lower bound on µ. But there is no upper bound. This proves that there exist a
financial system where aggregate leverage is unchanged but individual leverage can be
made arbitrary large. The intuition is that a high individual leverage remains within the
banking sector but does not swaps to the ultimate creditor sector. The analysis
is unchanged when using market values with one exception: Since the market value of
debt cannot be larger than the market value of the assets, there is an upper and a lower
bound for µ. Leverage of the systems λ is given by:
λ =
∑
j
Aj∑
j
Ej
= 1 +
∑
j
Ejzj(λj − 1)∑
j
Ej
.
Fact 1.2.6. Total system leverage increases if the amount from outside financing z in-
creases.
This approach can be enriched by introducing risk management issues, i.e. value-at-
risk. Shin (2006) provides this extension.
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1.2.8 Regulation of OTC Derivatives
OTC derivatives are bilateral agreements to hedge risks or bet on prices. They are taylor-
made and there was little regulation in the past. This lead also to lack of transparency
about the counter parties. Since these markets grew heavily in the near past the lack of
information led to uncertainty about the risks of these markets for the counter parties
but also for the whole financial system, see Figure 1.25 for the size of the markets. If
one assumes a notional amount of about 600 trillion USD in the OTC markets and if
one compares this figure with the world wide GDP of about 55 trillion USD one might
wonder about the rationale why for each dollar GDP there exist 11 dollars of protection
transactions.
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Figure 1.25: The size of the OTC derivatives market in terms of notional amount outstanding
(USD trillion).Source: BIS (2011)
The size in these markets is a poor risk figure since several risk mitigating meth-
ods exist. The most prominent are the Master Agreement and Credit Support Annex
(ISDA). These agreements reduce counter party risk in the bilateral trades. Major in-
struments in doing these are netting agreements and collateralization. Although this is
effective on a bilateral level due to the privacy of the trades (i) it is not transparent from
a system point of view and (ii) it does not provides a global view on the whole network
of interlinked counter parties. Due to this lack of reporting and supervision a problem
of undercollateralization can occur. A prominent example was AIG which served as pro-
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tection seller for many investment banks, i.e. AIG obtained a premium from the banks
in exchange of credit protection by AIG if the reference entities default. AIG faced a
liquidity crisis due to a downgrade of its rating. Such a downgrade forced AIG to post
additional collateral with its trading counter parties. Furthermore the credit protection
sold lost in value since the market for CDOs (Collateralized Debt Obligations) were quasi
evaporating. This led to a first bailout by the FED. There were others to follow with a
total amount of 182 Billion USD. The first of bailout is an example of risk structuring and
risk transfer. The FED created an 85 billion credit facility in exchange for the issuance
of a stock warrant to the Federal Reserve Bank for 79.9% of the equity of AIG. Hence,
the FED exchanged credit and market risk. It took the credit risk of AIG in exchange
for a future participation in the firm value.
A main requirement to reduce some the mentioned risks in OTC transactions is to
clear the contracts via a central counter party (CCP). The idea is that the contracts
are no longer between say two investment banks but between each investment bank and
a clearing house. This has the following consequences:36
• Standardized OTC derivatives (interest and credit derivatives, the clearing of FX
contracts is an open issue) are traded on exchanges or electronic platforms.
• The contracts are cleared, i.e. the clearing house applies the margin process. Figure
1.26 shows the logic of client clearing.
This means that on a daily basis difference in value of the contracts are settled.
Using such a procedure it is not possible that positive or negative value accumulate
over time. From a risk perspective OTC trades are only partially secured. In
the future trades will be overcollateralized and all clearing members are liable to
a certain extend if clearing members default. More precisely, the ’risk waterfall’
method applies. A CCP has a multi-layer capital structure to protect itself and its
members from losses due to member defaults. The following types of collateral will
be held (we follow Arnsdorf (2011), Pirrong (2009) and ZKB (2012) in the sequel):
– Variation Margin: Variation margin is charged or credited daily to clearing
member accounts to cover any portfolio mark-to-market (MtM) changes.
– Initial Margin: Initial margin is posted by clearing members to the CCP.
This is to cover any losses incurred in the unwinding of a defaulting member’s
portfolio. Typically the margin is set to cover all losses up to a pre-defined
confidence level in normal market conditions.
– CCP Equity: A CCP will have an equity buffer provided by shareholders.
36The consequences meet the statement of the G20 in their Pittsburgh Summit 2009: ’All standardized
OTC derivative contracts should be traded on exchanges or electronic trading platforms, where appro-
priate, and cleared through central counter parties by end-2012 at the latest. OTC derivative contracts
should be reported to trade repositories. Non-centrally cleared contracts should be subject to higher capital
requirements.’
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Figure 1.26: Client clearing under the existing ISDA and CSA setup and under the new clearing
requirements.
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– Default Fund (funded): Every member contributes to the clearing house de-
fault fund. This acts as a form of collective insurance for uncollateralised
losses.
– Default Fund (unfunded): Each clearing member is usually committed to
providing further funds if necessary. The maximum amount of additional
funds that can be called upon depends on the CCP. In some cases the liability
is uncapped.
• Clearing the OTC contracts via a clearing house changes the bilateral random
network topology of all contracts to a star shaped one.
Participants in the OTC markets have three options: They can do nothing which means
that they will stop to use say interest rate swaps. They can evaluate a clearing broker.
This requires to invest into updating collateral risk management, accounting workflows
and the redefinition of backoffice post trade workflows. The third alternative is to become
a member of a clearing house. This allows for large flexibility to offer client clearing. Be-
sides investment costs to change workflows one has also to consider the amounts payable
into the default fund. To understand the alternatives, we consider them in an example
regarding capital requirements. This example is an extension of an example developed by
ZKB, 2012. The regulatory capital charge for OTC derivatives increases since bilateral
OTC derivative contracts have to satisfy the Credit Value Adjustment (CVA) require-
ments and the risk weights of cleared OTC derivatives increase from 0% to 2% . Cleared
transactions will receive lower risk weights and can abstain from CVA if portability is
given with a high probability. It is not yet defined what ’high probability’ means. We
consider the following portfolio of CHF-IRS.
Notional TtM Add On NPV EAD
500 9m 0% 5.03 5.03
700 4y 0.5% -20 -16.5
400 10y 1.5% 40 46
The currency figures are in million CHF. The EAD is calculated using the standard-
ized approach, i.e.
EAD = Notional x Add On + NPV .
The portfolio has a credit equivalent after netting is 32 Mio. CHF. With a rating of AAA
to AA- this gives the 8% capital charge of 512’000 CHF. A lower rating of A+ to BBB-
gives in the standardized approach the amount of 1.28 Mio.CHF. The nominal weighted
TtM is 4.5 years. For a rating of AAA to AA the CVA capital is 2.3 Mio. CHF and 2.7
Mio. for a A rating.
If one clears the portfolio collaterization applies. The clearing client pays an initial
margin of 4 Mio. CHF and receives a variation margin of 25.03 Mio. CHF. The capital
requirements ...
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• using two clearing brokers is 17’500 CHF by applying the risk weight of 2 percent.
• using a single AAA clearing broker is 175’000 CHF by applying the risk weight of
20 percent and the minimal CVA capital requirements are 510’000.
• using a single A clearing broker is 440’000 CHF by applying a risk weight of 50
percent and the minimal capital requirements for the CVA are 582’000 CHF.
This calculation shows the trade off between capital costs and costs for a second clearing
broker. CVA should be part of the trade valuation but calculated separately because of
portfolio effects. If one uses cleared OTC the risk weights increase from zero to 2 percent.
Pirrong (2009) shows the following effects of CCPs:
• In conditions of complete information, a CCP can improve welfare by allocating
default losses more efficiently than in a bilateral network. A CCP can reduce the
frequency and severity of default losses that hedgers suffer in these high marginal
utility states, thereby improving welfare. The formation of a CCP also affects
equilibrium prices, quantities, and profits.
• ’A CCP affects the distribution of default losses among market participants. Net-
ting effectively gives derivatives counter parting a priority claim on assets of an in-
solvent counter party, and therefore transfers wealth from other creditors to deriva-
tives counter parties. Moreover, CCPs insure non-members against losses arising
from a dealer default, thereby effectively transferring the burden of these losses from
non-members to the financial institutions that are members of CCPs.’
• ’Due to the distributive effects of clearing, and its effect on the pricing of de-
fault risk, it is not necessarily true that formation of a CCP reduces systemic risk.
Indeed, it can increase systemic risk under some circumstances.’
These results are all based on an economic model. Other approaches such as Duffie and
Zhu (2011) show that there is ambiguity to which extend CCPs reduce systemic risk.
OTC regulation applies to banks, insurance companies, asset managers and cor-
poartes with large OTC sizes. Pension funds are so far not included. Clearing houses
are London Clearing House for interest rate swaps, ICE or CME for credit default swaps.
The platforms where OTC trades are executed are so called multibank platforms.
Although bilateral counter party risk is reduced and overall transparency is gained
with this initiative some issues are still open. First, the yet scarce resource of collateral
will become more expensive due to the overcollateralization. This will make some OTC
contracts less attractive.
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1.3 Technology and Technological Shocks
Shocks to technology provide a supply-side explanation for the timing of some innova-
tions. Advances in information technology support sophisticated pooling schemes which
we observe in securitization. IT and improvements in telecommunications (internet) has
facilitated a number of innovations, including new methods of underwriting securities,
new methods of assembling portfolios of stocks, new markets for securities and new means
of executing security transactions. IT innovations - storage capacity, performance - often
allow intellectual finance innovation to become operational. Examples are value-at-risk
in risk management, advanced derivative pricing models which require performing IT
services or on-line retirement planning services were facilitated by both intellectual and
information technology innovations.
Figure 1.27 shows the complexity for the risk management function both for the work
flows on the business layer and the IT layer, i.e. the network of IT systems. This figure
should give an impression why 20-40 percent of the employees work for IT and logistics.
The importance of infrastructure in business can be seen for investment banks (IB).
Due to the recent cuts in risk capacity, the increasing costs of risk and regulatory cap-
ital and the still present pressure on margins innovation leads to a shift in traditional
investment banking: Earnings are more and more obtained from infrastructure banking
whereas earnings from traditional IB decrease, see Figure 1.28. Infrastructure bank-
ing has at least two meanings. First, banks are offering their trading functionalities to
clients. They then can act to using the trading functions of the investment bank without
the investment bank using its balance sheet as financial intermediary or they can use the
trading function to taylor made the products for their distribution channel. Electronic
banking where clients can design taylor-made products is such a case.
The development in stock market trading show up in the change of speed and
fragmentation in trading: Speed at which investors trade has greatly increased and
stock trading has become significantly more fragmented in the major trading places.
Two basic questions then are:
• To whom does these developments add value?
• What is the impact on risk for the traders, the investors and the system?
We follow Pagnotta and Philippon (2012). Let us first consider trading speed. Market
centers have made costly investments in fast computerized trading platforms to reduce
order execution and communication latencies. This process has gone beyond stock ex-
changes to include futures, options, bonds, and currencies. These type of investments
started in the U.S. and spread in the last decade worldwide. NYSE increased the speed
in cash equity trading from 350 milliseconds 2007 to 105 millisecond in 2009 and to 5
milliseconds at the end of 2009. Johannesburg Stock Exchange increased the speed 2011
by a factor of 400 to 126 microseconds. But speed is not only related to the individual
financial center but also between the centers. Spread Networks invested 300 Million USD
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Figure 1.27: Risk management work flows. Upper Panel: Business work flows. On the top
level six different functions are defined, the sales functions in work flows 1 and 2, the trading
unit (core work flow 3), and the risk management functions in the work flows 4 to 6. The
risk management function splits up into the limit management work flows 4 and 5 and a risk
measurement work flow 6. The figure shows the information flow, indicated by arrows, between
the different functions or units. Lower Panel: The IT system network for the risk management
function corresponding to the business work flows. Source: Leippold and Vanini, 2005.
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Figure 1.28: Market infrastructure earnings vs. investment banking earnings. The series are
indexed to 100 at the beginning of 2009. Source: Oliver Wyman, 2012.
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in a new fiber optic cable that links New York and Chicago on the straightest route sav-
ing 100 miles with respect to existing ones. Speed has an advantage that moral hazard
of brokers and traders is no longer possible. The machines are faster than individuals
are. This has also a drawback. Suppose that ECB announces at 1200 CET an increase
in interest rate. Than machines are able to generate profit from this announcement since
they can buy and sell say bonds faster than people can adjust their prices based on news.
Fragmentation means that traditional stock exchangs have lost an still lose mar-
ket shares to faster such as Chi-X. T The fraction of NYSE-listed stocks traded at the
NYSE has decreased from 80% in 2004 to just over 20% in 2009. Most of the lost trading
volume has been captured by new entrants. Regulators such as the SEC has enforced
fragmentation:
’Mandating the consolidation of order flow in a single venue would create a monopoly
and thereby lose the important benefits of competition among markets. The benefits of
such competition include incentives for trading centers to create new products, provide
high quality trading services that meet the needs of investors, and keep trading fees low.’
Source: SEC (2010).
The effects are that large-cap stocks can now be traded in almost 50 venues if one
includes bank internal pools, i.e. a bank matches internally supply and demand before
routing it in a stock exchange, and other types of markets.
But why do exchanges compete on speed? Is there a relation between the increase in
trading speeds and the level of market fragmentation? What are the consequences of these
changes? Does fragmentation achieve policy makers’ goals? Should investor protection be
fostered in the first place? Pagnotta and Philippon (2012) answer these questions based
on a microfoundation for how investors value speed in financial markets. They assume
that everything else being constant, all investors are better-off by trading faster, but they
do not value speed equally. Thus exchanges competing to attract investors can vertically
differentiate their intermediation services by catering to different clienteles, relaxing price
competition. But why and how investors value trading speed? Preferences need to
incorporate heterogeneity to create gains from trade as well as interesting participation
decisions among exchanges. First, the flow utility u which an investor derives from
holding ψ units of an asset at a given time is
u(ψt) = (µ+ σt)ψt
where µ, σ are constant and  = ±1 is a random variable. Investors are characterized
by the parameters σ ∈ [0, σ¯) and . The epsilon shock induce time varying liquidity
demands, financing costs or hedging demand while σ measure the size of the shock. The
value function of a specific investor at time t is equal to the sum of the expected value of
the above cumulated utility up to a random time T , where the investor makes the next
market contact, and an expression, which is given by the difference of the value function
starting at time T and the trading of the asset at time T at the price pT .
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In their model speed allows investors to realize a larger fraction of the ex post gains
from trade. They then analyze the allocation of investors across trading venues. Venues
differ in their trading speeds and compete in prices. They show that investors with high
expected volatility attach a higher value to speed. The authors then compare the monop-
olistic venue equilibrium with the equilibrium when two venues are given. Competition
lowers fees and increases investor participation. Faster venues charge a higher price and
attract speed-sensitive investors. Finally, they analyze the impact of trading regulations
aimed at protecting investors. Pagnotta and Philippon (2012):’We propose a stylized
analysis of this regulation by considering two polar cases. In one case, which we refer to
as “free segmentation,” any venue can refuse to execute the trades of investors from the
other venue. The venues are effectively segmented and trades occur at different prices.
The other case corresponds to “price protection.” We find that price protection acts as a
subsidy for the relatively slow market. At the trading stage, investors in the slow venue
enjoy being able to trade with investors from the fast venue. Anticipating this, they are
more willing to join the slow venue under price protection than under free segmentation.’
The interaction of technological advances, competition in the securities exchange
industry and market regulations interact with each other affecting the trading landscape,
asset prices, investor participation, and, ultimately, social welfare is shown in Figure 1.29.
The authors then endogenize the speed and the market structure. They find that
price protection encourages entry and that fragmentation leads to more investment in
trading technologies and thus faster trading speeds. Their model provides a consistent
interpretation of the U.S. experience that after the implementation of new regulations
(Regulation National Market System (RegNMS) of 2005) the new market centers prolif-
erated and trading speed increased rapidly.
When they analyze the welfare implications of entry, speed, and investor protec-
tion they find that the market outcome is generally inefficient. Pagnotta and Philippon
(2012):’In the monopoly case, participation is always too low and depends exclusively
on the distribution of investors. Allowing for endogenous speed improves welfare, even
though the speed chosen by the monopolist may be higher or lower than the one chosen by
the planner. In the duopoly case, both entry and speed can be inefficient. Regarding entry,
there is the usual tension between business stealing on the one hand, and competition and
product diversity on the other. Entry typically improves welfare, but it can be excessive if
entry costs are relatively high. Regarding speed choices, we find a fairly clear and intuitive
condition: Allowing venues to compete on speed improves welfare if the default available
speed is relatively low (e.g., purely human-based trading) but decreases welfare once the
default speed reaches a certain threshold.’
The discussion so far left some question open. First, the terms electronic -, algorith-
mic - (AT) and high frequency tradingHigh Frequency Trading (HFT) are often used
interchangeably although they describe different trading behavior. Electronic trading
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Figure 1.29: Security exchange industry evolution and aggregate outcomes.Source: Pagnotta
and Philippon, 2012.
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simply refers to the ability to transmit orders electronically. AT is a term which does not
necessarily implies the aspect of speed. Originally, AT was designed to trade large order
by reducing their market impact, i.e. the algorithm were used optimize trade execution.
AT is defined as a set of rules which can determine the time, quantity, price, order of
routing, monitoring of different venues, etc., see Chlistalla (2011), Brogaard (2010). HFT
is a subset of algorithmic trading where a large number of small sized orders are sent
into the market at high speed, with round-trip execution times measured in microseconds
(Brogaard, 2010). Empirical evidence reveals that the average U.S. stock is held for 22
seconds. While AT are strategies which use technology, HFT is not a strategy per se but
a technology, i.e. a form to implement more efficiently trading strategies. Two strategies
are (see Chlistalla (2011), Brogaard (2010) for more details):
• Liquidity-providing strategies mimic the traditional role of market makers, but
unlike traditional market makers, they have no formal market making obligation.
These strategies involve making a two-sided market aiming at profiting by earning
the bid-ask spread.
• Using Statistical arbitrage strategies traders seek profit from imbalances in
prices between cross-border or domestic marketplaces for example or between fu-
tures on an index and the underlying stocks.
HFT are mainly proprietary trader, i.e. they use their own capital and put it at risk. A.
Sussman et al. (2010) report that 48 percent of U.S. equity HFT is due to independent
proprietary firms, 46 percent of Broker-Dealer proprietary desks and the rest to Hedge
Funds. A main characteristic of HFT is the low latency, i.e. the time between the entry
of an order and the execution. Another feature of HFT is the real time analysis of infor-
mation to produce automatic trading decisions. HFT generate a hugh number of orders
whereas a hugh fraction of them is cancelled. Contrary to AT, HFT close their open
positions at the end of the day. They do not start the next trading day with unhedged
positions. The main reasons for AT are costs, anonymity and trader productivity (they
add up to 56 percent). Speed is estimated to be the reason in about 11 percent of all
trades.
Jovanovic and Menkveld (2010) suggest that HFT added liquidity to the markets,
reduced spreads and reduced arbitrage opportunities across different markets. Although
there is no proof of a negative liquidity impacts of HFT, some structural weakness exists
for sure. HFT are not obliged to provide liquidity as ordinary market makers. This may
lead to an outflow of liquidity if markets are under stress since many HFT programs
react in the same way. HFT does not contribute significantly to market depth due to
marginal size of their quotes. The low latency and the large cancellation rate of orders
make orders of HFT almost not accessible to market participants. Following Brogaard
(2010) analyzing a large data set of NASDAQ:
• HFTs add to the price formation process since they follow a price reversal strategy.
• HFTs do not engage in forbidden front-running.
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• HFTs provide the best bid and offer quotes for a significant portion of the trading
day, but only around a quarter of the book depth and reduce their supply of liquidity
only moderately as volatility increases.
• HFTs use fewer strategies than non-HFTs. This is a risk source for market stability
if strong market movements occur.
These observations enter the currently ongoing debate about how meaningful HFT is.
While electronic trading allowed retail investors to have access to the markets as quick
as professionals, under HFT asymmetries are introduced in markets: Special arrange-
ments give preference to specific needs of HFTs. The European Commission intends to
subject HFT to MIFID requirements and to supervision by a competent authority. ’The
Commission proposes to make sure that all persons involved in HFT above a minimum
quantitative threshold are obliged to be full regulatory oversight and to a number of or-
ganizational prerequisites such as risk management obligations and capital requirements.
In addition, the Commission intends to introduce amendments to MIFID related to the
provision of liquidity by HFTs: According to these plans, operators of regulated markets
would be required to ensure that a HFT firm continues to provide liquidity on an ongoing
basis subject to conditions similar to those applicable to market makers, if it executes a
significant number of trades in a certain instrument. In terms of order persistence and
tick sizes, operators of regulated markets may be required to ensure that orders remain
in the order book for a minimum period before being cancelled – or alternatively to en-
sure that the ratio of orders to transactions executed by any given participant would not
exceed a specified level. Implementing measures could further specify minimum tick sizes
that would generally apply to all trading, not just automated trading.’ Source; Chlistalla
(2011)
1.3.1 Point of Sale
Recent public available technologies allow a fundamental reshaping of the point of sales,
i.e. the interface between the banking institution and their clients. They allow for a closer
nearness between banking solutions and the clients. The technologies such as the IPad
make it possible that clients explore the products in a dynamic and user friendly way by
using their fingers and moving back and forward in the product descriptions according to
their needs. This replaces the more static, more one-directional traditional communica-
tion between the relationship manager and the client using a paper presentation. Using
these technologies banks can get off the risky process to first profile the clients and then
to match the profile to the products. The alternative is that clients directly search for
their appropriate solution. But this requires that clients wants to get involved in the
process. It is clear that a fraction of the population will have no interest to do so - even
if they can use the new technologies. This technological changes and regulations at the
point of sale (MiFID) lead to conjecture:
Conjecture 1.3.1. Bank clients will in the future use a mandate or make investment
decisions individual responsible using the infrastructure of banks. The traditional form of
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consulting by advisory bears to many risks for the banks.
Complexity and risk vs. uncertainty are of a fundamental behavioral importance
at the point of sale:
• Complexity is related to question ’how should the bank define the segmentation of
customers?’
• Risk vs. uncertainty is related to the question how people perceive risk or uncer-
tainty and how does one decides optimally.
1.3.1.1 Point of Sale: Complexity
It is a fact that most bank use a segmentation of their private customers according to
their wealthiness - retail clients, wealthy clients, private banking clients, high networth
clients and ultra high networth clients. Different institutions define different threshold
levels for the different classes and different assets are considered in the classification (cash,
securities, pension fund capital, real estate, etc.). Why do banks use a segmentation?
The first argument is the return-cost trade off. From a client where a bank can earn
USD 1’000 per annum in terms of fees the costs in the advisory should be appropriate.
Second, not all relationship managers are equally educated and experienced. This makes
a matching of less experienced advisors to less demanding clients meaningful. Two re-
quirements for segmentation are its operability and the adequateness for the clients. As
discussed, wealth is the key segmentation parameter. But if one requires that the client
understands the investment products, unless he has not delegated the decision or uses
the banking infrastructure for transaction only, the single wealth variable is not able to
hedge against possible advisory risks.
Two major dimensions of any banking product are its risk and return characteristic
and its complexity. This implies that there can be complex products which possess little
risk and on the opposite, highly risky products which are simple to understand. These
two dimensions capture preferences (risk and return) and know how (complexity) of
the client. While there are many risk and return measures comparatively little is known
about how to measure and classify complexity. We follow a information theory approach.
The information content of any financial product can be described by a finite number of
questions and there answers. For derivatives, a simple question is ’Which role does the
issuer of a product plays for you?’, more difficult is ’What does capital protection means
in capital protected notes?’ and even more difficult ’What does the optionality worst
of means in a barrier reverse convertible product?’. Assume that the difficulty level of
all questions are K = {K1,K2,K3,K4} and that Fa is the set of questions which are
necessary to unreveal all information of product a. We assume that questions in class
Ki are less complicated than in class Ki+1. A questions belongs
• to class K1 if it can be answered by yes/no, if the answer does not requires a
probabilistic judgement and if no dependency assessment is necessary. Examples:
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What is an issuer of a product, what are issuer-related risks which matter for the
investor?
• K2 consists of all questions which need a simple probabilistic judgment, i.e. con-
ditional expectations and dependency issues are excluded. Example: In the last
10 years the probability that a coupon between 2 and 3 percent was annually paid
was 45 percent.
• K3 is the set of questions based on conditional probability assessments and on
payoffs with barriers. Example: The probability that the product pays a return of
8 percent p.a. at maturity is 70 percent, given that the underlying does not hit
during the life time of the product a barrier level of 60 percent.
• A question is in K4 if it requires the concern of correlation risk or if no probabilis-
tic dependencies need to be understood. Example: The payoff of an investment
depends on the performance of a stock basket of 20 S%P 500 stocks: The return is
calculated using the positive performance (if any) of 8 best performing stocks plus
the negative performance (if any) the 3 worst performing stocks.
This is a raw characterization which serves for illustrative purposes only. The com-
plexity of the product Ca is defined by
Ca(s) =
∑
i∈K
∑
j∈Fa
f(sij)
with sij the difficulty degree of question j in class i and f a valuation function. y f
is a convex function in the complexity parameter i. Convexity takes into account that
the difficulty degree between the classes Ki is not growing linearly. We require that the
complexity measure Ca satisfies:
Ca(λs) =
∑
i∈K
∑
j∈Fa
λif(sij) , λ > 1.
The concept is applicable not to single products only but also to portfolios. We therefore
require:
Ca(s) + Cb(s) =
∑
i∈K
∑
j∈Fa
λif(sij) +
∑
j∈Fb
λif(sij)−
∑
j∈Fa∩Fb
λif(sij)
 ,
i.e. the complexity of two products is equal to the sum of their single complexities minus
all double counting. As a normalization, we require:
Ca(0) = 0 .
As an example, we consider using the four categories Kj defined above, f(sij) = si and
s = 5. Three structured products are analyzed:
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• A knock-out call option (KO call) with barrier equal to strike.
• A single underlying barrier reverse (BRC) convertible.
• A capital protected note (CapProtect) with coupon payment linked to DJ Eu-
rostoxx 50 and capital protection of 100 percent provided by a AAA-issuer.
We calculate the complexity value of these three products net of all questions which
appear in all products, i.e. the complexity value is the value which we have to add to
the same unknown and irrelevant basis complexity figure. We get:
CKO call = 305 , CBRC = 580 , CCapProtect = 1′215 .
The capital protected note requires the understanding of correlation in an index and
the impact of correlation on the likelihood to receive a coupon. This drives the large
complexity number. If we define the numerical values for the classes Ki, i.e. K1 = [0, 200]
for example, the results of the complexity analysis can be compared with the risk of the
products. Such intervals are defined as follows:
• The difficulty degree of the questions and the number of questions define whether a
product belongs to an interval Ki: The complexity of many questions, each of them
of the simple typeK1, can be as high as the complexity of a single, very complicated
question which requires the capability of sophisticated statistical reasoning.
• To define these classes requires that the bank uses self-assessments to define the
intervals and testing with the function f such that different products are finally
classified properly in the scheme of intervals: If the intervals are too small, less
complex products are classified in too complex category and vice versa, if the
intervals are to broad, complex products are show a too low complex measure.
• The different Ki then define education levels not only for the client but also for the
relation ship managers. Juniors, say can consult only products of the class K1,K2
and after years of experience and education they can gain access to more complex
products.
Figure 1.30 shows these two dimensions, where risk is measured as Value-at-Risk (VaR)
and the six risk categories are those defined by the Swiss Derivative Association (SVSP).
It follows, that the product with the lowest risk figure (CapProtect) is the most complex
one and the product with the highest risk, the warrant call, is the less complex one. This
negative relation between risk and complexity of investment products in the example
shows that differences in preferences (here risk) and differences in understanding (here
complexity) are not simply related, i.e. the riskier a product, the more complex is the
product. If this would be the case, suitability would become straightforward in the sense
that one could sell risky products to experts and to lay individuals only low risk products
can be offered. But in the example, the bank has to put the highest efforts into the lowest
risk product to be suitable for only few people, those which have a high capability to
understand complex issues, can buy a capital protected note. This is an absurd situation.
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Figure 1.30: Complexity and risk dimension for investment products. SVSP stands for the
Swiss Derivative Association.
A bank will therefore decide that full understanding a product with a 100 percent capital
guarantee is not relevant - it suffices that the client understands under which condition
the capital guarantee is lost (default of issuer). On the other hand, suppose that a
product is both of maximum complexity and maximum risk. Then, the bank should
ask (i) whether there are enough educated relationship managers able to understand and
explain the product and (ii) how many clients the bank has in this sector. This may
well lead to the conclusion that the product is withdrawn because consulting risks and
the few number of clients are not acceptable. This shows that using complexity and risk
structures the point of sales: If forces the bank to think about its own capacities and the
capacities of the client base in a concrete way, i.e. the product offering of the institution.
1.3.1.2 Point of Sale: Risk and Uncertainty
Risk and uncertainty are two different concepts, leading to different behavior and with
a different neurological foundation.37 According to Knight (1921) risk refers to situation
of perfect knowledge about the probabilities of all outcomes for all alternatives. This
makes it possible to calculate the optimal. Uncertainty refers to situations where the
probabilities are unknown or unknowable. Robust decision making is a specific setting
where one calculates optimal solutions assuming that a set of probabilities can influence
the state variables and where nature chooses the worst probability, see Section 1.8 for
a specific model in intertemporal decision making. Knight perceived that uncertainty
37Gigerenzer and Volz (2012), Gigerenzer and Goldstein (2011), Kahneman (2011), Knight (1921),
Savage (1954), Binmore (2009).
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may afford opportunities for profit that do not exist in situations where risks can be
calculated.
Savage (1954) introduced the term ’small worlds’ for situations of perfect knowledge
where all relevant alternatives, their consequences, and their probabilities are known for
certain. According to him, these are the worlds in which Bayesian theory provides the
best answer. Examples are lotteries and roulette. Small worlds need to be distinguished
from ’large worlds,’ where part of the relevant information is unknown or must be
estimated from small samples, or the future is uncertain. Examples are decisions about
when to plan a picnic, whom to marry, and how to raise your kids.
Decision making under uncertainty is what our brain does most of the time, while
situations of known risk are relatively rare and found mostly in gambling. Savage argued
that applying Bayesian theory to decisions in large uncertain worlds would be utterly
ridiculous’ because there is no way to know all alternatives, consequences, and probabil-
ities. As a consequence, the brain needs strategies beyond Bayes’ rule to succeed in an
uncertain social and physical environment.
The best solution in a world of risk is generally not the best one in a world of un-
certainty. If for risk value-based statistical thinking (e.g., Bayesian probability updating
plus utilities) is sufficient for making good decisions, provided that the problem is com-
putationally tractable then for uncertainty statistical thinking is no longer sufficient but
heuristic thinking is required. The recent financial crises illustrate that statistical tools
for estimating risk, Bayesian or otherwise, failed consistently in the real, uncertain world
of finance (Taleb, 2010). They are optimal when risks are known, but not in a world of
uncertainty. Applying normative theories of risk to uncertain worlds can in fact lead to
disasters. With respect to the financial crash of 2008, Stiglitz (2010) noted: ’It simply
wasn’t true that a world with almost perfect information was very similar to one in which
there was perfect information’. In sum, norms derived from assuming known risks do not
simply generalize to norms under uncertainty.
Consider how to allocate money to N assets is Markowitz’s mean-variance model.
Like all optimizing theories, it assumes a small world with perfect knowledge about the
relevant parameters. Is this theory also optimal in the real, uncertain world of financial
investment, where parameter values are not known for certain but need to be estimated?
De Miguel et al. (2009) compared the mean-variance model with a heuristic called 1/N ,
or equality heuristic. The heuristic simply allocates money toN assets equally. The result
was that 1/N consistently performed better in out-of-sample prediction (an elementary
form of uncertainty). Cross-validation is a prime example of out-of-sample prediction:
the data is divided into two complementary subsets: the in-sample data set, which is
used for fitting the parameters of the competing models and an out-of-sample data set,
which is used for testing how well the models predict (see also below). Note that in data
fitting, that is, when all data are known, the optimizing model always wins, but not in
prediction. None of 12 other optimization models, Bayesian or otherwise, could consis-
tently predict better than the simple heuristic. This result contradicts the widespread
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view that heuristics are always second best to logic and statistical optimization mod-
els. This view makes no distinction between risk and uncertainty. Researchers in this
tradition have evaluated people’s reliance on 1/N negatively and attributed it to their
cognitive limitations. However, ignoring part of the information is what makes heuris-
tics robust for the unknown future, whereas by trying to integrate all information and
estimate the weights, complex strategies such as the mean-variance portfolio suffer from
overfitting the past. The mathematically sophisticated reader who wants to understand
why and when simple heuristics can be more accurate than complex statistical methods
will find an answer in the bias-variance dilemma. The fact that simple heuristics often
outperform "optimization" models in situations of uncertainty has been demonstrated
many times over (Gigerenzer et al., 2011). In order to deal with an uncertain world, the
brain relies on an adaptive toolbox of heuristics. Accordingly, intelligence is defined as
the degree of knowing in which situation to use which heuristic. The scientific study of
this normative question is called the study of the ecological rationality of a heuristic. For
instance, 1/N tends to outperform mean-variance optimization in situations where pre-
dictive uncertainty is high (stocks are hard to predict), the number of options N is large
(the optimization models have to estimate more parameters which leads to more error),
and the sample size is relatively small. In uncertain worlds with these features, 1/N can
be expected to be both faster and more accurate than the mean-variance optimization.
When would mean-variance outperform 1/N? De Miguel et al. (2009) estimated that
with 50 assets, one would need some 500 years of stock data before the optimization
model is profitable. Humans rely on the 1/N heuristic not only for financial investment.
In many situations, fairness and justice are achieved by distributing resources equally.
Our normative argument has fundamental consequences for the neuroscience of deci-
sion making: Claims that the rational brain always works by Bayesian calculations are
founded on the assumption that what is rational in a world of risk is also rational in an
uncertain world - the world our brain has to deal with most of the time. These claims
are also incompatible with three well-known restrictions: Bayesian optimization is not
feasible if (i) the choice alternatives are not known for sure, (ii) the mind has more than
one goal, and (iii) even if all alternatives were known and the mind had only one goal,
the calculations can quickly become computationally intractable, that is, no mind can
actually perform them in a lifetime (Gigerenzer, 2004). Bayesian inference works in small
worlds where there are reliable data for probabilities and only a few alternatives and cues.
We argued that what is optimal in a world of risk is typically not the best in a world of
uncertainty. Consequently, an adapted brain relies on different processes according to the
situation. When faced with risk, using heuristics is of little value, unless the computations
become too difficult. When faced with uncertainty, using logic and statistics is of little
value, unless the part of the problem that is known is being calculated. In an uncertain
world, there is broad experimental evidence that humans and other animals rely on a
toolbox of heuristics. These are based on evolved and learned core capacities and include
(see Gigerenzer and Gaissmaier, 2011):
• Recognition-based heuristics: Recognition heuristic; fluency heuristic.
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• Equality-based heuristics: 1/N .
• One-good-reason heuristics: take-the-best.
• Social heuristics: tit-for-tat, imitate-the-majority.
Consider a simple heuristic that humans and other animals use to make inferences
about an uncertain world: Recognition heuristic (RH): If one of two objects is recog-
nized and the other is not, then infer that the recognized object has the higher value
with respect to the criterion. Goldstein and Gigerenzer, 2011: ’Consider the question
whether Milan or Modena has more inhabitants. If one has heard of Milan but not of
Modena, the inference is that Milan is the larger city. Note that the RH requires semi-
ignorance to be applicable, meaning that if one has heard of both (or neither) objects, it
will not be effective. Experimental studies indicate that a large proportion of subjects rely
on it in uncertain situations, such as when predicting which tennis player will win in
Wimbledon or which political candidate to vote for, and by animals when choosing food.’
Using fMRI, researchers find evidence that RH-based decision processes go beyond au-
tomatically choosing the recognized alternative and are guided by judgments about the
ecological rationality of the RH, as reflected by activation in anterior medial prefrontal
cortex.
1.3.1.3 Model Risk as a Type of Uncertainty
When consider a specific form of model risk :38 Uncertainty about the risky assets
price dynamics. We assume that ...
• ... all agents are rational.
• ... all states of the world are known.
• ... the agents do not know which probability distribution drives the risky asset
dynamics. In this sense there is uncertainty in decision making.
Consider a risk less asset B and single risky asset S. The risky asset S dynamics
is driven by a constant drift plus a noise or random term. In most traditional models
one assumes that the probability distribution P is known with certainty - this is
the zero model risk situation. Model risk is inserted as follows: We assume that the
decision maker does not know P - other probability laws could as well drive the asset
price dynamics. Let P ′ be a different law. P and P ′ can be very different but they have
to possess the property: An impossible price paths under P is also impossible under P ’
and vice versa (the probabilities are called equivalent). If under P the path that the
stock price of say Google doubles within one year is 5 percent, then under P ′ the same
event with a probability of 50 percent or 0.05 percent is allowed - but not with 0 percent.
38We refer to Trojani and Vanini (2002) for formal details in the following discussion. Literature
concerned with ambiguity is Brenner and Izhakian (2011), Dow and Werlang (1992), Epstein and Wang
(1994), Cao et al. (2005) and Ui (2011), Izhakian (2012a), Schmeidler’ (1989).
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Why is equivalence of probabilities or priors required? The most convincing answer is
that in this setup powerful tools from probability exist to analyze these problems.
A second property bounds P ′ from to be ’too distant from P ’ - we limit the extent of
uncertainty. How do we define a measure stick for the distance between probability laws?
This is not trivial since the set of probability laws is not a vector space where the usual
measure stick applies. The quantity used is relative entropy , i.e. a measure of the
discrepancy of the two probabilities. This can be interpreted as the expected surprise ex-
P´ 
P 
Set of all admissible 
models 
Entropy Radius h 
Figure 1.31: Set of model misspecification and relative entropy.
perienced when believing that P describes the model dynamics and being informed that
in fact these are described by P ′. Relative entropy is zero, if P = P ′, see Figure 1.31.
We interpret the entropy measure as the marginal rate of change with which expected
surprises are experienced when we are continuously informed over time about the under-
lying data generating mechanism. How does an agent makes his optimal decision in such
a uncertainty-related setup? As a first step the entropy radius is bounded by a number η.
η is the largest entropy distance for which a model misspecification is seen as relevant by
the agent - doubling of the Google stock price in one year is acceptable but quadrupling
is not considered to be possible. Then the investor chooses his optimal investment strat-
egy and consumption to maximize expected utility under the budget constraint. This is
also deformed due to the model risk of the asset price dynamics entering the constraint.
So far, the decision problem is over the set of all different probabilities within the en-
tropy radius. Which one should the agent consider? The worst case is to assume that
a second player - nature - chooses the probability which is admissible with the worst
consequences for the investor. This is called a robust optimal decision problem . In
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this sense, the optimization problems leads to optimal decisions by the agent where the
model misspecification result deviates maximally from the reference one P . Carrying out
the analysis for an isoelastic current utility of consumption ca/a, a ∈ (0, 1), the optimal
robust consumption and investment rules satisfy:
• A lower variance of equilibrium consumption and a lower variance of expected
growth of equilibrium optimal aggregate consumption compared to the non-robust
problem follows.
• Lower investments in the risky assets, i.e. a larger fraction of wealth is invested in
the risk free asset compared to the non-robust case.
• A decomposition of the market price in the usual market price of risk part plus a
an extra equilibrium reward for risk that arises because of a possible misspecifica-
tion of the given reference model for asset prices. The usual consumption based
market price of risk is of the form market price of risk times risk tolerance (i.e. the
parameter a matters). The market price of risk equals excess return over the risk
free rate divided by volatility.
This description of a basic model of a formal model risk is generalized in several directions.
• Equilibrium analysis, i.e. the impact of model risk on endogenous asset prices is
considered
• Learning, i.e. agents learn about uncertainty.
We do not solve this model analytically since this would take us to far away. But we
solve the non-robust version of this model and then simply state the robust solution.
The non-robust problem in the discussion above is Merton’s optimal consumption
and investment problem. We discuss this model next which is a classic example of an
intellectual innovation . In order of not getting lost in the mathematical formalism we
first consider the structure of intertemporal decision making. An agent chooses a decision
(vector) variable c, which is a function of time. The decision can be a consumption choice,
a choice of portfolio, a cost function, a salary scheme or a combination of them. This
variable is chosen such that the objective function
EP [
∫
T
u(t, c,W )dt]
is optimized with u(t, c,W ) the instantaneous utility function andW the state variable(s).
Instantaneous utility u(t, c,W ) depends on the date, the choice at c at this date and the
state variable W . The (vector) state variable W describes the evolution of states such as
wealth, human capital, risk measures such as Value-at-risk. The set T defines the time
horizon of optimal decision making. P is the probability which the agent assumes to
account for randomness in the state variable - i.e. if Wt is an asset price today, the price
tomorrow is not know with certainty. This optimization is done under the restriction
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that (dWt, ct) ∈ At, i.e. that the state and decision variable assume feasible values. For
the state variables such a feasibility condition is the budget restriction, i.e. a dynamic
relation for the state variable. For the choice variable consumption feasibility for example
means that consumption is never negative. Solving the optimization problem provides
an optimal choice function c∗.39 This function depends on:
• The agents preferences u.
• The probability law P
• The assumptions about the constraints set At.
These are all sources of model risk. Preferences can be misspecified, the probability law
over uncertainty can be distorted, the dynamics of the state vector flawed: If a state vec-
tor turns out to jump over time but the dynamics does not allow for jumps or if it turns
out that it is very difficult to estimate the state vector parameters. This is prominent in
portfolio theory where the necessary estimates of expected returns and correlations are
plagued by estimation risk.
Whereas in the discussion so far the concern is about misspecification of the random-
ness of the state variable dynamics there are situations where also consequences or the
states themselves are uncertain. The A-influenza is such an example where not only the
probability of the spreading disease are unknown but also the states or consequences in
terms of number of deaths is largely unknown.
We formalize Merton’s model which serves as a basic model for many inter temporal
finance optimal decision making models.
We start with an individual which at time t0 wants to maximize utility in a period
[t0, T ] by making continuous decisions ct. One assumes that the dynamics of the state
variable follows a diffusion process:
dW = g(t, c,W )dt+ σ(t, c,W )dB .
The first term is the drift, the second one the noise term. The drift defines the evolu-
tion of say wealth if a small amount of time dt elapses. The drift coefficient function
g is setup in a general form, i.e. the agent can control it through the variable c and it
can be state dependent. The same remarks apply to the volatility function σ. The
expression dB represents an increment of Brownian motion, i.e. it can thought about
a difference between two random variables, closely apart in time, with the properties:
First, (dB)2 = dt. That is displacement in space scales as the square root of time.
Second, the expected value E(dB) = 0. We consider this basic building block for
financial modelling in continuous time later on in more details. We just note that this
stochastic process, i.e. for all t we have random variable Bt (we skipped time index
39Only a few models can be solved analytically.
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above), has a long history starting with the biologist Brown, the mathematician Batch-
lier and Einstein in 1905, Samuelson, Black and Scholes in the 60s and 70s of last century.
If J is the value function, the agent solves
J(t0, w0) = max
c,ω
E
[∫ T
t0
u(t, c,W )dt+ f(W (T ), T )
]
dWt = g(t, c,W, ω)dt+ σ(t, c,W, ω)dBt , W (t0) = w0 . (1.9)
The function f defines terminal utility, w0 is the initial wealth level and ω is the fraction
of wealth invested in the risky assets. This is the second choice variable, the optimal
portfolio choice, besides the consumption stream. How do we solve this optimization
problem in continuous time? The problem can be solved analytically only in some specific
cases, i.e. for some utility functions (log, HARA, CARA, quadratic) and simple functions
g and σ. Therefore a large and impressive body of numerical methods emerged in the
last decades. We use the Principle of Optimality which was developed by Richard
Bellman defining the method of dynamic programming.40 The principle states that an
optimal path c∗t has the property that whatever the initial state conditions and control
values of c over some initial period, the control or decision variable c over the remaining
period must be optimal for the remaining problem, with the state resulting from the
early decisions considered as the initial condition. We show in Appendix 7.1 how the
optimization problem is formally solved for the specification:
u(c) = ca/a , 0 < a < 1 , f(·) = 0
a Geometric Brownian motion dynamics for the risky asset with drift µ and volatility σ
and a risk less asset with return r.
The optimal decision and value are:
V (W ) = α∗W a , c∗ = W (aα∗)
1
a−1 , ω∗ =
µ− r
σ2
1
1− a .
with α∗ a W -independent constant (see the Appendix). This shows that it is optimal
for the individual to invest in the risky asset (and therefore also in the risk free asset)
independent on the state variable. Optimal investment is proportional to the market
price of risk µ−r
σ2
and relative risk aversion 11−a , i.e. a product of market character-
istics and individual preferences. This observation is common to most inter temporal
consumption-investment problems. Optimal consumption is proportional to wealth, i.e.
state dependent. In more complicated models with model risk the optimal investment
variable is no longer state independent. it often becomes dependent on the state variable
describing the stochastic opportunity set. This set can be stochastic due to model risk
40There are two other solution methods, one is the optimal dynamic control of Pontryagin and the
calculus of variations which dates back several hundred years to Lagrange and Euler. Which method to
use depends on the problem which one considers.
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or changing macro economic circumstances. In the optimal consumption and investment
model with model risk discussed above, the optimal decision rules change to:
c∗ = W (aα∗(η))
1
a−1 , ω∗ =
µ− r −√2ησ
σ2
1
1− a
with α∗ a wealth-independent constant (see the Appendix). The uncertainty parameter
η therefore enters in the market price of risk and the optimal consumption path. This
shows that an investor facing model risk will invest less in the risky asset compared to
the investor without model risk. There are various extensions of this basic model: Mod-
els with learning, multiple assets, more realistic constraints. We refer to the literature
for the formal methods, see Anderson (2005), Hansen and Sargent (2001), Hansen and
Sargent (2008), Trojani and Vanini (2002). Using the expression for the optimal con-
sumption and investment strategy the price dynamics of the risky asset and the interest
rate of the risk less investment follow from the market clearing condition in both markets.
Although the above model and its extensions are based on first economic principles
they are hardly used in practice. Uncertainty and risk are considered in a different way.
First, uncertainty is not defined in the above way that one does not know which probabil-
ity laws applies but one knows the set of all possible laws. Uncertainty in practice is not
a well defined statistical concept. Uncertainty is often related to bounded rationality
and lack of knowledge about future states. Therefore, to deal with uncertainty and risk
in practice is much less related to sophisticated formal modelling but more to reasoning.
As an example consider a bank setting a price p for a product. Uncertainty arises if the
bank consider two other prices: pm the market price of the product and p∗ the price
which the bank assumes should be paid for the product. The following alternatives are
possible:
p < pm <
p∗
p < p∗ <
pm
pm < p <
p∗
pm < p
∗ <
p
p∗ < pm <
p
p∗ < p <
pm .
Why should a bank assume that there is a price p∗ different from market prices pm? First,
the bank should not assume this but think about whether this is in their opinion the case
for a specific product. That is, the bank has to use their experience and analytical skills
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to discuss whether the market misprices a product. The six alternatives define different
risks and market shares for the bank. The simple answer to set p = pM = p∗ is only
optimal if there is no uncertainty at all. In all other cases, such a choice is not optimal:
The bank misses opportunities if they can figure out the right inequality relation and
runs large risks if they choose the wrong one. If it turns out ex post that market prices
were too high, the winning situation for the bank is p∗ < p < pm: the bank is on the save
side from the risk perspective and earns a rent compared to all other market participant.
To arrive at such a decision p∗ < p < pm first requires that market misprice financial
instruments and that the bank under consideration has three capacities: First, the bank
needs the experience or analytical strength to identify the mispricing. Second, they need
to be that efficient and effective that they can offer at lower than market prices. Finally,
they need the courage to believe in the view and to act in this respect.
1.3.2 Social Networks
Social networks are mainly interesting for the bank in two respects: Outsorcing of costs
and increased quality of client services and preferential attachment of savings to loans.
It is well known that agents in social networks are motivated to share their knowledge
and to help other people in the network. It is also known that some agents in a so-
cial network, which are independent of the banking institution, know more about what
other bank clients do not understand than the bankers. They offer free, better and often
faster advice than the banking professionals. This defines the business case to setup a
social network where some costs of the client relationship management are outsourced
with non-decreasing quality of consulting. There are examples of large firms (Swisscom)
which implemented such a model and were both costs and quality evolved in the desired
direction. But from a risk perspective what is beneficial today may be harmful to-
morrow. Since the agents in the external network are not banks employees one cannot
dismiss them if they cause problems. Furthermore, the opinion makers in the network
have many followers, i.e. if a bank is in trouble with an opinion maker the bank is in
trouble with a large fraction of the network. The cause of such risks are differences in
values: A priori it is not clear why the different values of a bank and of a social network
community should not contain conflict potential. Even further, the way of communica-
tion in the network has to be transparent to everybody. This leads to a conclusion, that
in case of severe problems the only risk management action is to shut down the network.
But this leads to a disruption between in the client-bank relationship and triggers severe
operational risks. The identification, valuation and management of the risks between a
social network which operates in the point of sales interface of a bank and the business
continuity management of the bank is still in a state of infancy. It is not clear whether
there exist intrinsic motivation such that a network is formed which helps bank to im-
prove their services.
The second aspect of preferential attachment is already implemented in practice:
There are banks and networks or networks which have not a banking status where money
invested is linked to loans. Basically, a network platform allows borrowers and lenders
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to post their needs and preferences. The bank needs matches them. An interesting issue
is who bears credit and liquidity risk. Consider an individual which is willing to hand
its investment to a home owner. The home owner pays interest to the investor. What
happens if the home owner defaults - is it the bank which faces the credit risk or the
investor? Another issue is compliance. Many financial s institutions have been reluctant
to use social media tools because of the stringent compliance and regulations that govern
the sector. This restricts the use of social media as a new channel for traditional business.
We consider Crowd Funding as an example. With Crowd Funding, people which
are looking for money for projects are brought together over the Internet with investors.
This idea from the U.S. has recently extended to the financing of startups or SMEs (small
and mid sized enterprizes). In Europe at present (2012) 37 platform attack traditional
banks in different areas from payments to Crowd Finance. In some jurisdictions, such
as Germany, public offerings require a prospectus. Such a prospectus has to inform
about all types of risks and needs approval by the Bafin (the German regulatory author-
ity). This rule does not applies if the offering is lower than 100’000 EUR. Hence most
providers restrict their business to low capital amounts. Crowd Funding is not risk free.
UK’s Financial Services Authority (FSA) warns investors to naively participate in Crowd
Funding to finance over the internet. ’Many ways to crowdfunding are highly risky, com-
plex, offer no guaranteed return, rarely dividends, and if anything, it takes a long time
until investors see results’, criticizes the FSA (2012). Furthermore, investments are very
illiquid and no secondary market exists. Almost none internet page is regulated or even
controlled, i.e. there is no client protection. Some platform realize that circumventing
regulation will not add value to their business but limit their success. Recently the plat-
form Seedrs, a Crowd Funding platform for startups, is authorized and regulated by the
Financial Services Authority. It took Seedrs two years to bring their business model in
line with the British and European regulatory requirements and the FSA then needed
another year to provide the approval. The platform offers the two classical streams -
invest in startups and raise startup capital.
1.4 Who Innovates, Innovation Life Cycle
Boot and Thakor (1997) model how different institutional structures might lead to differ-
ent levels of innovation. They find that innovation would be lower in a universal banking
system—especially one with substantial market concentration—than in one in which
commercial and investment banking were functionally separated. Essentially, greater
competition among these private parties leads to increased innovation. There is mixed
empirical academic evidence about which type of institution innovates and who follows
the innovation. But from a practitioners view banks with larger market shares will tend
to innovate, as will banks whose clients are more sticky. Innovators earn higher mar-
ket shares than followers, even though imitation is rapid. Innovation has a difficult to
measure impact on reputation. Some investment product innovations face the life cycle
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shown in Figure 3.28.
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Figure 1.32: Life cycle for investment products.
The first player is the innovator. If the innovation is successful the highest margin due
to monopolistic power follows. If innovation fails, the dashed line, the product vanishes.
This is more the rule than the exception for financial innovation. But failures provide
information for subsequent innovations. The next step of successful innovation is the en-
trance of the first market competitors which offer the same product (Followers). To copy
a financial product is a matter of few days for simple structures and for more complicated
ones the advantage of the innovator should not be expected to be longer than roughly a
half a year. This possibility to copy products that fast is due to the absence of patent
rights and the extensive intellectual capacities within the investment banks. We then
enter in a liquid market case. Whether the product is produced by all banks in the mar-
ket or whether some buy it from other ones and serve as a distribution channel to their
clients, depends on the product’s complexity, the bank’s know how and risk appetite.
In the last period of the life cycle efficient production matters, i.e. the production costs
become important. Those banks with inefficient work flows stop selling the product.
Production costs have several components. There are direct costs for the work force, IT
costs, costs for distribution, marketing, education, regulatory and economic capital costs.
Understanding the innovation dynamics has been a long-standing research topic. Mer-
ton (1992) characterizes the dynamics of innovation in the financial service world using a
metaphor of ’financial innovation spiral’ in which one innovation begets the next. We see
the spiral when we consider that the trading of standardized exchange-traded products
facilitates the creation of custom-designed OTC products, which in turn stimulates even
greater trading, lowering transaction costs and making possible even more new products.
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In Merton Miller’s 1986 view on financial innovation, the period from the mid- 1960s to
mid-1980s was a unique one in American financial history. Contrary to his belief about
future innovation, financial markets continued to produce a multitude of new products
(derivatives, alternative risk transfer products, exchange traded funds, and variants of
tax-deductible equity). Tuffano (2002) states: ’A longer view suggests that financial in-
novation is an ongoing process whereby private parties experiment to try to differentiate
their products and services, responding to both sudden and gradual changes in the econ-
omy. Surely, innovation ebbs and flows with some periods exhibiting bursts of activity
and others witnessing a slackening or even backlash.’
1.5 The Impact of Financial Innovation on Society
While most authors acknowledge that innovation has both positive and negative impacts
on society, their conclusion regarding the net impact of financial innovation reflects a
diversity of opinions. Merton (1992) stakes out one side of the argument: ’Financial
innovation is viewed as the “engine” driving the financial system towards its goal of im-
proving the performance of what economists call the “real economy.’ He cites the U.S.
national mortgage market, the development of international markets for financial deriva-
tives and the growth of the mutual fund and investment industries as examples where
innovation has produced enormous social welfare gains. Others take the opposite view-
point to make the argument that innovation’s benefits are less clear: Time and again,
business has seized upon a new idea—junk bonds, LBOs41, derivatives— only to push it
far past its sensible application to a seemingly inevitable disaster.
How do we research the question of the net social benefits of innovation? One ap-
proach attempts to measure the size of the gains for specific innovations, say the in-
novations in mortgage markets in the form of securitization. While some find positive
evidence, other researchers often from the legal and policy literature find contrary evi-
dence by discussing the costs due to tax evasion, reduced tax revenues, loss of confidence
in government and social costs of inequality or inequity. Other arguments against welfare
gains are complexity that in turn leads to bad business decisions and social costs or that
specific innovations contribute to high levels of market volatility and possibly to market
crashes.
Do derivatives have a positive or negative influence on social welfare? Tuffano (2002)
states: ’Despite the best intentions of the authors, their studies cannot measure social
welfare directly, nor can they benchmark the observed outcomes against those never ob-
served. Furthermore, in light of the innovation spiral (where successful innovations beget
others) and the evolutionary process (where many innovations fail), it is exceedingly dif-
ficult to identify the boundaries of a particular innovation, if one wanted to measure its
41A leveraged buyout (LBO) occurs when an investor acquires a controlling interest in a company’s
equity and where a significant percentage of the purchase price is financed through borrowing, i.e.
leverage.
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costs. It is a hopeless task to measure the ex post impacts innovations. Ex ante views
often focus on very specific and narrow aspects of innovation to permit a meaningful dis-
cussion.’ The existing theoretical models are too stylized and to narrow to allow for
general welfare considerations. Duffie and Rahi (1995), summarize a wide range of the
literature: At this early stage, while there are several results providing conditions for the
existence of equilibrium with innovation, the available theory has relatively few norma-
tive or predictive results. From a spanning point of view, we can guess that there are
incentives to set up markets for securities for which there are no close substitutes, and
which may be used to hedge substantive risks. This summary still holds true today. The
complexity of the question contrasts with the strengths of the available analytical tools.
If we setup a general economic model yet the specification of the individual preferences
is a complicated task if one wishes to capture the time-varying opportunity set with and
without innovation and possible feedback effects of decision not related to the innova-
tion part and vice versa. The complexity further increases if one aggregates individual
preferences and tries to derive properties of the general equilibrium. Reality shows that
such a model could only be treated numerically. One might ask, whether the traditional
microeconomic approach is in principle well suited to answer such questions or whether
not a different approach is needed. A lot of the heated debate about the dark side of
financial innovation reflects the shortcomings of traditional analytic tools where moral,
ethics and emotions replace formal thinking.
Given the difficulty to value financial innovation for society, one could propose that
there is value if an innovation becomes successful and that one puts the efforts in the
identification of potential dark sides of innovations.
There is more than evidence that financial innovations is sometimes undertaken to
create complexity and exploit the purchaser - CDO Squared are an example. Some emails
from investment bankers which became public show that some bankers indeed follow such
a client hostile strategy. Paul Volcker said in December 2009 that the biggest innovation
in the industry over the past 20 years had been the cash machine. He went on to attack
the rise of complex products such as credit default swaps (CDS). I wish someone would
give me one shred of neutral evidence that financial innovation has led to economic growth
— one shred of evidence, said Mr Volcker. Many others made a similar point. Krugman
(2007) argues
(T)he innovations of recent years—the alphabet soup of C.D.O.’s and S.I.V.’s, R.M.B.S.
and A.B.C.P.—were sold on false pretenses. They were promoted as ways to spread risk,
making investment safer. What they did instead—aside from making their creators a lot
of money, which they didn’t have to repay when it all went bust—was to spread confusion,
luring investors into taking on more risk than they realized.
Henderson and Pearson (2011) provide evidence for a particular type of structured
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equity product.42 They show that these were overpriced and did not provide any redeem-
ing service to investors. They document 64 issues of SPARQS by Morgan Stanley from
June 2001 to the end of 2005 and show that the return on these risky securities was less
than the risk free rate. They are able to show that these securities have no advantageous
hedging properties, liquidity features or tax advantages that can explain this low return.
During the three and a half years they study Morgan Stanley issued about USD 2.2 billion
of these securities. Their payoffs were tied to the stock price of major listed companies.
They are typically callable after six months and have a maximum maturity of slightly
over a year Henderson and Pearson demonstrate that they have a price premium when
they are issued of 8 percent compared to an equivalent dynamic trading strategy with
exactly the same payoffs. Given the short maturity and interest rates at the time this
means their payoff was less than the risk free rate. Since they are positively correlated
with major stock indices they do not have any advantageous hedging properties. They
are taxed as prepaid terminable forward contracts. If anything this gives them a tax dis-
advantage rather than advantage. Moreover, they are not particularly liquid. Henderson
and Pearson argue investors would have been better off investing in banks’ certificates of
deposit. Structured equity products became very popular not only in the U.S. but also
in Asia and Europe.
Bergstresser (2008) documents that at the peak structured products reached a total
outstanding of Euro 4.4 trillion. He considers a much larger sample than Henderson and
Pearson consisting of 314,000 individual notes including issues in Asia, and Europe as
well as the US. His results are similar. Prior to 2005, these products were overpriced
similarly to those considered by Henderson and Pearson, particularly those issued by
Goldman Sachs and Unicredit. However, subsequently this overpricing was considerably
reduced. There seem to be many occasions where structured equity products were signif-
icantly overpriced in order to extract money from investors who did not fully understand
the alternatives to what they were buying.
I do not intend to comment on the adequacy of the used methods neither I want to
look for a needle in a haystack. When I compare the issuance margin - the 8 percent
difference between the fair price and the issuance price - Henderson and Pearson (2011)
provide about the 1y products SPARQS with the issuance margin of the business of a
large Swiss bank in the last 3 years across all products, then I conclude:
• Innovation has a cultural component.
• The life cycle of innovation insight applies.
These claims follow from the issuance margin in all structured products of a Swiss bank
which ranges in the last three years between 1.15 and 1.32 percent. The value of the
issue amount ranged between 2.5 and 3 Billion CHF. All types of structured products
were considered except vanilla option (warrants, knock-out warrants). The difference
42They are known as Stock Participation Accreting Redemption Quarterly Pay Securities (SPARQS)
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between the pricing of the Swiss bank and the U.S. Investment bank shows that two
differences interfere. First, during the period where SPARQS were issued this type of
product was not a mass type product from the supply side - only few issuers could and
indeed offered the products. In such an early stage of a product life cycle margins are
higher as we already discussed. Second, the incentives, total compensation for bankers
and the way how the bank considers the point of sales are different for people working
for a large investment bank compared to bankers working in smaller, more retailed focus
institution. These differences make have a cultural component. This triggers different
answers to the question ’Which costs do we charge?’.
The vast range of different financial products, types of financial institutions and ser-
vices raise the motivation to search for a categorization. But all attempts to catalog
innovation face some shortcomings. One might ask what the value of such a categoriza-
tion is and for whom? It is doubtful whether people who innovate need a categorization
scheme.
Innovation can mean for example
1. Products (swaps, options, ...),
2. New corporate securities (tier 1 bonds, hybrid capital, ....),
3. Processes (outsourcing industry production, using new transaction processes, ...),
4. Governance (salary system, point of sales, ...).
Although these types of innovations seem independent from each other they often are
not. Innovation often affects several types. Truly novel innovations occur very few. In-
dependent of the originality of an innovation, it has two parts. An act of invention is
followed by a diffusion of new products, services etc. The attempt to categorize innova-
tions tends to be either uninformative (firms use names to differentiate similar products),
not consistent if legal or regulatory definitions are used since innovations often spans be-
tween the defined objects (structured products are a debt-like product but they possess
characteristics of equity and other assets classes), not manageable if products features are
used for categorization (e.g., maturity, redemption provisions, etc.). Academics prefer
to characterize products by their function they serve, see the BIS approach. Merton’s
(1992) functional decomposition identifies six functions delivered by financial systems:
(1) moving funds across time and space; (2) the pooling of funds; (3) managing risk;
(4) extracting information to support decision-making; (5) addressing moral hazard and
asymmetric information problems; and (6) facilitating the sale of purchase of goods and
services through a payment system. There is much overlap in these descriptions. To setup
a Collateralized-Debt-Obligation (CDO) one pools funds, manages risks, and moves funds
across time. The BIS scheme identifies the functions performed by innovation, focusing
on the transfer of risks (both price and credit), the enhancement of liquidity, and the
generation of funds to support enterprizes (through credit and equity.). No commonly
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accepted and unique taxonomy of functions has been adopted. If functions represent
timeless demands put upon financial systems, then why do we observe innovation? Some
authors adopt a static framework, where no attempt is made to explain the timing of
the innovation. Other authors adopt a dynamic framework, where innovations reflect
responses to changes in the environment, and the timing of the innovation mirrors this
change.
1.6 Summary: Impact of Regulatory Changes on Banking
1.7 Global Risk Capacity
1.8 Pricing, Hedging
Pricing and hedging of financial products are key competencies in financial innovation.
The importance of these skills distinguishes the financial sector from other industry sec-
tors. Pricing and hedging is much more demanding in the financial industry due to the
temporal or forward looking properties of financial contracts. Issuing such contracts for
the clients requires for the issuer to master uncertain or risky cash flows. Not all finan-
cial services are forward looking. The pricing of pure adminstration services or advisory
services (financial planning, pension planning) are not considered.
There are three approaches to pricing.
• The integrated economic approach using a fully fledged economic model. Solving
the model, i.e. finding the optimal policies for all agents in the economy under
several constraints such as individual budget constraints and the market clearing
conditions delivers the optimal individual decisions and from market clearing, the
price dynamics of the asset in the economy are specified.
• The no arbitrage approach. This approach starts with the assumption that
arbitrage is not possible: An investment strategy starting with zero initial wealth
ending with certainty with no loss and in at least one state with a gain defines
an arbitrage strategy. Such strategies are ruled out. Using this assumption and
that people like more to less money relative pricing of assets follows: Derivatives
are priced given the exogenous base assets such as stocks or bonds. This relative
approach is neither contradictional nor orthogonal to the first general economic
approach. In fact, no arbitrage is a necessary condition that financial equilibria
exist. We discuss this in the next chapter.
• If prices of base assets do not exist since markets are in a state of infancy in practice
a potpourri of different methods is used: Ad hoc rules, try-and-error approaches,
signaling pricing and others apply.
We consider arbitrage pricing in some details in the next chapter. We therefore focus
on general economic pricing. The difference between the first two approaches can be
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considered as follows. While economists populate the first approach, in the second one
many physicists, mathematicians and other non-economists started to work in the last
two decades (’Quants’). Banks were and are willing to pay high salaries to quants; higher
ones than to comparable jobs which required an economic curriculum. The interdepen-
dence between these two groups is small. The research ’Econophysics’ is an example
that quants and economists often are not communicating. While quants pretend that
their research is closer to reality since in their opinion they use less ambiguous economic
concepts (utility functions), many economists argue that econophysics has little to do
with economics but a lot with the application of physical concepts to economics.
Since ricing of financial products requires models, one faces model risk independent
whether one considers the general equilibrium or the no arbitrage approach. Model risk
sources can be possible misspecification of model parameters (utility functions, correla-
tions), omissions of price sensitive variables, misspecification of estimates or uncertainty.
Consider a new derivative product where no market exists for mark-to-market but mark-
to-model is required for pricing. Traditional pricing models of Black and Scholes (equity),
Black and LIBOR43 market models (interest rates) or extensions of them apply. All these
models face model risk, i.e. there are not enough payoffs to span the possible states of the
world (market incompleteness), trading is restricted (short positioning is not possible)
are two examples, volatility is a constant in the model but a function in reality, etc.
Pricing is only one side of the medal with hedging on the other side. Hedging applies
to investment and trading product innovations where the issuer of the product faces a
liability to the investor. The idea of hedging is: The initial price of a product is chosen
such that the bank can invest in a portfolio which generates the payoff of the product
in any possible states at any future dates. If this is possible, one speaks about a perfect
hedge or replication. One assumes that the bank neither needs to inject additional
money to cover the liability nor can it withdraw cash (self-financing). For other products
such as bank deposits hedging is different. First, there are no tradeable products such
that a bank deposit can be replicated. Second, risk management is defined on the whole
balance sheet. That is interest -, liquidity - and credit risk are considered jointly for the
asset and liability side. Hedging then means that the risk figures of the balance sheet
are calculated and compared with the risk tolerance expressed by Value-at-Risk, Greek
(key rate delta, convexity) and liquidity figures (NSFR) on an daily, operational basis
43London interbank offered rate (LIBOR) describes an interest rate which is published daily by the
British Bankers Association. LIBOR is the average interest rate which banks in London are charging each
other for borrowing. It’s calculated by Thomson Reuters for the British Banking Association (BBA).
It is a used benchmark for short term, i.e. up to 1 year, interest rates. LIBOR is offered in ten major
currencies GBP, USD, EUR, JPY, CHF, CAD, AUD, DKK, SED, and NZD. LIBOR has been a factor
in the pricing of hundreds of trillions of dollars of loans, securities and assets There are many vanilla
LIBOR based instruments which are actively traded both on exchanges and over the counter such as
LIBOR futures, forward rate agreements. The significance of these instruments is that: (a) They allow
professionals effectively hedge their interest rates exposure. (b) One can use them to synthetically create
desired future cash flows and thus effectively manage assets versus liabilities. (c) They allow market
participants express their views on future levels of interest rates.
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and with economic capital and risk budgeting on annual basis.
Hedging of investment and trading products requires that the innovator has a strong
technology, strong human skills and risk capacity. Without a fast performing and secure
IT innovation in financial products is no longer feasible. First, an overview over the
positions is missing which means a blind flight in the management of risks follows. Second,
without a performing infrastructure traders will lose money in particular if their is high
flow due to market panics or market exaggerations. Third, derivative houses are under
permanent attack of specialized software, so called high frequency trading. Say a traders
set bid-ask offers at 100-101. Then the high frequency machine observes this and offers
100.01-100.99.
The pricing and hedging of derivative offer some intellectual challenges. We consider
plain vanilla European call and put options on a liquid stock.44 The pricing of the options
follows from no arbitrage and mathematical reasoning in a perfect market: That is, there
is a unique price formula for this options consistent with no arbitrage. Assuming zero
dividend, the option price is driven by two parameters: The risk free interest rate and
the volatility parameter. But it is not the historical volatility which matter - it is the
implied volatility σim. By definition, this is the value which we put into the theoretical
pricing formula to equalize observable market price:
TheoPrice(σim) = MarketPrice .
This requires an option pricing model such as the Black and Scholes model for example.
Why is volatility a key parameter in trading? First, trading prices of vanilla options
is the same than trading volatility - there is one-to-one relationship in the Black and
Scholes model. An increasing volatility means increasing option prices and vice versa.
We note that implied volatility for a call option by definition leads to the correct market
price of the call but that if one inserts the same value in another option type, say a digital
option, a wrong result follows, even if the options have the same underlying, the same
maturity. As a second remark we observe that implied volatility is not constant. This
parameter is a function of the maturity and the moneyness, i.e. how deep the option
is in- or out-of-the-money. Implied volatility is indeed a surface in the two dimensions
’maturity’ and ’moneyness’. Fixing one dimension, a volatility curve follows, see Figure
1.33.
Figure 1.33 shows the bid and ask volatility curves as a function of the moneyness.
They show a typical shape for equity derivatives: A smile, i.e. U-shaped pattern, and
a skew, i.e. a asymmetric smile. The figure shows that volatility increase with distance
to the at-the-money (ATM) region, i.e. where actual stock price and strike price are
close. This is typically the region of liquidity. The increase in volatility away from ATM
indicates that uncertainty increases which make the option more expensive. Rebonato
44Plain vanilla means that the options do not possess a complicated structure such as trigger events,
barriers or other path dependent features. European means that the option can only be exercised at
maturity.
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Figure 1.33: Volatility curves for fixed maturities for call and put options on Standard
and Poor’s 500 Index.
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summarizes:
The implied volatility is the wrong number to put in the wrong formula
to get the right price.
The traders use the calculated volatility curves from say Eurex options prices.
The Black and Scholes model (BSM) approach is widely used to price vanilla option.
Even though volatility is not constant, the approach is consistent with market prices. But
the model is no longer consistent for path-dependent options, i.e. options where the price
not only depends on the probability distribution at expiry. For all path-dependent options
BSM prices will not be in-line with observed market volatilities for relevant strikes and
maturities. In order to bring prices for path-dependent options in-line with the market,
option specific spreads are presently used on the vanilla option implied volatility surfaces.
Consider a barrier option. Then we face using BSM a problem which volatility we
should plug into the analytical barrier option price formula - the implied volatility at
the strike or barrier level in the volatility surface? One can choose one volatility and
add/subtract a spread for the volatility at the other point. The problem of finding the
single BSM volatility is exacerbated if the distance between the barrier and strike is large.
The reason for the problem magnification is due to the curvature of the skew and often
the large difference between strike and barrier volatility. If one consider other options,
the problem accentuates, i.e. multiple barriers emerge, cash flows can enter, etc. The
BSM then becomes unsuitable.
The Local Volatility Model (LVM) enable pricing of path-dependent option that is
consistent with observed market volatility surfaces without the need of a volatility spread.
The price is systematically determined by providing a set of volatility data instead of a
single volatility value, as is the case with the BSM.
Local volatility models assume the following underlying price dynamics:
dS(t) = rS(t) dt+ σ(St, t)S(t) dWS(t), (1.10)
where σ is a deterministic function of both time and the underlying’s price. This is
opposite to stochastic volatility models where there is an own stochastic dynamics for
the volatility state variable. Hence, the same risk source drives both the underlying and
the volatility in LVM.
The motivation for this model class is as follows. For vanilla options, implied volatil-
ity I(K,T ) = IBS is a function of strike and maturity. Hence, the fair vanilla option
price is a function of K and T or in other words, I(K,T ) determines the risk neutral
probability for vanilla option’s underlying value S(T ) at maturity. The option value at
maturity is independent of the underlying’s path. If we consider a barrier option, not only
the terminal value S(T ) matters for option pricing, i.e. pricing becomes path dependent.
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The implied volatility surface for vanilla options will not tell the right answer, since the
volatility figure is of a global type, i.e. path independent. The path dependency requires
a volatility figure which is also path dependent, i.e. σ(St, t) as for the local volatility
model. Since this volatility is not a global figure but is only valid for given St and t, the
expression "local volatility" is used.
Dupire (94) shows that, given a complete set of European option prices for all strikes
and maturities, local volatilities are uniquely determined by the vanilla option prices and
their derivatives. The Dupire equation describes the relationship between implied and
local volatility. The non-discounted risk-neutral value C = C(S0,K, T ) of a European
call option is given by
C =
∫ ∞
K
ϕ(ST , T )(ST −K) dST (1.11)
where ϕ is the unknown probability density of the final spot price at maturity. Then,
∂C
∂T
=
σ2K2
2
∂2C
∂K2
− rK ∂C
∂K
,
which is the Dupire equation with initial condition
C(K, 0) = (S(0)−K)+ .
For the proof see Appendix 7.2. Implied local volatility σLoc(K,T ) is then defined as:
σ2Loc(K,T ) =
∂C
∂T + rK
∂C
∂K
K2
2
∂2C
∂K2
. (1.12)
This is the local volatility function consistent with the given prices of options and their
sensitivities whereas the unknown density function φ has been eliminated. Equation
(1.12) holds for non-dividend paying stocks. With a continuous dividend stream d,
Dupire’s equation reads:
σ2Loc(K,T ) =
∂C
∂T + (r − d)K ∂C∂K + dC
K2
2
∂2C
∂K2
. (1.13)
It follows that Dupire’s equation is obtained by switching from the PDE in the variables
S, t to a PDE in the variables K,T .
There is a simple interpretation of Dupire equation in terms of static option strategies.
That for, we set the interest rate equal to zero. Then,
σ2Loc(K,T ) =
∂C
∂T
K2
2
∂2C
∂K2
.
But ∂C∂T is the infinitesimal version of
C(S, t,K, T + ∆T )− C(S, t,K, T )
∆T
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i.e. a long call position with maturity T +∆T and a short call with maturity T . In other
words, a calendar spread with strike K. Similar, ∂
2C
∂K2
is the infinitesimal version of
C(S, t,K + ∆K,T )− 2C(S, t,K, T ) + C(S, t,K −∆K,T )
(∆K)2
.
But this is a butterfly spread with strike K. Hence, local variance is proportional to
the ratio of a calendar and a butterfly spread.
Dupire equation looks much like the Black-Scholes equation with t replaced by T
and S replaced by K. But whereas the Black-Scholes equation holds for any contingent
claim on S, Dupire equation holds only for standard calls and puts. This equation tells
you how to find σLoc(K,T ) and hence build an implied local volatility tree from options
prices and their derivatives. You can then use that implied tree to value exotic options
and to hedge standard options, knowing that you have one consistent model that values
all standard options correctly rather than having to use several different inconsistent
Black-Scholes models with different underlying volatilities.
Dupire’s approach requires a continuous set of options data for all K and T . Since
data are only available for a discrete set and options out- and in- the money are suffering
from illiquidity several problems arise in the implementation of the approach. First,
an interpolation between the discrete data points is needed. It turns out that different
interpolation methods have a strong impact on the outcome. Besides this instability due
to the interpolation, the calibration of the local volatility surface is also instable over
time.
If we re-express Dupire equation in term of the original variable, by applying the
chain rule and using the formula for the Greeks in Black and Scholes we get:
Proposition 1.8.1 (Local variance in terms of Black-Scholes implied variance). For zero
dividends and zero interest rates, implied local variance reads in term of Black-Scholes
implied variance:
σ2Loc(K,T ) =
2∂IBS∂T +
IBS
T−t
K2
(
∂2IBS
∂K2
− d1
√
T − t
(
∂IBS
∂K
)2
+ 1IBS
(
1
K
√
T−t + d1
∂IBS
∂K
)2) (1.14)
with
d1 =
ln(S/K) + (r + 12I
2
BS)(T − t)
IBS
√
T − t .
Using the forward price and the transformation
x = ln
(
K
F0,T
)
, y(T, x) = I2BS(K,T |S, t)(T − t),
the result (1.14) reads:
σ2Loc(x, T ) =
∂y
∂T
1− xy ∂y∂x + 14
(
−14 − 1y + x
2
y2
)(
∂y
∂x
)2
+ 12
∂2y
∂x2
.
118 CHAPTER 1. OVERVIEW
This proposition relates the two concepts: Implied local volatility and implied Black
and Scholes volatility.
Proof. For further properties of LVM we refer to the literature, see Derman et al. (1994,
1996), Dupire (1996) and Gatheral (2006). There is in particular a relationship between
local variance and instantaneous variance, i.e. the variance which is for example given in
a stochastic volatility model such as Heston’s one. We only assume that the underlying
process is a diffusion - but no further specification is assumed:
σ2Loc = E
[
σ2T |ST = K
]
.
Implied local volatility is equal to the risk neutral expectation of the instantaneous vari-
ance conditional on the final stock price ST being equal to the strike price K. In this way,
(squared) local volatility can be thought of as the conditional, risk-neutral expectation
of future variance. This is again analogous to forward rates which can be thought of as
the risk-neutral expectation of future interest rates.
There are numerous advantages of using this model in practice. The most impor-
tant of these is that it gives a description of volatility, without adding further sources of
risk/Stochastic factor to the model. Therefore the model will still be complete. This is
due to the LVM being a function only of the stock price and time. This leads to many
nice features of the model. One of these features, and the second major advantage of
the model, is that all European options can be fully hedged using only the underlying
and risk less bonds (as was the case in the BSM). This means that many of the use-
ful features of the BSM are preserved in the LVM. The third advantage of the model
is that it is relatively simple since it only has one stochastic factor, making numerical
implementation fairly easy. Finally, it is important to note that for a sufficiently smooth
IVS, the model guarantees the existence of a unique LVM, meaning that knowledge of
the IVS is equivalent to knowledge of the LVM. The model also has a few drawbacks.
The first of these is that it gives wrong predictions of future volatility. This can be
seen by comparing the model’s prediction today of volatility at some future date, to the
model’s prediction of volatility at that future date after reconstructing the local volatility
surface at that point. These two values will not necessarily be the same, meaning that
the model’s prediction of stock price dynamics can be inconsistent. The local volatility
surface also tends to flatten out over time, meaning that the model predicts that the
implied volatilities will flatten out over time. This is not empirically consistent and so
the model’s representation of stock price dynamics is not perfect. The second drawback
of the model is that it predicts shifts in the IVS due to increases in the stock price that
are contrary to typically observed movements in markets. More specifically, the model
predicts skew shifts to the left for increases in the stock price, whereas in reality, shifts
to the right are often observed. In spite of these drawbacks, the LVM can still be imple-
mented effectively in practice, and it is possible to compensate for some of the problems
with the model.
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The LVM possesses two types of model risk.
• Intrinsic model risk: The LVM gives wrong predictions of future volatility. This
can be seen by comparing the model’s prediction today of volatility at some future
date, to the model’s prediction of volatility at that future date after reconstructing
the local volatility surface at that point. These two values will not necessarily be
the same. The local volatility surface also tends to flatten out over time, meaning
that the model predicts that the implied volatilities will flatten out over time. This
is not empirically consistent. Due to the bad predictive ability and the flattening
of the surface the LVM falls short in volatility dynamics modelling. It is therefore
not very suitable for options which have heavy dependency on the dynamics of the
volatility, e.g. forward starting options.
• Competitiveness model risk: Although the LVM dominates other models such
as BSM for path dependent options in terms of pricing and hedging accuracy,
there is lower intrinsic model risk in LVM, total model while using LVM can be
substantially larger if the competitors which are needed to buy and sell options do
not use the LVM model. That is, if market practice uses prices which are different
than LVM prices and rejects to trade at LVM prices.
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Chapter 2
Discount Factors and No Arbitrage -
The Basics
Pricing of assets is key in financial innovation. This brings us to the roots of finance:
The time value of money or discount factors. We consider first the case of non-stochastic
discount factors. We extend this to the case with risk and relate the stochastic discount
factors to the no arbitrage paradigm.
2.1 Discount Factors - ad hoc View
Since one Swiss Franc today is in general worth more than 1 CHF in the future, cash
flows at different time points cannot simply be added: There is a time value of money.
Cash flows can be pushed forward or backward in time if their time value is considered.
Discount factors precisely provide this information. Consider a future date T and present
date t ≤ T . A discount factor D(t, T ) states how much 1 CHF at future date T is worth
at time t. If interest rates are positive, the discount factor satisfies 0 < D(t, T ) ≤ 1.
Given the discount factors we can value cash flow streams due to their additivity. The
construction of discount factors is therefore a major task in pricing financial contracts.
Using discount factors allows one to reduce the complexity of cash flow profiles. The
simplest way is to shift all cash flow to one particular date and to add the values. The
present or net present value (PV or NPV) is such a measure which values all future cash
flows discounted back to the present date. If all cash flows are projected onto a future
date, the value is called the future value (FV). The PV and FV are used since they
reduce a complicated multi dimensional problem - the comparison of whole cash flow
streams - to a one dimensional comparison of numbers. This makes pricing of contracts
possible. If we can construct the discount factors for different maturities T one can value
and compare all cash flow profiles using the PV or FV.
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There are different ways to express discount factors. This is largely due to different
ways of interest rate compounding. Using continuous compounding the discount factor
reads
D(t, T ) = D(T − t) = e−(T−t)×R
with R the nominal interest rate. Taking the time derivative τ := T − t we get that the
growth rate of the time value of money is the interest rate R. What kind of information
does R reflect? So far, the discount factor captured the time value of money in a stylized
world. But discount factors depend on different factors. Using compounding1 they read
as:
D(0, T ) =
1
(1 +R)T
=
1
(1 +R(risk free, liquidity, credit risk))T
.
A standard way to approach the complicated and not known function R is to expand it
using a Taylor series, i.e.
D(0, T ) =
1
(1 +R(risk free, liquidity, credit risk))T
∼ 1
(1 +R(risk free ) + ∂R∂L∆L+
∂R
∂C∆C)
T
(2.1)
with L representing liquidity and C credit risk. This is a first order approximation
where the terms which are added to the risk free rate are called the credit or liquidity
spread. If the liquidity and credit risk interdependent one can consider the next order
approximation to obtain this cross effects.
The existence of a risk free rate is a fiction. There are market circumstances
where some rates can be considered to be risk free such as default risk for some govern-
ment bonds. The near past however shows that what is assumed to be risk free today
can be risky tomorrow. Even cash is not risk free - inflation and currency risk also affect
the value of cash. Before the financial crisis the LIBOR rates were often considered to
be quasi risk free - reflecting the believe that the large international active banks which
fix LIBOR rates are default free. In the middle of 2012 furthermore the LIBOR fixing
scandal popped up: More than a dozen banks are under investigation by authorities in
Europe, Japan and the United States over the suspected rigging of the LIBOR in the
period 2005 - 2009. calls the risk free assets to be money market accounts. In the finan-
cial turmoil of 2008 it became clear the money market accounts faced default risk of the
respective banks - without the interventions of the governments which put liquidity into
the banking system and gave implicit or explicit state guarantees there would have been
considerable losses in such money market investments. In theory one likes to consider
financial market models where there is one risk free asset and several risky ones. First,
there can be no more than one risk free asset, else arbitrage holds. The assumption of
a risk free asset is possibly driven by psychology and elegance. The existence of a risk
free asset defines a benchmark both for modelling and for practitioners: The return of a
strategy or a portfolio is then the risk free return plus ’a sum of risky returns’. That is
1Compounding means the way how cash flows are considered during the investment period. If they
are consumed - simple compounding follows. If they are reinvested we call it compounding.
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the risk free rate is the opposite to risky rates.
How many discount factors are there in a given currency for fixed dates t and T?
There exists only a single discount factor D(t, T ) for each economic environment.
If this is not true, we construct a money machine, i.e. arbitrage exists. Assume
that there are two discount factors for the Euro in else two identical economic situations.
One discount factor states that 1 Euro tomorrow equals 0.8 Euro today and the other
one 0.9. Buy (a long position) the 0.8 zero bond and sell (a short position) the 0.9 one
at t. Since both pay 1 tomorrow we make the risk less profit of 0.1 per unit Euro.
A second main implications of existing interest rates is on investment and loan busi-
ness. Consider an agent with 100 savings in a currency an positive interest rates. If
the agents do not invests the real value of its savings decreases over time. The amount
of goods for consumption becomes smaller from year to year. Hence, there is an incen-
tives to search for investment products which at least offset the decreasing purchasing
power. Consider in the second case a bank which lends 100 to a borrower for a given
period. If the bank does not charges interest rate payments the borrower will pay back
in the future an amount which is in nominal terms still 100 but which in real units is lower.
Although discount factors are unique interest rates are not. The non-uniqueness
of interest rates is related to how individuals behave in the different time scales which
matter in the time value of money. The different time scales and human behavior are:
• Maturity of the contract T defines a time scale.
• Basis of interest rates, i.e. are the rates calculated on an annual, monthly or
daily basis?
• Individuals can act in two different ways: Cumulated interest in a given period
can be consumed or reinvested. The first behavior leads to simple compounding
interest rate calculation, the second one to compounding.
In the calculation of interest payments one further distinguish between market rates (LI-
BOR), internal rates (Yield-to-maturity YtM) and day count conventions: How many
days has one year and the how are the how do we count the days if accrued interest
occur, i.e. how is ”dd.mm.yyyy − ˜dd.mm.yyyy” defined.
Interest rates are always quoted per annum (p.a.) and nominal interest rates are
quotes. Simple compounding is used for structured products with maturity smaller than
one year, for the LIBOR market interest rates and for accrued interest. Compounding is
applied to saving accounts and bonds. Continuous compounding is used for derivatives
and Treasury Bills for example. We note that the time value of money is always given
by a difference between two dates (T − t). Time homogeneity means that the future
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is not different than the present or that time itself matters only in a relative way in the
time value of money. If one buys a financial product today the price remains unchanged
if one buys the product at a future date if the economic conditions are unchanged. This
assumption is conflicting with modern research about how people make consumption or
investment decisions. This research indicates that decisions depend on the actual date
or vista time: The discount factor is of the form D(s, t, T ) with s the vista-time of
valuation. As an example consider a family spending their summer holidays at the sea
side. The child is then asked to make the following choice: He can have one ice cream
in 5 minutes or two of them in 1 hour. He also has to make the choice now whether
in one year he would then prefer to wait 5 minutes for one ice cream or one hour for
two of them. Impatience is likely to lead to the decision to prefer the immediate ice
cream now and to prefer in one year two of them. Consider the family back in one year
at the sea side under the same circumstances. The child is asked to make the same
choice as in the past year. He then prefers only to wait 5 minutes and not one hour.
He is conflicting his own decision made one year before. This is an example of an intra-
personal conflict or time-inconsistent preferences. Such a decision problem cannot be
modelled using traditional time homogeneous discount factors. There are situations were
individual preferences are more presently oriented than the usual exponential discounting
assume. The traditional form of discounting implies consistent time preferences, i.e. if
an individual is asked to value two future events it does not matter when the individual
is asked for the valuation given that the circumstances remain unchanged. In the case
of more presently oriented preferences this is no longer true, see Rabin and O’Donoghue
(1999). Individual are often aware of the future intra-personal conflicts and use different
strategies to avoid them such as self- or pre-commitment strategies. Suppose that you
know or would feel better if you would clean up your apartment. Although you plan
to do this tomorrow, tomorrow is repeatedly postponed. To commit yourself you decide
to invite for the next weekend guests which then breaks the inconsistency. An elegant
formalism of such presently based preferences is due to Laibson (1997). Let u be the
utility at a given date and U the utility over a period. We set
U t(ut, ut+1, . . . , uT ) = D
tut + β
T∑
s=t+1
Dsus
with β > 1 and D the discount factor. If β = 1, we are back in the exponential dis-
counting case. If u depends on the consumption rate c for β > 1 we get from vista time
t the following marginal utility for consumption at the future date t + 1: βDt+1u′t+1.
At the next day t + 1 the optimal plan of the individual is Dt+1u′t+1. This shows the
conflict of the individual if for unchanged circumstances the only difference is the vista
time of decision making. Vista time explicitly enters in discounting. Although this kind
of research is interesting for individual decision making or even macro economic policy
it is not used to price financial contracts. The main reason is that cash flow valuation
depends on individual time preferences and the question then is: Whose time preference
should matter? Second, suppose that some or even a majority of people fail to decide in
a time consistent way. Is this a convincing argument that one should adopt this behavior
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and price say products in a non-time consistent way too?
Examples
1. We discuss the valuation of a single floating LIBOR cash flow C. C is fixed at date
T1 and payed at T2. Calendar date is 0. The two dates Ti are distant exactly six
months, i.e. we consider 6m LIBOR. We don’t know at 0 what will be the value of
6m LIBOR in T2. The best guess is the forward rate F (0, T1, T2). We derive this
rate using
PV(C) = D(0, T1)
C
1 + F (0, T1, T2)/100× (T2 − T1)/360
= D(0, T1)DF (0, T1, T2)C (2.2)
i.e. the cash flow C is first discounted from T2 to T1 using the forward rate and then
back to 0 using a spot rate discount factor. The term (T2− T1)/360 represents the
day count convention ’Actual/360’. The division by 100 implies that the forward
is a percentage value. On the other hand, we have
PV (C) = D(0, T2)C . (2.3)
No arbitrage implies
D(0, T1)DF (0, T1, T2) = D(0, T2)
. Solving for the forward rate:
F (0, T1, T2) =
(
D(0, T1)
D(0, T2)
− 1
)
× 36
′000
T2 − T1 =
(
D(0, T1)
D(0, T2)
− 1
)
× 1
α1,2
, (2.4)
with α1,2 the accrued interest factor.
2. We consider an investor which buys a capital protected structure product from a
bank (the issuer). The investments is 100 CHF and the product matures after 5
years. The payoff of the product consists of a capital protection part which pays 100
CHF after five years conditional that the bank is not bankrupt and a participation
at a given stock. To guarantee capital protection, the bank invests the PV of 100
buying a zero coupon bond, i.e. an instrument which pays 100 in 5 years and zero
coupons in between. The bank has two alternatives to buy the zero bond from two
other banks with different creditworthiness. bank 1 has a better rating than bank
2. Therefore, bank 1 pays interest rates of one-year Swap plus 2%. Bank 2 instead
pays one-year Swap plus 3%. We assume that one-year Swap is 1%. The inverse
5-years discounting factors for the two banks using simple compounding are
D−11 = 1 + 5(1% + 2%) = 1.15 , D
−1
2 = 1 + 5(1% + 3%) = 1.2 .
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Therefore, the PV for the capital protection part is:
PV1(100) =
100
1.15
, PV2(100) =
100
1.2
.
If the structured product issuer does not account for the different creditworthiness
of the zero bond issuers, buying the bond from bank 2 allows him to show a higher
participation rate for the investor since the difference between the investment of
100 and the PV is used to buy derivatives which generate the participation at the
chosen underlying value. In this case the investor an unhedged higher credit risk
exposure. To see this, let P (B|Yi) be the probability that the issuer B defaults
given that bank i, i = 1, 2 defaults. Assuming P (B|Y1) = P (B|Y2), P (B ∩ Y1) =
1/100, P (Y1) = 2/100 and P (B2) = 5/100 it follows from the equivalence
P (B|Y2) = 1/100× 5/100
2/100
= 5/200 .
Therefore, if the issuer funds the structured product from bank 1 we get the default
probability
P1(B) = 3/100
2 ,
and funding from bank 2 gives
P2(B) = 12.5/100
2 .
The probability of default of the issuer is about 4 times larger if the higher partici-
pation product is issued compared to the other case. The investor faces a four time
larger risk that the promised capital protection evaporates. Hence, to account for
this difference in funding, the discount factors should contain a premium for credit
risk. The situation can become severe if the issuer pushes business with the bank 2
without considering counter party risk in the pricing of the structured products. In
this case, the relation P (B|Y1) = P (B|Y2) is changed into L×P (B|Y1) = P (B|Y2)
with L > 1. That is the issuer has a leveraged position. The leverage multiplies
through the value chain, i.e. it multiplies the credit risk of the final investor in the
structured product.
3. So far we neglected bid/ask spreads. Consider the no arbitrage relation between
forward rates and zero bonds: 1 + F (0, T1, T2) =
p(0,T1)
p(0,T2)
. Replicating the forward
rate means buying the T1 bond and selling short T2 bonds. Therefore, the ask price
F a(0, T1, T2) uses the ask price of the T1 bond and the bid price of the T2 bond,
i.e.
1 + F a(0, T1, T2) =
pa(0, T1)
pb(0, T2)
.
Similarly the bid price of the forward rate satisfies
1 + F b(0, T1, T2) =
pb(0, T1)
pa(0, T2)
.
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F b < F a implies consistency conditions under no arbitrage:
pb(0, T1)p
b(0, T2) < p
a(0, T1)p
a(0, T2) .
4. Negative interest rates. In some currencies such as CHF one observes 2011
and 2012 negative interest rate LIBOR fixings for 1m or even 3m maturity. This
means that 1 CHF is worth less today than say in 3m. Suppose that you lent in
CHF. Does this means that the bank has to pay you for the money lent to you?
Although this is correct from an economic point of view it is not from a legal one
since a negative interest rate violates the meaning of a loan - the borrower has to
compensate the lender and not vice versa. A difficulty arises if documentations
are not properly formulated. Consider an investment product with capital guar-
antee and a participation at the LIBOR rate. If the rate is negative, capital is no
longer guaranteed. Hence banks which wrote LIBOR in their termsheets and not
max(LIBOR, 0) are likely to face claims of investors if after maturity the capital is
not repayed at the guaranteed level. A third problem are interest rate models which
are used for markt-to-model pricing of interest rate derivatives such as caps and
floors. The market standard for these vanilla options is the Black model. This is a
model of the so called log normal type. Basically, the logarithm is not defined for
negative arguments on the real axis. That is, negative rates lead to a break down
of theoretical option pricing. A final problem follows if the LIBOR rate is used to
create synthetic positions where in case of negative rates different procedures apply
to the LIBOR rate. Consider a corporate client which asks for a fixed mortgage
loan. This demand is replicated synthetically as follows:
• The client enters in a 3m LIBOR roll over loan. They pay 3m LIBOR which
is settled each 3m plus a fee.
• The client also enters in a Swap contract with the bank: He pays a fixed rate
and receives the 3m LIBOR rate.
• Netting these two contracts implies that the client pays the fixed swap rate
and the fee, i.e. the LIBOR components cancel.
The problem with negative rates shows up as follows. The loan transaction in 3m
LIBOR and the payer Swap transaction with 3m LIBOR floating leg are in two
different markets. The first one is in the internal corporate banking market, the
second one in trading department which acts on the capital markets. Therefore, if
say in the first markets by the legal view LIBOR cannot be negative for a loan this
view is not applicable in the capital markets: The two LIBOR positions no longer
cancel. A profit and loss follows. The questions is then who is the owner of the
profit and loss - the bank or the client?
5. Inverse term structure. Figure 2.1 shows the price of credit risk for ABB com-
pany in the period Aug 03 until Aug 04. The price of credit risk is expressed for
Credit Default Swaps (CDS) derivatives in bps for different maturities (term struc-
ture). The price reflects how much a protection buyer has to pay to a protection
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Figure 2.1: Term Structure dynamics for ABB CDS risk. On the horizontal axis are the
maturities for the CDS contracts and on the vertical axis the prices in bps p.a. Source:
JP Morgan ORBIT.
seller if the buyer wishes protection in case of ABB default for a given maturity.
The top line shows that in Aug 03 the term structure was inverse. This reflects
that in the CDS market actors believed that if ABB is surviving the nearest future
then it will also survive later on. That is, a situation comparable to an intensive
care case where the probability to die are higher for the short run than for the long
run. ABB faced in this period serious problems: They were hit by general economic
uncertainty, they faced asbestos claims and several mismanagement decisions had
an impact. The stock price was down from over CHF 40 to less than 1 Swiss Franc.
Since ABB could handle the problems, the price of credit risk became normal for
latter term structures.
2.2 Stochastic Discount Factor - Asset Pricing
Stochastic discount factors (SDF) generalize the discount factors of last section, i.e. the
discount factors of last section are contained as a special case in the more general setup.
We follow Cochrane (2005) and Telmer (2007). Besides the introduction of risk we also
derive the SDF from first economic principles leaving the former ad hoc discussion. In
analogy to the short introduction to presently oriented preferences the time value of
money follows from human behavior using a micro economic specification. Let u be
the utility derived from consumption of a good c which is a smooth function, e the
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endowement S the price of a an asset. We consider decision making in a discrete time
setup. Since preferences are time-separable it is sufficient to consider the decision problem
for the consumer at date t and t+1 - the general problem beeing a evident generalization.
The consumer chooses the portfolio φt, i.e. the amount of asset, such that expected utility
is maximized and the budget constraints hold true:
max
φt
u(ct) + Et[bu(ct+1)] (2.5)
ct = et − φtSt
ct+1 = et+1 + φtSt+1 .
b > 0 describes the subjective impatience of the investor and the expectation is condi-
tional on the information available at time t. The randomness enters from the stochastic
prices of the asset. The budget constraints are binding since there is no opportunity
than consumption. We only solve for the investment strategy. A full analysis would also
consider the optimal choice of consumption. We do not carry this out, i.e. the optimal
consumption path will enter implicitly the results. Inserting the budget constraints in the
objective function and deriving the first order conditions w.r.t. φ implies the optimality
condition (FOC)2:
Stu
′
t = Et[bu
′
t+1St+1] , or St = Et[
bu′t+1
u′t
St+1] (2.6)
where the prime denotes the derivative w.r.t. consumption. The condition expresses the
marginal condition for an optimum. At time t there is a loss in utility if the investor
buys another unit of the asset. This loss is equalized to the expected gain in the next
period due to the additional payoff. If we define the SDF
D(t, t+ 1) :=
bu′t+1
u′t
, (2.7)
the basic asset pricing equation reads
St = Et[D(t, t+ 1)St+1] . (2.8)
Since D(t, t) = 1, the discounted price process is a martingale. This implies that it has
no drift or the expectation is constant. This is due to the simplicity of the optimization
problem, i.e. absence of a dynamics of the asset prices for example. If there is no risk,
the asset pricing formula becomes the standard NPV formula. For discrete comounding
we get D(t, t+ 1) = 11+r =
bu′t+1
u′t
. Therefore
(1 + r)
bu′t+1
u′t
= 1 .
2The FOC follow from:
∂
∂φt
(u(et − φtSt) + Et[bu(et+1 + φtSt+1)) = 0 .
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This shows that time impatience and the substition rate are neutralized by the inter-
est rate. The pricing formula tells us that there is a correlation between the random
components of the common discount factor and the asset-specific risk. The SDF is the
marginal rate of substitution, i.e. the rate at which the investor is willing to substitute
consumption at future time for consumption at a present time. The pricing formula can
refer to real (denominated in goods) or nominal (denominated in dollars) prices. The
difference is only in the SDF being real or nominal. If prices are nominal values, real
prices follow by using a numeraire, here a price index Nt, i.e.
St
Nt
= Et[D(t, t+ 1)
St+1
Nt+1
] . (2.9)
The normalization can be packed into the nominal disount factor D leading to a real
discount factor D′. The basic return equation follows at once by taking St inside of the
expectation in (2.8):
1 = Et[D(t, t+ 1)(1 + rt+1)] . (2.10)
Consider several assets. For each asset the return equation (2.10) holds. Pick assets j
and k. We get
0 = Et[D(t, t+ 1)(r
j
t+1 − rkt+1)] . (2.11)
Since the expectation is a scalar product, i.e. E(fg) = 〈f, g〉, the excess return are
orthogonal to the SDF. This is in particular true if one asset is the risk free one. This
leads us directly to risk premia, i.e. the conditional risk premium of asset k is the expected
excess return over the risk-free rate rt: Et[rkt+1 − rt]. The unconditional risk premium
follows by taking expectation of the conditional one and using the tower property, i.e.
we get E[rkt+1 − rt]. Since E(fg) = E(f)E(g) + Cov(f, g), we get from (2.11)
Et[D(t, t+ 1)]Et[(r
j
t+1 − rt)] = −Covt(D(t, t+ 1), rjt+1) . (2.12)
Assets with returns which covary positively with the SDF will pay a negative risk pre-
mium. If the SDF is constant, covariance is zero and risk premia (unconditional and
contional one) are zero. As a first application the law of iterated expectations (tower
law) implies
E[(rjt+1 − rt)] = −
Cov(D(t, t+ 1), rjt+1)
E[D(t, t+ 1)]
. (2.13)
We drop in this case the time indices. If we rewrite the above condition for a benchmark
portoflio return r∗ and divide the two expressions we get
E(rj − r)
E(r∗ − r) =
cov(D, rj)
cov(D, r∗)
=: βj ,
i.e.
E(rj − r) = βjE(r∗ − r) . (2.14)
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If we further specifiy D = a + br∗ for the discount factor βj = cov(r
∗,rj
var(r∗) follows. For
r∗ the market portfolio, the above specification is the CAPM. As a second application
we consider again the case where the covariance between the SDF and the asset is zero.
Then no matter how large the idiosyncratic asset risk is, its volatility, it has no impact
on the asset pricing. Only systematic risk generates a risk correction. We finally apply
the result to mean-variance analysis. If R is a gross return of an asset, we get from the
fundamental asset pricing equation
1 = E[DR] = E[D]E[R] + ρD,Rσ(R)σ(D) . (2.15)
This implies
E[R] =
1
E[D]
− ρD,Rσ(R)σ(D)
E[D]
.
Since 1E[D] equals the risk free rate r and the absolute value of the correlation is bounded
by 1 we get the bound
|E[R]− r| ≤ σ(R)σ(D)
E[D]
. (2.16)
Hence, the set of means and variances of returns is limited. They must lie in the wedge-
shaped region illustrated in Figure 2.2. The boundary is the mean-variance frontier,
i.e. the region which tells the investor ’how much mean return he can get for a given level
of risk’. The frontiers correspond to the unit absolute value correlation. Returns on the
upper part of the frontier are perfectly negatively correlated with the discount factor and
hence positively correlated with consumption. Theyare ’maximally risky’ and thus get the
highest expected returns. Returns on the lower part of the frontier are perfectly positively
correlated with the discount factor and hence negatively correlated with consumption.
They thus provide the best insurance against consumption fluctuations. All frontier
returns are also perfectly correlated with each other, since they are all perfectly correlated
with the discount factor. This fact implies that we can span or synthesize anyfrontier
return from two such returns. Since each point on the mean-variance frontier is perfectly
correlated with the discount factor, we must be able to pick constants a, b, c, d such that
D = a+bRmv, Rmv = d+eD. Thus, any mean-variance efficient return carries all pricing
information. Given a mean-variance efficient return and the risk-free rate, we can find a
discount factor that prices all assets and vice versa. Thus, any mean-variance efficient
return carries all pricing information. Given a mean-variance efficient return and the
risk-free rate, we can find a discount factor that prices all assets and vice versa.
2.3 No Arbitrage
The notion of no arbitrage enters in the pricing of assets, in particular in the pricing
of derivatives such as swaps, structured products, real estate derivatives, credit default
swaps, warrants. Pricing of assets is roughly driven by the no arbitrage principle.
132 CHAPTER 2. DISCOUNT FACTORS AND NO ARBITRAGE - THE BASICS
D D 
1+r 
Figure 2.2: Mean-variance frontier. The mean and standard deviation of all assets priced
by a discount factor m must lie in the wedge-shaped region. Source: Cochrane (2005).
The strength of this approach is that a unique principle leads by logic reasoning
to the prices of derivatives. The theory of no arbitrage pricing has obtained indeed a
mathematical foundation culminating in the work of Delbaen and Schachermayer (1994).
Fortunately, the main ideas can be explained using simple mathematics. We consider
the whole section the simplest possible setup - one period, discrete states.
We consider perfect markets, i.e. we assume:
• There are no transaction costs or taxes.
• All securities are perfectly divisible (i.e. it is possible to buy any fraction of a
share).
• There are no restrictions on short selling.
• Markets are liquid and there is no liquidity premium.
There are three approaches to the pricing of derivatives which are all based on the
no arbitrage principle:
• Replication approach.
• Hedging approach.
2.3. NO ARBITRAGE 133
• Risk neutral pricing.
A different, more absolute approach is the (general) equilibrium approach. The no
arbitrage approach prices assets based on prices of other assets - derivative are priced
given the prices of the underlying values and the use of the no arbitrage principle. The
no arbitrage approach uses minimal behavioral assumptions. The approach cannot de-
tect mispriced underlying assets neither can one understand the implications changes in
taxation or other institutional characteristic on asset prices.
The equilibrium approach is appropriate when we want to value the primitive securi-
ties. To do this we must understand what ultimately drives the supply and demand for
the risky cash flows: Strong assumptions about investor preferences, trading frictions,
information structure are necessary. These strong assumptions make it difficult for equi-
librium models to be successful in practice, i.e. where it is important to know a robust
price of a derivative with precision.
The arbitrage approach is consistent with the equilibrium approach in that all prop-
erties of the former will hold in the latter. The converse, however, is not true.
To motivate the arbitrage approach, we consider a minimal market with two dates,
0 and T .
• There is a stock S with price 100 in a given currency at time 0, see Figure 2.3.
Research estimates that
– the stock raises to a value of 120 with a probability of 90% and
– that the stock drops with a probability of 10% to a price of 80.
• The investor can buy the following contract - a derivative C - at time 0 with the
payoffs at time T
– 20, if the stock rises,
– 0, if the stock drops.
This is a call option with strike 100 for the underlying S.
• There is a risk-less instrument B with price 1 today and which pays 1.1 at time T
independent whether the stock rises or falls.
How much is the investor willing to pay at time 0 for the derivative C - this is the
pricing problem.
We show that there is a unique answer to this question, which can be considered
to be fair. To achieve this goal we introduce the motivations of a seller (writer) and of a
buyer of the derivative.
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Figure 2.3: One period model.
The writer of the derivative would like to obtain a price from the buyer at time 0
such that he can buy a portfolio V0 at 0 which will have a value VT at time T which is
always worth at least the value of the derivative CT at time T , i.e.
VT (ω) ≥ CT (ω) , in all states ω .
The price at time 0 should be high enough that the writer can pay the liability at time
T using the price change of the portfolio V0 up to time VT without additional money3
and using the three instruments S,B,C only. The buyer of the derivative wants not to
pay a price at 0 for the derivative such that the writer can buy a portfolio V at time 0
which is worth more than the derivative value at time T , i.e.
VT (ω) ≤ CT (ω) , in all states ω ,
is the buyer’s intention. The buyer does not want to pay too much for the derivative.
The price, if it exists, where both motivations are met
VT = CT , in all states ω .
is called the fair price of the replication portfolio (we often skip the state variable
ω in the notation). There are no restrictions on the portfolio positions, i.e. we can be
long or short any instrument in the market.
3The portfolio is required to be self-financing: All changes in the portfolio value from time 0 to time
T are due to changes in asset price values in that period.
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What is a ‘state?’ It represents everything that is relevant for the value of the firm,
including firm-specific variables such as earnings and leverage, industry-specific variables
such as product demand and input prices, and macroeconomic variables such as interest
rates and exchange rates. The state includes everything that we are not going to model
explicitly. Sometimes it includes the stock’s price, so that, even though we are ultimately
interested in deriving the stock price as a function of more primitive variables, the dis-
tinction between the state and the price becomes blurred.
Replication is not always possible. This leads to the following definitions.
• Complete Market: VT = CT holds in all states. This is the case of replication
or a perfect hedge.
• Incomplete Markets: VT = CT not always holds true. The portfolio value at
time T can be smaller or larger than the liability value in some states. A portfolio
is called a hedge in such a setup and there exists always hedging risk.
The use of language is less precise in practice. There one always speaks about hedging,
independent whether there is hedging risk. To find the replication portfolio V we buy or
sell an amount A of the risky asset and buy or sell B risk less products. The condition
VT = CT is equivalent to two linear equations for A and B:
A ∗ 120 +B ∗ 1.1 = 20
A ∗ 80 +B ∗ 1.1 = 0 . (2.17)
Solving the system we get
• A = 0.5, i.e. buy 1/2 risky asset.
• B = −36.36, i.e. long a loan with value 36.36.
Choosing A,B in this way, there are no hedge risks. What is the fair price C(0)? To
answer this we calculate the portfolio value at time 0 using the above (A,B)-strategy:
V0 = 0.5 ∗ S0 − 36.36 = 0.5 ∗ 100− 36.36 = 13.64 . (2.18)
Is this also the fair derivative price? Yes. Indeed we apply the Law of One Price which
is a weaker formulation than the no arbitrage principle:
Definition 2.3.1 (Law of One Price). Two assets with identical cash flows must trade
at the same price or if the replication price of an option exists, then this price is unique.
One often states the law of one price as follows: If we have three payoffs x, y, z at a
given date with
z = x+ y .
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Then the prices p(·) at any date of these equal payoffs also agree:
p(z) = p(x) + p(y) .
If this is not true, one constructs money machines. Although this looks like a trivial idea
its consequences are not - they define the innovations called mathematical finance,
financial engineering and the concept is also key in general equilibrium financial
economics.
The probabilities P = (90%, 10%) do not matter in the pricing of the derivative. The
fair price is - if the market is complete - independent on individual belief’s of the market
participants. This is a major reason for the success of derivative pricing. Given this
observation people are tempted to state that the belief is of no importance at all. This is
not true. Suppose that the common belief is that Google’s stock price will raise by 10%
in one week. Then the belief does not enter a derivative contract of Google but it clearly
affects the level of the stock. Therefore, beliefs matter in derivative pricing by affecting
the underlying’s price level.
It is interesting to setup the above market as a game with other people and to ask
them what is the price they would pay for the derivative. Given the price list, for each
price different from the fair one, the arbitrage strategy is defined and the risk less profit
is calculated. Two things are interesting in doing this. First, the list of prices is arbitrary.
That is, most people have no idea about a method to determine the fair price. Second,
the astonishment if they see how the writer of the option makes the risk less profits in a
risky environment - the magic of option pricing plays at this stage.
Since VT = CT we must have V0 = C0. If a different price follows, the writer can make
risk less profits in a risky environment. For V0 < C0, the writer invests the difference in
the risk less asset. If C0 < V0 the writer buys the derivative from the investor and sells
it to the fair price. Again the difference is looked in and invested in the risk less asset.
The law of one price is the most important special cases of no arbitrage.
Example
An investor builds up a stock position. He wants to possess 100 stocks in one year of
a particular firm with today’s stock price S0 = 100. Assuming that the firm pays no
dividend, he considers two investment opportunities:
• Opportunity A: He buys the stock on a forward basis at a price X. This contract
needs no cash at time 0.
• Opportunity B: He buys the stock today. That for, he needs a loan of 10′000 CHF
with an interest rate of 5%.
In both opportunities, the value of the portfolio at time 0 is equal to zero. In the forward
case, the value VT is equal to the difference between spot and forward price X, i.e.
VT = ST −X .
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The value VT for the opportunity B is spot minus repayment of the loan, i.e.
VT = ST − S0(1 + 5%) .
Since the value of the two portfolios is the same at time 0, they have to be equal also at
time T , i.e.
ST −X = ST − S0(1 + 5%) ,
i.e. X = S0(1+5%) = 105. In this case no arbitrage determines the price of the forward
which is equal to the spot price plus the cost-of-carry. We apply this in the Interest
Rate Parity. The interest parity is a basic equation which relates interest rates and FX
rates. The parity is based on the no arbitrage principle. Although theoretical in nature
the parity has wide applications in practice too. There are two parity relations.
• Covered Parity : The return of a domestic risk free investment equals the return of
a foreign risk free investment if the FX risk is hedged using a forward contract.
• Uncovered Parity : The interest differential between two countries is compensated
by the expected FX changes.
An arbitrage strategy tries to make money based on the uncovered parity. Such trades are
called ’carry trades’. We consider first the covered parity and discuss it using Japanese
yen (JPY) and Brazilian Real (BRL). If JPY are exchanged against BRL there is no
guarantee that BRL does not devaluates. Using a FX forward we eliminate this risk. We
assume
• Interest rate Yen RJPY = 1% p.a.
• Interest rate Real RBRL = 10% p.a.
• Spot Rate S(t) = 0.025 BRLJPY.
We consider two dates 0 and T = 01y from a Japanese investor’s view. The investor acts
as follow in 0:
• He borrows JPY 1000 at 1% for 1y, i.e. he pays back JPY 1010 at T .
• He changes the JPY into BRL at the spot rate which gives BRL 25.
• He invests the BRL 25 at 10% for 1y, i.e. he receives at T BRL 27.50.
In T = 1y, the investor changes the BRL 27.50 into JPY at the spot S(T ) which is not
known at 0: The above strategy is risky. To choose a risk free FX strategy he replaces
the today unknown spot rate S(T ) by the known forward price F (0, T ). The forward
price is determined with the above no arbitrage argument. This leads to the covered
interest rate parity. We write Rd for the nominal interest rate in the domestic currency
JPY and Rf for the interest rate in the foreign currency BRL for one year. Figure 2.4
illustrates the strategy where borrowing is in the foreign currency. At 0:
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• The investor borrows BRL for one year. He exchanges the BRL at the spot S(0)
in JPY and invests the JPY for 1y.
• He buys a forward F (0, T ) to exchange in one year JPY against BRL.
At T :
• The investor exchanges (1 +Rd)× F (0, T ) JPY in BRL.
• He pays back the borrowed BRL amount and pays (1 +Rf )× BRL.
  
 
t  1 BRL borrow S(t) JPY receive   
 
 
 
T (1+ Rf)  BRL  (1+ Rd)S(t) /F(t,T)    
 receive BRL receive 
 
Figure 2.4: Representation of the forward strategy to hedge the FX risk.
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To avoid arbitrage at time T the amount received in foreign currency cannot be
larger than the amount of foreign currency payed back. Else a risk less profit follows.
This implies the Covered Interest Rate Parity Theorem (CIP)
F (t, T ) = S(t)
(1 +Rd)
(1 +Rf )
. (2.19)
The difference
Rd −Rf
is the interest rate differential. The covered parity states that the difference between
domestic and foreign interest rate determines the forward price. For lower domestic rates
the forward price of the foreign currency is lower than the spot price.
Assuming S(t) = 106 JPYUSD, Rd (in JPY) = 0.034 and Rf (in USD) = 0.050. We
get for F (t, 1y)
F (t, 1y) = 106× (1− 0.016) JPY/USD = 104.304 JPY/USD.
If this price is violated, say a Bank offers the forward for 100 JPYUSD, then a U.S.
investor exploits this by borrowing in the cheaper USD currency, changing this amount
into Japanese Yen earning the foreign interest rate on this amount and he buys USD on
a forward contract basis. At maturity he changes the Yen into USD at the forward price
and pays back the loan.
A test of the CIP for CHFGBP are corrected delivers for the payoff
F (t, T )− S(t) (1 +Rd)
(1 +Rf)
a median value of −0.00099 for GBP-CHF and −0.00103 for CHF-GBP. This shows that
the deviations are smaller than the bid ask spread. This indicates that it is difficult to
develop no arbitrage strategies in the FX markets.
What is the difference between the uncovered and the covered parity? The difference
is to replace the forward price in the above procedure leading to the CIP by the expected
spot price, i.e. replace F (t, T ) by Et[S(T )] where this the conditional expectation given
the information up to time t.
This leads to uncovered interest rate parity (UIP):
Et[S(T )] = S(t)
(1 +Rd)
(1 +Rf )
. (2.20)
Which view enters the expectation? If one beliefs that the best guess is the same as
the forward rate, we are back to the CIP: There is no FX risk left. Carry trades are a
bet that the expectations formation is different from the forward rate:
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Et[S(T )] 6= F (t, T ) = S(t) (1 +Rd)
(1 +Rf )
. (2.21)
Consider a Swiss investor which needs in 30d JPY. As a first strategy, he buys the
30d JPYCHF forward instead buying the Yen at the spot. This fixes the exchange rate
and he invests the money for 30d in CHF. This is a covered position, i.e. there is no
FX risk. The higher interest rate in CHF is compensated by a discount in the forward.
A second, different strategy is to exchange the CHF in JPY at the spot rate S(t), to
invest the amount in the Japanese money market for 30d and to pay the debt in JPY
back. This also leads to a CIP. The lower Japanese interest rate is compensated by the
difference between spot and forward price. Finally, a third strategy is to invest the CHF
amount and to exchange it in 30d into JPY. This investment is not covered, i.e. FX risk
is only zero if realized 30 spot equals the forward price.
This shows that if the forward is lower than indicated by the CIP one borrows money
in the foreign currency, exchange it in domestic currency at the spot price and lend in
the domestic currency. Contrary, if the forward is higher than CIP indicates, borrow in
the domestic currency, exchange at the spot rate into domestic currency and lend in the
foreign currency.
A currency carry trade is by definition a strategy to borrow in a currency with low
interest rates and to invest simultaneously in a currency with high interest rates. This
can only be profitable if the expected spot price and the forward price deviate, else the
interest rate difference is compensated by the forward price difference. For JPY this
means to borrow at close to zero Japanese interest rates and to invest in a currency with
high rate. Assume that he Japanese rate is 0.5%. The loan in JPY is exchanged at spot
prices into USD where USD interest rates for one year are 5.25%. If the exchange rate
between USD-JPY remains unchanged, the net gain is 4.75%. If USD weakens relative
to JPY the gain shrinks since one then needs more USD to repay the debt in JPY.
Does the UIP holds or equivalently, do carry trades make sense? We tested these
questions and present the results below.
Figure 2.5 shows the distribution of the monthly returns for JPY-USD carry trades.
The results show that in a majority of the cases the returns are positive. If UIP would
hold true the return should be zero. The return are small, i.e. high capital amounts are
needed to make substantial gains (or losses) in carry trades. The variation of the positive
returns is smaller than for the negative ones. Hence, under normal market conditions the
carry trade produces a small positive return. An analysis shows that the median return is
0.005 and that the distribution is skewed to the left: Therefore, with small probabilities
high losses compared to gains are possible in a carry trade.
In the replication approach a portfolio of bonds and stocks was set up to replicate the
derivative payoff. In the hedging approach one considers an unknown amount of the
stock and the derivative. This portfolio is then specified by requiring that the portfolio
has the same value in all states of the world as the risk less bond. Therefore, using the
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Figure 2.5: Monthly returns of a carry trade. Percentage monthly data from Jan 1 1997
to Jan 1 2007 where bid ask spreads were considered. Source: M. Salvi. ZKB
option and the stock one derives the bond property. A portfolio with this property is
hedge position. The same value for A follows as under the replication approach. One
could equally take the last combination - the derivative and the bond - as a portfolio
combination an replicate the stock.
Assume that the market consists of two risky assets and the option. What happens
if the two asset payoffs are linearly dependent, i.e. the assets are redundant? Then, the
replication system has no solution. Similar if there is only one asset the option cannot
be replicated.
We change our market in the initial example as follows: The time T -values of the risky
asset are 80 and 105 and the derivatives pays 10 in the upper state and 0 in the lower one.
Forming the replication portfolio and solving the equations we get A = 0.4, B = −29.1
and V0 = 10.9. This price makes no sense. Why should anybody pay 10.9 for a contract
which pays 10 or 0 at time T? The replication portfolio was setup correctly. Therefore
something must be wrong in the market structure. We show that the market is not free
of arbitrage. To see this, we write the risky asset price moves using the up (’u’) and
down (’d’) notation, i.e. 120 = 100 ∗ u and 80 = 100 ∗ d. Hence, d = 1.2, u = 0.8. We
further write r = 1.1 for the risk less interest factor.
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Proposition 2.3.2. Arbitrage is not possible in the above one period market if and only
if
u > r > d (2.22)
holds
To explain the result, we note that u > d. Suppose r > u > d. Then the risk less
investment always dominates the risky one - in all possible stated tomorrow. Therefore,
go short the risky asset and long the risk less one. In the case u > d > r a similar
argument applies. We obtain for the example at the beginning of the section:
1.2 > 1.1 > 0.8 ⇒ u > r > d .
The above proposition gives us a simple criterium to check whether no arbitrage is
possible or not in a given binomial market.
We consider risk neutral pricing. We have seen that historical probabilities or
beliefs about the risky asset price dynamics do not matter for fair option pricing in the
replication approach. But there is a pricing approach where probabilities matter. These
probabilities are different from the empirical or subjective ones. We define for our one
period market the quantity q:
q =
r − d
u− d . (2.23)
Proposition 2.3.3. Suppose that there are no arbitrage possibilities. Then q is a prob-
ability, the so-called risk neutral probability.
To prove this we show 0 ≤ q ≤ 1. Since r − d > 0 and u − d > 0, we have q > 0.
Assume q > 1. This is equivalent to r − d > u − d, i.e. r > u. This contradicts the
assumption of no arbitrage.
If we calculate q in the original setup we get q = 0.75. In the variant with an arbitrage
opportunity we have q = 1.25. The form of the risk neutral probabilities is
q =
Return relative to risk free
Volatility
.
Again, the original probabilities p, 1 − p do not matter. We can use the quantity as
follows to characterize no arbitrage. The definition of q is equivalent to qu− qd+ d = r.
Multiplying the last equality with S0 we get (using the notation SuT = S0u)
qSuT + (1− q)SdT︸ ︷︷ ︸
Expected value under Q
= EQ[ST ] = rS0 .
Dividing by r:
EQ[
ST
r
] = S0 .
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In an arbitrage free market, the expected value of discounted risky assets under the
risk neutral probability equals today’s discounted asset value (note that S0/1 is the dis-
counted value in 0). This generalizes to many period models - themartingale property
for discounted risky assets. The First Fundamental Theorem of Finance states that
converse also holds. The existence of a martingale measure implies no arbitrage. Since
martingales have no drift, the expected value of the discounted price process is constant.
Given that interest rates in 2012 are close to zero in Switzerland the martingale property
for discounted Swiss stocks implies that one expected zero growth for Swiss stocks. This
reasoning is not true since the martingale property holds under the risk neutral proba-
bility - the real life probability is obtained by adjusting the risk neutral one by the drift
of the stock prices. We consider this below in more details.
We relate the replicating approach to the risk neutral one. The solution of the
general replication equations
A ∗ S0 ∗ u+B ∗ r = Cu
A ∗ S0 ∗ d+B ∗ r = Cd (2.24)
is
A =
Cu − Cd
S0u− S0d , B =
Cu d− Cd u
dr − ur
A measures the price sensitivity of the derivative given a price change of the underlying
risky asset. This sensitivity is called the Delta, i.e. A = ∆. We have at time 0:
V0 = AS0 +B = ∆S0 +B . (2.25)
Transforming this expression we get after some algebra:
V0 = C0 = DeltaS0 +B (2.26)
=
1
r
(
Cuq + Cd(1− q)
)
= EQ[
1
r
CT ] ,
i.e. the fair option price is equal to the discounted payoff under the risk neutral proba-
bility Q.
Fair derivative prices are expected values of discounted terminal payoffs under the risk
neutral probability. The discounted derivative process is a martingale under the risk
neutral probability. The existence of a synthetic probability Q leads to an arbitrage free
market structure. The objective or empirical probabilities P does not enter derivative
pricing formula.
Instead of a market with a risky and a risk less asset, we can consider a more general
setup with two risky assets:
A ∗ SuT +B ∗XuT = CuT
A ∗ SuT +B ∗XdT = CdT . (2.27)
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with S and X two assets and C the derivative. Using X as numeraire, the discounted
option and risky asset S are both martingales. Indeed, it follows that C or the replicating
portfolio is a martingale if and only if S is a martingale:
C0
X0
= EQ
X
[
CT
XT
]
⇐⇒ S0
X0
= EQ
X
[
ST
XT
]
. (2.28)
The probability QX depends on the choice of the numeraire:
qX =
S0
X0
− SdT
XdT
SuT
XuT
− SdT
XdT
.
We summarize. First, the advantage of relative pricing w.r.t. X is that the probability
QX is independent of the claim or replicating portfolio and the pricing equation (2.28)
holds for all derivatives C. Second, both the derivative and the relative asset price are
martingale measures, i.e. the measure related to the numeraire. Third, we could choose
S as a numeraire instead of X. This leads to a new measure QS such that X/S and C/S
are martingales under this new measure: The choice of a numeraire does not alter the
price of the derivative 4. One can b chose to most convenient for calculations. Fourth, if
we would consider absolute pricing (pricing using a general equilibrium model) instead
of relative one, the martingale measure for a derivative depends on the specific derivative
payoff VT . This is a main reason why one uses relative no arbitrage pricing in practice
much more often than a fully fledged general equilibrium model.
2.3.1 General One Period Model
Using linear algebra the above toy one period model can be generalized to multiple assets
and several periods. The linear replication equations are generalized as follows.
Definition 2.3.4. Consider a one-period model with K > 1 states at time T and N − 1
risky assets S and a risk less asset B. The price of asset j at time T in state k is given
by Sj(k). The payoff matrix PT is defined by
PT =
 B
1(1) S2(1) · · · SN (1)
...
...
. . .
...
B1(k) S2(k) · · · SN (k)
 . (2.29)
A portfolio or a strategy is a vector φ = (φ1, . . . , φN )′ with X ′ the transpose of X.
In our basic one period model we have two states (K = 2), two assets (N = 2) and
the strategy φ = (B,A). The matrix PT has the dimension K × N . If φk < 0, there is
4The numeraire has to be a strictly positive random variable or stochastic process.
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a short position in the asset k. The payoff or portfolio value at time T in state k is the
product of the payoff matrix and the strategy vector, i.e.
VT (k) =
N∑
n=1
φnS
n(k) (2.30)
and the payoff vector is VT = PTφ.
Definition 2.3.5. A payoff VT is attainable given a market structure PT if a portfolio φ
exists such that VT = PTφ. The portfolio φ is called a replication portfolio.
Examples:
We rewrite the replication formula (2.27) in matrix form
PTφ = CT , PT =
(
1.1 120
1.1 80
)
, φ = (A,B)′ , CT = (20, 0)′ . (2.31)
Consider the following variation of the one period model: There are not 2 but 3 states
for the assets at time T . Everything else remains the same. The matrix PT reads:
PT =
 1.1 1201.1 80
1.1 x

with x a value for the risky asset in the third state. The linear replication equation has
then - if the assets are linearly independent - no solution. Replication is therefore not
possible. In the other case, we assume that there are still two states but we have 2 risky
assets. Then PT is of the form
PT =
(
1.1 120 x
1.1 80 y
)
.
The linear replication equations typically will have an infinite number of solutions. This
shows that the number of states and the number of risky determine the market structure.
The system
VT = PTφ → φ = P−1T VT
has a solution if PT is invertible. If N = K and if the rows or columns are linearly in-
dependent the inverse exists. Intuitively, for N = K the sources of randomness, i.e. the
number of risky assets, can spanned in all state by the assets. What happens if there are
more states than assets, i.e. K > N? Then the replication problem has no solution. In
the case K < N there are more variables φ than equations. Linear algebra implies that
an infinite number of solutions is the generic case. We have fewer risk sources than assets.
Definition 2.3.6. A market with a payoff matrix PT is complete if each claim VT can
be obtained, i.e. there exists a strategy such that VT = PTφ.
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If PT is invertible, market completeness follows. This means that the rank of PT has
to be equal to K, i.e. the number of assets is not lower than the number of states. Given
a market with payoff matrix PT and asset price vector S0, arbitrage is defined as follow:
Definition 2.3.7. Consider a market with payoff matrix PT and asset price vector S0.
An arbitrage is a portfolio φ = (φ1, . . . , φN )′ such that
• the initial portfolio value V0 = 〈S0, φ〉 ≤ 05 is not positive,
• the payoff of the portfolio φ is not negative for all states k and
• and there exists at least a single state k˜ where VT (k˜) > 0 or 〈S0, φ〉 < 0 holds.
Starting with no money the strategy leads to a portfolio where no loss is possible
and if some specific states are realized even a gain follows. When do we know that a
market is free of arbitrage? In the one period model the statement of no arbitrage can
be restated equivalently in terms of geometry and linear algebra. An application of the
Separating Hyperplane Theorem leads to the following characterization of no arbitrage:
Proposition 2.3.8 (First Fundamental Theorem of Finance (FFTF)). There is no ar-
bitrage opportunity if and only if there exists a vector ψ ∈ RK , ψj > 0 for all j, such
that
P′Tψ = S0 . (2.32)
The proof is given in Appendix 7.3.
This theorem is a characterization theorem. It characterizes a relationship that must
exist between given security prices and payoffs if no arbitrage opportunities are to
exist. It does not tell what security prices should be. They come from market equilibrium
(i.e., supply = demand). The FFTF states that the price of asset i at time 0 is given by
Si(0) =
K∑
j=1
ψjS
i(j) .
To further specify and obtain an interpretation, consider first the risk less asset, i.e.
i = 1, Then
B(0) =: B0 =
K∑
j=1
ψjB
1(j) =
K∑
j=1
ψj × 1 =
K∑
j=1
ψj
since the risk less asset pays 1 in all possible K states. If we normalize the right hand
side of the last equation, i.e. we set
φ0 :=
K∑
j=1
ψj
5We write 〈x, y〉 for the scalar product of two vectors x, y.
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and
qi = ψi/ψ0 , ∀i ,
the risk less asset can be rewritten
B0/ψ0 =
K∑
j=1
qjB
1(j) = 1 .
Therefore, ψ0 is the discount on a risk less borrowing. If r in the risk less annual interest
rate, we write
B0 = ψ0 =
1
(1 + r)T
.
This implies for all other risky assets:
Si(0) =
K∑
j=1
ψjS
i(j) =
1
(1 + r)T
K∑
j=1
qjS
i(j) = EQ[
Si
(1 + r)T
] .
Since the sum of the qi’s is equal to 1 and for all qi > 0 - the q’s are probabilities.
The qi are called risk neutral probabilities. This shows the equivalence of risk neutral
probabilities and state prices:
qi
(1 + r)T
! ψi .
To obtain an interpretation of the state price vector, we introduce the Arrow-Debreu
securities, that is a set of securities e(j), j = 1, . . . ,K where the security e(m) pays 1
CHF if the state m is realized and zero else. The First Fundamental Theorem of Finance
implies 
1
e(1)
. . .
e(K)
 =

(1 + r)T · · · · · · (1 + r)T
1 0 0 0
· · · · · · · · · · · ·
0 · · · 0 1


ψ1
ψ1
. . .
ψK
 .
Hence, e(j) = ψj follows.
Corollary 2.3.9. State-price densities are the prices of the Arrow-Debreu securities.
Using the FFTF the stochastic discount factor D satisfies
Sj0 = E[D(0, T )Pj ]
with Pj the j-th row of the payoff matrix and the expectation w.r.t. to the objective or
statistical probability measure P . The stochastic discount factor in state s, Ds is equal
to Ds = ψs/ps, i.e. it is the state price, per unit probability.
We state and prove the Riesz-Fischer Theorem in Appendix 7.3. This theorem is the
basis for the above linear pricing relationship. It states that any linear function on a
particular vector space has an scalar product representation.To apply this to our case: A
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system of prices (S0, D) is consistent with no arbitrage if and only if there exists a SDF
D such that the linear representation Sj0 = E[D(0, T )Pj ] holds for all j. The expected
value has the property of a scalar product, i.e.
Sj0 = E[D(0, T )Pj ] = 〈D(0, T ),Pj〉 .
Hence the Riesz-Fischer Theorem states that if f(Pj) is linear then it f can be uniquely
represented by the scalar product, i.e. the expectation.
Given the equivalence between state-price densities and risk neutral probabilities, we
restate the First Fundamental Theorem of Finance:
Proposition 2.3.10 (First Fundamental Theorem of Finance). There is no arbitrage
opportunity if and only if a risk neutral probability exists.
The absence of no arbitrage does not implies that the risk neutral probability is
unique. In fact, there can be an infinite number of them. Which one should we take for
pricing? Our market structure together with the no arbitrage condition is not sufficient to
imply an unique price. Such markets are called incomplete. The Second Fundamental
Theorem of Finance considers the case where pricing is unique.
Proposition 2.3.11 (Second Fundamental Theorem of Finance). Consider an arbitrage
free market. The state price vector is unique if and only if the market is complete.
Hence, market completeness is equivalent to the uniqueness of the risk neutral prob-
ability.
Proof. To show that completeness implies uniqueness of the state vector, assume that
there exist two state vectors ψ1, ψ2 which both solve the equation S0 = Pψ. This then
implies that 0 = P(ψ1 − ψ2), i.e. the vector difference is orthogonal to all rows of the
payoff matrix. Therefore, the difference is not attainable which contradicts that the two
vectors are state price vectors. The other direction is proved with a similar argument.
Examples
1. Consider the following structure:
PT =
(
4 6 2
12 3 9
)
, S′0 = (7, 3, 5)
The equation for the state price density reads
D′Tψ = S(0) .
One solution of the linear system
ψ′ = (1/4, 1/1) .
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The market is free of arbitrage. That the system has a solution is the exception
and not the rule. That is, a system of 3 equations and 2 unknowns typically has no
solution. Intuitively we have 3 securities and 2 states. The expectation is that the
payoffs of the three non-redundant securities are conflicting, i.e. the system has no
solution and arbitrage is possible.
2. We consider the following market with a risk less and a risky asset with 3 states.
This is the next two examples are taken from Frey and Schmidt (2006)
PT =
 1 1801 150
1 120
 , S(0) = (1, 150)′
i.e. we assume that interest rates are zero. The defining equation D′ψ = S0 reads
explicitly
150 = 180ψ1 + 150ψ2 + 120ψ3
1 = ψ1 + ψ2 + ψ3 .
Since there are more unknowns than equations, one expects a continuum of state
price densities to satisfy the no arbitrage condition. The solution reads
ψ1 = ψ3 , ψ2 = 1− ψ3 .
Since all state prices have to be strictly positive, the following parametrization
describes the set of all state prices:
ψ = {(a, 1− 2a, a) , a ∈ (0, 1/2)} .
This market is free of arbitrage within the given parametrization set but incomplete.
This means that there exist self-financing portfolios φ such that there are claims VT
which are not replicable in all possible future states at date T : Hence, VT 6= PTφ
for some states. In this example consider a call option which payoff (30, 0, 0). The
standard replication equations are
A+B ∗ 180 = 30
A+B ∗ 150 = 0
A+B ∗ 120 = 0 .
The first and third equation imply A = −60, B = 1/2. But this choice does not
solve the second equation. Hence the call option is not attainable.
Since the difference VT − PTφ is not zero, hedge risks exist. No arbitrage alone
does not leads to a unique price a second criterion is needed to enforce uniqueness.
The most important one is the market, i.e. the price of a derivative depends on
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parameters which are not fully specified within the model itself. The derivative
price is fixed by mapping the parameterized prices to observed market prices. This
approach is used in interest rate modelling for example and is known as "inverting
the yield curve". Academic research considers various other approaches such super-
replication, quadratic hedging, quantile hedging for example.
Super-replication is e a criterion where one searches for a strategy φ such that
PTφ ≥ VT holds and the strategy costs are minimal, i.e. 〈S0, φ〉 attains a minimum
value. Using such a strategy, the seller of the product is on the safe side ( PTφ ≥
VT ). The price of this strategy is often prohibitive large. This is due to the
requirement that the hedge portfolio is in all possible states worth at least the
liability VT . It follows that super replication amounts to solve the problem
sup{EQ[V˜T ] , Q a risk neutral probability} ,
where V˜ is the discounted payoff. Hence, super replication is to find the risk neutral
probability which gives the highest discounted payoff value. If we introduce the
claim VT = (30, 0, 0)′ in our example, we have to solve
sup{a30 + (1− 2a)0 + a0, a ∈ (0, 1/2)} .
The solution is given by a = 1/2 which implies
sup{EQ[V˜T ] , Q a risk neutral probability} = 15 .
This leads to a degenerate state price vector ψ = (1/2, 0, 1/2), i.e. a corner solution
where at least one state price density is zero. Since state price densities have to be
strictly positive such that arbitrage is not possible the calculations in incomplete
markets deliver prices which form the bounds for no arbitrage prices. Using this
vector one replicates the claim
φ′1 + 180φ
′
2 = 30 , φ
′
1 + 120φ
′
2 = 0 .
The solution is φ′1 = −60 and φ′2 = 1/2. This leads to the costs
〈S0, φ′〉 = −60 + 1/2× 150 = 15 .
There the fair premium equals the upper bound of the expected value over all risk
neutral probabilities.
3. We consider an incomplete market in one period with two securities S (risky)
and B (risk less). The security B pays in each state at the end of the period
CHF 1. The risky security S can achieve three states at the end of the period:
Su = S0u > S
m = S0m > Sd = S0d with S0 the initial price and the up/mid/down
parameters u/m/d. This model extends the basic complete market binomial or
Cox-Ross-Rubinstein model, see Section ??. The trinomial model is incomplete
since the payoff matrix has the dimension 3 × 2 or alternatively, there are more
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states than traded asset to span the states. Since there is a risk less asset, the three
state prices add up to the risk less discounting factor:
1
1 +R
= ψ1 + ψ2 + ψ3 . (2.33)
The second condition S(0) =
∑
j ψjS
j follows from no arbitrage. Since Sj =
S(0)× x with x = u,m or d the condition reads:
1 = uψ1 +mψ2 + dψ3 . (2.34)
Equation (2.33) and (2.34) are two equations for the three dimensional state price
vector. In the binomial models there are two equations for a two dimensional state
price vector. A unique state price vector exists. The market is complete. In the
trinomial model the solution of the two equations is in general a line which shows
that there is a continuum of no arbitrage free prices, see Figure 2.6.
Figure 2.6: Intersection of the two planes (2.33) and (2.34) defining the bounded line of
arbitrage free prices. The parameters are u = 1.2,m = 1.1, d = 0.9, R = 0.4.
Therefore, the state price vector is not unique. Despite the incompleteness the no
arbitrage condition is the same as in the binomial model: There is no arbitrage if
and only if
d < 1 +R < u .
The line is bounded by the requirement that state prices are positive. Each vector
on the line segment used to price derivatives leads to arbitrage free prices. Solving
two equations, the boundary points of the line segment follow: One gets for m ≥
1 +R
ψ1 =
1 +R− d
(1 +R)(u− d) , ψ2 = 0 , ψ3 =
u− 1−R
(1 +R)(u− d) ,
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and
ψ1 = 0 , ψ2 =
m− 1−R
(1 + r)(m− d) , ψ3 =
1 +R− d
(1 +R)(m− d) .
A similar solution holds it the mid-move m is lower than the risk less one (m < 1+
R). The boundary values do not lead to arbitrage free prices since some components
of the state price densities are not strictly positive. It is a general fact, that extreme
or boundary values lead to arbitrage opportunities. If m → d or m → u, the
trinomial model collapses to the binomial one, the state price are
ψ1 =
1
1 +R
q , ψ2 =
1
1 +R
(1− q) , ψ3 = 0 .
Consider a call option in this market with strike Sm < K < Su. The cash flows
are Su −K in state 1 and zero in the two other states. The no arbitrage price is
the expected value
C = ψ1(S
u −K)
Using the two possible state prices
ψ1 =
1 +R− d
(1 +R)(u− d) , ψ1 = 0
in the case m ≥ 1 +R the upper C+ and lower bound C− for the call price follow:
C+ =
1 +R− d
(1 +R)(u− d)(S
u −K) , C− = 0
For m < 1 +R, ψ1 = 1+R−m(1+R)(u−m) , holds and the option price is
C =
1 +R−m
(1 +R)(u−m)(S
u −K) .
If the trinomial model tends to a binomial one, i.e. m tod for example, the upper
and lower bond prices collapse, i.e.
C+ = C =
1
1 + r
q(Su −K) .
Before we do the next step in option pricing, the generalization to multi periods, we
make a break and consider other topics of options in the next section.
2.3.2 Options Basics and Option Strategies
We considered the pricing of options in the last sections. But there is more than pricing.
First, there are properties of options which are pricing model independent. Second, op-
tions can be used to define investment strategies. We introduce some basic option types
in this section, discuss model-free relationships and propose some classic, static option
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strategies.
A European-style call option/warrant confers the right to purchase at a specific point
(maturity T ) in time a specific amount (strike K) of a specific underlying security (S)
at a specific price. If the right to purchase the underlying is given for a whole period
the option is of the American style. Call warrants are essentially the securities form of
standardized call options. Consequently, they are easier to trade for private investors. If
in the definition the right to buy is changed to the right of sell the option is called a put
option.
Options can be classified according different characteristics: The exercise-type (Eu-
ropean or American), the complexity of the payoff (simple or vanilla and exotic) and the
trading type (warrant, OTC or standardized options such as Eurex-options).
The option price has two components: the intrinsic value, i.e. the value when you sell
an option at a given date, and the time value. The intrinsic value of a call with strike K
is
Ct = max(St −K, 0) =: (St −K)+
with St the price of the underlying at time t. This is the value when the call is exercised
at a date t. If St−K > 0, the option is in-the-money and it pays to exercise. If St−K < 0
at any date t it is not rational to buy the underlying at a price K is it worth the lower
value St - hence one uses the optionality of not exercising the call. This leads to the kink
or maximum in the payoff formula. At maturity T the intrinsic value equals the payoff
and time value is zero. The intrinsic value can never be negative since its the intrinsic
value of an option and not of an obligation. This value is model independent, i.e. it can
be read off from market data. What can be said about the time value? We consider at
a date t < T the portfolio Vt in Table 2.1:
Portfolio V Vt VT if ST < K VT if ST ≥ K
Short S −St −ST −ST
Long call C +Ct 0 ST −K
Risk less PV (K) +K +K
Portfolio value −St + Ct + PV (K) K − ST > 0 0
Table 2.1: Time value of a call.
We assume in this first part that the underlying stock is paying no dividends. The
portfolio value in 2.1 is at maturity never negative. No arbitrage implies that the portfolio
can never be negative at any prior date t too, i.e.
−St + Ct + PV (K) ≥ 0 .
Assuming positive interest rates, PV (K) is smaller than K. Therefore,
Ct ≥ St − PV (K) > St −K ,
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that is the option price at any time t prior to maturity is strictly larger then the intrinsic
value. Therefore, the call option price for positive interest rates is never smaller than
the intrinsic value - the difference is the time value. The non linearity of the payoff for
options is basic to generate a time value. To see this, we linearize the payoff in 2.2, i.e. at
the kink of the strike value we would have the following cash flows (bold faced) Therefore
Portfolio V Vt VT if ST < K VT if ST ≥ K
Short S −St −ST −ST
Long derivative C ′ +C ′t ST −K ST −K
Risk less PV (K) +K +K
Portfolio value −St + C ′t + PV (K) 0 0
Table 2.2: Time value of a linear payoff.
the time value of such a linear payoff, i.e. a forward contract, is zero. Contrary to the
intrinsic value the quantification of the time value requires a model.
Options satisfy structural constraints which a pricing model independent, see Figure
2.7.
Underlying 
Strike 0 
Underlying 
Strike 0 
Strike Level 
Strike                          
Call                          Put                          
Figure 2.7: Model independent price bounds for call options (European or American
style) and American puts. Source: Zurich Cantonal Bank.
The value of a call is always less or equal than the underlying value. To understand
this, assume a strike of 0, then the call value is equal to the underlying value. For any
higher strike the call value is lower than the underlying value. The values are bounded
above by the intrinsic value - the price bands for a call follows. For puts similar a reason-
ing implies that the put value is smaller or equal to the strike. If C and Ca are the call
prices for an European and American call, respectively, the first restriction states that
all prices are non-negative which reflects the optionality. A second restriction is that at
maturity the American and European style options have the same value since time value
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is zero and the American feature to early exercise is worthless. Third, since American
options can be exercised any time they must always be worth at least their intrinsic
value, else arbitrage is possible by buying the option and immediate exercising them.
This condition is not valid for European style options. Fourth, since additional rights
cannot have negative value the American style options cannot be worth less than their
European style counter parts. For non-dividend paying stocks the price of an American
call is equal to the price of an European one. This is surprising since the American
call seems to have a more valuable optionality than the European one. To understand
the equality, we recall that the value of an European option is not less than its intrinsic
value. Assume that it is worth to early exercise at t < T . One obtains the underlying
value St and pays the strike K. Hence one gives up the interest rate on K between t
and T . Therefore, it is optimal to pay K as late as possible, i.e. at maturity T . This
shows that early exercise is not optimal which sets the price of the American call equal
to the European one. If the stock pays dividends, to sell a call early makes sense if the
received dividend value exceeds the described interest rate loss. For puts, even without
dividends, we always have that Pa ≥ P . Consider a put with strike K = 10 and assume
that the underlying becomes worthless. Early exercising gives a profit of 10 and waiting
does not increase the profit. Even worse, 10 today are worth more than 10 in the future.
Therefore early exercise can be rationale for puts. The structural difference between calls
and puts is that for former one pays for the strike whereas for puts one obtains the strike.
Fifth, the higher the strike for a call the lower the call price since profitability or
the change to be ITM (in-the-money, i.e. S > K) decreases with increasing strike. The
opposite is true for puts. Sixth, a similar property holds for different time to maturities.
Since an additional time period can do no harm the price of a call or put should be
not decrease with an increasing time to maturity. Seventh, since the underlying can be
seen as a call option with strike 0 and infinite maturity it follows together with the facts
under four and five that the price of the stock must be at least as high as the price of an
American call. Therefore, the stock price is an upper price boundary for call options -
American or European style ones. Eights, since the stock is an asset with limited liability
the American put values have the strike value as upper boundary value.
We consider break-even and leverage. Consider a stock with price S0 = 27.6 in a
currency, a put option with strike K = 24.5, a option price P0 = 0.125 and a ratio of
1:2, i.e. two options are necessary to buy 1 stock. Break-even, i.e. the profit is zero at
maturity, is defined by the equation
PT = 0.125 = max(K − ST )× Ratio .
Therefore to make no loss the stock ST is allowed to attain at most the value
ST = K − PTRatio = 24.25 .
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Leverage considers the Delta of the option, i.e. it is defined as:
Leverage =
Price Underlying
Price Option x Ratio
×∆ = S
C ×R
∂C
∂S
.
This For an investment in a stock, Leverage is 1. Consider a call with price 10, Delta of
0.75, Ratio of 1:1 and price of the stock of 22.50. Leverage is then 3: The call option offers
a three time higher participation at the stock compared to a direct stock investment.
Put-call parity is an important model-independent relationship for European
style options. The parity states that a put is a call and vice versa. We consider the case
of non-dividend paying stocks. The parity is essentially the mathematical equality
max(S −K, 0)−max(K − S, 0) = S −K .
In more finance terms, form a portfolio V (i) short a call, (ii) long a put, (iii) long a
stock and (iv) short cash. The European call and put have the same maturity, strike and
underlying. Then V has in both states ST > K and ST ≤ K value zero at time T .
No arbitrage implies that V0 = 0 has to hold, i.e. the put-call parity follows:
Ct − Pt = St − PVt(K) . (2.35)
If the stock pays known dividends D, the value of the stock is reduced by the PV of the
dividends. The put-call parity then reads:
Ct − Pt = St − PVt(K)− PVt(D) . (2.36)
To derive the parity for futures we note that F (t, T ) = S(t)e−r(T−r) or we set up two
portfolios:6
Ct − Pt = (F (t, T )−K)e−rτ . (2.37)
A similar argument gives the put-call parity for FX underlyings. We get
Ct − Pt = Ste−rFT −KerDt (2.38)
with rD the domestic and rF the foreign risk free rate.
Examples:
• Consider a call on 6m silver futures with price CHF 0.56 per ounce and strike 8.5
CHF. The silver spot price is CHF 8.0 and risk less rate is 10%. The price of the
put option with the same characteristic is given by
0.56 + 8.5e−0.5×0.1 − 8e−0.5×0.1 = 1.04 CHF .
6Portfolio V is long a call on the future F with strike K and long cash Ke−rτ . We have
VT = max(F (T )−K, 0) +Ke−r0 = max(F (T ),K) .
Portfolio W is long a put on the same future, long the future and long cash Fe−rτ . It follows, that
WT = VT
and by no arbitrage the two portfolios have to be equal for all times which implies the parity relation.
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• Consider next a European call on USDCHF underlying S, i.e. the underlying
expresses how much CHF equals one USD. The risk free rate in the U.S. is 2
percent and 1 percent in Switzerland. The spot is at 1.05, maturity of the call is 1
year and the 1.10call price, i.e. the call with strike K = 1.10, is 0.025 CHF per 1
USD. What is the 1.10put price? We get P = 0.0141 CHF.
• Put-call parity implies for positive interest rates:
C = S − PV (K) + P = S −K +K − PV (K) + P
= S −K︸ ︷︷ ︸
Intrinsic Value
+ (1− e−rt)K︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
+ P︸︷︷︸
>0︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
.
Since the price of an American is worth not less than an European one, early
exercising means to throw away a put option. If the stock pays dividends, the
above analysis reads
C = S − PV (K) + P − PV (D) = S −K +K − PV (K) + P − PV (D)
= S −K︸ ︷︷ ︸
Intrinsic Value
+ (1− ert)K︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
+ P︸︷︷︸
>0︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
−PV (D)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
?
,
i.e. early exercise is rational if
(1− ert)K + P − PV (D) < 0
holds: The interest lost by early exercising has to be smaller than the gained
dividend.
2.3.3 Basic Option Strategies
An option strategy is a portfolio of options with a single or several objectives. Possible
objectives are:
• Hedging. Reduce risks in an existing portfolio of securities.
• Investing. Customized risk and return profile.
• To take advantage of mispriced securities, i.e. arbitrage strategies.
A characteristic of an option strategy is whether the strategy is static, i.e. the strategy
is setup at initiation and left unchanged over time until maturity, or whether the strategy
is dynamic. Dynamic strategies can be rule based or discretionary or a mixture of them.
For call and put strategies the loss/gain is
• bounded by the premium for long call and long put,
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• bounded by the exercise price minus the premium for short put,
• unbounded for short call.
The gain potential is
• bounded by the premium for short put and short call,
• bounded by the exercise price minus the premium for long put,
• unbounded for long call.
The next more complex strategies are those consisting of an option and the underlying
value. We consider:
• Covered call (investment strategy), see Figure 2.8;
• Protective put (hedge strategy).
The investment motivation for a covered call is a belief that the underlying value
will move sideways or at most increase only moderately. The investor does not search
protection for a stress or a crash scenario. The covered call strategy, i.e. long the
underlying and short a call option, capture this investment motivation. If the underlying
decreases the value of the covered call is always higher than the underlying values since
the investor obtained a premium for the sold call option.
125 150 75 50 
P&L 
Underlying 
short call 
long Underlying 
covered call 
Figure 2.8: Covered Call.
Table ?? shows: The covered call is always worth more than the underlying if it
drops, there is no capital protection and the upside is given up if above a certain level. If
the motivation of the investor is to buy protection he goes long the underlying and long
a put. This strategy - protective put - reduces loss potential to the put premium keeping
the gain potential unbounded.
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ST Payoff Call P&L Short Call P&L Long S P&L Covered Call
27 0 3.6 -4 -0.4
28 0 3.6 -3 0.6
29 0 3.6 -2 1.6
30 0 3.6 -1 2.6
31 0 3.6 0 3.6
32 0 3.6 1 4.6
33 0 3.6 2 5.6
34 -1 2.6 3 5.6
35 -2 1.6 4 5.6
36 -3 0.6 5 5.6
Table 2.3: P&L-comparison for covered call, long underlying, short call for the data
K = 33, S(0) = 31. The upside is restricted to 5.6 = K − S(0) + C(0) = 33− 31 + 3.6.
The next strategy is the so-called 3-options strategy. Consider 3 European or
American call options with increasing strikes K1 < K2 < K3 with the same underlying
and maturity. If arbitrage is not possible, the following structural,i.e. model-independent,
inequality holds:
C(K2) ≤ K3 −K2
K3 −K1C(K1) +
K2 −K1
K3 −K1C(K3) . (2.39)
It exists a combination of strikes such that the option price to the middle strike K2 is
never larger than a combination of the minimum price C(K1) and the maximum price
C(K3). This relation is due to the fact that option prices are monotone decreasing with
increasing strikes.
We show how the above 3-option relation can be used to test for arbitrage. Assume
S0 = 100 and three American calls with strikes and prices:
• C1(94) = 8.4.
• C2(100) = 5.5.
• C3(108) = 1.4.
Are these prices arbitrage free? To answer this, we write the middle strike K2 = 100 as
a convex combination of the two others:
K2 = 100 = a ∗K1 + (1− a)K3 = a ∗ 94 + (1− a)108 = 108− 14a,
a = 4/7 = K3−K2K3−K1 and 1− a = 3/7 = K2−K1K3−K1 follow. Using this, we check (2.39):
K3 −K2
K3 −K1︸ ︷︷ ︸
a
C(K1) +
K2 −K1
K3 −K1︸ ︷︷ ︸
1−a
C(K3) = 4/7 ∗ 8.4 + 3/7 ∗ 1.4 = 5.4 .
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This price is smaller than C(K2) = 5.5. Arbitrage is possible. The K2-call is relative to
the two other ones to expensive. Can you exploit this?
The next strategy, called conversion, shows how no arbitrage violations measured
in the put-call parity can be exploited. We recall the put-call parity for futures:
C − P = (F −K)e−rτ
and consider the example strike of call and put K = 110, futures price F = 100, put
price P = 12, call price C = 4, r = 10% and time to maturity τ = 1 year. Inserting this
into the parity gives.
C − P = −8 6= (F −K)e−rτ = −9.05
Since the call is out of the money and the put is in the money it is more likely that the
call is mispriced. To exploit the arbitrage opportunity we buy the low priced put and
sell the high priced call. At time t we setup the portfolio V :
• Long Put, i.e. P = −12.
• Short Call, i.e. C = 4.
• Long den Future, i.e. F = 0.
• Borrow Cash to finance the strategy, i.e. 8.
This portfolio value is zero at time t. What is the value at time T?
V (T ) = PT − CT + F −Xerτ
= (K − ST )+︸ ︷︷ ︸
Put
− (ST −K)+︸ ︷︷ ︸
Call
+ (ST − F )︸ ︷︷ ︸
Future
− Xerτ︸ ︷︷ ︸
Pay back loan
The value of the long futures equals the value difference between the underlying at
maturity ST and the contracted futures price F at time t. This gives two portfolio values
at T :
• ST ≥ K
V (T ) = PT − CT + (ST − F )−Xerτ
= 0− (ST −K) + (ST − F )−Xerτ
= 0− ST + 110 + ST − 100− 8e0.1
= 110− 100− 8.84 = 1.16
• ST < K
V (T ) = PT − CT + (ST − F )−Xerτ
= (K − ST )− 0 + (ST − F )−Xerτ
= 110− ST − 0 + ST − 100− 8e0.1
= 110− 100− 8.84 = 1.16
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An arbitrage strategy is found: A strategy which is worth zero at time t and which is
worth 1.16 at time T in all possible states. We note that this risk less gain equals the
future value of the initial mispricing in the put-call parity:
(9.05− 8)e0.1 = 1.16 .
The next strategies are spread strategies. They are generated by at least two op-
tions where the options are identical expect in one or possible two parameters. Variations
in strikes are bull and bear spreads, vertical spreads or risk reversals; variation in matu-
rity are calendar or horizontal spreads; variations in the option right are straddles and
variations in the option right and strike lead to strangles and butterflies.
For a bull spread, the investor believes that the underlying will increase to a certain
level and he wants to restrict losses if the belief turns out to be wrong. He invests in a
bull spread, i.e. a long call C(KL) and short call C(KH):
Bull Spread = C(KL)− C(KH), where KH > KL
The loss is restricted to the difference in the premia, see Figure 2.9.
125 150 75 50 
P&L 
Underlying 
short call KH=HIGH 
long call KL =LOW 
bull call spread 
Figure 2.9: Bull Spread.
Verify the following figures for the Bull Spread:
P&L = max(S(T )−KL, 0)−max(S(T )−KH , 0)− CL(0) + CH(0)
max Profit = KH −KL − CL(0) + CH(0)
max Loss = CH(0)− CL(0)
Break even = KL + CL(0)− CH(0)
If an investor beliefs that events will move the underlying away from its present price
but he has no directional view, strangle or straddle allow to invest into this volatility
bet, see Figure ??.
A strangle has contrary to the straddle two options with different strikes. A strangle
is cheaper than the comparable straddle.
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 long put 
long call   
Straddle 
= ?           
Figure 2.10: Straddle.
2.4 No Arbitrage in a Multi Period Setup
2.4.1 Cox-Ross-Rubinstein (CRR) Model
The ideas of the one period option pricing model transfer to the multi period modelling:
The existence of a martingale measure is equivalent to the absence of arbitrage and the
uniqueness of such a measure defines a complete market. We discuss the standard Cox-
Ross-Rubinstein (CRR) model.
The CRR is a discrete time, discrete state model with two assets: a risk less
B and a risky asset S. The risk less interest rate describing the risk less asset is r > 0
and the dynamics of the risk less asset is Bt = (1 + r)t with B0 = 1. The initial price
of the risky asset is S0 and we define the dynamics of the risky asset as follows: The
price in period t + 1 can go up (u) or down (d) with constant rates d and u starting
from the t-price. That is, the dynamics reads under an objective probability measure
P = (p, 1− p)
St+1 =
{
St(1 + u), with probability p;
St(1 + d), with probability 1− p. t = 0, 1, . . . , T − 1.
The risky asset can be represented by a recombining binomial tree. The price at time k
is then
Sk = S0(1 + u)
Nk(1 + d)k−Nk
with Nk the number of upwards moves in k time steps.
The values of a portfolio V are given by
Vt = φtBt + ψtSt , ∆Vt = φt∆Bt + ψt∆St
where ∆Vt = Vt − Vt−1, φt the amount of CHF invested in risk less asset at time t and
ψt the number of shares held at time t. The number of shares ψt has to be known before
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t, that is a time t− 1. This property of random variable sequences (stochastic processes)
is called predictability.
We only consider self-financing strategies. Assume that the portfolio value V is
given by a single asset Vt = φtXt. The change in value has two components using the
discrete time ’differentiation rule’:
∆Vt = φt∆Xt +Xt∆φ .
The first changes in portfolio value are due to changes in asset prices. The second one
are due to changes in the strategy in a given period, i.e. additional money is injected
or withdrawn. If strategies are considered where the second part is zero we speak about
self-financing strategies: A self-financing strategy only redistributes total wealth after
new prices are known. We restrict ourself always to self-financing strategies. If φt is
self-financing, the portfolio value reads
Vt = V0 +
t∑
j=0
φj∆Xj .
The final portfolio value is equal to the initial value plus the cumulative gains and losses
from the price changes of the asset X over time weighted by the investment strategy. If
we recall that replication means Vt = Ct in all states and at all time points, the above
equation transforms to - if we can replicate -
Ct = C0 +
t∑
j=0
φj∆Xj .
φj is the hedging strategy which given the initial option price C0 generates the random
option claims Ct. The martingale representation theorem states when such a strat-
egy exists, see below. The notion of an arbitrage strategy carries over from the one-period
case. Formally:
Definition 2.4.1. A self-financing strategy φ is an arbitrage strategy, if the portfolio
value under this strategy satisfies: V0 = 0, Vt ≥ 0 for all t = 1, . . . , T − 1, VT ≥ 0 for all
states and VT > 0 for one state.
Starting with zero initial portfolio value, we face no losses in the future and there is
a chance that we end up with a gain.
We consider the evolution of the information which is richer than in the one period
model. We work with a 3-period model. We can observe 8 possible path realizations
ωk, see Figure 2.11:
ω1 = (u, u, u) , ω2 = (u, u, d) , ω3 = (u, d, u) , ω4 = (u, d, d)
ω5 = (d, u, d) , ω6 = (d, d, u) , ω7 = (d, u, d) , ω8 = (d, d, d) .
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Figure 2.11: Illustration of the information and filtration structure for the three period
CRR.
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That is an observable state is a path in the tree. In a k period model there are 2k
paths. We assume that the up and down probabilities are constant over time. Suppose
that the first move was up. Then several paths are still possible but other paths are no
longer possible, for example the path with 3 down-moves. If in the second step there
is a down move, some more paths will become impossible and so on. This shows that
besides observable elements also possible events are important. The notion of filtration
considers the possible event structure and its dynamics over time. If we have 8 observable
events, the power set A = 28 defines all possible events, i.e. from the empty set to the
set of all paths every set is included. Ft represents the possible information up to time
t. This set is an element of the power set. Assume that
Ft ⊂ Ft+1 ,Ft ∈ A ∀t .
The inclusion Ft ⊂ Ft+1 means that for increasing time, the information resolution
increases. At t = 0, F0 = {∅,A} - everything is possible, no information resolution so
far took place or all information is still random.7 At t = 1, either the price S0 increased
or decreased. We therefore define the sets
A1 = {ω1, ω2, ω3, ω4} , A2 = {ω5, ω6, ω7, ω8} .
A1 (A2) is the set of all events where the first price move is ’up’ (’down’). We set
F1 = {∅,A, A1, A2} .
This assures that F0 ⊂ F1. It is clear, how F2 can is defined. The information sets or
filtrations was generated by the evolution of the asset prices. Other source such
as noise or insider information do not enter the model.
Given a specific date we use the information at this date to forecast future prices
using the conditional expectation based on the available information set.
Since for each node on the tree there is a filtration and vice versa, nodes and filtrations
are in one-to-one relationship for trees. How does self-financing strategies fit into the
filtration concept?
The strategy ψt is known in advance at t − 1 i.e. an element of Ft−1. Such strategies
are called predictable processes. The price processes St are not known in advance, i.e.
they are observed at t and therefore related to Ft. Such processes are called adapted.
The notion of information is fairly intuitive in discrete time models. In continuous
time the mathematics becomes intricate.
7The inclusion of the empty set guarantees that F0 has required mathematical structure is powerful,
i.e. the information set system is closed under countable intersection and complement set formation.
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The First Fundamental Theorem of Finance transforms to the CRR model case.
The theorem is based on the notions of risk neutral probabilities or equivalent
martingale measures.
Definition 2.4.2. Consider a price process under a probability P . A probability Q is
equivalent to P , written Q ∼ P , if they have the same the same impossible sets. A
probability Q ∼ P is a risk neutral probability if the discounted price process S˜ := S/N
is Q-martingale with N > 0 the numeraire, i.e.
S˜t = E
Q[S˜s|Ft] ,
holds for all t and s ≥ t.
Equivalence means, that P (State k) > 0 for all states implies Q(State k) > 0 for all
states and vice versa. The definition of a martingale leads to the following characteriza-
tions:
• Martingales are processes with zero drift.
• The expected value of a martingale process is constant. This follows from the
tower law or the law of iterated expectations.
Proposition 2.4.3. Consider the CRR model and self-financing strategies. There is no
arbitrage if and only if there exists a risk neutral probability Q.
We interprets the martingale property next. Since St is known at t, it can be moved
inside of the expected value, i.e.
EQ[St+1/St|Ft] = 1 + r .
Taking expectations w.r.t. F0 on both side we get by the law of iterated expectations:
EQ[St+1/St] = 1 + r ⇒ EQ[St+1 − St
St
] = r .
Therefore, the expected return of the risky asset under the risk neutral probability equals
the risk free rate. No arbitrage implies that on average the return process cannot grow
in the risk neutral world stronger than the risk free asset. It is useful to introduce the
random variable
Xt+1 := St+1/St .
This price ratio takes only the values (1 +u) or (1 +d). Since Q is strictly positive, both
values are attained with a positive probability. This implies d < r < u, else the equation
EQ[St+1/St] = 1+r does not hold true. The last inequality is the no arbitrage condition
of the one period model. If the inequality is violated, arbitrage is possible.
Can we construct the measure Q? The following proposition gives the answer, see Ap-
pendix 7.4 for the proof.
Proposition 2.4.4. Assuming −1 < d < r < u. The following statements are equivalent:
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1. S˜k is a Q-martingale.
2. The random variables Sk+1/Sk are i.i.d. under Q = (q, 1− q) with
Q[Sk+1/Sk = 1 + u] = q =
r − d
u− d
Q[Sk+1/Sk = 1 + d] = 1− q = u− r
u− d .
The risk neutral probability is unique, i.e. the CRR market is complete. If the
underlying instrument pays a dividend yield δ ≥ 1, the risk neutral probability and the
no arbitrage condition are:
u > r/δ > d , q =
r/δ − d
u− d .
We show how to price an European call option in the CRR model. Such a contract pays
at maturity C(ST ) = max(ST −K, 0) with K the strike value. The following proposition
is proven in Appendix 7.4.
Proposition 2.4.5. The arbitrage free price of a call option in the n-period CRR model
is given by:
C(S, t) =
n∑
k=0
(
n
k
)
qn(1− q)n−k max(S0ukdn−k −K, 0) . (2.40)
Separating the two terms in the payoff formula8, the price of a call option shows
the same form as in the one period model. The price is proportional to the underlying
value and the present value of the strike. Since this last expression has negative sign
it represents a loan. The difference to the one period model are the more complicated
factors in front of S and K. They are probabilities. The formula can be read as follows:
The price of a call or put option in the CRR model at a date t with maturity T is
given by:
C(S, t) =
∑
paths
Path Probability×No. of paths× Payoff End Node T (2.41)
where the path probability equals qku(1− q)kd with q the risk neutral probability ku the
number of ’up’ moves on the given path from t to T and similarly kd the number of
’down’ moves, ’No. of paths’ the number of paths connecting the node at time t with
the end node at T .
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Figure 2.12: Underlying value S in two periods.
2.4.2 Examples
1. T Consider a call option in a two period model with strike 95 in a currency and
risk less interest rate of 4% per period. The underlying value dynamics is shown
in Figure 2.12.
The risk neutral probability is q = 1.04−0.91.1−0.9 = 0.7. Using (2.41) we get:
C0 =
1
(1.04)2
(
0.72 × 1× 26 + 0.7 ∗ 0.3× 2× 4 + 0.32 × 1× 0) = 13.33
where each term is calculated by multiplying (i) the probability of a path with (ii)
the number of paths and (iii) the final node option payoff.
2. We compare the accuracy of the binomial CRR model with observed option prices.
Consider a call on ABB Ltd. with strike CHF 31 and expiration June, 20 2008.
The bid and ask prices where at CHF 0.33 and 0.34 respectively and the actual
ABB share price was CHF 29.9, see Figure 2.15. The figures are calculated using
(2.41).
The first step is to calculate the tree u, d, r from the real world data. If R is
the annual rate, r the rate on the tree, n the number of periods in the tree and
τ = T − t time to maturity, we have the relationship rn = Rτ . The number of
periods in the CRR model is n = 11, time to maturity is τ = 0.917. This implies
r = Rτ/n = 1.00327. The discount factor is D = e−τr/n = 0.920. We need the
up and down values. A standard approach is to set u = eσ1y
√
τ/n, d = 1/u, we
8Due to the max operator a separation leads to an adjustment of the summation range.
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Figure 2.13: Data for the ABB call. Source: Swissquote.
comment about this choice at the end of the example. Using ABB closing data we
get a daily volatility of σ1d = 0.0150983. To obtain an annualized volatility we use
the square-root rule, i.e.
σ1y =
√
daysσ1d =
√
250σ1d = 0.2882
where we assumed that there are 250 days in a year. We also need to know the risk
less rate for one period. This gives u = 1.087, d = 0.92. These values imply for the
risk neutral probability q = 0.499. The table shows the pricing result.
The sum of the path weights over all end nodes is 1 and the sum of the payoffs
over all nodes, i.e. the last column, is CHF 3.41205. Discounting this value back
to time zero gives 3.1383. Using the ratio 1 : 10 gives the theoretical price of 0.31
CHF compared to the actual bid-ask prices of 0.33− 0.34.
We finally consider the relationship between discrete CRR and continuous time
modelling. Consider a continuous time model for the risky asset where the mean
and variance of the asset ratio St+dt/St are given by
Mean(St+dt/St) = erdt , Variance(St+dt/St) = e2rdt(eσ
2dt − 1)
where r is a risk free interest rate and σ is the volatility of the continuous time
price process of the risky asset. In the Black and Scholes, which turns out to be
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Node S0uk−10dk max(ST −K, 0) No. of Paths qk−10(1− q)k S.P. Sum Payoff
11 74.541 43.541 1 0.0004 0.0004 0.020
10 63.114 32.114 11 0.0004 0.0052 0.168
9 53.440 22.440 55 0.0004 0.0264 0.593
8 45.248 14.248 165 0.0004 0.0796 1.134
7 38.312 7.312 330 0.0004 0.1600 1.170
6 32.440 1.440 462 0.0004 0.2250 0.324
5 27.467 - 462 0.0004 0.2260 0.000
4 23.257 - 330 0.0004 0.1622 0.000
3 19.692 - 165 0.0004 0.0814 0.000
2 16.673 - 55 0.0004 0.0272 0.000
1 14.118 - 11 0.0004 0.0054 0.000
0 11.954 - 1 0.0005 0.0005 0.000
Sum 1 3.41205
Table 2.4: Valuation of the call option in the 11 period model with ABB as underlying
value. ’S.P.’ means ’sum of path weights’.
a continuous time limit of the CRR model, the risky asset dynamics will satisfy
exactly this dynamic properties under the risk neutral measure. Contrary, in the
one period model the mean and variance of the same asset ratio are9
Mean(St+1/St) = qu+ (1− q)d
and
Variance(St+1/St) = qu2 + (1− q)d2 − (qu+ (1− q)d)2 = q(1− q)(u− d)2 .
Equating the two moments in both models we get:
qu+ (1− q)d = erdt , q(1− q)(u− d)2 = e2rdt(eσ2dt − 1) .
This implies the risk neutral probability formula q = e
rdt−d
u−d from expectation
matching. Making the symmetric choice u = 1/d from the variance matching
condition a complicated expression for u follows. Using a Taylor approximation by
assuming that dt is small one gets
u = 1/d = 1 + σ
√
dt+
σ
2
dt+ ... .
The first terms agree with the power series expansion of u = eσ
√
dt - this justifies
the approach in the above pricing of the ABB call option.
9var(X) = E[X2]− E2[X].
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3. We consider Delta hedging, first in a one period and then in the CRR model.
We consider a portfolio of N call options C(S) with underlying S. The portfolio
value V is
V = N ∗ C(S) (2.42)
with N the number of option contracts. We assume a ratio of 1, i.e. one option
gives the right to buy one unit of the underlying value. To Delta hedge the portfolio
we search for a number nS of underlying S such that the augmented hedge portfolio
V h
V h = nS +NC(S) (2.43)
is Delta risk free: ∆(V h) = 0. Taking the derivative, the Delta reads
∆(V h) = nS∆S +N ∗∆C(S) = nS +N ∗∆C(S) .
Delta neutrality implies:
∆(V h) = 0 ⇐⇒ nS +N∆(C(S)) = 0 ⇐⇒ nS = −N∆(C(S)) . (2.44)
We next consider Delta in a multi period CRR model. That is we choose a strategy
∆t such that at each date t− 1 fixing the Delta at this date and the investment in
the risk less asset delivers a portfolio value which is equal to the claim or option
value at the next step t in all possible states. Choosing a ∆u/dt means to buy or
sell an amount of the underlying stock at time t, where we have to consider the
last period of the stock. The trader is Delta neutral if
• at t − 1: A Delta ∆t−1 and an amount φt−1 of the risk less asset are chosen
such that
• at t:
∆t−1 × St + φt−1 × risk less return = Payoff in t.
At time t = 2, using backward induction, we calculate φ1,∆
u/d
1 . Consider a call
option in a two period model with strike 95 in a currency and risk less interest rate
of 4% per period. The underlying value dynamics is shown in Figure 2.12. In the
upper area of the tree in Figure 2.12, we have:
26 = ∆u1121 + φ
u
11.04
2
4 = ∆u199 + φ
u
11.04
2 .
Solving gives ∆u1 = 1, φu1 = − 951.042 . If we are in the lower area, that is the stock
went down in the first period, we have:
4 = ∆d1121 + φ
d
11.04
2
0 = ∆d199 + φ
d
11.04
2 .
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The solution of this system is ∆d1 = 2/9, φd1 = − 181.042 . At time t = 1, we have to
solve:
∆0110 + φ01.04 = ∆
d
1110 + φ
d
11.04
∆090 + φ01.04 = ∆
d
190 + φ
d
11.04 .
The solution of this equations gives ∆0 = 83104 , φ0 = − 71.91.042 .We show that this Delta
hedging strategy is self-financing and replicating. We assume that the following
path is realized: In the first period the risky assets moves up and it falls in the
second period to 99. Using the calculated Delta we have at time 0:
V0 = 83/104 ∗ 100− 71.9/1042 = 13.33 = C0 .
i.e. we can finance the fair call price with the hedge. At time 1 we have:
V u1 = 83/104 ∗ 110− 71.9/104 = 18.65 .
This portfolio value has to be reallocated for the next period using the Delta of 1
and the risk less strategy of −95/1.042. The price of the new portfolio is
V1 = 1 ∗ 110− 95/104 = 18.65 .
Hence the reallocation is self-financing. At time 2 the new portfolio has the value
V2 = 1 ∗ 99− 95 = 4 ,
i.e. the payoff of the call option at maturity in all states is replicated.
4. We consider a barrier option, more precisely with a down& out call (DUC)
European option in a 3 period model. Barrier options are path dependent which
follows from the payoff definition. A DUC is parameterized by a strike K like an
ordinary or vanilla call option and a barrier B. The barrier is lower than the strike
- the ’down’ - and the option is worthless if during the life time of the option the
barrier is hit at least once - the ’out’. To price such an option we assume B = K,
i.e. a knock-out option. Figure 2.14 shows the necessary data.
We assume u = 1.25, d = 0.8, r = 1.1. This implies the stock price path in the
left panel of Figure 2.14. The right panel shows the intrinsic values of the option.
It follows that for different paths different option values follow - there is a path
dependency. The dashed path hits the barrier: The option becomes worthless. If
we consider the dotted paths we end up at the same final node but we never hit
the barrier which give the intrinsic value of 180. Therefore
up x down 6= down x up
for path dependent options. To value this option we neglect all paths which lead
to a positive final payoff which once hit the barrier. We have for the top end node
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Figure 2.14: Knock out barrier option.
481.25 a single path which never breached the barrier. For node 180 there are 3
paths but only 2 of them are never knocked-out. All other nodes have zero terminal
payoff. The risk neutral probability is q = 0.444. The option price is therefore:
CDUC0 =
1
(1.1)3
× (0.4443 × 1× 461.25 + 0.4442 × 0.555× 2× 180) = 59.9 .
The price of the vanilla call is 74.7. This is a general fact that barrier options are
more risky and hence less expensive than their vanilla counter parts.
5. American Put. Consider a binomial tree with n time steps. Let Sk(j) be the
price of the underlying value at time k in node j. The intrinsic value of a vanilla
put option is K − Sk(j). Since it might be optimal to early exercise the option
the investor faces at each time and in each node the decision problem whether to
continue or to exercise. If P (k, j) is the arbitrage free put option price at time k
in state j, the decision problem reads:
P (k, j) = max(EQ(P (k + 1)D(k, k + 1)), X − Sk(j)) .
Since we consider a recombining tree,
EQ(P (k + 1)D(k, k + 1)) =
1
1 + r
(qP (k + 1, j + 1)− P (k + 1, j))
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holds for a constant discount factor. Why is this not equal to
EQ(P (k + 1)D(k, k + 1)) =
1
1 + r
(qP (k + 1, j + 1)− P (k + 1, j-1)) ?
From k to k+ 1 time step the node j moves to the nodes j and j+ 1 in k+ 1. This
expected value is the continuation value. This defines the backward induction
algorithm to price an American put - at each node the investor has to decide
whether to continue or to realize. Consider a stock, the figures of this and the
following example are from Kwok (2011), with strike and initial price S0 50 in a
currency, a 10 percent risk free rate, 40 percent volatility and 5mmaturity. Consider
a 5 period tree, i.e. ∆t = 0.0833 is the length of one period equal to one month.
Then u = eσ
√
∆t = 1.1224, d = 1/u = 0.8909, R = er∆t = 1.0084, q = 0.5073 follow
as input parameters.
C 
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E 
E 
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C 
Figure 2.15: American put. At each node the value of the underlying (upper number) and
the value of the option (lower value) are shown. The letter ’E’ indicates that execution is
optimal at the node and ’C’ that continuation is optimal. The dashed line shows that the
boundary region between the two decision. Source: Y.K. Kwok, 2011, adapted Figure..
The stock price Sk(j) is given by j up-moves and k − j down-moves, i.e. Sk(j) =
S0u
jdk−j . The final option prices are simply max(K − ST , 0). The option value
without considering early exercise is say at node E equal to
e−0.1×0.0833 (0.5073× 0 + 0.947× 5.45) = 2.66 .
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Since early exercise at this node gives zero, it is optimal to wait in node E. The
figure shows the critical boundary between exercising early and continuation. A
variant of this product is a callable American put, i.e. a feature that entitles
the issuer to buy back the American option at any time at a predetermined call
price. Upon call, the holder can choose either to exercise the put or receive the put
price as cash. Let X be the price if the put is called. Then the simple American
put recursion becomes
P (k, j) = min
(
max(EQ(P (k + 1)D(k, k + 1)),K − Sk(j)),max(X,K − Sk(j))
)
.
The first max-term represents the optimal strategy of the holder, given no call of
the option by the issuer, the second is the payoff if the product is called where
the holder receives either the cash amount X or exercises the option. The issuer
chooses to call or not in order to maximize the option value with reference to the
possible actions of the holder. The value of the callable call is given by taking the
minimum value of the above two terms. The recursion is equivalent to
P (k, j) = max
(
min(EQ(P (k + 1)D(k, k + 1)), X),K − Sk(j)
)
.
The issuer calls the option when the continuation value is above the call price X.
When the option is either called or not called, the holder can always choose to
exercise to receive K − Sk(j) if the exercise payoff has a higher value.
6. So far the examples were equity based. We turn to an interest rate example.
Consider the spot LIBOR rate L(t, T ) at time t for maturity T defined by
L(t, T ) =
1− p(t, T )
(T − t)p(t, T ) . (2.45)
We assume a constant grid of dates Tj , j = 1, . . . , n, i.e. Tj − Tj−1 = δ for all j.
For each date exists a zero p(t, Tj). The forward LIBOR rate F (t, i− 1, i) at time
t with expiry Ti−1 and maturity Ti is given by
F (t, i− 1, i) = 1
δ
(
p(t, Ti−1)
p(t, Ti)
− 1
)
. (2.46)
The definition can be written as
1 + δF (t, i− 1, i) = p(t, Ti−1)
p(t, Ti)
,
which is the no arbitrage relationship between forward and bond prices. The LI-
BOR market model models the family of rates F (t, i− 1, i) for a spanning number
of dates i.
We show how no arbitrage pricing works in this two period model. We follow Neftci
(2008).
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• Model with dates T0, T1, T2.
• Two zero bonds p(T0, Ti) where one matures at time T1 and the other one at
time T2.They are assumed to be default free.
• A money market account B that pays in-arrears the discrete time simple
LIBOR spot rate L(Ti, Ti+1) observed at time Ti. Payoff of the account at
time T2 is the random variable
B(T2) = (1 + δL(T0, T1))(1 + δL(T1, T2)) .
• A FRA contracted at time T0, settled at time T2. The buyer receives/pays
the difference between the fixed forward rate F (0, T1, T2) and the floating rate
L(T1, T2) at time T2. The final payoff with notional 1 reads for the buyer
δ(L(T1, T2)− (F (0, T1, T2)) .
• The underlying random LIBOR rates follow a binomial model with u, d moves.
In this market the payoff matrix PT2 =: P2 reads, see (2.47):
P′2 =

Buu2 B
ud
2 B
du
2 B
dd
2
1 1 1 1
puu2 p
ud
2 p
du
2 p
dd
2
δ(F0 − Lu1) δ(F0 − Lu1) δ(F0 − Ld1) δ(F0 − Ld1)
 (2.47)
for the money market account, the T1-zero, the T2-zero and the FRA. We simplified
the notation as follow: Buu2 = B(T2)uu, puu2 = p(T0, T2)uu, F0 = F (0, T1, T2)
and Lu1 = L(T1, T2)u. If there is no arbitrage, the First Fundamental Theorem
of Finance states there exists a state price vector ψ = (ψuu, ψud, ψdu, ψdd) with
strictly positive components such that P′2ψ = S0. Explicitly we have the linear
pricing relationship:
1
p(T0, T1)
p(T0, T2)
0
 =

Buu2 B
ud
2 B
du
2 B
dd
2
1 1 1 1
puu2 p
ud
2 p
du
2 p
dd
2
δ(F0 − Lu1) δ(F0 − Lu1) δ(F0 − Ld1) δ(F0 − Ld1)


ψuu
ψud
ψdu
ψdd
 .
If we use the risk neutral measure associated with the money market account, the
risk neutral probabilities are obtained from the first row:
1 = Buu2 ψ
uu +Bud2 ψ
ud +Bdu2 ψ
du +Bdd2 ψ
dd .
Since the ψ′s are not negative, quu := Buu2 ψuu and the other three q’s are indeed
probabilities. They defines a probability Q. If we use the paths ω1 = uu, ω2 = ud
and so on we can write
1 =
4∑
k=1
q(k) =
4∑
k=1
B2(k)ψ(k) .
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Using the risk neutral probabilities, the last row in the linear pricing relationship
for the FRA reads:
0 = δ
∑
k
(F0 − L]1)ψ(k) = δ
∑
k
(F0 − L1) q(k)
B2(k)
= δEQ
[
F0 − L1
B2
]
where L]1 equals L
u
1 in the states ω1, ω2 and down in the other two states. Solving
this last equation w.r.t. the forward rate we get
F0 =
1
EQ
[
1
B2
]EQ [L1
B2
]
.
Since B2 is a random variable, the last expression cannot be simplified to
F0 = E
Q [L1] .
Hence, under the risk neutral measure associated to the money market account
the forward rate is not equal to the estimated future LIBOR rate. This bias is
due to convexity. Generalizing, the forward rate Ft is not a martingale under the
above specified risk neutral probability Q. Therefore, if we model the dynamics
of the forward rates Ft we have to model a drift and to calibrate this drift. This
makes the measure Q an inconvenient pricing tool. The forward measure is a
more adequate measure. This measure is defined for each zero bond and hence
different for different bond maturities. We choose the T1-bond. The second row of
the pricing equation reads
p(0, T1) =
∑
k
ψ(k) .
Dividing by the bond price this defines the QT1 =: Q1-forward measure probabili-
ties, i.e.
1 =
∑
k
ψ(k)
p(0, T1)
=:
∑
k
q1(k) .
The general theory implies that any asset A with payout only at time T1 can be
priced by
A0 = p(0, T1)E
Q1 [AT ] ,
i.e. the ratio Zt = Atp(t,T ) is a martingale under the forward measure Q1. Using this
measure we arrive at
F0 = E
Q1 [L1] .
To obtain this divide the fourth row of the pricing equation by the T1-zero and
rearrange. Under the forward measure the forward LIBOR rate is a martingale.
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2.4.3 Measure Change and Hedging
We encountered the need to change the measure in pricing derivatives. To understand
the technique we start with the change of measure technique in a two period model
setup. This is an extended version of Baxter and Renyj (2003). p1 is the probability for
up in the first time step, p2 for up in the second one, given the first move was up and p3
the up probability in the second step, given the first move was down. The filtration is
generated by the price dynamics:
F0 = {∅,Ω} ⊂ F1 = {∅,Ω, {ω1, ω2}, {ω3, ω4}} ⊂ F2
where F2 equals the power set of the four elements ωi. Each ω represents a possible price
pathsin the two period model. There are 4 paths. Instead of considering the up- and
down-probabilities, we switch to path’s probabilities since derivative prices are expected
values of final payoff values times the number of paths and the path probabilities. We
have:
Realizations Path Probability P and Π
up-up ω1 p1p2 =: pi1
up-down ω2 p1(1− p2) =: pi2
down-up ω3 (1− p1)p3 =: pi3
down-down ω4 (1− p1)(1− p3) =: pi4
We defined a path probability measure Π = (pi1, . . . , pi4) out of the price process probabil-
ity P = (p1, . . . , p3). The sum over all path probabilities equals one. If 0 < pi < 1 for all
i, given the p’s we can obtain the pi’s and vice versa: P and Π are equivalent. Suppose
that we deform the P -probabilities to a new probability Q = (q1, . . . , q3). If 0 < qi < 1,
P and Q are equivalent and the Q’s generate new path probabilities Π˜. These new path
probabilities are equivalent to the former ones since the equivalence of probabilities is a
transitive relation.
• For each path i, the density Zi = p˜iipii =:
dQ
dP (Radon-Nikodym derivative) measures
the difference between the two path probabilities.
• This derivative allows us to switch from P to Q as follows. Knowing P , we know
pii. The Radon-Nikodym derivative then gives the ratio p˜ii/pii. Hence, we know p˜ii
which allows us to calculate Q.
• Suppose that X˜(T ) is a discounted contingent claim. The no arbitrage price under
Π˜ satisfies
X˜(0) = EΠ˜[X˜(T )] =
∑
i
p˜iiX˜i(T ) =
∑
i
pii
p˜ii
pii
X˜i(T ) = E
Π[ZX˜(T )] .
• The density serves to calculate the new probabilities as follow:
P 7→ Π and Z 7→ Π˜ 7→ Q .
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So far we studied the density Z at maturity. But Z := Zt is a stochastic process which
defines at each date the ’stretching factor’ between two equivalent probabilities. If the
probabilities qj are all equal to 12 , then all paths p˜ii have the same probability under Q,
i.e. p˜ii = 14 . If the price process probabilities pj are all equal to
1
4 we get for the path
probabilities pii under P
pi1 =
1
16
, pi2 =
3
16
, pi3 =
3
16
, pi4 =
9
16
.
Using this we calculate the density process Z2 for the path probabilities Π and Π˜ at time
t = 2:
Z2(ωi) :=
dQ2(ωi)
dP2(ωi)
=
p˜ii|F2
pii|F2
=

4, ω1,
4
3 , ω2,
4
3 , ω3,
16
36 , ω4
.
The figures are calculated as follow. For the state ω1 we have (see Figure 2.16):
Z2(ω1) =
p˜i1|F2
pi1|F2
=
q1q2
p1p2
=
1/2× 1/2
1/4× 1/4 = 4 .
At time t = 1 we get:
1 
21
21
pp
qq
)p-(1p
)q-(1q
21
21
)p-(1 p
)q-(1q
12
12
)p-)(1p-(1
)q-)(1q-(1
21
21
1
1
p
q
)p-(1
)q-(1
1
1
Figure 2.16: The process Zt in the example.
Z1(ωi) =
p˜ii|F1
pii|F1
=
{
2, ω1, ω2
4
6 , ω3, ω4 .
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We obtain EP [Z2] = 1. The process Z is a P -martingale. We prove EP [Z2|F1] = Z1.
For the states ω1, ω2:
EP [Z2|F1(ω1, ω2)] = 1
4
∗ 4 + 3
4
∗ 4
3
= 2 = Z1(ω1, ω2) .
For the other states:
EP [Z2|F1(ω3, ω4)] = 1
4
∗ 4
3
+
3
4
∗ 16
36
= 2/3 = Z1(ω3, ω4) .
This proves EP [Z2|F1] = Z1. The other martingale properties are proven in the same
way. How does the ’pricing relation of the last period’ EQ[X˜(T )] = EP [ZX˜(T )] gen-
eralizes to the case where we have a process, i.e. how can we relate EQ[X˜t|Fs] and
EP [X˜t|Fs]. One could guess:
′EQ[X˜t|Fs] = EP [ZtX˜t|Fs]′ .
This is wrong. The reason is that Zt describes the scaling from time 0 up to time t.
But we calculate the expectations starting in time s given by the filtration. We have
to correct for the scaling from 0 to s. This then leaves us with the required amount of
change of measure from time s up to time t. To achieve this we simply consider Zt/Zs.
Consider the two period example for Z2(ω1)/Z1(ω1, ω2). Then
Z2(ω1)/Z1(ω1, ω2) =
q1q2
p1p2
p1
q1
=
q2
p2
gives the correct weighting of the measure change from time 1 up to time 2. Summarizing,
Bayes’ formula follows:
EQ[X˜t|Fs] = Z−sEP [ZtX˜t|Fs] (2.48)
is the correct formula. Since Z−s is known at time s, it can be taken out of the expected
value. The results of the example hold in general. We summarize.
Proposition 2.4.6. The process
Zt(ω) := EP [ZT | Ft] (2.49)
is a P -martingale and EP [ZT ] = 1. For any random variable Xt ∈ Ft
EQ[Xt] = EP [ZtXt] (2.50)
and Bayes’ formula holds:
EQ[Xt|Fs] = EP [XtZt
Zs
|Fs] = 1
Zs
EP [XtZt|Fs] , 0 ≤ s ≤ t . (2.51)
When can we hedge an option dynamically? The answer is given by the martingale
representation theorem. Replication means that we can achieve the value of an option
XT at maturity by a selecting a strategy ψ with portfolio value Vt over time such that:
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• The portfolio value equals the option value at any date.
• The changes in portfolio value are due to changes in the asset prices only (self-
financing strategy).
Formally, when does a self-financing ψ exist such that
XT = VT = V0 +
∑
j
ψj∆Sj ?
In order that the change in prices on the tree is able to match the option, the information
structure generated by the price process and the option random variable have to be
related: At each time t given the filtration generated by the price process we need to
know what happens to the option random variable. Else there is no possibility to adjust
the price process in order to generate the desired option values. This means that the
option prices needs to be adapted to the filtration generated by the price process. The
martingale representation theorem then states that there exists a Brownian motion Wt
process which has this spanning property: For each random variable which is adapted to
the Brownian motion information structure10 there exists a predictable strategy ψ such
that X is spanned by the Brownian motion
X = E(X) +
∫ ∞
0
ψsdWs .
This shows that formally Brownian motion acts as a ’basis vector’ in continuous time.
Although the theorem states the existence of a ψ it does not tell us how to find the
hedge. What is a Brownian motion? We return to this point later on. For the moment
we summarize that specific random variables (martingales) can be represented linearly
as sums of a specific stochastic process (Brownian motion).
To gain some more insight we consider a discrete time model on a tree. Let Rt and St
be two binomial processes. Both are martingales w.r.t. to the same R-filtration. Then
by the martingale representation theorem there exists a predictable process ψ such that
St = S0 +
t∑
s=1
ψs∆Rs . (2.52)
Why is this useful for hedging? Let X be the option payoff at maturity. Then the process
Vt = E[X|Ft] is aQ-martingale11 w.r.t. the filtration F generated by the discounted price
10X needs also to be square integrable.
11Square-integrability follows from Jensen’s inequality:
E[V 2t ] = E[E([X|Ft])2] ≤ E[X2] <∞ .
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process S/B which is also a Q-martingale. By the martingale representation theorem
there exists a ψ such that
Vt = V0 +
t∑
s=1
ψs∆Ss/Bs . (2.53)
Therefore
VT = X = V0 +
T∑
s=1
ψs∆Ss/Bs (2.54)
shows that ψs is a perfect hedge. We define the strategy (the theorem does not tells us
how to find the hedge):
• We hold ψt units of the risky asset St at time t.
• We hold φt = Xt/Bt − ψSt/Bt units of the risk less asset at time t.
This strategy replicates the option and is self-financing. To see this insert the strategies
in Vt = φtBt + ψtSt.
2.4.4 Continuous Limit of CRR
The CRR model converges under an appropriate limit procedure to the continuous time
and continuous state space model of Black and Scholes. The limit is twofold: Discrete
time spacing and discrete states become continuous.
We fix time T of the continuous model. We to make sure in the limit procedure that
(i) the value of one dollar in [0, T ] is the same in the CRR model and in the Black and
Scholes model and (ii) that the CRR-price process St converges towards a continuous
price process which is log-normally distributed (this is the assumed distribution in Black
and Scholes).
We first consider (i) and divide [0, T ] in m equidistant subintervals, i.e. a binomial
model in m periods. We have (Bk, Sk)k=0,...,mwith Bm = BT , Sm = ST . How do we
adjust the parameters rm, um, dm of this model such that they can be compared with
the parameters of the CRR model? Let R = ln(1 + r) be the risk free interest, the
instantaneous interest rate with respect to one time unit [0, 1]. Setting rm := RTm and
Bm = (1 + rm)
m we have in the limit
lim
m→∞(1 + rm)
m = lim
m→∞
(
1 +
RT
m
)m
= eRT = (1 + r)T ,
i.e. Bm converges towards the same value as in the T -maturity continuous model.
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We consider (ii) and define relations between rm, um, dm:
ln(1 + um) = ln(1 + rm) + σ
√
T
m
ln(1 + dm) = ln(1 + rm)− σ
√
T
m
with a constant σ > 0, which is independent of m and we set as in the T -model
pˆm :=
rm − dm
um − dm .
The above parametrization implies u/d = 1. The definitions guarantee that logXi is
normally distributed with a mean and variance that reduces to the same one as in the
assumed risky asset dynamics of the Black and Scholes model, i.e. a geometric Brownian
motion. Formally, we have:
Proposition 2.4.7. Let rm, um, dm defined as above. Then
lim
m→∞ ln
(
S˜T
S0
)
∼ N (−σ
2T
2
, σ2T ).
That is, the random variable ln S˜TS0 converges for m → ∞ in probability to a normally
distributed random variable with mean −σ2T2 and variance σ2T .
The proof is given in Appendix 7.4. We apply this result to price call and put options
in Black and Scholes model.
Proposition 2.4.8 (Black-Scholes Formula). Let um, dm, rm, pˆm be given as above.
The prices of European call and put options in the Black and Scholes model are given by:
lim
m→∞C
(m)
0 = S0Φ(d1)−Ke−RTΦ(d2) (2.55)
lim
m→∞P
(m)
0 = Ke
−RTΦ(−d2)− S0Φ(−d1)
with d1, d2 given by:
d1 =
ln(S0/K) +RT
σ
√
T
+
σ
√
T
2
d2 = d1 − σ
√
T =
ln(S0/K) +RT
σ
√
T
− σ
√
T
2
The proof is given in Appendix 7.4.
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2.5 No Arbitrage in Continuous Time: Black and Scholes
2.5.1 Interpretation of the Formula
We have shown how the continuous time, continuous state model of Black and Scholes
follows as a limiting model from the CRR. There are two reasons to consider this limit
model in more details. First, the ideas of hedging are more neatly explained using in-
tegrals than clumsy summation formulae. Second, a lot of finance theory is written in
continuous time. In the last years one observes a switch to discrete time modelling.
Consider the call option formula in (2.55). The formula looks complicated but we
show that some basic thoughts allow us to understand it. Consider an out-of-the-money
call option with price
C(S = 90,K = 100, r = 2%, σ = 20%, t = 0, T = 6 m) = 1.99 ∼ 2 .
This positive price cannot be due do interest rates only since investing CHF 90 for 6m
gives 90 ·er(T−t) = 90.905 CHF which is much less than 100. The reason for a price of 2 is
due to the fact the underlying is a random variable which has a potential to grow above
the strike value in the next 6m. To make this transparent, we assume that the return of
the underlying is normally distributed (one of the Black and Scholes assumptions), i.e.
ln(ST /St) ∼ N(µ, σT )
This implies that the stock price at T is log-normal distributed:
ST ∼ StLN(µ, σT ) = LN(ln(St) + µ, σT ) .
Since we know the distribution, we can price the call using the no arbitrage principle.
The price is given
C(S,K, r, σ, t, T ) = EQ[max(ST −K, 0)] . (2.56)
How do we find the risk neutral probability? No arbitrage implies that the discounted
price process S is a martingale with the risk free interest rate as numeraire. But this
means that the expected value S has to grow like the risk less asset - else the drifts are
not the same. But if the drifts are not the same, their ratio - S/risk less asset - cannot
be driftless. Summarizing, we must have at T
E[ST ] = St exp(r(T − t)) . (2.57)
But the expectation of log normal distributed random variable is given by
E[ST ] = St exp(µ+ σ
2
T /2) . (2.58)
Equations (2.57) and (2.58) imply:
µ+ σ2T /2 = r(T − t) ⇒ µ = r(T − t)− σ2T /2 (2.59)
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The volatility σT from t to maturity is determined from the annual maturity by the
square-root rule:
σT = σ
√
T − t
with σ the annualized volatility. Summarizing
ln(ST /St) ∼ N
(
r(T − t)− 1
2
σ2(T − t), σ√T − t
)
(2.60)
or
ST /St ∼ LN
(
r(T − t)− 1
2
σ2(T − t), σ√T − t
)
All these expressions enter d1 and d2 in the Black and Scholes formula. How can we
calculate the probability that we exercise the call? The option is exercised if ST > K.
This reads for the continuous return rS = ln(ST /St)
rS = ln(ST /St) > ln(K/St) .
But we know from (2.60) the distribution of rS :
rS = ln(ST /St) ∼ N
(
r(T − t)− 1
2
σ2(T − t), σ√T − t
)
A calculation shows
P (ST > K) = P (rS > ln(K/St)) = Φ(d2) .
The probability to exercise the option is equal to Φ(d2).
Is there a derivation of the Black and Scholes equation which is more intuitive than
the formal limit procedure in the CRR model? There are several ways to derive the pric-
ing equation. One is using a pedestrian view of a trader - but to be honest this approach
was only derived after more abstract derivations of the Black and Scholes equation ex-
isted. Another one, which is the original one of Black and Scholes, is to use replication
in continuous time similar to the discrete model setup. The price to pay here is that one
needs to know about stochastic calculus in continuous time.
2.5.2 Brownian Motion and Stochastic Calculus in a Nutshell
The theory of continuous time stochastic processes is a vast topic. Fortunately, for a user
in finance only some simple rules need to be known to work with these mathematical
objects. There two basic processes which are used to generate more complicated price
processes: Brownian motion and the Poisson process. The first one is used to
describe price evolutions where the price process follows a drift and a random walk
(Brownian motion). But prices cannot jump - to consider this one uses the Poisson
process and its generalizations. What is a Brownian motion?
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Definition 2.5.1. A standard Brownian motion Wt is a continuous time process where:
1. W0 = 0, i.e. Brownian motion starts at zero.
2. For all t > s > 0 the increments Wt − Ts are independent.
3. Wt −Ws is normally distributed with mean zero and variance t − s, this leads to
the classification ’standard’.
4. The paths of Wt are continuous, , i.e. for a fixed state ω the function t → Wt(ω)
is continuous.
Intuitively, a Brownian motion price process can be seen as the results of many
demand and supply activities. There are many of them which results in the normality
assumption and there is no long term memory, the independence assumption. Although
there are no jumps, Brownian motion is not a regular function of time - i.e. the paths
of Brownian motion look jagged. There are several deep mathematical properties which
follow from the definition of Brownian motion. First, although the paths are continuous,
they are not differentiable. Hence, price changes have no velocity or a trend but are
at each date completely random. Second, Brownian motion is a Markov process. The
Markov property means that given the current value Xs, the prediction of future values
of Xt is not improving if one considers the full history of the process compared to the
information at time s only: The process only ’knows’ its value at time s and has no
memory about how it got there. Third, the paths of Brownian motion are of infinite
first variation but of finite second or quadratic variation. The finiteness of the quadratic
variation
[W,W ](t) = t
reflects the basic assumptions in the construction of the Brownian motion: Squared dif-
ferences in space of the process are proportional to linear differences in time. Intuitively,
[W,W ](t) is the sum of the quadratic differences (W (s) −W (v))2 over a time interval
with length t, where interval is partitioned in finer and finer subintervals. See the Ap-
pendix 7.5 for more definitions of the first, quadratic variations and the proofs of the
stated properties. Fourth, from the normality assumption follows that displacement in
space is proportional to the root of time displacement, i.e.
(∆Wt)
2 = ∆t , (dWt)
2 = dt (2.61)
where the second notation is a suggestive differential notation, see below. This different
behavior of scaling in space and in time has far reaching consequences for the integral
calculus and differential calculus of functions of Brownian motion. To see this, let f(W )
be a smooth function of Brownian motion. Taylor expanding the function gives
f(W ) =
∂
∂W
f(W )dW +
∂2
2∂W 2
f(W )(dW )2 + . . . .
The second order term is due to the scaling property:
f(W ) =
∂
∂W
f(W )dW +
∂2
2∂W 2
f(W )dt+ . . . .
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That is, the chain rules has an additional term compared to classical analysis. If one
considers the question to construct an integration theory of Brownian motion one faces
the problem that Brownian motion paths are of unbounded first variation - i.e. we
cannot us the ’usual’ integral construction. But the second variation is finite. Using
this one constructs an integral, the Itô integral. Without going in any details about
the definition of differential and integral calculus we state the main properties which we
need as workhorses. For φ, ψ two processes (strategies) which are ’nice enough’12 the
stochastic integral w.r.t. a standard Brownian motion∫ t
0
φ(s, ω)dWs (2.62)
is well defined. The integral should be thought of as a limit of the discrete sum∑
j
φ(tj)(W (tj+1 −W (tj)) .
The integral has the following properties. First, the integral is linear in φ (evident as a
sum). Second, expectation of the integral is zero, i.e. E
[∫ t
0 φ(s, ω)dWs
]
= 0. Since φ is
adapted to the Brownian motion filtration the expected value of the sum is equal to the
expected value of the two Brownian motions. This are zero by definition. Third, the Itô
isometry holds:
E
[(∫ t
0
φ(s)dWs
)2]
=
∫ t
0
E[φ2(s)]ds .
The Itô isometry follows from the independence of increments. That is, the square of
the finite sum is decomposed into two parts: A part where the differences in Brownian
motions are the same, i.e. where (W (tj+1 −W (tj))2 holds and the other terms of the
form (W (tj+1 −W (tj))(W (tk+1 −W (tk)) are collected. The first ones scale as ∆t and
the second ones vanish due to the independence of increments. Fourth, the stochastic
integral is an Ft-martingale. This follows at once from the discrete version. Fifth, he
quadratic covariation of a stochastic integral is given by:∫ t
0
φ(s)ψ(s)[dW, dW ]s =
∫ t
0
φ(s)ψ(s)ds .
Consider the martingale
Yt =
∫ t
0
φ(s)dWs .
We use the following symbolic differential notation
dYt = φtdWt .
12At each information time t the processes are known, i.e. they are adapted to the filtration and they
are square integrable.
188 CHAPTER 2. DISCOUNT FACTORS AND NO ARBITRAGE - THE BASICS
The expression dYt is called a stochastic differential - its definition is given by the
stochastic integral. This formal notation is useful. For the quadratic variation of a
stochastic integral we get:
[dY, dY ]t = [φdW, φdW ]t = φ
2
t [dW, dW ]t = φ
2
tdt (2.63)
where we used the Itô isometry and [W,W ](t) = t. Since the quadratic variation of the
Brownian motion equals t, we also have d[W,W ]t = dt. The rules are collected in the
multiplication table :
(dWt)
2 = dt , dtdt = 0 , dtdW = 0. (2.64)
We apply these rules. Consider the stochastic differential equation (SDE)
dXt = µ(X, t)dt+ σ(X, t)dWt , X0 given , (2.65)
which is the shorthand for
Xt = X0 +
∫ t
0
µ(X, s)ds+
∫ t
0
σ(X, s)dWs . (2.66)
The equation (2.65) is a diffusion. This equation has two components. A random part
generated by the Brownian motion and a drift part proportional to time.
Given a diffusion dXt. What can we say about a transformed process df(X, t) with
f a smooth function? We perform a Taylor approximation, use the dynamics of X and
the multiplication rule (2.64) to obtain:
dY =
∂f
∂t
dt+
∂f
∂X
dX +
1
2
(
∂2f
∂t2
(dt)2 +
∂2f
∂X2
(dX)2 + 2
∂2f
∂X∂t
dtdX
)
+ o(dt2)
=
∂f
∂t
dt+
∂f
∂X
dX +
1
2
σ2
∂2f
∂X2
dt+ o(dt2)
This formal calculation shows that the term 12σ
2 ∂2f
∂X2
(dX)2 is a first order term, i.e. he
changes formally the ordinary chain rule. We summarize using the notation ∂nX1,...,Xnf
for the nth derivative of f w.r.t. to X1, . . . , Xn:
Proposition 2.5.2 (Itô’s formula). Let f be a twice-continuous differentiable function in
two variables and consider the SDE dXt = µtdt+σtdWt. Then f(X, t) has the differential
dft = σ∂XfdWt + (∂tf + µ∂Xf +
1
2
σ2∂2XXf)dt (2.67)
or in integral form
ft = f0 +
∫ t
0
∂XfXσsdWs +
∫ t
0
(
∂sfs + µ∂Xf +
1
2
σ2∂2XXf
)
ds . (2.68)
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The properties of the stochastic integral implies that f is a martingale if and only
if the last integral in (2.68) vanishes, i.e. if f satisfies the following partial differential
equation:
∂sfs + µ∂Xf +
1
2
σ2∂2XXf = 0 .
This gives a first indication that there are some deep mathematical relationships between
stochastic calculus, analysis and the notion of martingales. The function Z(x, t) =
eax−
1
2
a2t is basic in the change of measure technique. Itô’s formula implies that Z solves
the SDE
dZ(W, t) = aZ(W, t)dW , Z(W, 0) = 1 .
Hence Z is a martingale sinceW is a martingale and a stochastic integral w.r.t. Brownian
motion is also a martingale.
Three main models in financial modelling are the Bachelier model, the geometric
Brownian motion model (GBM) and the Ornstein-Uhlenbeck (OU) process. The defini-
tion and the main properties are given in Table 2.5 and 2.6. The solutions, the expected
values and the variances are derived in Appendix 7.6.
Name Process Solution
Bachelier dXt = µdt+ σdWt , X0 = x Xt = x+ µt+ σWt
GBM dXt = µXtdt+ σXtdWt , X0 = x Xt = xe(r−
1
2
σ2)t+σWt
OU dXt = −cXtdt+ σdWt , X0 = x Xt = e−ctx+ e−ct
∫ t
0 e
csσdWs
Table 2.5: Bachelier model, the geometric Brownian motion model and the Ornstein-
Uhlenbeck process
The Bachelier model leads to negative values for the process X. The geometric Brow-
nian motion leads to positive prices X. This model is assumed in the Black and Scholes
model. The Ornstein-Uhlenbeck model is considered for mean-reverting processes. The
solution of the Bachelier model is trivial, the geometric Brownian motion model and the
Ornstein-Uhlenbeck model both need a trick to find the solution - this is discussed in the
Appendix 7.6.
Name Expected Value Variance
Bachelier E[Xt] = x+ µt var(Xt) = σ2t
GBM E[Xt] = X0eµt var(Xt) = X20e2µt
(
eσ
2t − 1
)
OU E[Xt] = e−ctx var(Xt) = σ2e−2ct(e2ct − 1) 12c = σ2c(1− e−2ct)
Table 2.6: Bachelier model, the geometric Brownian motion model and the Ornstein-
Uhlenbeck process.
The expected value of the Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process goes to zero for t to infinity
and c positive and the long term variance is constant, i.e. var(Xt)→ σ2c if time goes to
infinity.
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Consider two stochastic processes
Xt = X0 +
∫ t
0
µsds+
∫ t
0
σsdWs , Yt = Y0 +
∫ t
0
µ′sds+
∫ t
0
σ′sdWs
where µ, µ′, σ, σ′ are stochastic processes satisfying appropriate conditions. The following
stochastic partial integration formula holds:
Proposition 2.5.3.
XtYt = X0y0 +
∫ t
0
XsdYs +
∫ t
0
YsdXs +
∫ t
0
σsσ
′
sds . (2.69)
The proof is given in Appendix 7.5. In differential notation the formula reads:
d(XY ) = XdY + Y dX + σσ′dt . (2.70)
As a corollary we state some useful formulae: We define the covariation of two pro-
cesses [X,Y ] as
[X,Y ]t = XtYt −X0Y0 −
∫ t
0
YsdXs −
∫ t
0
XsdYs . (2.71)
This definition of the covariation is consistent with the quadratic variation [W,W ]t = t.
From the multiplication table and integration by parts formula we deduce
d[X,Y ]t = [dX, dY ]t = σσ
′dt .
We next consider the change of measure topic. We write Bt for a risk free asset
and Xt for a risky asset with dynamics
dBt = rBtdt,B0 = 1 , dXt = Xt(µdt+ σdWt) , X0 = 0 (2.72)
where µ, σ and r are processes such that integrals w.r.t. Brownian motions are well-
defined. The dynamics of the risky asset X is under a probability P . These two assets
define the financial market.
Let V ξ = (B,X) be the portfolio process and ξ = (φ, ψ) the portfolio, i.e.
V ξt = φtBt + ψtXt
where we mark explicitly the portfolio. Such a portfolio is self-financing if a change in
portfolio value is given by a change in asset prices only, i.e.
dV ξt = φtdBt + ψtdXt . (2.73)
We write discounted values using the tilde, i.e. V˜ = V/N with N a numeraire. A
numeraire is a strictly positive stochastic process. Let a portfolio ξ be a self-financing
portfolio and V ξ = (B,X) the portfolio value process. What can be said about the
discounted portfolio process V˜ ξ = (B˜, X˜) = V ξ/N under the portfolio ξ? Using Itô
calculus we get:
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Proposition 2.5.4. ξ is a self-financing strategy for a portfolio V ξ if and only if it is
self-financing for the discounted portfolio process. If ξ is a self-financing strategy and X
is a Q-martingale, then V ξ is also a Q-martingale.
A strategy is self-financing for V if and only if the same strategy is self-financing for
V˜ . The second statement seems innocent but it drives most of the theory which follows.
The notion of arbitrage is unchanged compared to the discrete time model. A key and
simple to prove property is:
Proposition 2.5.5. Suppose that there exists a self-financing strategy with portfolio dy-
namics
dV = kV dt .
If the market is arbitrage free, k equals the risk free rate r.
With more than one risk less asset arbitrage is possible. In discrete time models the
existence of a risk neutral probability or an equivalent martingale measure Q is equivalent
to the absence of arbitrage. This hold true also in continuous time:
Proposition 2.5.6 (First Fundamental Theorem of Finance). A market is arbitrage free
if and only if there exists an equivalent martingale measure Q.
We recall that two equivalent probability measures are related by the density process
Zt:
Qt(A) =
∫
A
Zt(ω)dPt(ω) , A ∈ Ft . (2.74)
The volume A measured with a stick Q is equal to using a different stick P if corrections
by the stretching factor Z are used. The process Z = (Zt)t is the density process or
Radon-Nikodym derivative and we write in differential notation
Zt(ω) =
dQt(ω)
dPt(ω)
. (2.75)
We summarize:
The change of measure leads to a re-weighting of probabilities of the price paths of
the risky assets. Neither are paths created or deleted. This change of measure technique
affects only the drift of diffusion processes. The volatility structure is not affected by
such a measure change. Therefore, the technique is the tool to transform processes which
are not martingales into martingales. To change the volatility structure of a diffusion one
needs to use different methods such as the time change method. Using this method one
alters the number of paths, i.e. the change of measure are not of an absolutely continuous
type. The notions of self-financing and no arbitrage are invariant under the choice of the
numeraire. The choice of a numeraire is a matter of convenience and is dictated by the
valuation problem at hand.
We consider the following questions:
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• What happens to a portfolio if we change the numeraire?
• How does a Brownian motion changes if we change to a new equivalent measure?
The answer is the Cameron-Martin-Girsanov Theorem.
What happens if we change the numeraire from N to N ′? The Cameron-Martin-Girsanov
(CMG) Theorem, see below, states that the exists a new martingale measure Q′ such
that V (T )N(′T ) is a Q
′-martingale, i.e.
V (s)
N ′(s)
= EQ
′
[
V (T )
N(′T )
|Fs] . (2.76)
Using this representation and Proposition 2.4.6 implies:
V (s)
N ′(s)
= EQ
′
[
V (T )
N ′(T )
|Fs]
= Z−1s E
Q[ZT
V (T )
N ′(T )
|Fs]
=
dQ
dQ′
(s)EQ[
dQ′
dQ
(T )
V (T )
N ′(T )
|Fs]
=
N(s)
N ′(s)
EQ[
N ′(T )
N(T )
V (T )
N ′(T )
|Fs] .
Summarizing:
V (s) = EQ
′
[
V (T )
N ′(T )
|Fs] = EQ[ZT V (T )
N(T )
|Fs] , ZT = N(s)
N ′(s)
N ′(T )
N(T )
. (2.77)
Examples
1. Spot and forward measure. The spot numeraire reads N(t) = B(t) = e
∫ t
0 r(s)ds
and the forward measure numeraire is N(t, T ) = p(t, T ), i.e. the zero coupon bond
for maturity T. We elaborate on the second example for a fixed date T .
dQT
dQ
=
1
B(T )p(0, T )
defines an equivalent probability QT to the probability Q associated to the nu-
meraire B(t). For t ≤ T , we have
dQT
dQ
(t) = EQ
[
dQT
dQ
(T )|Ft
]
=
p(t, T )
B(t)p(0, T )
.
QT is called the forward measure. Consider the zero bond price ratio p(t, S)/p(t, T )
with S > T . This ratio is a QT -martingale. To prove this we use Bayes’ rule for
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w < t ≤ min(S, T ):
EQ
[
p(t, S)
p(t, T )
|Fw
]
=
EQ
[
p(t,T )
p(0,T )B(t)
p(t,S)
p(t,T ) |Fw
]
p(w,T )
B(w)p(0,T )
=
p(w,S)
B(w)
p(w,T )
B(w)
=
p(w, S)
p(w, T )
. (2.78)
This result and
1 + αF (t, S, T ) =
p(t, S)
p(t, T )
.
imply that the forward LIBOR rate F (t, S, T ) is a QT -martingale.
2. Let XT be an option payoff with fair price C(t,X) in a model setup with interest
rate risk:
C(t,X) = EQ
[
e−
∫ T
t r(s)dsXT |Ft
]
.
To calculate the price one has to solve for a double integral, i.e. an integral for
the r and X risk factors. Only if r and X are independent random variables, the
integration splits into two one-dimensional integrals:
C(t,X) = EQ
[
e−
∫ T
t r(s)ds|Ft
]
EQ [XT |Ft] = p(t, T )EQ [XT |Ft] .
Unfortunately, the two random variables are dependent and a double integral has
to be considered under the measure Q. But the change or measure technique allow
us to reduce the number of integrations as follows. The idea is to use the T -zero
bond as a numeraire and define the T -forward measure QT by the requirement
that the process Ct/p(t, T ) is a QT -martingale. Since the zero bond pays one at
maturity, p(T, T ) = 1, and C(T,X) = XT we get with the martingale property
C(t,X)
p(t, T )
= EQ
T
[XT |Ft] ,
or
C(t,X) = p(t, T )EQ
T
[XT |Ft] .
This is the desired reduction of a double integral to a single integration.
We consider the Cameron-Martin-Girsanov (CMG) Theorem.
Proposition 2.5.7 (Cameron-Martin-Girsanov (CMG)). Let Wt be a P standard Brow-
nian motion , νt ∈ Ft13 and EP [e 12
∫ T
0 ν
2(s)ds] < ∞. There exists a measure Q ∼ P with
density
ZT =
dQ
dP
(T ) = e−
∫ T
0 ν(s)dWs− 12
∫ T
0 ν
2(s)ds (2.79)
and the process W˜t = Wt +
∫ t
0 ν(s)ds is a Q- standard Brownian motion.
13The filtration is generated by the P -Brownian motion.
194 CHAPTER 2. DISCOUNT FACTORS AND NO ARBITRAGE - THE BASICS
Equivalently, W˜ is a Brownian motion under P with drift −νt. If we correct the
original Brownian motion W by the integrated process we get a standard Brownian
motion W˜ under the equivalent measure Q. Why is this useful? Consider an option
pricing model where the discounted price process under P is not a martingale due to the
presence of a drift term (the expected value of the process is not constant). To apply the
option pricing formula we need to change the original process into a new one which is a
martingale. That is we have to remove the drift or equivalently replace the W -term by
the W˜ -term.
The integrability condition is called the Novikov condition. It implies that the solution
Zt = Z0e
∫ t
0 ν(s)dW (s)− 12
∫ t
0 ν
2(s)ds
of the equation dZt = νtZtdWt is a martingale. Applying Itô’s formula to the density we
get:
dZt = Zt(νtdWt − 1
2
ν2t dt+
1
2
ν2t dt) = ZtνtdWt , Z0 = 1 . (2.80)
Since Z is proportional to a Brownian motion and νt satisfies the integrability condition
it follows that Z is a P-martingale.
To gain some intuition for the density Z’s functional form, we consider two examples.
Let X be a normal distributed random variable with mean µ and unit variance. We
write Eµ[f(X)] with f an arbitrary function for the expected value under such a µ-mean
distribution. We want to express this expected value using a distribution with mean
zero, i.e. using E0[f(X)]:
E0[f(X)] =
1√
2pi
∫
R
f(x)e−
1
2
x2dx
=
1√
2pi
∫
R
f(x)e−
1
2
(x−µ)2eµ
2−µxdx
= Eµ[f(X)e
µ2−µX ] .
This shows how the exponential term appears in the density Z in the CMG Theorem
when a drift correction is made. As a second example, consider CMG for a Brownian
motion. For X a Gaussian with mean µ and variance σ2 the Gaussian integral EP [eaX ]
equals14
EP [e
aX ] = eaµ+
1
2
σ2a2 .
If X = W is a standard Brownian motion under P , i.e. WT is normal with mean zero
and variance T under P , we have
EP [e
aWT ] = e
1
2
σ2a2 .
We define the Radon-Nikodym density at the final time T by
dQ
dP
|T = e−νBT− 12ν2T , (2.81)
14To derive this result one needs to perform Gaussian integrals.
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for an equivalent measure Q. Then,
EQ[e
aWT ] = EP [
dQ
dP
|T eaWT ] = EP [e−νWT− 12ν2T eaWT ] = e−aνT+ 12a2T .
Hence, EQ[eaWT ] is a Gaussian with mean −νT and variance T . This holds for all
t < T : Wt is a standard Brownian motion under P and a Brownian motion with con-
stant drift ν under Q. The process W˜t = Wt+νt is again a Q standard Brownian motion.
We apply the theorem to the price dynamics of the risky asset used in Black and
Scholes. Let dS/S = µdt+ σdW be a geometric Brownian motion under P Using Itô’s
formula for the discounted process S˜ = S/B we get
dS˜ = S˜(µ− r)dt+ S˜σdW .
This process is a martingale if and only if µ = r. To find the martingale measure Q we
use W˜t = Wt +
∫ t
0 ν(s)ds which leads to (ν is constant)
dS˜ = S˜(µ− r + σν)dt+ S˜σdW˜ .
S˜ is a Q-martingale if the drift term vanishes, i.e.
−ν = µ− r
σ
holds. ν is the negative value of the market price of risk. We could equally consider
the underlying asset S as our numeraire. Then B/S has to be a martingale. Applying
Itô we have:
d
(
B
S
)
=
(r + σ2 − µ)B
S
dt− σB
S
dW .
To obtain a martingale, the drift has to vanish, i.e. µ = r + σ2. With the Girsanov
theorem the dynamics of the two assets in the martingale measure related to the S-
numeraire reads
dS = (r + σ2)Sdt+ σSdW , dB = Brdt .
The new process W˜ which makes B/S a martingale requires a correction ν = r+σ
2−µ
σ .
Pricing a call option under this measure has to give the same value than using the
traditional risk less asset as numeraire (good exercise).
2.5.3 Derivation of Black and Scholes using Stochastic Calculus
The model of Black and Scholes starts with a dynamics of a single risky asset S and a
risk less one B. This two assets define the financial market. There are no transaction
costs, the instruments can be traded freely and instantaneously either long or short at
the price quoted. We assume that S is driven by a single source of risk (which we model
below as a Brownian motion) and we use the notions of arbitrage, complete markets and
hedging in continuous time. Figure 2.17 illustrates the main results for continuous time
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First Fundamental Theorem of Finance 
Market is free of arbitrage 
 
Exists a probability Q s.t. All normalized  
prices are  
Q-martingales 
Choice of numeraire 
arbitrary 
Pricing Formula 
Markt is free of arbitrage. 
Then the fair price of an option is 
 a Q-martingale. 
Market is complete if 
 every option can be hedged. 
This is the case if Q is unique 
Meta Theorem 
N = number of risky assets 
R = number of independent risk source 
• Market arbitrage free          R >=N 
• Market complete            R<= N 
• Market arbitrage free and complete         R=N 
Option payoff can be written 
as a stochastic integral 
  
 
 
Figure 2.17: Main results of continuous time finance. Source: T. Björk (2009)
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finance. Since their logic is not different from their discrete time counterparts we do
not discuss them. A portfolio in the Black and Scholes model is ξt = (φt, ψt) where
φ represents the amount of the risk less asset and ψ the number of shares of the risky
asset. The portfolio value is
V ξt = φtBt + ψtSt .
We always consider self-financing strategies. By the Meta theorem, see Figure 2.17, the
Black and Scholes market is arbitrage free and complete, i.e. there exists a single risk
neutral probability measure (martingale measure) Q such that the discounted
price process S˜ = S/B is a martingale. The risky asset St satisfies under the physical
measure P
dSt = Stµdt+ σStdWt , S0 given (2.82)
where µ and σ are constants (the drift and the volatility, respectively) and Wt is a stan-
dard Brownian motion under the objective probability P . The solution of the stochastic
differential equation (SDE) for the risky asset is (see Appendix 7.5, (7.15)):
S(t) = S0e
(µ− 1
2
σ2)t+σWt . (2.83)
The risk less asset price grows as:
dBt = rBtdt , B0 = 1, i.e. Bt = ert , (2.84)
with r the risk less interest rate. S is not a martingale under P since EP [S(t)] = S0eµt
which is not constant. The discounted prices S˜ satisfies, see Appendix 7.5, (??):
EP [S˜(t)] = S0e
µt−rt . (2.85)
To satisfy the martingale property we need µ = r. That for, we We remove the drift
from the Wt Brownian motion under P using the CMG Theorem: There exists a new
Brownian motion W˜
dW˜t = νdt+ dWt , ν =
r − µ
σ
(2.86)
such that S˜ with the Q dynamics
dS˜ = σS˜dW˜t . (2.87)
is a martingale under this new measure (see Appendix 7.5). Using the representation of
self-financing strategies
V˜ ξt = V0 +
∫ t
0
ψsdS˜s
and the martingale representation theorem it follows that the discounted value process
is a Q-martingale, i.e. ,
V˜ ξt = EQ[V˜
ξ
T |Ft] .
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This is equivalent to
V ξt = EQ[e
−r(T−t)V˜ ξT |Ft] . (2.88)
Now we are done to derive the Black and Scholes formula - we have to calculate the
expected value in the last formula which gives the call option pricing formula (2.55), see
Appendix 7.5 for the calculation.
2.6 Hedging, Risk Management and P&L
We always work in this section either in the discrete binomial CRR or the Black and
Scholes model.
2.6.1 Introduction to the Greeks
Greeks are sensitivities of option prices with respect to parameters (partial derivatives).
Delta (∆) is a number that measures how much the theoretical value of an option will
change if the underlying stock moves up or down by 1 in a given currency. A Delta of
+0.5 implies that if an underlying stock rises by CHF 1, the theoretical option price
increases by CHF 0.5. The sum of the absolute values of the Deltas for an European
call and an European put with the same strike and maturity is 1. This follows from
put-call parity by taking the partial derivative w.r.t. to S. Delta is a linear operation:
the Delta of a portfolio equals the sum of the constituent’s Delta. This allows to define
the position Delta, i.e.
Position Delta = ∆ × Quantity × Number Shares ,
where ∆ is the option theoretic Delta, Quantity’ is the quantity of option contracts and
’Number Shares’ is the number of shares of stock per option contract.
An investor is long 10 option contracts of 50-calls (i.e. strike 50) on Nestle stock with
a Delta of 0.5 with 70 shares of the stock per option contract and the investor is short
200 Nestle stocks. The position Delta is from the stock and option part:
−200 + 0.5× 10× 70 = +150 .
Theoretically a change of Nestle stock by CHF 1 leads to a gain/loss of CHF 150 in this
portfolio.
The Delta for ATM is close to 0.5 but not exactly (why?). Delta is not uniformly
strong for ATM, ITM and OTM options - Gamma measures the Delta sensitivity.
Gamma Γ is an estimate of how much the Delta of an option changes when the price
of the stock moves. A big Gamma means that the Delta can start changing strongly for
even a small move in the stock price. A positive Gamma means that the Delta of long
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calls will become more positive and move toward +1 when the stock prices rises, and
less positive and move toward zero when the stock price falls. The Gamma as a second
derivative is also a linear operation and we therefore have for the position Gamma:
Position Gamma = Γ × Quantity × Number Shares ,
where Γ is the option theoretic Gamma. The graph of a call option shows that the slope
(the Delta) is always positive and monotone increasing from zero to 1. The increase is
highest close to ATM, i.e. the Gamma has a peak value in the ATM-region and goes
monotonically to zero if either deep ITM or OTM regions are considered where the Delta
becomes almost stable. Gamma is the same for call and puts. The Gamma of ATM
options is higher when either volatility is lower or there are fewer days to expiration. But
if an option is sufficiently OTM or ITM, the Gamma is also lower when volatility is lower
or there are fewer days to expiration. What this all means to the option trader is that a
position with positive Gamma is relatively safe, that is, it will generate the Deltas that
benefit from an up or down move in the stock. A position with negative Gamma can
be dangerous. It will generate Deltas that will hurt the trader in an up or down move
in the stock. But all positions that have negative Gamma are not all dangerous. For
example, a short straddle and a long ATM butterfly both have negative Gamma. But
the short straddle presents unlimited risk if the stock price moves up or down. The long
ATM butterfly will lose money if the stock price moves up or down, but the losses are
limited to the total cost of the butterfly.
Although the sensitivities are given by partial derivatives of the option pricing formula
it is meaningful to consider Delta and Gamma hedging in a simple, discrete setup. We
consider a call option with strike 95$ and underlying with price 100$ today. The option
has a market price of 8.5$. But as the option’s theoretical-model price is 8.75$, an
investor may be tempted to buy the call and make a gain of 0.25$. This is, however,
a risky strategy. We show how the mispricing effect can be cashed-in without any risk.
To simplify the analysis, assume that the underlying value can only move in steps of
±$5. Table 2.7 gives the price of the option today and tomorrow under both the up- and
down-scenarios.
Today Tomorrow, down Tomorrow, up
S Prob. Price S Prob. Price S Prob. Price
70 0.08 - 65 0.08 0 75 0.08 -
85 0.17 - 80 0.17 0 90 0.17 -
100 0.50 2.50 95 0.50 0 105 0.50 5.00
115 0.17 3.33 110 0.17 2.5 120 0.17 4.17
130 0.08 2.92 125 0.08 2.5 135 0.08 3.33
Sum 1.00 8.75 Sum 1.00 5.00 Sum 1.00 12.50
Table 2.7: The theoretical option price under different scenarios (K =$95).
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If the underlying’s price decreases (increases), the option price becomes $5 ($12.5).
With the risky strategy, i.e. by buying the option with the lower market price and hoping
to gain $0.25, we lose 3.5$ if prices fall and win $4 if prices rise. Using ∆, we can cash
in the $0.25 with a risk less strategy. In either scenario ∆ is given by
∆ =
8.75− 5
100− 95 =
12.5− 8.75
105− 100 = 0.75,
i.e. the ∆ is the same. Given this result, we set up the following strategy:
• sell 0.75 units of the underlying asset today at the price of $100;
• buy the call for its market price of $8.5;
• in the following period, sell the call, no matter what the value of the underlying
asset is.
We check that this is a risk less strategy us to cash in the mispricing amount:
• Scenario down: We lose $3.5 on the call and gain 0.75 ∗ (100 − 95) =$3.75 from
buying the underlying asset. The net gain is equal to $0.25.
• Scenario up: We gain $4 on the call and lose 0.75∗(100−105) =$-3.75 from buying
the underlying asset. The net gain is equal to $0.25.
Therefore, ∆ is the hedge ratio required to keep hold of 0.25$. In the second step, we
relax the assumption of a constant ∆, i.e. we bring the Gamma into play. We have a
call option with strike $100 and price $5 today. In the up- and down-scenarios the option
price becomes $2.5 and $12.5, respectively. We consider underlying price movements by
±10 in one period. The discrete time ∆ under the two scenarios is given by
∆− =
5− 2.5
100− 90 = 0.25, ∆
+ =
12.5− 5
110− 100 = 0.75.
Hence, ∆ is not constant. Which Delta do we have to choose? The goal is to fix ∆ in
such a way that
∆(100) · δS − Γ(100) · (δS)2 = 0,
i.e. the Γ-corrected ∆ provides us with a position which does not depend on the under-
lying’s risk. To achieve this, we compute Γ as the change in ∆ over the change in the
underlying price,
Γ =
0.75− 0.25
110− 90 = 0.025.
Therefore,
∆(100) · 20− 0.025 · (20)2 = ∆(100) · 20− 10 = 0;
∆(100) =
10
20
= 0.5.
If we take ∆ equal to 0.5, we make a risk less gain. Suppose the underlying’s price falls
to $90. Then the option is worth $2.5 and we make a loss of 5 − 2.5 =$2.5 by selling
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the option. Selling 0.5 units of the underlying asset gives us a gain of 0.5(100− 90) =$5
and the net gain is $2.5. Suppose now the underlying’s price increases to $110. Then
the option is worth $12.5 and the gain from selling it is 12.5− 5 =$7.5. Selling 0.5 units
of the underlying asset gives us a loss of 0.5(100 − 110) =$-5 and the net gain is $2.5.
Summarizing, if the underlying’s price falls, we are 25 ∆-units overhedged. If the un-
derlying’s price rises, we are underhedged by the same amount. Γ is on average equal to
2.5$ ∆-units for one point movement in the underlying’s price. Correcting our ∆-hedge
exactly by this amount provides us with a risk less strategy. Using this correction of the
Delta one can then risk less cash-in mispricings.
Theta Θ, or time decay, is an estimate of how much the theoretical value of an option
decreases when 1 day passes. The Thetas for a identical calls and puts are not equal.
The difference in Theta between calls and puts depends on the cost-of-carry for the un-
derlying stock. When the dividend yield is less than the interest rate - the cost-of-carry
for the stock is positive - Theta for the call is higher than for the put. The difference
between the extrinsic value of the option with more days to expiration and the option
with fewer days to expiration is due to Theta. Therefore, long options have negative
Theta and short options have positive Theta. If options are continuously losing their
extrinsic value, a long (short) option position will lose (gain) money because of Theta.
Theta value does not decreases linearly over time since the value is not linear distributed
between OTM, ATM and ITM. If volatility increases the value of the option is more
varying over time which reduces the Theta. Gamma and negative Theta are dual to each
other: If Gamma is highest for a long call position which will make money if there is
a large move in the underlying, negative Theta is also largest. Therefore, if the stock
move is not realized, Theta will negatively affect the position value. Position Theta is
calculated in the same way as position Delta, but instead of using the number of shares
of stock per option contract, Theta uses the dollar value of 1 point for the option contract.
Consider a long call option on CHFUSD with a Delta of 30 percent for one million
USD with a Gamma of 3 percent. To hedge this position on sells 300’000 in the spot.
If the spot first moves up by 1 percent and then falls back by 1 percent in the first step
one has to sell additional shares and then buy back the same amount of shares to remain
Delta neutral in these two steps. Although the amount of shares is the same in both
transactions, they were sold at a higher price than bought - this is the long Gamma
position, which leads to a gain. For a long put and long share position a similar analysis
holds. Consider to buy a 40 Delta EURUSD put15 for one million with a Gamma of
5.8% you can hedge the option position by buying 400,000 in the spot market. If the
spot increases by one percent the option becomes a 34.2 Delta Put (-40 + 5.8 = -34.2).
Since you have a long position in the spot of 400,000 this implies that you become long in
Delta and must sell 58,000 of your position in the spot to remain Delta neutral. Similarly,
if the spot descends to its original position you will have to buy back the 58,000 that you
15The Delta of the Put is actually -40 since the Delta of a long position in a Put is negative. However,
market convention is to omit the negative sign.
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just sold.
We consider Delta and Gamma Hedging in for the portfolio V :
• Short 1′000 calls, Time-to-Maturity (TtM) 90 days, strike 60, volatility 30%, risk
less rate 8%. The currency is irrelevant.
• The fair option price using Black and Scholes is 4.14452 and the Delta is 0.581957.
We therefore receive a premium of 4144.52 by selling the options.
• To hedge the position we buy 581.96 stocks for the price 60. That for we borrow
(cash)
581.96× 60− 4144.52 = 34′917.39− 4144.52 = 30′772.88 .
The portfolio value today is zero. We consider the portfolio value after 1 day, i.e. TtM
is 89 days.
In the Scenario ’unchanged’ the underlying value remains at 60. Using Black and
Scholes, the option is worth 4.11833 (Theta, i.e. time value). Therefore the option
liability value is lower but the cash liability increased:
30′779.62 = 30772.88 ∗ (1 + 0.08/365) .
Therefore, a gain 19.44 follows, see Table 2.8. The result for the two other scenarios ’up’
and ’down’ are calculated in the same way and reported in the table.
Value
unchanged up down
Underlying 34’917.39 35’499.35 34’335.44
Cash -30’779.62 -30’779.62 -30’779.62
Option -4’118.33 -4’721.50 -3’559.08
Sum 19.44 -1.77 -3.26
Table 2.8: Value of the portfolio V after 1 day for different scenarios.
This shows that the Delta hedge is effective for small changes in the underlying value.
We continue the example requiring that we also want to hedge the Gamma. Since
one option is used for the Delta hedge, we need a second option to achieve also Gamma
neutrality. The data of this option are:
• Call, TtM 60 days, strike 65.
• All other parameters are the same as for the first option, see Table 2.10.
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TtM Strike Option Price Delta Gamma
Option 1 90/365 60 4.14452 0.581957 0.043688
Option 2 60/365 65 1.37825 0.312373 0.048502
Table 2.9: Option data.
We require the portfolio V to be both Delta and Gamma neutral. That for we choose
the number of stocks and the number z of option 2 such that the conditions have to hold:
∆V = x− 1′000∆Opt1 + z∆Opt2 = 0
and
ΓV = −1′000ΓOpt1 + zΓOpt2 = 0 .
Solving these two linear equations gives
x = 300.58 , z = 900.76
To fix cash, one solve V = 0 at time 0, i.e.
V = xS + Cash− 1000 ∗Opt1 + z ∗Opt2 = 0
gives
Cash = −15′131.77 .
To be Delta and Gamma neutral we are long in the underlying, long in option 2 and short
cash. The following table compares the hedge effectiveness between Delta and Delta &
Gamma hedging.
Underlying after 1d Delta & Gamma Delta
58 -2.04 -71.35
58.5 0.3 -31.56
59 1.07 -3.26
59.5 0.81 13.69
60 0.02 19.45
60.5 -0.79 14.22
61 -1.11 -1.77
61.5 -0.49 -28.24
62 1.52 -64.93
Table 2.10: Delta & Gamma vs. Delta Hedge.
Vega is an estimate of how much the theoretical value of an option changes when
volatility changes by 1 percent. Higher volatility means higher changes to realize gains,
the higher risks to make losses are not there since we consider options and not forwards.
Therefore, higher option prices follow. Positive Vega means that the value of an option
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Position Delta Gamma Theta Vega Rho
Long stock 1 0 0 0 0
Short stock -1 0 0 0 0
Long call positive positive negative negative positive
Short call negative negative positive negative negative
Long put negative positive negative negative negative
Short put positive negative positive negative positive
Table 2.11: Relation between positions and their Greeks.
position increases when volatility increases, and decreases when volatility decreases. For
a 50-call with price CHF 1, a Vega of +0.5 and a volatility of 20 percent an increase of
the volatility to 31 percent leads to a option price of CHF 1.5. Vega is highest for ATM
options, and is progressively lower as options are ITM and OTM. Position Vega measures
how much the value of a position changes when volatility changes 1.00%. Position Vega
is calculated in the same way as position Theta.
Rho ρ is an estimate of how much the theoretical value of an option changes when
interest rates move 1.00 percent. The Rho for a call and put at the same strike price and
the same expiration month are not equal. Rho is one of the least used Greeks. When
interest rates in an economy are relatively stable, the chance that the value of an option
position will change dramatically because of a drop or rise in interest rates is pretty low.
Nevertheless, we’ll describe it here for your edification. Long calls and short puts have
positive Rho. Short calls and long puts have negative Rho. How does this happen? The
cost to hold a stock position is built into the value of an option. Since an option can be
replicated by a stock and loan position, stocks and options are substitutes of each other.
Due to the leverage effect to replicate the value of a stock position much less has to be
spent for the corresponding options. Put it different to build up an option position one
has to borrow money to buy the shares. This interest costs are part of the option price
and the more expensive it is to hold a stock position, the more expensive the call option.
Table 2.11 summarizes relations between positions and their Greeks.
In the Black and Scholes model the sensitivities can be calculated explicitly. They
are shown in next table.
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Sensitivity w.r.t. Math Finance Expression
Underlying S ∂C(S)∂S Delta ∆ ∆C = Φ(d1) > 0
∂P (S)
∂S ∆P = Φ(d1)− 1 < 0
Time-to-maturity τ ∂C(τ)∂τ Theta Θ ΘC = −Sσφ(d1)/(2
√
τ)− rKe−rτΦ(d2) < 0
∂P (τ)
∂τ ΘP = −Sσφ(d1)/(2
√
τ) + rKe−rτΦ(−d2) < 0
Risk free rate r ∂C(r)∂r Rho ρ ρC = Ke
−rττΦ(d2) > 0
∂P (r)
∂r ρP = −Ke−rττΦ(−d2) < 0
Vola σ ∂C(σ)∂σ Vega ω ωC = φ(d1)S
√
τ > 0
∂P (σ)
∂σ ωP = ωC
Underlying S ∂
2C(S)
∂S2
Gamma Γ ΓC = φ(d1)/(Sσ
√
τ) > 0
∂2P (S)
∂S2
ΓP = ΓC
2.6.2 Relating the Greeks via Black and Scholes
We discussed the sensitives as if they were independent. But they are not. That for
we discuss the derivation of the pricing equation of Black and Scholes from a pedestrian
view. This discussion is taken from Neftci (2008). Consider a trader buying an at-the-
money call option with price C on some underlying stock with price S. The trader may
fund his position by either shorting the underlying or by taking a loan from the money
market desk at a fixed, non-zero funding cost r. Figure 2.18 shows that the net position
of the market maker is risky.
Underlying 
+ 
- K  
Funding Amount 
Long Call 
Underlying 
+ 
- 
Money 
Market 
Position 
Underlying 
+ 
- K  
Netto 
Position   
Underlying 
+ 
- 
Short 1 
Underlying 
Underlying 
+ 
- K  
Net 
Position   
Underlying 
+ 
- K  
Net Position 
"hedged"   
Figure 2.18: Left Panel: Net position market maker. Right Panel: Net position where
the market maker is short 1 underlying.
206 CHAPTER 2. DISCOUNT FACTORS AND NO ARBITRAGE - THE BASICS
The market maker makes a profit if the underlying price increases and loses in the
other case. But the trader also needs to manage his risk. One idea is to short one unit of
the underlying since a short position in the underlying value gains if the underlying falls.
Hence a finite change from S by δS leads to change in the short position by −δS. At
this point the non-linearity of the call payoff and the linearity of the underlying payoff
matter: Any change of the underlying value has the same slope sensitivity of +1, but
the call sensitivity measured with the slope is bounded by 0 and +1. A small change in
the option price is proportional to the underlying value, i.e.
δC = C(S + δS)− C(S) = ∆δS + Error .
By going short only ∆ of the underlying we get for the sensitivity of the net position.
δV = ∆δS −∆δS + error = error .
But the Delta hedge over time has to be adjusted. This is a second order effect.
Figure 2.19 shows what happens in a simple scenario. We assume that the underlying
value oscillates with an annual volatility σ around the mid point S0. The underlying can
reach two states in the oscillation S− or S+, where in the case of a geometric Brownian
motion we have:
S+ = S0 + δS = S0(1 + σ
√
(T − t)) .
Hence δS is the percentage oscillation of the underlying which is proportional to the
square root of time t.
Underlying 
+ 
- 
K =S0 
D+ 
D0 
D- 
S+ S- 
- dS  + dS  
Figure 2.19: Delta hedge over time.
Consider the loop S0 to S+ and back. The Delta ∆+ is larger than the original one
at 0, i.e. the market maker has to increase his short position. If the underlying value
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drops back to the initial price, the position has to reduced by the market maker. For
such a two-period oscillation S0 → S+ → S0 the Delta hedge generates the cash gain:
∆+(S+ − S0)−∆0(S+ − S0) = (∆+ −∆0)δS > 0 .
For the cycle S0 → S− → S0 also a gain follows. These cycles are specific. How does the
result changes if only small but arbitrary moves are allowed? To see this, we transform
the gain into a gain rate, i.e.
(∆+ −∆0)δS = (∆
+ −∆0)
δS
(δS)2 .
This is the two-period gain. The gain in the first period is half of this value:
1
2
(∆+ −∆0)δS = 1
2
(∆+ −∆0)
δS
(δS)2
which is proportional to (δS)2 > 0. The constant of the proportion is:
Γ :=
1
2
(∆+ −∆0)
δS
,
i.e. the change of the Delta over time - the Gamma. The dynamic adjustment of the
Delta over time is given by the Gamma for a long position.
This shows that gains are generated over time if the market maker Delta hedges his
long position. Is this an arbitrage possibility, since the market maker with zero initial
investment only needs to wait until the oscillations spontaneously generate cash. No.
There are more factors in the transaction which we did not consider so far.
• Funding. If time elapses, the market maker has to pay back the funding plus
interest rates. The interest rate costs are for a period δ with simple compounding
equal to
rC(T − t)
with r a constant interest rate.
• Time decay. If time passes and all other parameters for the option price are fixed,
then the option loses value. The value of the loss is
Θ(T − t)
proportional to the period length T − t. The constant is the Theta Θ.
• Cash. The short position generates in each period an earning
rS∆(T − t) .
For simplicity we assume that this earning rate is equal to the funding rate.
208 CHAPTER 2. DISCOUNT FACTORS AND NO ARBITRAGE - THE BASICS
The net cash gains/losses of the Delta hedged position are
1
2
Γ(δS)2 + r∆S(T − t)− rC(T − t).
All this cash flows have to be equal to the time decay, else arbitrage is possible, i.e.
1
2
Γ(δS)2 + r∆S(T − t)− rC(T − t) = −Θ(T − t).
In the specific Black and Scholes model the dynamics of the underlying asset leads to
Γ(δS)2 = ΓS2σ2(T − t)
which implies
1
2
ΓS2σ2(T − t) + r∆S(T − t)− rC(T − t) = −Θ(T − t)
or:
σ2S2Γ + rS∆− rC = −Θ . (2.89)
In terms of derivatives this equation is a partial differential equation (PDE) in the un-
known function C reflecting the no arbitrage free option price:
σ2S2
∂2C(t, S)
∂S2
+ rS
∂C(t, S)
∂S
− rC = −∂C(t, S)
∂t2
. (2.90)
We note that the drift does not matter but the risk free rate r like in the stochastic
approach using martingales. Often it is not possible to solve analytically PDEs. Fortu-
nately, this fundamental pricing equation is of the well-known type of diffusion equations.
The solution exists - i.e. plugging the Black and Scholes formula (2.55) into the PDE
with the boundary conditions shows that the pricing formula is a solution.
The equation (2.89) together with the terminal condition for a call
C(T,X) = max(S −K, 0)
is called the Black-Scholes equation. This is the fundamental pricing equation.
The terminal condition reflects the contract under consideration, solving the PDE
w.r.t. C gives its no arbitrage price. This equation is the equity market equivalent to
the term structure equation for interest rate options.
Although we know the solution of the PDE of Black and Scholes one might wonder
how one can solve such type of equations. There are indeed analytical methods which
one can use to solve the equation. There is a deep mathematical result of Feynman and
Kac which states that one can solve some PDEs (such as the Black and Scholes one) by
running a Brownian motion, i.e. be calculating an expected value of a function of the
Brownian motion (i.e. the martingale approach (2.88).
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2.6.3 P&L - a Formal Approach
We start with an intuitive approach. The daily profit and loss (P&L) can be decomposed
as a linear superposition of the Greeks contributions, i.e.
Daily P&L = Delta P&L + Gamma P&L + Theta P&L (2.91)
+ Vega P&L + Rho P&L + Mu P&L + Higher order
where the sensitivities are in this order w.r.t. to the underlying, the change in Delta,
time, volatility, interest rates, dividends and higher order derivatives. If we assume that
implied volatility remains constant through time, interest rates are zero, dividends are
zero and the higher order derivatives are negligible the daily profit and loss becomes
Daily P&L = Delta P&L + Gamma P&L + Theta P&L (2.92)
= ∆S +
1
2
Γ(∆S)2 + Θ∆t . (2.93)
If the trader is Delta-hedged this reduces to
Daily P&L =
1
2
Γ(∆S)2 + Θ∆t . (2.94)
Theta and Gamma are related by
Θ = −1
2
ΓS2σ2im
with σim the implied volatility, i.e. the parameter value which one has to put into
the theoretical Black and Scholes option price formula such that the theoretical prices
matches the market price of the option. The last equality follows from the Black and
Scholes pricing equation with zero interest rates and Delta hedged positions, we finally
get for the daily profit and loss
Daily P&L =
1
2
Γ(∆S)2 − 1
2
ΓS2σ2im∆t
=
1
2
Γ
(
(∆S)2 − S2σ2im∆t
)
=
1
2
ΓS2
(
(∆S/S2)2 − σ2im∆t
)
, (2.95)
i.e. the final profit and loss is proportional to the difference of a floating leg (the stock
variance) and a fixed leg (the implied volatility part). Therefore, for a Delta-hedged
position the daily profit and loss is proportional to the squared percent change in spot
price or equivalent the realized return which is the daily realized variance and the daily
implied volatility. ΓS2 is the dollar Gamma, i.e. the second-order change in the option
price for a squared percent change in the spot price. Thus a trader who is long dollar
Gamma will make money if the daily realized volatility is higher than implied, break
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even if they are the same, and lose money if realized is below implied. If we sum the
daily profit and loss over time we obtain
P&L =
1
2
T∑
t=1
ΓtS
2
t
(
(∆St/S
2
t )
2 − σ2im∆t
)
. (2.96)
The final profit and loss is a function of the daily volatility spread weighted by the Dol-
lar Gamma, i.e. it is a path-dependent quantity. The formula shows that periods where
Dollar Gamma is high will dominate in terms of P&L.
If we assume that S satisfies a geometric Brownian motion dynamics, the instanta-
neous variance (∆St/S2t )2 equals
(∆St/S
2
t )
2 = σ2∆t
with σ the realized variance. Therefore,
Daily P&L =
1
2
∆tΓS2
(
σ − σ2im
)
.
Suppose the trader sells a call or a put, i.e he is Γ-short, i.e. Γ < 0. If he sold the option
for σimp < σ, then he will make a loss; but if σimp > σ, then he will make a gain. The
exact amount of the gain/loss depends on the stock price path (the integral); but the
value is proportional to the difference between the volatilities used for pricing and the
true volatilities. The result is intuitive and looks simple. But it is not. Suppose that
a trading book has say 50 underlyings. Then, the full covariance matrix is of the size
50× 50. Hence, the trader needs to have a view on 2450/2 pairwise correlations ρij , 50
volatilities and their potential changes. This is not trivial. So far, we considered a single
asset. Assuming that there are N assets which satisfy a system of coupled geometric
Brownian motions, the result immediately extends to:
Daily P&L =
1
2
∑
i,j
(
ρijσiσj − ρijimσiimσjim
)
SiSj
∂2C
∂Si∂Sj
. (2.97)
Hence, besides volatility figures also implied and realized correlation between the assets
matter. Equation (2.97) is the P&L of a trader who uses Black-Scholes and is ∆-neutral.
2.6.4 P&L and Risk Management, a General Approach
Chapter 3
Investment
3.1 Investment
3.1.1 Overview
Investment is about a choice to distribute $ 1 today such that tomorrow 1+x follows with
the goal x > 0. Since x is not known with certainty, unless it is a risk less investment,
there is a risk that x < 0. Several questions arise:
• Who decides? What are the objectives, constraints and opportunities?
• What is the method in decision making? Economic analysis, rule based mecha-
nism, replication of markets, views, optimal portfolio strategies or a mixture?
• How should we decide between the risk and return trade-off, i.e. what is the
objective? Some questions related to this one are:
– How many assets x1, x2, . . . , xn should one choose?
– How much weight should we give to each chosen asset at each date (portfolio
weights)?
• What defines the opportunity set? What are the constraints, opportunities for
the investment?
• Are the alternative asset combinations which deliver the same risk and returns but
at lower total costs, i.e. the costs to buy the assets, the costs to sell the assets and
taxation costs?
• How liquid are the assets: Can we sell them at any time as a price taker?
There is not a single, accepted approach how one should address these investment ques-
tions. Figure ?? illustrates a possible characterization of different methods. Three fun-
damental methods of investment are shown:
• Trust based or discretionary;
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• Payoff based;
• Algotrading.
Trust based or discretionary, i.e. where the investor delegates the investment decision
to portfolio managers either with the goal to reproduce the market or to beat the market.
Broadly, this is the asset management approach. Originally, investments were linear, i.e.
long and short positions but non-linear investments (options) were not used. Three types
of objectives are common:
• Relative return. This approach defines the success of investing relative to a bench-
mark. A benchmark can be an index, a basket of assets or a portfolio which is
the result of an optimization problem in (Modern Portfolio Theory). There
are different ways how information is obtained which leads to portfolios different
than the benchmark one. The Tactical Asset Allocation (TAA), i.e. the forecast of
expected future returns conditional on actual information, and the Strategic Asset
Allocation (SAA), i.e. the forecast of expected future returns, are two common
types of information processing to forecast future returns. By construction, the
TAA is more volatile than the long-term oriented SAA. Three factors impact the
outcome of the return estimate: The information used in the conditional expecta-
tion for the TAA, the risk model and the degree of rationality to build the forecast.
The information set can contain past price information of the assets but also macro
economic information. The risk model, i.e. the assumed dynamics of the returns,
is a second key ingredient. The deep and broad methods of econometrics are then
used for the risk model and the information process to generate forecasts. Since
not all factors can be included in such forecasts one often use these estimates to-
gether with subjective judgements to correct them. At this stage emotions, biases
and other behavioral aspects matter. If one believes that one can systematically
beat a benchmark one assumes that markets are not efficient. Put it different, if
it is impossible to make profit by trading on the basis of the information used to
predict asset returns one should on average not be able to generate a return above
a benchmark return.
• Absolute return.
• Market replication. The objective is to obtain a broad, cheap and close replication
of a market. This is often achieved using Exchange Traded Funds (ETFs).
Payoff based, i.e. the bank enters in a binding liability. This requires a trading unit, the
willingness of the bank to take risks. Payoff based investments can be further classified
considering the protection level and the investment horizon. In the first dimension,
one distinguishes between capital protected products and products where capital is at
risk. We stress that capital protection in payoff based investment is contingent on the
issuer not defaulting (Lehman Brothers). The choice of the time horizon differentiates
between opportunistic investments due to market disruptions, overreaction and longer
term investments where not events but fundamentals provide the rationale. Payoff-based
investment can be described in three dimensions:
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• Underlying value.
• Payoff.
• Wrapping.
The dimension underlying value consists of all asset classes such as Equity (EQ), Fixed
Income (FI), Commodity, Currency (FX), real estate, private equity. We consider Hedge
Funds not as an asset class but as an investment strategy. This dimension has a second
attribute which distinguish between single, basket or index investments. The payoff di-
mension can be decomposed in the following categories: payoffs with the possibility of
discretionary interventions, i.e. a mixture or discretionary and payoff type investments
and those where the payoff is given ex-ante as a mathematical expression. Examples
are options and retail structured products. The third dimension wrapping is related
to the costs of producing the investments, liquidity issues and taxation. For example to
participate in a basket of stocks can be realized using an exchange traded fund (ETF) or
a tracker certificate (RSP) or by simply buying all stocks on an individual basis. First,
transaction costs are not the same. Second, taxation of the products with the same
economic rationale can be different. Third, liquidity is not the same. Fourth, issuer
risk the investor faces is very different. Fifth, time to market to produce the product
are different. Sixth, life cycle management has a different complexity for the different
solutions. Seventh, whether or not dividends of the underlying share are reinvested can
be different with different impact on taxation.
Algotrading is a different way to generate earning based on market inefficiencies.
Originally Algotrading ment to exploit arbitrage, i.e. to detect on the markets whether
mispricings exist. For example, European put and call options satisfy a model indepen-
dent equality (the Put Call Parity). This equation states that a call is a put and vice
versa. Therefore, given the price of a put the price of the call follows. If one observes a
different price arbitrage is possible: One designs a strategy where one makes a risk less
gain in risky environment. Algotrading are computer programs which screen the market
and search for such opportunities. Today algotrading strategies exist in many different
forms. The above example belongs to so-called high-frequency trading, i.e. computers
make elaborate decisions to initiate orders based on information that is received elec-
tronically, before human traders are capable of processing the information they observe.
Other aspects of algotrading are not considering to exploit arbitrage opportunities but
the algorithm serve other purposes such as for example to sell a large amount of stocks
in an intelligent way where there is almost no price effect. A final use of algotrading is
’steal’ flows. Consider a market maker with bid ask 100-100.5. Then a very fast machine
observes this and quotes 100.1-100.4, i.e. the flow is taken away from the market maker.
This kind of trading leads to exploding IT costs since it is a battle of technology. This
kind of trading is so far not well understood from a systemic risk perspective. But given
the almost zero value such a technological war adds one might wonder why regulators do
not stop this kind of trading. The studies for the Government Office of Science of UK
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(2011) state as key findings:1
• Economic research thus far provides no direct evidence that high frequency com-
puter based trading has increased volatility. However, in specific circumstances,
self-reinforcing feedback loops within well-intentioned management and control pro-
cesses can amplify internal risks and lead to undesired interactions and outcomes.
• Overall, liquidity has improved, transaction costs are lower, and market efficiency
has not been harmed by computerised trading in regular market conditions.
• The nature of market making has changed, shifting from designated providers to
opportunistic traders.
• Computer –driven portfolio rebalancing and deterministic algorithms create pre-
dictability in order flows. This allows greater market efficiency, but also new forms
of market manipulation.
• Technological advances in extracting news will generate more demand for high fre-
quency trading, while increased participation in this will limit its profitability.
• Today’s markets involve human traders interacting with large numbers of robot trad-
ing systems, yet there is very little scientific understanding of how such markets can
behave.
• Future trading robots will be able to adapt and learn with little human involvement
in their design. Far fewer human traders will be needed in the major financial
markets of the future.
Despite the differences there is a convergence in the instruments used in the trust
and the payoff based approach: Both approaches use linear (shares, bonds, futures, swaps,
rates) and non-linear instruments (options, structured products).
The discretionary and payoff approaches can be defined more formal. LetW (= 1+x)
be wealth at a future date or absolute return, B be a benchmark return. Then the asset
only and the asset liability case objectives can be stated as follow:
• Asset only: Absolute return W , relative return W −B, replication B.
• ALM: With S = A − L the surplus, we have absolute return S, relative return
S −B and replication B.
From an economic perspective one should write more general preferences than linear
ones. Besides objective the constraint or opportunity set A has the following form:
• A depends on the wealth evolution (budget constraint) and on the decisions (port-
folios).
1The authors of the three studies in the report are C. Furse, A. Haldane, C. Goodhart, D. Cliff, J.-P.
Zigrand, K. Houstoun. O. Linton. P. Bond.
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• A is a union of different constraints/opportunities: A risk constraint, an investment
constraint (not more than 10 percent US stocks), an market admission constraints,
a transaction cost bound, an incentive constraint are examples.
• It is obvious that adding a constraint reduces the return possibilities.
Finally, if φ is the investment strategy at a given date, wealth W ′ at a future date is
given by:
W ′ = W + φ∆S
with ∆S the price change of the investment (share, commodity, etc.) in a period. The
strategy φ can be selected by a rule, discretionary or optimal as the solution of an
optimization problem. Given this setup, discretionary investment means the solution of
the problem
max
φ∈A
W (φ)
where the portfolio manager chooses φ, the chief investment officer defines the opportu-
nity set A and the investor likes the whole optimization program.2 In the payoff case, let
f(S) be a (non-linear) function of an underlying value S. Then f(S) satisfies the con-
straints of the investor (f(S) ∈ A) and is optimal for the investor, i.e. f(S) maximizes
the objective. This shows that in the payoff case (i) the investor solves the optimization
problem and not the portfolio manager. Given the optimal choice f(S), the investor pays
1 USD today in exchange for f(S) at a future date.
3.1.2 Diversification, Arbitrage Pricing Theory, Alpha, Beta
What do Alpha and Beta mean? Active management is often expressed using Alpha
and Beta is used for passive investments. Alpha then denotes today each return which
is attributable to active management and is above the risk less rate is. This view is
not helpful for practice and has no theoretical foundation. The two Greek letters are
not related to the trading frequency but to different types of risk factors. They are
identifiable within to modern portfolio theory: Theories where the portfolio return follows
to be a linear combination of factors. To understand this, we first consider the notion of
diversification and then the decomposition of a return in risk factors.
Definition 3.1.1. Systematic risk (aggregate risk, market risk, or undiversifiable risk)
is vulnerability to events which affect broad market returns. Idiosyncratic risk (specific
risk, unsystematic risk, residual risk, or diversifiable risk) is risk to which only specific
agents/firms/assets are vulnerable. Idiosyncratic risk can be diversified away.
’diversified away’ means that the risk of a portfolio is reduced by adding more and
more assets to the portfolio. We discuss the notion of diversification. We start with
abstract pure asset diversification. There is no other type of diversification across
2Since wealth and other variables are random, one considers the expected value in the objective.
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Figure 3.1: Different approaches to investments.
trades, models, information source, ideas and information processing. Assets are mod-
elled as random variables. The basic result is:
Proposition 3.1.2. Assume that returns are not correlated and investment is equally
distributed. Then increasing the number of assets reduces portfolio risk monotonically.
To prove the result, we first assume that there are N returns R1, . . . , RN of some
assets which are uncorrelated and that there exists a uniform upper bound c for risk
measured by the variance, i.e. var(Ri) ≤ c for all i. Using elementary properties of the
variance,
var(
N∑
i=1
φiRi) =
N∑
i=1
φ2i var(Ri) ≤ c
N∑
i=1
φ2i
follows for an investment strategy vector φ. Supposing that the investment is equally-
distributed, i.e. φ = 1N , then
var(
N∑
i=1
φiRi) ≤ c
N∑
i=1
φ2i =
c
N
→ 0 , (N →∞).
To eliminate portfolio risk completely in an equally-distributed portfolio with uncorre-
lated returns one has to increase the number of assets in the portfolio. Since volatility
is the square of variance, adding new assets reduces volatility only as 1√
N
. But most
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assets traded in stock exchanges are (positively) correlated. Can we still eliminate
risk completely?
Proposition 3.1.3. Consider an equally-distributed portfolio strategy φi = 1N and N
assets. Then the portfolio variance σ2p is given by:
σ2p = 〈φ, V φ〉 =
1
N
σ2N + (1−
1
N
)covN
with the mean variance σ2N and the mean covariance covN . If N →∞ and if the unsys-
tematic risk 1N σ
2
N is uniformly bounded, then the systematic risk covN cannot be diver-
sified away.
The proof is given in Appendix 7.7. The residual risk cov∞, i.e. the average co-
variance, cannot be fully diversified and is called the systematic (market) risk. The
diversifiable risk 1N σ
2
N , i.e the average variance, vanishes as N → ∞ and it is called
the unsystematic risk of the portfolio. Figure 3.2 shows diversification for world wide
stock market indices. Diversification allows to eliminate unsystematic risk or idiosyn-
cratic risk. Market or systematic risk can only be reduced to the level of the average
portfolio covariance. We often encounter the case that assets can be pooled. For example
assets within an economic sector show a more similar dependence among them compared
to assets in other sectors. To see that the above analysis also applies to the case where
we have a macro structure on the assets we assume that the number of assets N can be
decomposed in a set of N1 assets and a second set N2 = N −N1 representing a second
sector. To consider the limit N to infinity we assume that N1/N = c is constant. This
implies that N2/N = 1− c is also constant if N,N2 →∞. If one repeats the calculation
as in the proof of the last proposition for this two-sector economy one obtains in the
infinite asset limit:
σ2p = c
2cov1 + (1− c)2cov2 + c(1− c)(c(1− c)− 1)cov1,2
with covi the mean covariance in sector i. This result shows that total portfolio risk is
bounded again by the mean covariances, i.e. this risk cannot be diversified away. The
formula shows that this non-diversifiable asymptotic risk arises from the two sectors and
the cross-sector correlation. Compare this two sector case with the one sector one. For
c = 0, 1 we are in the respective one sector boundary case. Choosing c = 1/2 it follows
that portfolio variance σ2p is lower than each of the two boundary values cov1, cov2. This
shows that risk is not only reduced within an asset class by increasing the number of
assets but also by increasing the number of different asset classes.
The figure shows that diversification within the global equity class alone is a poor
concept - the different diversified regional markets are moving in the same directions.
Only the extent of the yearly return variation is different:If one regional market is posi-
tively performing almost all others behave in the same way. Hence, instead of investing
in many local markets one can equally invest in a single index representing the world
wide stock markets. For a true diversification the figures shows that other asset classes
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Figure 3.2: Diversification for world wide stock market indices. On the vertical axis the an-
nual linear returns are shown. The following stock market (indices) are shown: American SE,
BOVESPA, Buenos Aires SE, NASDAQ OMX, NYSE Euronext (US), TSX Group, Australian
SE, Bombay SE, Bursa Malaysia, Hong Kong Exchanges, Korea Exchange, National Stock Ex-
change India, Shanghai SE, Shenzhen SE, Singapore Exchange, Taiwan SE Corp, Tokyo SE,
Athens, BME Spanish Exchanges Madrid, Borsa Italiana, Budapest SE, Deutsche Börse, Egyp-
tian Exchange, Istanbul SE, Johannesburg SE London SE, SIX Swiss Exchange, Tel-Aviv SE.
Source: World Federation of Exchanges, 2012.
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are needed.
So far diversification was across assets. But there is also diversification acrossmeth-
ods. Diversification across methods means a reduction of model risk: The risk that each
single approach in investment faces the risk of being misspecified. Different methods:
• Information sources. What are the sources of information which are used in decision
making? Fundamental values, technical information, market information (flows),
positions, macro information.
• Strategies across regions and assets classes, i.e. invest/exit and long/short. Focus
not diversification.
• Quantitative models such as market signalling models (momentum signals, VaR
measures, information ratios, spread information).
• Trades. Diversification across different trades. For example in FI and FX duration,
cross-market, government, curve, credit and currency.
This characterization is used by JP Morgan (2004). Diversification can therefore be
considered as:
Diversification Assets×Diversification Methods→ Trades .
This wider interpretation of pure asset diversification has also drawbacks. First, different
methods can be conflicting: What a strategist propose can be conflicting with duration
risk. This requires a procedure to resolve conflicts or to make a decision between con-
flicting alternatives.
Is there a foundation for this double diversification approach? One might argue
that more diversification is always better. But this is in general not true. First, if
one has the analytical skills to understand deep economic relations and if one has the
capacity to transform the view into a trade then one is not interested in diversification per
se. Second, portfolio theory assumes that probabilities of future outcomes are known.
But there is ambiguity in these probabilities. Is there relationship between risk and
ambiguity? Izhakian (2011) shows that in most cases ambiguity cannot be diversified
without increasing risk. This implies that with ambiguity it is often not optimal to hold a
fully diversified portfolio. Assuming that investors are averse both to risk and ambiguity,
they would like to minimize both of them. In the modelling approach3 not only returns
are random but the probabilities of these returns are themselves random. In this model,
the degree of risk is measured by the variance of returns (as usual) and the degree of
ambiguity can be measured by the variance of the probability of loss or gain. Working
within the family of normal distributions random probabilities means random means and
random variances of the distributed asset returns. The degree of ambiguity is a matter
3Izhakian calls the model expected utility with random probabilities (EURP).
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of the classification of returns as losses or gains, relative to a reference point. Izhakian
proves that ambiguity and risk are inversely related under quite weak assumptions: Under
these assumptions ambiguity cannot be diversified without increasing risk. Formally, the
intuition is as folows. Let X be a random variable. The expected value of X is then
a double sum - a sum over the probability weighted outcomes (risk) and a sum over
all probabilities which one considers (ambiguity). The random mean is then a random
variable where one takes only the sum over the weighted outcomes. The central concept
is that the probabilities of outcomes are random; thus, as the degree of risk can be
measured by the variance of outcomes, the degree of ambiguity can be measured by
the variance of probabilities. Then the sum over all probabilities where the random
variable X is lower than a reference point is the expected random loss. To be more
concrete, we consider an example.
• Assume that the probabilities of d and u are known: P (d) = P (u) = 0.5.
• The expected return is 5 percent and standard deviation is 15 percent. Ambiguity
is zero.
• To introduce ambiguity, P1(d) = 0.4 and P1(u) = 0.6 and P2(d) = 0.6 and
P2(u) = 0.4 are the uncertain probabilities. The new distribution which describes
the probability that either the first or second randomness is realized is an equal
distribution: With 50 percent the first probability P1 (P2) is drawn.
• Assume that a negative return is considered a loss. Ambiguity, which is four times
the variance of the probability of loss, is then 0.2.
The common thread between risk and ambiguity is the random variance. The higher
random variance is, the higher is risk. The impact on ambiguity is the opposite. Since
a higher random variance means a flatter random probability density function, a lower
ambiguity follows: Formally, if the reference point satisfies some conditions:
Ambiguity
Random Variance
≤ 0 .
Hence, adding an asset increases its ambiguity as it decreases its risk. Can ambiguity
be diversified away in an asset portfolio or are two assets less ambiguous when combined
than each asset separately? Again the result is in the opposite direction than for the risk
dimension. For risks, an incresing correlation means increasing risk. But if correlations
of the asset return increases the variance of the returns is also increasing. But as we
stated above an increasing random variance reduces ambiguity. If an investor considers
risk and ambiguity, holding a fully diversified portfolio is not optimal sinc since for a
given expected return, minimizing risk increases ambiguity.4
4The paper considers some puzzles: Individual investors tend to hold very small portfolios—only 3-4
stocks, i.e., underdiversification (Goetzmann and Kumar (2008)), or they choose not to participate in
the stock market (Guo (2004) and Bogan (2008)). Expected volatility is higher than realized volatility
(volatility risk premium Eraker (2004), Car and Wu (2009) and Drechsler (2012)).
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Consider a bank which uses a modern portfolio theory model. Such a model faces re-
turn and volatility risk, i.e. risk that the estimates of the past which are used to calibrate
the model are ambiuous. To consider ambiguity the bank can ad hoc change the fully
diversified portfolio outcome of the model or they can use other sources in investment
decision making - analysts, strategiy analyists, trade information. In this sense double
diversification as discussed above can be conidered as method to control risk and ambi-
guity in investment decision making.
We consider Arbitrage Pricing Theory (APT). We follow Wang (2003). APT
was developed primarily by Ross (1976a, 1976b). It is a one-period model in which
every investor believes that the stochastic properties of returns of capital assets are
consistent with a factor structure: It starts with specific assumptions on the distribution
of asset returns and relies on approximate arbitrage arguments. Ross argues that if
equilibrium prices offer no arbitrage opportunities over static portfolios of the assets,
then the expected returns on the assets are approximately linearly related to the factor
loadings. APT assumes that asset returns R are driven by N assets:
R = µ+ βf +  (3.1)
with β a N×K matrix, f the K factors,  is the risky asset’s idiosyncratic random shock,
f,  are both assumed without loss of generality to have mean zero, idiosyncratic  risk is
assumed to be to be uncorrelated across assets and uncorrelated with the factors and µ
is the expected asset return. Given the assumption, µ equals the expected return E[R].
Each factor fj is written as the ’surprise’:
fj = Fj − E[Fj ] .
βik gives the sensitivity of return i with respect to news on the k-th factor. It is called
the factor loading of asset i on factor fk. Using a no arbitrage argument one derives:
Proposition 3.1.4 (APT). Assume the factor representation (3.1) holds with all as-
sumptions. Then the expected return µi for any asset i depends only on its factor expo-
sure
µi ' µf +
K∑
k=1
βik(Rfk − µf ) (3.2)
with Rfk − µf the premium on factor k and µf the risk free rate.
This model gives a reasonable description of return and risk. Contrary to the CAPM,
which can be seen as a particular case of the APT, the is no need to measure the market
portfolio. The model does not says what the right factors are which also can change
over time. Conceptually, APT is based on approximate no arbitrage and the factor
models of returns. CAPM, which we below after the Markowitz model, is based on
investor’s portfolio demand and equilibrium arguments. Since (approximate) arbitrage is
a more robust assumption, APT is often preferred in practice to CAPM. Some immediate
consequences of the Proposition are:
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• Any well-diversified portfolio is exposed only to factor risks, i.e. idiosyncratic risk
can be diversified away.
• A diversified portfolio that is not exposed to any factor risk must offer the risk-free
rate.
• There always exist portfolios that are exposed only to the risk of a single factor.
That is, given say two portfolios which are exposed to two factors one can choose
a convex combination of the two portfolios such that resulting portfolio is only
exposed to one risk factor.
Instead of discussing the not difficult proof, we prefer to consider examples to gain
intuition. Consider two factors f1, f2. The first one describes unexpected market return,
the second one unexpected inflation. We assume a risk less rate of 5 percent a premium
on market return of 8% = Rf1 − rf = 13%− 5% and a premium on inflation of −2% =
Rf2 − rf = 3%− 5%. We assume that there is only factor risk, i.e. idiosyncratic risk is
zero. The APT equation 3.2 reads for an asset X:
µX = µf + b1(Rf1 − rf ) + b2(Rf2 − rf )
= 0.05 + b1 × 0.08− b2 × 0.02 .
Consider the specific asset X where both Betas are 1.0. Then, µX = 11% follows. Sup-
pose that the expected return of X is different, say 10%. Then there is arbitrage. To see
this, we invest USD 100 twice in the two parts of the above portfolio (the so-called factor
portfolios): We invest the amount in the portfolio which pays the return 0.05 + 0.08 and
the same amount with return 0.05 − 0.02. We sell the 100 USD of low priced portfolio
with the expected return µX . In summary we are so far long the two factor portfolios and
short the X-portfolio. To prove that there is an arbitrage, we should state with initial
investment of zero. So far we have USD 200 − 100 total investment. To get zero, we
simply sell another USD 100 in the risk free asset. All four portfolios require zero initial
investment, they bear no risk and they pay 1 = 13 + 3 − 10 − 5 USD for sure. Hence,
this would be an arbitrage. This shows that the APT must hold in absence of arbitrage
if b = 1, i.e. if there are only factor risks. What if an asset also bears idiosyncratic risks?
Then by a contradiction argument shows that if the APT equation is not true for most
assets, again arbitrage is possible.
After the discussion of diversification and APT, we consider the notions of Alpha and
Beta:
• Beta. This is the proportion of the yield, which is associated to one or more
systematic risk factors (such as a stock index, a bond index, etc.).
• Alpha is the residual amount.
Thus, in this view, Alpha has nothing directly to do with active Management but with non
systematic risk factors. As more and more risks are added over time, Alpha decreases
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Figure 3.3: Development of the Alpha over time. Source: Berger and Kalliber, AQR,
2008
over time. In the historical development of each yield above the risk less rate was denoted
Alpha, see Figure 3.3: In each portfolio with a return above the risk free rate this result
was assigned to the portfolio manager. The use of indices reduced the Alpha for the
first time. The managers were then able to express a large portion of the return with
the commonly held market risk. The CAPM model provides, for example, the following
decomposition for the expected Return µi of the title i:
µi = µ0 + βi(µ
T − µ0) + α ,
with βi =
Cov(µi,µM
Var(µM )
and α = 0 in the CAPM.
Some managers succeeded to achieve systematically returns above market returns.
They followed simple rules on subsets of the broadly diversified indices. They, for ex-
ample, overweight small-cap stocks and underweight large-cap stocks. Fama and French
(1993) have shown in their work, using a three-factors model, that the returns of portfolio
can be better explained if one adds to the CAPM distinctions of such market structures
such as Large-cap stocks, small-cap stocks, growth stocks, etc. This explained a further
part of the Alpha - the so-called style risk premia or the style Beta. Other empiri-
cal studies have shown that a further part of the returns can be assigned to alternative
investments - the alternative risk premia or exotic Beta. The last part of the trans-
formation of Alpha to the Beta is based on the hedge fund industry. Many hedge funds
apply the same concepts. This results in that a further part of the Alpha is transformed
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Asset Class Market Beta Style Beta Hedge Fund Beta
Equities Equity indices Size, Value, Momentum Merger Arbitrage
Fixed Income FI market Credit Spreads, HY Spread Convertible Arbitrage
FX FX market Carry Trade
Table 3.1: Transformation of Beta for different asset classes.
to the Beta. In addition to the presented subdivision, there are other approaches. For
example, the hedge fund Beta can be subdivided into a part called the inefficiency Beta.
There are market situations in which you can exploit through systematic action struc-
tural imbalances. The imbalances can be generated by market participants, regulators,
central banks or tax authorities.
The reduction of Alpha is for several reasons beneficial to investors: They are increas-
ingly less exposed to non-identified risks and costs of portfolio management are reduced,
since the investment in the Beta-parts is not specific to the asset manager’s skills but can
be achieved at lower costs using simple rules. Table 3.1 shows how for the asset classes
of equities, fixed income and currencies the general market Beta, style Beta and Hedge
Fund Beta is replicated.
The word ’arbitrage’ comes from practice and should not be confused with the theo-
retical concept of no arbitrage. The various premia for e.g. ’value’, ’size’ or ’credit spread’
should be both implementable for long and short positions. Figure 3.4 shows different
implementations for the Betas of Hedge Funds and Styles, see Brian et al. (2009).
More important than the risk-return characteristics of the individual Beta compo-
nents are the dependence structures, i.e. how do the individual risk premia correlate?
The figure shows that many risk premia only slightly positive or even negative correlate
with each other. Thus they offer real diversification to investors. Two points should be
noted, however. The correlation between high yield and credit spreads is large. This
is not surprising since both involve creditworthiness risk. Thus, one can dispense with
one of the two factors if there is no significant basis risk. The second observation relates
to the period of investigation, ie it stops at the outbreak of financial crisis. A fact of
a crises is that the correlation structures can change dramatically - a negative or weak
correlation can become strongly positive for example. Comparing these risk premiums
with those of the market Betas, i.e. comparing the correlation between ’value’ and the
MSCI shows, that many of the style and Hedge Fund risk premia diversify. Others like
’Merger Arbitrage’ or ’High Yield Spread’ possess a strong positive correlation with stock
indices - i.e. they are largely redundant.
3.1.3 Active vs. Passive Investments
There is an ongoing debate whether passive or active portfolio management pays for the
investor. We start with two basic results. W. Sharp states that it must be the case that
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Figure 3.4: Implementations for the Betas of Hedge Funds and Style (left panel) and
correlation of the style and hedge fund risk premia from May, 1995 to October, 2008
(right panel). Source: Briand et al., 2009
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1. before costs, the return on the average actively managed dollar will equal the return
on the average passively managed dollar and
2. after costs, the return on the average actively managed dollar will be less than the
return on the average passively managed dollar.
He claims that every statement holds for any time period. The claims imply that for
active management the selection process of the asset managers is key since without skills
on average active management is worthless. A market must be chosen such as MSCI
index for example. By definition a passive investor always holds a fraction of the market.
An active investor is one who is not passive. His or her portfolio will differ from that of
the passive managers at some or all times. Because such managers tend to trade fairly
frequently, they are called ’active’.
Let RM , RP , RA the market -, passive investment - and active investment returns,
respectively. Over any specified time period, the market return will be a weighted average
of the returns on the securities within the market, using beginning market values as
weights, i.e.
RM = λRP + (1− λ)RA
with λ the weight factor. Since RM = RP before costs, the above equation implies
RM = RA. This proves claim 1.
To prove claim 2, we note that the costs of actively managing a given number of dol-
lars exceeds those of passive management. Active managers must pay more for research
and for more frequent trading. Because active and passive returns are equal before cost,
and because active managers bear greater costs, it follows that the after-cost return from
active management must be lower than that from passive management. This proves the
second claim.
Claim 1 implies that in the group of active investors there are some which beat the
market return and a second group which under perform. These results do not depend
on any behavioral assumptions or advanced statistical concepts - they follow from basis
arithmetics.
Using claim 1 one could conclude that active management in the aggregate can never
outperform market performance. To see how active management can nevertheless out-
perform performance, we consider rates of return to capital for investments in China.
Understanding how the Chinese markets are regulated it follows that the active perfor-
mance should be split into a RpA private sector and a state sector R
s
A which is dominated
by the private sector, see Figure 3.5. We have
RM = λRP + µR
p
A + (1− λ− µ)RsA
with λ, µ the weight factors. Although RM = RP holds still true, the active returns
are once higher and once lower than the market return. But how do we know that the
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Figure 3.5: Rates of return to capital by sector for China. Source: Xiaodong Zhu, University
of Toronto.
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private sector outperforms the state owned one and do this last for all future dates?
The necessary insight is that China’s remarkable growth performance is driven by rapid
productivity growth in the non-agricultural non-state sector. But there are financing
constraints which lead to under investment in the non-state sector such as limited access
to external financing by non-state firms. Furthermore there is high business risk, taxa-
tion is not favorable for non-state firms and costs of investment are high. Despite high
domestic saving rates, many high return investment projects in the non-state sector are
not financed. In summary there are structural causes for the difference in the rates of
return before costs. Successful investment is not the art of understanding or estimating
market signals but to understand underlying economic, legal or institutional structures.
If an investor can find the possibility to invest in the non-state sector then even after
costs the return of non-state investments dominates the state investments. This will not
last for ever since improvements in capital markets will remove the imbalances. But for
a short or midterm investor active investment into Chinese stocks ’dominates’ passive
investment - if he gets access to the Chinese’ assets.
There is no guarantee that active investment in the above example dominates pas-
sive one. But the example shows how knowledge based active management can be more
valuable than reasoning based on statistical estimates of past returns and risks.
Active management often has two components: A passive one which represents
long-term goals in a benchmark portfolio and an active portfolio on short or medium-
term which represents views. Active management defines deviation from the benchmark
to benefit from market opportunities. In such a setup the passive portfolio stabilizes the
whole investment about what one expects to be optimal in the long term. What defines
the success of the active strategy? First, skills to identify opportunities matter. The
second factor is the number of trades. This two factors skill and activity impact the
success of active management as follows. Assume for simplicity that returns are normally
distributed with mean zero and variance σ2. The profitable trades are defined as having a
positive return. The expected return of the profitable trades equals σ
√
2
pi .
5 Consider two
traders. One trader is always successful, the other one in x percentage of all trades. Both
trade n times. The information ratio, i.e. the measure of the trader’s generated value,
is defined as the excess return over risk. The Information Ratio (IR) is a measure
of the risk-adjusted return of a financial security (or asset or portfolio). It is defined as
expected active return divided by tracking error, where active return is the difference
between the return of the security and the return of a selected benchmark index, and
tracking error is the standard deviation of the active return. The expected return is
xnσ
√
2
pi︸ ︷︷ ︸
x% success in n trades
− (1− x)nσ
√
2
pi︸ ︷︷ ︸
1− x% failures
= (2x− 1)nσ
√
2
pi
.
5The expected value E[RχR≥0] of successful trades is given by: 1√2piσ
∫∞
0
xe−x
2/σ2dx = σ
√
2
pi
∼ 0.8σ .
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If x = 1, the trader is always correct. Since risk scales with the square-root of the number
of trades (or time), risk equals σ
√
n. This gives the information ratio
IR = (2x− 1)
√
2n
pi
.
Therefore, for a fixed success rate x an increasing trading frequency increases the informa-
tion ratio and raising the trading frequency encounters diminishing returns. Numerically,
a IR of 0.5 needs a success rate x of two-third if the trader trades quarterly. We remark
that the volatility does not enter the IR - this is particular to the assumption of a normal
distribution. Assume that a single trade induces costs k > 0. The IR after costs then
reads
IRpost = (2x− 1)
√
2n
pi
− kn .
This simple extension shows that increasing the trading frequency no longer increase the
IR but that there is an optimal level which depends on the ratio between the success rate
and the cost factor.
3.1.4 Efficiency of Markets
Since Eugene Fama, many academics believe financial markets are too efficient to allow
for repeatedly earning positive Alpha, unless by chance. To the contrary, empirical
studies of mutual funds usually confirm managers’ stock-picking talent, finding positive
Alpha. However, they also show that after fees and expenses are deducted, the effective
Alpha for investors is negative - as it must be according to the two claims of W. Sharpe.
Nevertheless, Alpha is still widely used to evaluate mutual fund and portfolio manager
performance, often in conjunction with the Sharpe ratio and the Treynor ratio.6 This
raises the question to which extend one predict returns?
Intuitively the time horizon for prediction matters. To predict a share price in one
hour is most likely close to a random event. But to forecast the return over 2 years
randomness is superimposed by non-random factors such as quality of the production,
human capital, skills of the management, etc. Randomness is likely to enter more as
external events, i.e. technological revolution or market disruptions for example. The
question is to what extend are the portfolio managers able to identify and value the
fundamental values of the firm.
The Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH) considers market structures where the fore-
cast of future returns is completely random or in other words, where it is impossible
to make profit by trading on the basis of the information used to predict asset returns.
If markets are efficient passive investments, i.e. investing in an index and holding the
investment to maturity is the best strategy. This raises the debate between active or
6The Sharpe ratio is a measure of the excess return (or risk premium) per unit of deviation in an
investment asset or a trading strategy and the Treynor ratio relates excess return over the risk-free rate
to the additional risk taken; however, systematic risk is used instead of total risk.
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passive investments. While a significant part of the academic literature gives evidence
that active investment does not adds value significantly in a given set of assets under
consideration in practice both approaches coexist simply because there markets which
are not efficient and where an active strategy can make payoff attainable which are not
in a passive investment. The test of efficiency is often related to statistical efficiency -
to what extent are future returns predictable. But there are inefficiencies which are not
random in nature. Market segmentation and fragmentation are two examples. I
How is the EMH defined? Samuelson (1965) stated that in an informationally ef-
ficient market price changes should be unpredictable. Fama (1970) then argued that
a market is efficient if prices fully reflect all available information. After the work of
Fama there have been several refinements and precisions in the statement of the EMH.
Malkiel (1992): ’...A capital market is said to be efficient if it fully and correctly reflects
all relevant information in determining security prices. Formally, the market is said to
be efficient with respect to some information set.... if security prices would be unaffected
by revealing that information to all participants. Moreover, efficiency with respect to an
information set ... implies that it is impossible to make economic profits by trading on
the basis of [that information]...’
One consequence of the EMH is that unless an investor is just plain lucky, it is im-
possible to exploit the market to make an abnormal profit by using any information that
the market already knows. Another consequence is that for someone without any such
private information, it does not make any sense to talk about ’undervalued’ or ’over-
valued’ individual securities, sectors or markets. Finally, it is impossible for any other
portfolio than the total-market portfolio to have both a higher expected return and lower
risk than the total-market portfolio, i.e. the total-market portfolio is always located on
the ’efficient frontier’ in academic risk/return models.
There are three definitions of the information sets which in turn lead to three EMHs:7
• The information set includes only the history of the prices or returns themselves -
7
• If agents are rational the three different forms of the EMH can be described as follows in forecasting
prices S of assets. Let Fs be the information set generated by the price history of the asset S
only starting at time 0 up to time s. Then for t > s
E[St|Fs]
is the best guess of future prices St. It follows that the conditional expectation is the orthogonal
projection on the information set Fs. If Ns denotes the set of public information which is not
part of the price information, the semi-weak form implies
E[St|Fs ∪Ns] .
Since the conditional expectation has no vector space structure on the information sets, such
models are difficult to handle analytically and general, intuitive results can not be expected. A
second obstacle is the difficulty to define the set of public information. Finally, if Pt denotes
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the weak form of the EMH follows.
• The information set includes all information known to all market participants (pub-
licly available information) - the semi-strong form of the EMH follows.
• The information set includes all information known to any market participant (pri-
vate information) - the strong form of the EMH follows.
The assumptions for market efficiency to hold true are strong. For example, it re-
quires that equal perception of risk among all investors holds. But a T-Bill might be
considered risk free for an US investor but not for a German one, the assumption of the
same risk aversion is clearly wrong, some investors have an asset-only view others such
pension funds an asset liability one with typically lower risk tolerance and investors also
differ in their time horizon for the investment. This remarks make it plausible why there
is active portfolio management.
How can one test the EMH? If markets are efficient abnormal profits should not be
possibly by trading on information. This is an operational concept which allows for
empirical tests. One can consider profits by professional market participants. If after
adjusting for risk the returns are superior than the returns of the others, markets are not
efficient. The problem is how to observe the information which the agents use. A second
approach is to consider hypothetical trading strategies based on explicitly specified in-
formation set. Do they earn superior returns? To test for it one needs (i) to specify the
information set and (ii) to specify the model for risk. We consider the second approach.
What about the model for risk: How do we define abnormal returns? One can define
abnormal return as the difference between realized and expected returns. But to capture
the expected return a risk model is needed (CAPM, APT). Then, we state the Null
Hypothesis for the EMH:
E(Abnormal Returnt+1|Ft) = 0
where Ft is one of the three information sets. If abnormal return is predictable using
the information Ft, the hypothesis of market efficiency is rejected. This shows that a
test of EMH contains a joint hypothesis (JHP): (i) That markets are efficient and
that (ii) the right risk model is chosen. This implies that market efficiency can never
be rejected. One cannot know if the market is efficient if one does not know if a model
correctly stipulates the required rate of return. Consequently, a situation arises where
private information which the strong form formally implies
E[St|Fs ∪Ns ∪ Ps] .
We note that the weak form is the standard one used in financial engineering and mathematical
finance. Furthermore, in the theory of asset pricing the expectation of the asset S discounted by
an appropriate numeraire is a martingale, i.e. the best guess of the future discounted asset price
given present information is the present value of the discounted asset price.
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either the asset pricing model is incorrect or the market is inefficient, but one has no
way of knowing which is the case. In other words there is interference between model
risk of asset pricing models and the potential efficiency in markets which one cannot
disentangle. The debate between ‘Rational Finance’ and ‘Behavioral Finance’ can be
framed in terms of the JHP.
To test for the EMH a new taxonomy of tests is proposed (see Franzoni (2008) for
details). First, there are tests for predictability, both cross-sectional and for time-series.
These are tests the JHP supporting the weak from EMH. Second, on focus on event
studies which represent test for the semi-strong EMH. One computes returns after the
release of public information and sees if returns are different from zero after the events.
Given the short period, risk adjustment is not important. These are very close tests of
the corresponding EMH. Many events or news make stock markets react quickly: Prices
go up quickly supporting the semi-strong hypothesis. But when investors become aware
that the news should induce a short position instead of a long position, one observes
often a delayed and incomplete correction downwards, i.e. a violation of the semi-strong
hypothesis. Third, to test the strong EMH, one tests for private information: One focus
on hedge fund or mutual fond performance for example.
The results of the tests of the tree types are roughly as follows. In the short run
there is almost no predictability, i.e. the market seems to be adequately described by
a random walk. If one switches to longer time horizons returns become more and
more predictable. The JHP clearly manifests itself. In the long run returns become
predictable using valuation ratios such as the earning-price ratio. Randomness is impor-
tant in the short run but in the long run deterministic, possibly time-varying relations,
determine the returns. For a more detailed and in depth analysis we refer to the literature.
The EMH does not tell how individuals behave given an information set. In rational
general equilibrium models information is modelled as a stochastic process and individu-
als use actual information to forecast future prices using conditional expectations. They
estimate future values by conditioning on the present information set. The conditional ex-
pectation is mathematically the best estimate of future prices if all agents in the economy
behave in this way. There is strong evidence from psychology, experimental economics
and field experiments that people fail to apply the laws of probability correctly. Framing
the information set, deviations from rational forecasting are even stronger. By assuming
that information is in the prices the EMH does not tell anything of how information
is perceived, understood, valued and transformed into economic activities. Therefore if
a hypothesis fails to be supported behavioral economists attribute the imperfections in
financial markets to a combination of cognitive biases such as overconfidence, overreac-
tion, representative bias, information bias, and various other predictable human errors in
reasoning and information processing. The EMH does not require that investors behave
rationally. When faced with new information, some investors may overreact and some
may underreact. Markets would not behave the way they do in the real world if everyone
always reacted in the same perfectly rational way to new information. All that is required
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by the EMH is that these overreactions and underreactions be random enough and cancel
each other out such that the net effect on market prices cannot be exploited to make an
abnormal profit. Stated different, irrationality is irrelevant as long as it is unpredictable
and not exploitable. Even the entire market can behave irrationally for a long period
of time and still be consistent with the EMH, again as long as this irrational behavior
is not predictable or exploitable. Thus crashes, panics, bubbles, and depressions are all
consistent with a belief that markets are efficient.
Andrew Lo (2010) and his collaborators recently tested the human ability to detect
randomness from non-random financial returns. The logic of their paper is as follows.
Pick a time series p of historical prices p0, p1, . . . , pT with the returns rt = pt − pt−1.
Then generate a new series of prices p∗ by permuting the historical prices. Such a random
permutation p∗ does not alter the marginal distribution of the returns but it does destroy
the time-series structure of the original series, including any temporal patterns contained
in the data. Hence, all moments of the two series p and p∗ agree but the latter one
has no time series pattern which can be used for predictions: One can test individual
behavior in visual pattern recognition. The two price series are shown and the individual
is asked to decide which of the two moving charts is the real one by clicking on it. The
individual is informed immediately whether the choice was correct or not. For each
data set, the user is shown approximately 35 pairs of moving charts and asked to make
as many choices. The null hypothesis is that participants cannot distinguish between
actual and randomly generated price series, i.e. their choices should be not better than
random guesses. Testing the null hypothesis means to calculate the p-value of obtaining
at least as many correct guesses when guessing at random. Formally, if s is the number
of individuals, c the number of shown charts, X the number of ’heads’ in n = s × c
independent tosses of a fair coin and g the number of correct guesses, we have.
p-value = P (X ≥ g) =
n∑
i=g
(
n
i
)
/2n.
There is strong evidence against the null hypothesis since the p-values are at most 0.503
percent for each of the eight data sets with values less than 0.001 percent for six of them.
How did individuals managed to perform so well? An analysis indicates that financial
experience seems to have no correlation with game performance. The authors conjecture
that feedback which leads to learning and adaption is the most important factor of
success. A subject wrote: ’Admittedly, when first viewing the two data sets in the practice
mode, it is impossible to tell which one is real, and which one is random, however, there
is a pattern that quickly emerges and then the game becomes simple and the human eye
can easily pick out the real array (often in under 1 second of time).’
It is well known that computers struggle with many image-recognition and classifica-
tion tasks that are trivial for humans. This is a possible explanation for the individuals
performance. We argue that although the test shows that people are successful in iden-
tifying the difference between random and real time series no conclusion can be made
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about the ability of individuals in forecasting prices.
3.1.5 Risk and Return
Risk and return are the starting point for any investment decision in Modern Portfolio
Theory. A major assumption is that risk and return are positively related to each other
- it is not wise to consider them independently and more risk goes in line with more
return and vice versa. Risk is in investment often measured by the variance, i.e. the
weighted average of squared deviations from the mean. Since variance is expressed in
square units and difficult to interpret one prefers the square root as measure of risk -
the standard deviation or volatility. Since the volatility measure stick punishes also the
positive deviations from the mean and fails to measure the heavy impact events (tails),
today one uses often asymmetric risk measures such as Value-at-Risk. But since for liquid
asset classes the return on longer investment horizons can be considered to be normally
distributed, VaR is given by a multiple of the variance. We therefore continue to work
with the variance. Assets from different asset classes show different volatility. To make
return comparable, one adjusts them for the risk. The Sharpe ratio is such a measure
defined as excess return, i.e. return over risk free rate, normalized by the annualized
volatility of excess return. If this ratio is close to zero for an asset there is no long term
return premium, i.e. it does not pay to keep an unhedged position. The real risk free
rate represents the time value of money or the opportunity cost of trading current for
future consumption.
Calculating the risk-return relationship for different asset classes shows that the trade-
off changes over time. The changes can be classified into three different economic events.
First, economies show mean-reverting behavior. The economy fluctuates around the
mean-reversion. In a recession interest rate are cut to stimulate business activity and
volatility increases due to higher default risk and increasing uncertainty about future
firm profitability. Second, structural shifts impact the risk-return trade-off. Japan
faced such a shift in the 90’s of last century and the Euro Crisis is likely to reprice many
European assets to a new equilibrium value. Third, event risks such a financial crisis,
new regulations effect the risk-return trade off.
Given the risk free rate and risk premia, we can use them to forecast expected asset
returns. How should this be done? We could extrapolate the historical values. This is
not a good idea since it postulates that the past repeats itself: Falling or increasing value
will continue to do so. Hence, we fail to account for cyclicality by extrapolating past
trends. A more suitable approach is to construct the returns bottom-up by comprising
stationary and variable components, see Figure 3.6 for an example.
The approach of Modern Portfolio Theory (MPT) follows the principle to obtain the
highest possible return given a level of risk. The elements which matter in MPT are
the expected return, the volatility of the individual assets and the co-movement of asset
prices (covariance). Consider two assets, a bond and a stock. The expected return is the
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Figure 3.6: Forecasting long-term return using a bottom-up approach.Source: JP Mor-
gan, 2004
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weighted average
E(R) = 0.6× 5% + 0.4× 4% = 4.6%
where we assume that 60 percent of the wealth is invested in the stock, 40 percent in
the bonds and the expected returns are 5 and 4 percent, respectively. Expected return
is additive, i.e. co-movements do not matter. The risk dimension variance or volatility
is not additive, i.e. covariance matters in the risk of the assets:
cov(Rstock, Rbond) = E[(Rstock − µstock)(Rbond − µbond)]
with µ the expected returns. If one asset is risk free, covariance is zero. Since covari-
ance is not bounded this makes it difficult to interpret. Normalizing covariation by the
product of the two assets volatilities correlation follows which takes value between −1
(perfect negative correlated) and +1 (perfect positive correlated). Positive correlation
means that if stock price moves in one direction then also the bond price moves without
delay in the same direction and vice versa. The standard rule for the variance of a sum of
random variables (portfolio) implies that this variance is equal to the weighted individual
variance’s sum plus their correlation. Hence, a negative correlation value reduces the sum
of the individual risk components for portfolio risk keeping the return level unchanged.
This is the value added of diversification. Unfortunately, most asset classes show positive
correlation and correlation is not stable over time, see Figure 3.7. The portfolio choice
60/40 was arbitrary. If we draw the expected portfolio returns and the portfolio standard
deviation, for different portfolios different points follow. The maximum risky portfolio
100/0 and the lowest risky one 0/100 are shown. The straight line represents all possible
portfolio choices if there is perfect positive correlation. If we fix any portfolio on this
line and consider portfolios which give the same return with higher risks or for the same
risk provide lower return, we call this portfolio a dominate one and the portfolio which
dominates such a choice is called an efficient portfolio. The set of these portfolios is the
efficient set or efficient frontier. If we vary the correlation parameter, the efficient frontier
varies. The frontier becomes maximally bowed if perfect negative correlation holds: The
lower correlation is the higher are the gains from diversification. So far, all asset were
assumed to be risky. We add a risk less asset to the picture, i.e. an asset with zero
volatility by definition. Hence for 100 percent in the risk free asset the efficient frontier
starts on the y-axes. The Mutual Fund Theorem (see below) states that every efficient
portfolio can be written as a linear combination of two efficient portfolios. Therefore,
we can obtain an profile for portfolios on the straight line (Capital market line) which is
tangent to the efficient set of risky assets only. The tangent point represents the highest
attainable portfolio of risky assets - the so-called market portfolio. At the tangent
point the investor holds a combination of cash (risk less asset) and the market portfo-
lio. Regardless of where an investor is positioned on the capital market line he holds
the market portfolio. The proportion of each asset in the portfolio are the same for all
investors. Therefore the efficient portfolio is a market capitalization weighted basket of
securities. Hence in theory all investors hold the market portfolio. The assumptions are
that all investors perceive risk equivalently, all investors hold a combination of cash and
the market portfolio, a market-cap weighted basket of securities is the efficient portfolio,
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Figure 3.7: Upper Panel: Time varying correlation.Source: Goldman Sachs, 2012. Lower
Panels: Efficient frontiers (sets) as a function of asset correlation.
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there in no compensation for non-market allocations and there is not point for active
management, i.e. if the market portfolio is efficient, there is no role for active investing.
We consider the two asset example im more details. Let φ = (φ1, 1 − φ1) be the
corresponding normalized portfolio of an investment in two risky assets. Where can
the feasible portfolios be positioned in the risk-return space with coordinates (σφ, µφ) of
a portfolio φ with
µφ = E[R
φ] = 〈φ, µ〉 = φ1µ1 + φ2µ2 (3.3)
σ2φ = var(R
φ) = φ21var(R1) + φ
2
2var(R2) + 2φ1φ2cov(R1, R2) ?
To find the relationship between risk and return we solve the variance equation w.r.t. to
the strategy weight φ1. This gives two possible solutions φ±1
φ±1 =
B ±√D
A+B
, (3.4)
where
A = σ21 − ρσ1σ2 B = σ22 − ρσ1σ2 , D = B2 − (σ22 − σ2φ)(A+B) (3.5)
Inserting the solutions φ±1 in the return expression (3.3) for µφ we obtain µ
±
φ :
µ±φ = µ2 + φ
±
1 (µ1 − µ2) . (3.6)
Thus, µφ is as a function of σφ an hyperbola where for any possible level of standard
deviation σφ two portfolio expected returns µ± are generally obtained. Without loss of
generality we assume µ1 < µ2 and σ1 < σ2.
In the case D = 0, i.e. D = 0 ⇐⇒ σφ =
√
σ22−B2
A+B , a single portfolio φ = φ
+ = φ−
follows. This implies a single expected return solution
µφ =
µ2A+ µ1B
A+B
. (3.7)
This portfolio is the global minimum variance portfolio, i.e. the portfolio attaining
the minimal variance risk in the set of all feasible portfolios. Since the discriminant D
is monotonically increasing in σφ, because A + B > 0. Hence the minimum D = 0 is
attained at the minimal allowed standard deviation σφ. The corresponding portfolio φ
is therefore the global minimum variance one.
The portfolio opportunity set is a hyperbola in (σφ, µφ)−coordinates. If the risky
assets are perfectly (positively or negatively) correlated, the relationship between the
portfolio return standard deviation and if the expected portfolio return is linear, see
Figure 3.7 (lower panel right). The point A represents asset 1; B represents asset 2.
Asset 1 has lower expected return and variance than asset 2. Consider the case ρ = 1.
Then all efficient portfolios lie on a straight line 1 in the mean-standard deviation space.
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Any risk and return combination between the ones of assets 1 and 2 is obtained as a
portfolio φ = (φ1, 1− φ1) determined by
µφ = φ1µ1 + (1− φ1)µ2 ,
for any given target expected return µ1 ≤ µφ ≤ µ2. The standard deviation σφ then
follows. Similarly, for ρ = −1 all portfolios expected returns and standard deviations
will lie either on the straight line 2a or on the straight line 2b, respectively, depending
whether µφ is larger/smaller than (Aµ2 +Bµ1)/(A+B), i.e. the expected return of the
minimum variance portfolio. In this case the minimum variance portfolio is a risk free
asset, since it has zero standard deviation of the return. In the presence of a perfect
negative correlation we can fully eliminate the portfolio risk while having long positions
in both assets. In such a setting, asset 1 is a perfect hedging instrument for asset 2
(and vice versa). When comparing for any target expected return µφ the standard de-
viation implied for ρ = −1 and ρ = 0 one can observe the risk reduction deriving from
the stronger hedging effects arising when ρ = −1. More generally, hyperbolas for lower
ρ−values will tend to be moved to the left, in mean-standard deviation space, due to the
stronger hedging effects obtained in this case.
The portfolio returns of portfolios of more than two risky assets will be scattered
on a whole surface in mean-standard deviation space.
Definition 3.1.5. Assume that investor’s preferences on portfolio returns depend only
on the expected return and the variance of the portfolio. The following terminology is
used:
• If a portfolio offers a larger expected return than a second portfolio for the same
risk, then the latter portfolio is strictly dominated by the first one.
• If a portfolio offers a smaller risk than a second portfolio for the same expected
return, then the latter portfolio is strictly dominated by the first one.
• Portfolios that are not strictly dominated by some other one are called mean-
variance efficient or simply efficient, i.e. we define that a portfolio φ∗ as mean-
variance efficient if there exist no portfolio φ such that
E[Rφ] ≥ E[Rφ∗ ] , var(Rφ) < var(Rφ∗) . (3.8)
The Markowitz model allows us to systematically determine the set of all efficient
portfolios.
One can argue at this point that the variance or volatility is not an adequate risk
measure. This is indeed the case. There are more convenient risk measure sticks such as
value-at-risk or even coherent or convex risk measures. We discuss them at the end of
this chapter. Although there has been impressive research in the last decade concerning
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appropriate risk measures in investment besides the variance only value-at-risk seems
to be used. The reason is that the dependence of the assets in markets under stress is
becoming extreme - the benefits of diversification vanishes. It is important to have a
view on different markets, to have a clear policy when to enter or exit the markets.
3.1.6 Indices
Indices are often used as benchmarks or as investment vehicles to achieve broad diversi-
fication within an asset class. Besides the member asset prices, there are four other main
factors determining the index value. In order to calculate the index value the following
factors have to be taken into consideration: member weighting, divisor, index return type
and value fixing. In general the formula for index calculation looks like
I =
∑M
i=1wiSi
D
where M is the number of assets in the index, Si is the price of a tradable unit of asset
i, e.g. the price of a stock, wi is the weight assigned to the price of that asset and D is
the divisor.
Weighting. Various methods are used for determining the weight of individual members
in the index. Within the same category there can be subcategories and slight differences.
• Market capitalization weighting: The members are weighted proportional to the
total market value of the asset issuer, i.e. Wi is dependent on the size of the
company for equity. In the equity case this would correspond to the number of
outstanding free-floating shares multiplied by the share price. Subgroups of this
weighting would be if weights were capped at some level, or that no consideration
was taken into free float. This is the most common form of weighting for public
indices and the rule for indices such as S&P, FTSE, MSCI and SMI .
• Equal weighting 1 (Price Weighting): The weight assigned to different assets is
the same. As a consequence the price of a tradable unit of the asset will have a
determining effect on the weight of an asset in the index . Dow 30 and Nikkei 225
indices are calculated using the equal weighing scheme.
• Equal weighting 2 (’CHF Weighting’): The CHF weight assigned to each asset is
the same, i.e. Siwi, is the same for each asset. This means that if CHF 500 is to be
invested in a basket of 10 assets, the amount bought of each asset would be CHF
50.
• Share weighting: The members are weighted proportional to the total number of
tradable units issued, i.e. Wi is dependent on the number of the shares outstanding
for the equity asset class.
• Attribute weighting: The members are weighted according to their ranking score in
the selection process. If our ranking is based on ethical and environmental criteria,
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and asset Y has a score of 75 and asset X 25, then weight ratio between asset Y
and X will be Weight Y / Weight X = 3.
• Hybrid or Custom weighting: The weighting scheme can be a combination of the
above alternatives or be something totally new, maybe based on the request of
client.
Free-floating is the portion of total shares held for investment purposes. This is opposite
to shares held for strategic purposes, i.e. for control. Some indices are quoted using
different weighting schemes, e.g. MSCI. However, the main quoted value is using the
market capitalization weighting method.
Remark:
The difference between the asset weighting scheme and the weight of an asset in the
index is as follows. For a price weighted index w1 = w2 for asset 1 and asset 2. However
if S1/S2 = 3 the weight of asset 1 in the index will be 3 times larger than the weight of
asset 2.
Divisor
The divisor is a crucial part of the index calculation. At initiation it is used for nor-
malizing the index value. The initial SMI divisor on June 1998 was chosen to a value
which normalized the index to 1500. However, the main role of the divisor is to remove
the unwanted effects of corporate actions and index member change on the index
value. It ensures continuity in the index value in the sense that the change in the index
should only stem from the investor sentiment and not originate from "synthetic" changes.
Corporate actions, which need to be accounted for by changing the divisor value, are de-
pendent on the weighting scheme used for the index. Consider a stock split for an index
with ...
• ... market capitalization weighting: The price of stock will be reduced and the
number of free-floating shares increases. These two effects will be offsetting and no
change has to be made to the divisor.
• ... equal weighting (Price Weighting): The stock price reduction will have an effect,
but the number of free-floating share has no impact on such a weighting. Therefore,
the divisor has to be changed to a lower value in order to avoid a discontinuity in
the index value.
It is very important in practice to have a good understanding of the influence of common
corporate actions such as splits, dividends, spin off, merger & acquisition, rights offer-
ing, bankruptcy, etc on the index value so that the index value continuity can be ensured.
Return Type
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How the dividends are handled in the index calculation determines the return type of
the index. There are three versions of how dividends can be incorporated into the index
value calculations:
• Price return index: No consideration is taken to the dividend amount paid out by
the assets. The day-to-day change in the index value reflects the change in the
asset prices.
• Total return index: The full amount for the dividend payments is reflected in the
index value. This is done by adding the dividend amount on the ex-dividend date
to the asset price. Thus, the index value acts as if all the dividend payments were
reinvested in the index.
• Total return index after tax: The dividend amount used in the index calculation is
the after tax amount, i.e. the net cash amount.
Value Fixing
Another set of rules that characterize an index calculation, is the data values and the
frequency, which they are used. An index value is usually calculated in real time or once
a day. Exceptions are illiquid indices for real estate asset class as an example.
The values that are needed for index value calculation can be quoted in various
versions. The most important value is the asset price. It has to defined weather the
value uses is mid prices, bid or ask prices, last trade prices or any other price value
provided.
In addition, if the index constituents have a wide geographical span, there are other
issues that need to be taken into consideration. Some of the rules that need to defined
are: index value quotation currency, source of currency rates, index opening and closing
hours, and assets registered on multiple exchanges.
For most major indices the quotation is real time and the currency rate used is also
real time. The opening hour for the constructed index starts with the opening of the
exchange of any index member, and the closing occurs when no index member exchange
is open. Having a global index, with constituents from Japan to USA, would mean that
the index would be "open" most hours of the day.
3.2 Beta: Delta One and ETF
Delta One represents investments where the sensitivity w.r.t. to the underlying assets
is one - i.e. linear payoff profiles. There are many investment motivations and many
products in Delta One business.
Investment motivations are reductions of productions costs, optimization of in-
vestment return and risk, gaining access to specific markets, diversification, taxation
issues, managing liquidity and leverage constraints, term financing, managing cash flows,
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cash optimization and leverage, precise hedging or investing in strategic themes.
There is a wide range of products serving the investor’s purpose.
• Stocks. Direct investment in stocks has the advantages of customization and
flexibility. It requires an infrastructure and one should anticipate a low turnover.
Infrastructure is expansive and borrowing costs for the stocks can add significant
variable costs.
• Single or index stock swaps. An equity swap exchanges a floating interest rate
(LIBOR) and the performance of either a stock or a stock market index. These
products are used to gain leveraged access to (global) markets and to access markets
which are otherwise difficult to trade since thy require only initial and variation
margins. They are used also in markets where stand liquid products may not exist.
These products provide a taylor-made risk and return profile at low production
costs since there is no management fee and administration as well maintenance
costs are low. Swaps are best suited for large portfolios, long term trades and
low turnovers. Other types of swaps are sector swaps and term swaps. Swaps
possess low fixed costs (bid-offer, commissions) but face some variable costs from
counterparty -, funding risk.
• Certificates ([Retail] Structured Products). These products allow for access
to countries or products that may be otherwise inaccessible. They can be used by
investors who have restrictions to trade derivatives. Certificates can be structured
as short, long or a combined exposure. For institutional investors they can be
completely be taylormade - payoff, underlying value and wrapping. The certificate
composition and intraday prices are known at any time. Certificates are ment for
longer term investments and low turnover. Besides bid-ask spreads and commis-
sions, management fees applies. The most important variables costs are from issuer
risk.
• Futures are best suited for high turnover and shorter duration. The fees are
low (bid-ask, commissions) but they face variable costs from rolling -, dividend -,
tracking error and funding risk.
• ETF are liquid, easy to use, are well suited for high frequent trading and if a
more granular exposure is wished than for example futures allow. The fix costs
consists of commissions, bid-ask spread and management fees. The all-costs are for
retail type ETF between 20 and 50 bps p.a. and between 5 and 15 bps p.a. for
institutional investors. ETF face tracking error risk and depending on the structure
of the ETF dividend treatment. ETFs exist since the early 1990s as a cost- and
tax-efficient alternative to mutual funds. The structuring of these funds initially
shared common characteristics with that of mutual funds.
We consider ETF in more details. Mutual funds use ETF on a strategic level, Hedge
Funds also on a tactical one. Initially ETFs shared common characteristics with that of
mutual funds, i.e. the underlying index exposure that the ETF replicated was gained by
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Figure 3.8: ETF asset growth in different markets. Source: Ramaswamy (2011), BIS,
and BlackRock (2011).
buying the physical stocks or securities in the index. In recent years, investors desire to
seek higher returns by taking exposure to less liquid emerging market equities and other
assets through ETFs that guarantee market liquidity has demanded more innovative
product structuring from financial intermediaries. ETFs have moved away from being
a plain vanilla cost- and tax-efficient alternative to mutual funds to being a much more
complex and diverse array of products and replication schemes. Table ?? some figures of
the ETF industry.
Number ETFs 2’500
Sponsors 130
6 Main Sponsors iShares, State Street Global Advisors, Vanguard,
Lyxor Asset Management, db x-trackers and Power Shares
control over 80% ETF market shares
Assets under management 1.3 Billion USD
Europe 80% of ETF assets in Europe are held by institutional investors
US 50% of ETF assets in Europe are held by institutional investors
Table 3.2: Some figures of the ETF industry. Source: Blackrock, 2011
Figure 3.8 shows the ETF asset growth.
How are ETFs constructed or what defines the ETF value chain?
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• Manufacturing. ETF are constructed by index providers, exchanges, regulators,
investment bank which apply the swap structuring, index fund managers.
• Distribution. Manufacturing is linked to the sales channel. Sales can be ETF-
specializes sales, investment banking sales, asset management sales or third party
distributors.
• Clients are mutual funds, hedge funds, institutions or private bank clients.
The construction of ETF can be broadly done in two ways: Direct replication or swap-
backed construction. In the direct replication one buys all index components (full replica-
tion) or just an optimized sample. This is a transparent approach with low counterparty
risk due to securities lending. But if the markets are difficult to access, significant track-
ing error can realize. In the swap-based approach one invests indirectly in a basket by
achieving the index performance via a total return swap, see Figure 3.9. This approach
minimizes the tracking error and one can access more underlyings. The drawbacks are
counterparty risk and documentation (ISDA).
Which method will dominate in the future depends on two factors: Clients need and
regulation. Since regulation impacts the costs, the clients need are not independent on
how regulation will be defined. The swap approach will be stronger regulated where
regulation will ask for more transparency. That is transparent on the collateral posted
by the swap counter parties and on the securities lending process.
Figure 3.10 shows how private banks can use ETFs. The bank seeks for ETFs which
can be used to construct a portfolio based on the building blocks Regional, Single Coun-
try, Sectors and Themes. The bank uses such an ETF portfolio complementary to the
active stock-picking strategy. Compared to the active strategy this passive component
has very low costs.
The cost components of an ETF are the spread, the broker charges and trading com-
mission and the Total Expense Ratio (TER). The spread is driven by several components.
Market liquidity has an impact, taxes such as stamp duty on underlying components of
physically replicated ETFs, execution costs such as brokerage fees on underlying com-
ponents in some markets (e.g. 30bps sell tax in Korea), creation or redemption cost
and tracking error due to restricted stocks or closed markets. The TER is the sum
of the management fee and the expenses. The expenses depend on the complexity of
the underlying portfolio and the replication costs. For plain vanilla structure the TER
can be 10bps but rise to 100bps for complex structures. TER is deducted daily from NAV.
Synthetic ETFs allow replication of the index using derivatives as opposed to owning
the physical assets. One motivation for using synthetic structures to replicate the index
could be to reduce costs. Physical replication can be an expensive method for tracking
broad market indices such as emerging market equity or fixed income indices, or other
less liquid market indices. Including only a subset of the underlying index securities
for physical replication can lead to significant deviation in returns between the ETF
and the index in volatile market conditions (tracking error). One popular synthetic
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Figure 3.9: Left Panel: ETF construction. Right Panel: Operational structure of ETFs.
Market makers purchase the basket of securities in the markets that replicate the ETF
index and deliver them to the ETF sponsor. In exchange each market-maker receives
ETF creation units (50,000 or multiples thereof). The transaction between the market-
maker and ETF sponsor takes places in the primary market. Investors who buy and sell
the ETF then trade in the secondary market through brokers on exchanges. The market
value of the basket of securities held by the ETF sponsor forms the basis for determining
the NAV of the ETF held by investors.Source: Ramaswamy (2011), BIS
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Figure 3.10: ETF portfolio via building blocks. MSCI Global Equity Indices are widely
tracked global equity benchmarks and serve as the basis for over 500 exchanged traded
funds* throughout the world. FTSE calculates over 120,000 end of day and real-time
indices covering more than 80 countries and all major asset classes. Nikkei 225 index is a
stock market index for the Tokyo Stock Exchange. S& P 500 is a free-float capitalization-
weighted index based on the common stock prices of 500 American companies. The
NASDAQ-100 Index includes 100 of the largest domestic and international non-financial
securities listed on The Nasdaq Stock Market based on market capitalization. SLI Swiss
Leader Index consists of the SMI stocks and the 10 largest SMIM stocks. Source: Credit
Suisse, 2010.
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Figure 3.11: Unfunded swap ETF structure. Source: Ramaswamy (2011), BIS
structure involves the use of total return swaps which the ETF sponsors refer to as
the unfunded swap structure, see Figure 3.11. Ramaswamy (2011) states:’Under the
synthetic replication scheme, the authorized participant receives the creation units from
the ETF sponsor against cash rather than a basket of the index securities as in the physical
replication scheme. The ETF sponsor separately enters into a total return swap with a
financial intermediary, often its parent bank, to receive the total return of the ETF index
for a given nominal exposure. This constitutes the first leg of the swap. Cash is then
transferred to the swap counterparty equal to the notional exposure. In return, the swap
counterparty transfers a basket of collateral assets to the ETF sponsor. The assets in the
collateral basket could be completely different from those in the benchmark index that the
ETF tries to replicate. The total return on this collateral basket is then transferred to the
swap counterparty, which constitutes the second leg of the total return swap.’
The nature of the swap transaction exploits synergies between banks’ collateral man-
agement practices and the funding of their warehoused securities. Synthetic replication
schemes transfer the risk of any deviation in the ETF’s return from its benchmark to
the swap provider, which is effected by entering into a derivatives contract to receive
the total return of the benchmark. This protects investors from the tracking error risk
which physical replication schemes would otherwise expose them to. However, there is
a trade-off: the lower tracking error risk comes at the cost of increased counterparty
risk to the swap provider. The increased popularity of ETF products among investors
has led to greater competition between ETF sponsors, forcing them to seek alternative
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replication techniques to optimize their fee structures. Ramaswamy (2011) states:’One
outcome of this fee structure review has been to explore the scope for possible synergies
that might exist between the investment banking activities of the parent bank and its asset
management subsidiary or the unit within the parent bank that acts as the ETF sponsor.
These synergies arise from the market-making activities of investment banking, which
usually require maintaining a large inventory of stocks and bonds that has to be funded.
When these stocks and bonds are less liquid, they will have to be funded either in the
unsecured markets or in repo markets with deep haircuts. By transferring these stocks
and bonds as collateral assets to the ETF provider sponsored by the parent bank, the in-
vestment banking activities may benefit from reduced warehousing costs for these assets.
Part of this cost savings may then be passed on to the ETF investors through a lower
total expense ratio for the fund holdings. The cost savings accruing to the investment
banking activities can be directly linked to the quality of the collateral assets transferred
to the ETF sponsor. For example, there could be incentives to post illiquid securities as
collateral assets. Typically, such securities will have to be funded by the investment bank
at unsecured borrowing rates. By posting them as collateral assets to the ETF sponsor
in a swap transaction, the investment bank division can effectively fund these assets at
zero cost for its market-making activities. In addition, the bank providing the total return
swap through the unfunded swap ETF structure may benefit from a reduction in regulatory
capital charges. This would be the case if lower credit quality and less liquid assets are
included in the collateral basket sold to the ETF sponsor compared with those acquired
for replicating the ETF index.’ In Ireland, for example, equities posted as collateral are
subject to a 20 percent haircut, whereas in Luxembourg it is up to the fund custodian
and the fund management company to negotiate the haircut. As a consequence, UCITS-
compliant ETFs that are synthetically replicated tend to be registered in Luxembourg
to reduce haircuts on collateral assets posted.
An alternative replication scheme used by ETF sponsors is to employ the so-called
funded swap structure. Under this, the ETF sponsor transfers cash to the swap counter-
party, who then provides the total return of the ETF index replicated. This transaction
is collateralized, with the swap counterparty posting the eligible collateral into a ring-
fenced custodian account to which the ETF sponsor has legal claims. This structure is
less commonly used by sponsors for synthetic replication of ETF indices
3.3 Alpha: Hedge Funds
What is a HF? HF allow for collective investments. In this sense they follow the same
purpose than ordinary investment funds. But there are differences.
• Many HF are offshore domiciliated, i.e. on some islands or countries which offer
them tax advantages and/or which have low regulation standards. But regulation
of HF is changing. The EU agreed 2010 to apply stronger regulatory rules for HF.
The G20 agreed in 2009 to regulate the 100 largest HF. The US SEC an the British
FSA have then the right for insight in the HF balance sheets.
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Figure 3.12: Comparison of the two ETF synthetic replication schemes. Source: Ra-
maswamy (2011), BIS
• Many HF cannot be offered to the public, i.e. private placement to qualified in-
vestors often defines the client and distribution channel.
• An important selling argument for HF is that their investment not or only weakly
correlate with traditional markets. This argument needs more explanation. First,
HF often invest in traditional markets too, i.e. the above argument means than
that their investment strategy in the traditional markets is only weakly correlated
to traditional strategies in these markets. To what extend the HF argument holds
true is changing over time. In the year 2000 and the following years, correlation
between MSCI World, a broadly world-wide diversified stock index, and the broad
DJ CS Hedge Fund Index or correlation between DJ-UBS Commodity Index and
DJ CS Hedge Fund Index changed on a 2y rolling basis. The correlation was at
0.54 respectively at 0.16 between the commodity and the HF index in the years
2000-2007. 2007, correlations jumped to 0.8 and 0.81. A significant part of the HF
managers started in 2007 to invest traditionally in stocks and commodities.
• Fee structure. HF often charge a fee of 1 percent per year of the NAV plus a
performance fee. These performance fees can be as high as 20 percent of net
income in a period.
• Investment strategies. HF use short selling and leverage strategies. In the latter
one, they hope that funding costs of capital are lower than the return on the
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Figure 3.13: Fractions of different HF strategies. Source: L. Seco (2010).
leveraged capital. Some HF strategies are described next, see Figure 3.13:
– Long-short stock strategies, i.e. one is long the stock which one consider
to be undervalued and short the overvalued one.
– Relative Value or Arbitrage Strategies. These strategies use mispricings
between securities. For example, if a stock trades at different prices at two
exchanges.
– Event Strategies focus on particular events which can effect specific firms,
sectors or whole markets. This can be spin-offs or joint-ventures for firms or
liquidity crunches for whole markets.
– Global Macro Strategies try to identify global economic trends and to
replicate them using financial products. An example is the HF Quantum of
G. Soros. This HF noted 1992 the overvaluation of the British Pound. Using
hugh capital amounts the HF forced the Bank of England to stop to maintain
the Pound - the Pound strongly depreciated against other leading currencies,
the HF made large gains and UK was forced to leave ECU; the ancestor of
the European Monetary Union.
We consider a convertible arbitrage strategy where we follow Seco (2010). A
convertible bond has the following properties:
• It trades at USD 80 at the moment, i.e. below par. The coupon is USD 4 and the
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Title 0 T1 T2 T3 T4 T5 T5
Bond 80 80 73 70 91 88 85
Stock -70 -70 -60 -60 -80 -80 -80
T-Bill +70 + 70 + 72.8 + 72.8 + 72.8 + 72.8 + 72.8
Coupon – + 4 + 4 + 4 + 4 + 4 + 4
Fee – + 3.5 + 3.5 + 3.5 + 3.5 + 3.5 + 3.5
Value 80 83.3 86.3 83.3 84.3 81.3 78.3
Table 3.3: Return of the convertible arbitrage strategy. The subscript x in Tx numerate
the scenarios.
bond holder can convert the bond in 10 stocks before the bond matures. The price
of the stock is 7.
• The bond holder sells the bond to the HF.
• The HF borrows 10 stocks for the price of USD 70 at a fee of 1 percent, sell the
stocks for USD 70 and invests the amount in US treasury bills (T-Bills) with 4
percent return. The costs of selling the T-Bills and buying back the stocks is
assumed to be 1 percent. This defines the convertible arbitrage strategy.
Table 3.3 shows the development of the P& L for different stock and bond price
changes starting today at t = 0 up to one year at T . The table shows that in only one
scenario a loss follows. This also shows that the strategy is not an arbitrage strategy
in the strict academic sense. The strategy has several earning components. The bond
yield, short-term rates, stock moves and the bond itself. The number of risk factors is
considerable. Besides interest and credit risk, stock volatility, liquidity risk is the corre-
lation between the bond and the stock market a relevant, difficult to estimate instable
factor. The HF index for convertible arbitrage increased almost linearly between 1996
and 2005. During this period interest rates largely failed and after the dot.com bubble
and 9/11 stock started to rise for a long period. This stock increase led after 2005 to
falling volatilities. Since not only realized but also implicit volatilities became lower, the
call option price which are based on the implicit volatilities became cheaper. But the
right of conversion in a convertible bond is equivalent to an exposure in a call option.
This led to a flattening of the index after 2005. In August 2008 of the financial crisis the
index lost more than 40 percent of its value. The events in this period - the repricing of
credit risk, the drop of stock markets, the squeeze in liquidity - correspond to a tail-event
from a risk view. In such an event a structural change follows. Risks and their dependen-
cies are newly calibrated. This shows that HF may provide better return properties for
many scenarios than traditional fund investments but that the often more complicated
strategies face higher losses is a structural change hits the HF.
While some consider HF to be a particular active investment strategy, others consider
HF to be a own asset class. Since HF generally invest in traditional asset classes and
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markets and therein value added is expected to come from the skilful re-allocation of the
portfolio among investment existing opportunities it is probably best to consider them
as a complementary strategy to traditional strategies and not as an own asset class, see
Figure 3.14.
Hedge Funds 
Figure 3.14: Asset classes and investment strategies. Credit L/S means credit long-short,
CTA means Commodity Trading Advisors (CTA), where the fund trades in futures (or options)
in commodity markets or in swaps, Credit RV means credit risk relative value strategies, FX
GTAA means FX Global Tactical Asset Allocation. Source: UBS Global Asset Management.
2011
During the financial crisis the question was raised about the relevance of HF for sys-
temic risk. Many authors such as the BIS in their annual report 2011 or B. Bernanke
estimate that the risk is not large. Two reasons lead to their estimate. First, many HF
are small in size. Second, many HF are not strongly connected to the banking sector.
The HF industry has a fund fortune of about USD 300 billion.8 in 2000. This figure
increased to USD 2’400 billion by the end of 2007. During the financial crisis the amount
fall to 1’400 billion in 2008. 2010 the value was at 1’750 billion USD. The number of HF
increased from 4’000 in 1999 to 9’400 in 2009. The average leverage factor varies around
1.5. This factor can increase for some strategies for a short period to values between 3
8The data are from the BIS annual report 2010, page 105 and the document of the City University,
2010, about HF.
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and 4. More than 2/3 or all assets of HF are in the US, Europe follows with around 1/4.
The low regulation standard of HF compared to banks is often criticized. There are
several causes for these debates. First, at the moment regulation of HF is weak compared
to the banking sector. Second, HF often operate in a non-transparent way. This natu-
rally raises suspicion. Third, given the number of HF and some prominent realized cases,
it would be not natural if there were no black sheeps in the HF industry. If we restrict
ourself to scientific work one notes the increasing number of papers which show evidence
that the HF industry manipulates the performance reports, see Agarwal et al (2011),
Bunnermeier et al (2004), Ben-David et al. (2012). The last cited work finds evidence
that HF manipulate stock prices at their critical reporting dates. The stocks show at the
last reporting date a significant excess return, which at the day after the reporting turns
in the opposite. The authors further show that the incentives for manipulation increase
for HF with stronger ranking incentives relative to other HF. Such manipulations affect
all other market participants which invest in the same stocks.
3.4 Rule Based Investment
What is a rule? A rule is a mathematical description which states which title of a defined
asset universe is selected at a given date for investment, what the amount of investment
is in each title, how coupons payments are calculated and when do they are payed, how
different styles such as momentum, volatility control are defined. Besides these type of
mechanistic rules there also exist mixtures where some discretionary decision are allowed
beside the rule mechanism.
What is the rationale to use mechanistic rules in investment? Rules are free of emo-
tions. In a world such as the financial world which is complex, unexpectedly changing
managers are sometimes less driven by rational analysis but more by emotions. Often,
such situations lead to underperforming investments. Hence rule based investment as-
sures that systematic thinking drives the investment process. On the other hand rule
based models can never capture the full complexity of the real investment world; they
are in particular blind to foresee structural changes. The attempt to make models more
and more realistic increases their complexity and makes parameter estimates more and
more difficult. Hence, to search for the most realistic and hence complex model is a dead
end in investment.
Given the pros and cons of rule based models and discretionary judgement one some-
times sees a combination of them - model provide information for discretionary decision
making. This takes away a fear to be model-driven but one remains informed by the
models. To successfully combine these two approaches requires a lot of experience from
the decision makers - discipline to control emotions when markets crash is an example.
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3.4.1 Momentum and Volatility Control
Momentum strategy means buying stocks which had a positive return over a predefined
past period and selling in the other case. Hence, momentum is basically a strategy which
is related to the ’velocity’ of asset prices. Whether or not shares are bought depends on
the definition of the signalling process. Clearly, people which believe in the EMH will
not invest according to a momentum strategy since for them returns are not predictable.
The difficulty is that an increase in asset prices, in and of itself, should not warrant fur-
ther increase. Such increase, according to the efficient-market hypothesis, is warranted
only by changes in demand and supply or new information (cf. fundamental analysis).
Defining the momentum strategy requires to fix a time period and the signals over
this period. If the period length is set too long the momentum strategy is likely detect
only longer term trends. This would make sense even from an EMH point of view. Taking
shorter periods the momentum strategy is on one hand side able to catch up also with
smaller trends but the strategy also becomes more volatile, i.e. trading becomes more
frequent. A simple example of a time horizon and a signalling strategy is for the weight
wi(t+ j) of investment in asset Si over the period [t, t+ j):
wi =
 1, Rj =
S(t+j)−S(t)
S(j) > r;
0, Rj =
S(t+j)−S(t)
S(j) ≤ r.
Momentum strategies are not successful if the markets are moving side way - then the
risk is that the strategy always changes too late or too early the investments.
A different rule is volatility control. The rationale of volatility control is to bound
the volatility of an investment portfolio, say at 10 percent. If one asset price falls, an
empirical regularity implies that volatility of this asset increases (negative leverage).
Therefore, volatility of the portfolio increases. Consider a second asset in the portfo-
lio with low correlation to the first asset with different risk sources. Assume that the
volatility of this asset is not increasing in the same magnitude as the first one does. Then
the volatility cap on the portfolio implies that at a given level investment switch from
the more volatile to the less volatile one. This if often considered to be beneficial for
the investor since a drop by say 20 percent of the first asset requires an increase of 40
percent to recover the status quo. Therefore, even if there exists capital protection this
is typically only effective at maturity date. Before, the investment can value well below
the guarantee level. Using a volatility control one tries to circumvent heavy losses during
the investment period. Consider the variance of a portfolio:
σ2port =
∑
j
w2jσ
2
j + 2
∑
i<j
wjwiρijσiσj ≤ σ2
with σ2 the variance cap level. Each value of this cap level defines multi-dimensional
ellipsoids in the wjσj-coordinate space, see Figure ??.
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Figure 3.15: Portfolio variance level curves for two assets. On a given ellipse the portfolio
variance assumes the same level.
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Given the uncountable number of portfolio combinations which lead to the same
target volatility, which one should one choose? At this point a second rule can help for
example the momentum based rule. This leads to a preference ordering of the investment
strategy wj at each date. One can therefore choose that portfolio which respects the
volatility constraint and which is optimal from the momentum strategy point of view.
3.4.2 CPPI
Option markets are basic to design structured products with capital protection and par-
ticipation. But there are many underlying values without a sister option market such as
many ETFs or investment funds. Is it possible to offer both protection and participation
in these cases? Yes if we recall that a call or put option is a leveraged product. That is
we only have to rebuild leverage. To understand the mechanics assume that an investor
wishes capital protection and participation by investing in a fund. More specific, out of
his CHF 100 investment
• CHF 75 are used to generate capital protection in 7 years and
• CHF 25 are free to define participation.
To generate participation assume that a leverage factor of 4 applies, i.e. the investor
does not participates with CHF 25 (the investment account) but in fact with CHF 100
at day 1. The difference of CHF 75 is money borrowed from the issuer at a borrowing
rate, see Figure 3.16. Suppose that at day 2 the underlying value increases by 3 percent.
The investment account has then the value CHF 28, debt financing is increased to CHF
84 to maintain the leverage factor constant. The invested amount raised to CHF 112,
i.e. CHF 28 plus 84. This shows that an increase of the investment account without
leverage, i.e. 3 percent of CHF 25 which is CHF 0.75 is leveraged with the factor 4 to an
increase of CHF 3 which means a 12 percent increase. The figures at day 3 follow with
the same logic if a constant leverage factor is restored.
We write It for the value of the investment account at time t. The dynamics of this
account is given by
It = It−1 (3.9)
+ (It−1 + Ft)
(
Rt − g n
360
)
− N × Fee× n
360
− Ft(rt + DebtFeet)× n
360
where
• Ft the debt financing level.
• Rt the return of the underlying value.
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Product 
Debt financing 
Day  2 Day 1 Day 3 
75 84 
28 25 
72 
24 100 112 96 
Figure 3.16: Leverage effect mechanics.
• g the gap risk fee.
• n the number of days between t− 1 and t.
• rt the interest rate SARON - Swiss Average Rate Over Night.
• DebtFeet the add on fee for debt financing.
The intuition of the dynamics (3.9) is as follows. The new value of the investment ac-
count is equal to the past value plus or minus some returns or costs. The first return line
(It−1 + Ft)
(
Rt − g n360
)
expresses the growth approximatively of the old account value
time the leverage factor h, i.e. It−1 +Ft ∼ h× It−1, with the growth factor ’return minus
gap risk fee costs’ (Rt − g n360). The expression N × Fee× n360 is simply the management
fee and the last line are the debt capital cost for the client.
The dynamics of the investment account is of first order and it can become negative.
That is, if say the return becomes negative It can become very small such that a jump
event can lead to It < 0. If this happens the value of the structured product is lower than
the capital protection part. To avoid this, the issuer carries this so-called gap risk and
the investor pays for this. If It falls below a certain level, It is set equal to zero and the in-
vestor then has a buy-and-hold product which consists of the capital protection part only.
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So far the leverage factor h was kept constant. We can make this factor state de-
pendent relying on the negative leverage effect: If volatility increases, the value of the
corresponding risky asset decreases. Figure 3.17 shows this effect for the Swiss index
SMI and the corresponding volatility index. The mirror behavior is almost perfect i.e.
showing negative correlation.
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Figure 3.17: Negative leverage effect between SMI and VSMI.
We can use this in the CP as follows. Instead of working with a fixed leverage factor
we make this factor volatility dependent. If volatility raises we expect risky assets to fall
and therefore we decrease the investment in the risky investment account, i.e. the leverage
factor decreases and contrary, if volatility increases. There are many possible ways how
the leverage factor can be made volatility state dependent. In general ht = f(h¯, σ¯, σt)
with h¯ and σ¯ fixed reference values, i.e. one assumes that for a given underlying there
is a kind of equilibrium or normal model leverage factor and volatility. One could then
model ht as a mean reverting process or simpler setup a rule of thumb, such as
ht = 2
h¯
σt/σ¯ + 1
.
In any case, one has to specify the equilibrium values and time dependent volatility. The
equilibrium volatility can be taken as the historical average volatility. The equilibrium
leverage factor should be chosen with care since gap risk and level of leverage are inti-
mately related to each other as we discuss below. Since the markets for these products
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do not possess options the time varying volatility σt can not be chosen to be an ATM
implied volatility. One has to choose a time-weighted average of historical volatilities. If
one chooses the weight to be present-oriented, i.e. for example the typical exponential
time decay into the past, one can capture recent moves with a satisfactory precision.
Example
Figure 3.18 illustrates the discussion for a German stock exchange listed real estate
fund over the last ten years. The real estate fund performed well until the start of the
financial crisis (right panel). The CP where the investment account consists of leveraged
investment in the fund does not suffers from the drop. The only effects are that the
investment account becomes smaller (left panel) and that the investment leverage in this
risky asset was reduced (right panel).
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
180
200
220
240
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
V
a
lu
e 
o
f 
th
e 
C
P
Value Capital Guarantee Value Investement Account
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Performance Underlying Leveraged CP Leverage Factor
Figure 3.18: Performance of a listed German real estate fund (right panel), performance
of the CP with investment into the real estate fund (right panel) and variable leverage
factor over time (right panel). The left panel shows the CP value evolution where the
two components capital protection and investment account are separately shown. Source:
Zurich Cantonal Bank.
On the left panel the capital protection amount, which was set equal to 100 percent
at the beginning is increasing over time in a jump style. This reflects the lock-in feature:
If the real estate fund performs well and reaches a defined value than a fraction of this
risky investment is transferred into the capital protection.
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We considered so far the risky investment part It of the CP and neglected the capital
protection part. Since we want to relate the discussed structure to the Constant Propor-
tion Portfolio Insurance (CPPI) strategy we consider both components of the structured
product in the sequel. We first recall the CPPI strategy. A CPPI strategy stats with an
initial investment above the present value of a guarantee and stops immediately when
the strategy value hits the present value of the guarantee. That is, a guarantee level
can be reached with probability one as long as it is possible to stop exactly at the mo-
ment when the portfolio value is equal to the present value of the guarantee and this
amount grows at the constant, risk free interest rate up to maturity. CPPI is a portfolio
insurance strategy designed to achieve a minimum level of wealth while at the same time
participating in upward moving markets.
We assume that there are two assets, a risky asset St which satisfies a geometric
Brownian motion law with constant mean µ and constant volatility σ and risk free asset
Bt with constant return r. At each time t a fraction at of the portfolio is invested in the
risky asset and 1 − at in the risk free one. The portfolio value dynamics Vt is therefore
given by
dVt/Vt = atdSt/St + (1− at)dBt/Bt , V0 = x .
This strategy is model independent i.e. it suffices to observe the asset prices but it is not
necessary to know the distribution of the prices. For a given time horizon T , the capital
guarantee is G at time T and its present value is denoted Ft = e−r(T−t)G. At each time
t the difference Vt − Ft = ct is called the cushion. Leverage is introduced by a positive
factor h, i.e. the investment in at becomes
at :=
hct
Vt
= h(1− Ft
Vt
).
The following proposition summarizes the CPPI facts.
Proposition 3.4.1. Assume that S satisfies a geometric Brownian motion dynamics.
The cushion process ct is lognormal, i.e.
dct/ct = ((r + h(µ− r))dt+ σhdWt) .
The value of Vt is given by
Vt = Ge
−rτ︸ ︷︷ ︸
PV Guarantee
+
V0 −Ge−rT
Sh0
e
(
r−h(r− 1
2
σ2)−h2 σ2
2
)
t
Sht︸ ︷︷ ︸
Power Option
. (3.10)
The proof is given in Appendix 3.4.1. Thus, the value process of a simple CPPI strat-
egy is path independent. For h > 1 the payoff is convex, i.e. a power option. Setting
t = T is follows that with certainty the terminal value of the strategy is higher than
the guarantee. Although the CPPI strategy is model independent, the evaluation of the
strategy at future date, the calculation of the final performance or risk figures require
the specification of a model.
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Given the distribution of the value process, the expected value and the variance
follows at once:
E[Vt] = Ft + (V0 − F0)e(r+h(µ−r))t
and
var[Vt] = (V0 − F0)2e2(r+h(µ−r))t
(
eh
2σ2t − 1
)
.
How is CPPI related to the former CP structured note discussion? Consider the dynamics
of the investment account It in (3.9). If we neglect the fee structure, assume a constant
leverage factor, set gap risk equal to zero, using It−1 +Ft ∼ h×It−1 and assume constant
interest rates, then the dynamics is given by
It − It−1
It−1
= h∆Rt − (h− 1)r∆t .
Setting ∆Rt = ∆St/St we get
∆It
It
= h∆St/St − (h− 1)r∆t .
Comparing this with the c-dynamics
dct/ct = hdSt/St − (h− 1)rdt
it follows that the It-investment account dynamics is under the assumptions equal to the
cushion dynamics of the simple CPPI.
In the above discussion we got the identification of the CPPI strategy with the invest-
ment account dynamics of the CP under several assumptions. Most of them are neither
important in practice nor do they provide any interesting insight. The exception is the
gap risk. First of all, this risk exists naturally and second, one should not issue or sell
products with risks which one cannot accept or reject simply because one has no idea
about the severity of the risk. We consider this risk in more detail.
Gap risk is related to jumps in the risky asset value given a low cushion or investment
account. Instead of introducing a difficult to calibrate jump process the risk is introduced
by restricting trading to discrete dates t0 < t1 < . . . < tn = T , which we assume to
be equidistant. But the underlying process trades at much higher frequency, i.e. we
assume continuous trading of the underlying. This approach makes perfect sense from a
practitioners view where rebalancing between the leveraged risky asset investment and
the capital guarantee part takes place only weekly or monthly depending on the volatility
and liquidity of the underlying instrument. The restriction that trading is only possible
immediately after any discrete date implies that the number of shares held in the risky
asset is constant on the intervals between two trading dates. But the fraction of wealth
invested in the risky asset changes within a given period due to the risky asset price
fluctuations. We let
ψt =
atVt
St
=
hct
St
, φt =
(1− at)Vt
Bt
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denote the respective investments into the risky asset and the risk free one and ξt =
(φt, ψt) is the CPPI portfolio or investment strategy in continuous time. We discretize
this strategy. Suppose that the discretization ξnt is defined by setting ξnt equal to the
left-end value ξtk in a trading interval (tk, tk+1] and keeping the strategy fixed for the
whole interval time, then the discretized strategy will not be self-financing: The strategy
is kept constant whereas asset values can change. One obtains a self-financing strategy
if the risk free investment is set equal to
φnt =
1
Bntk
(
V ntk − ψnt Stk
)
, t ∈ tk, tk+1]
and the discrete risky investment - avoiding short positions in the risky asset - is
ψnt = max
(
0,
hcntk
Stk
)
.
However, similar as for the simple continuous time CPPI, the discrete time CPPI does
not include short sale restrictions on the risk less asset. Recall that constant proportion
portfolio insurance means that the fraction of wealth á which is invested in the risky
asset is given proportionally to the difference of the portfolio value and the floor, i.e. the
cushion. To estimate the probability that the cushion becomes negative, i.e. gap risk is
realized, we consider the cushion process, i.e. the difference
cntk+1 = V
n
tk+1
− Ftk+1 .
This difference can be explicitly calculated, see Appendix 7.36. The result consists of
two cases. If the first time where cushion is negative after maturity date, the value of the
strategy is the discrete time analogue of (3.10). If cushion is negative before maturity,
the value at this date is pushed forward with the risk free rate to maturity date.
Using the results stated in the Appendix of [?], we define the following risk measures
for gap risk and prove the stated results.
Proposition 3.4.2. Assume the above discrete/continuous time model. Local shortfall
probability P loci is given by
P loci := P
(
V nti+1 ≤ Fti+1 | V nti > Fti
)
= P loc = Φ(−d2) (3.11)
with
d2 =
ln(h/(h− 1)) + (µ− r)T/n− 12σ2T/n
σ
√
T/n
d2 is independent of the date ti. The shortfall probability P short that the cushion is not
positive at maturity T is given by
P short = 1− (1− P loc)n . (3.12)
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Expected shortfall ES := E[G− V nT |V nT ≤ G] is given by
ES = −
(V0 − F0)k2 e
rT−kn1
erT/n−k1
P short
(3.13)
where
k1 = he
µT/nΦ(d1)− erT/n(h− 1)Φ(d2) , k2 = heµT/nΦ(−d1)− erT/n(h− 1)Φ(−d2)
and d1 = d2 + σ
√
T/n.
It follows that if trading becomes continuous (n→∞) the shortfall probability P short
converges to zero. One might guess that the shortfall probability is monotonically de-
creasing in the hedging frequency n. In general, this is only true after a sufficiently high
n is reached. The effect that the shortfall probability is increasing for small n is more
pronounced for high volatilities and high leverage factors. In contrast to a discrete time
option based strategy with a synthetic put, the calculation of the shortfall probability
implied by a CPPI strategy is simple. This follows if one observes that the shortfall event
is equivalent to the event that the stopping time is prior to maturity.
Figure 3.19 shows the behavior of the different risk measures when strategy param-
eters such as the leverage factor or the guarantee level are changed or when model
parameter such as the volatility, the drift or the interest rate vary.
Sensitivity calculation and the figure in 3.19 show that:
• Shortfall probability increases if leverage increases, drift decreases or volatility in-
creases. The shortfall level is independent of the guarantee level.
• Expected shortfall is increasing in an increasing drift, volatility or leverage factor.
An increasing guarantee level reduces expected shortfall.
• An increasing trading frequency lower all risk figures.
• Increasing maturity and increasing the trading frequency such that the ratio re-
mains constant and adjusting the initial guarantee value due to the increased trad-
ing frequency leads to an increase of shortfall probability and expected shortfall.
The CPPI strategy considered implies that if once the value of the strategy hits the
present value of the floor the investment in the risky asset is zero and remains zero with
probability one until maturity. One might think to alter the CPPI strategy such that
this unpleasant investment effect does not follow. Basically the change is to save the
value of the risky investment, i.e. to lock-in this value into cash, if the risky investment
approaches the value zero before the event of zero investment in the risky asset is met.
One defines such a risk measure, the cash-lock probability, by the conditional probability
that given at a date the investment in the risky asset is yet low as the probability that in
a future date the investment amount in the risky asset will even be lower than a defined
threshold. Given such a risk measure and a continuous time CPPI cash-lock probability
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Leverage Factor 12 12 12 12 12 12 5 5 5
Volatility 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.1 0.2 0.3
Risk Free Rate 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05
Drift Underlying 0.085 0.085 0.085 0.085 0.085 0.085 0.085 0.085 0.085
Maturity 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Trading Frequency 12 12 12 52 52 52 12 12 12
Initial Guarantee Value 95 95 95 95 95 95 95 95 95
Initial Product Value 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Factor for Expected Shortfall -0.001             -0.289           -1.864           -0.000   -0.005           -0.222           0.000            -0.000           -0.008           
Factor for Expected Shortfall k_1 1.039             1.056            1.117            1.009    1.009            1.012            1.019            1.019            1.019            
Factor for Expected Shortfall k_2 -0.000             -0.017           -0.077           -0.000   -0.000           -0.003           0.000            -0.000           -0.001           
d_2 3.101             1.529            0.995            6.316    3.148            2.087            7.817            3.887            2.567            
Local Shortfall Probability 0.1% 6.3% 16.0% 0.0% 0.1% 1.8% 0.00% 0.01% 0.51%
Shortfall Probability 1.2% 54.3% 87.6% 0.0% 4.2% 62.0% 0.00% 0.06% 5.98%
Expected Shortfall 0.582             2.809            11.879          0.148    0.555            1.814            -0.068           0.305            0.642            
Figure 3.19: Risk measures under simple CPPI.
is one if conditioning at a given date is one zero-investment and it is given by a normal
distribution in all other cases. It follows that the cash-lock probability is not monotone
in the time to maturity level and the multiplier level.
So far gap risk was considered without jumps. We consider the case where we believe
that gap risk is due to jumps. That is we consider gap risk and its fair pricing and
apply it to leveraged Delta one bond investments. This investment is issued as a Retail
Structured Product (RSP). In this case Figure 3.20 illustrates this risk source.
It follows that the maximum loss possible for the issuer is the total lend capital for
leveraging. The investor pays an annual fee to the issuer to compensate him for the gap
risk.
We assume that jumps in the price process of the bond portfolio which cause a ’gap
event’ are exclusively generated by a credit event. This is plausible since jumps associated
with market risk, i.e. moves in the interest rate, will in general be small and hence their
contribution for the gap risk will be small as well. Ie essentially ’tail risk’ from credit will
be taken into account. Liquidity risk which might also cause a gap event can be assumed
to be absorbed into parameter α introduced below. To estimate the gap risk generated
by credit risk / events we use a hazard rate model:
• The probability that a gap event with a Loss L occurs in [t, t+δt] is λLt δt conditional
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r=0.5 
Delta one with 
Leverage 
Initial Value (= Notional) 
If bond basket value drops to 80, the 
basket is liquidated and the product is 
repayed. The max value for the client 
is then 100-2*20=60  
Lack of liquidity can lead to 
liquidation prices below 80. The 
investor then receives the liquidation 
price with min 0 CHF.  
If the basket drops below 50% of is 
value the issuer faces a loss in their 
lend capital. This defines  GAP-Risk 
Tracker without 
Leverage 
Stop Loss-Level 60% 
of the Notional 
Amount, i.e. Loss of   - 
40% 
80 
GAP-Risk 
Bond Basket Value 
P&L  
Figure 3.20: Gap risk for a leveraged Delta 1 bond investment with leverage factor 2.
that none has occurred yet.
• The hazard rate λLt itself is assumed to have an exponential distribution (Pareto
distribution for peak over threshold):
λLt = exp(−αL)
Using these assumption we calculate the gap fee g in an interval [0, T ]:
g =
1
T
E[DτLτθ(T − τ)|F0] +O2(r, λ)
=
1
T
∫ T
0
∫ ∞
0
exp
(− (rs + λLs ))λLs LdLds+O2(r, λ)
=
1
T
∫ T
0
∫ ∞
0
exp(−αL)LdLds+O2(r, λ)
= − 1
α
exp(−αL)L∣∣∞
0
+
∫ ∞
0
exp(−αL)dL+O2(r, λ)
=
1
α
+O2(r, λ) .
We need to estimate the analogue of α for a single bond which we call β. To do this we
assume that jumps are again only generated by credit events or due to sudden widening
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of the bid / ask spread (liquidity risk). Both are assumed to be priced into the credit
spread of the bond. The hazard Rate of the bond and distribution of jumps / losses are
modelled in the same way as above which implies for λLt = exp(−βL):
cT =
1
T
ln
(∫ T
0
∫∞
0 exp
(− (rs + exp(−βL)))dLds∫ T
0 exp(−rs)ds
)
(3.14)
=
1
β
(3.15)
We next derive the relation between α and β. The probability of jumps crossing the
threshold S reads pHit = L−1+SL with L the leverage factor and S the threshold relative
to notional amount of the RSP. Hence,
⇒ α ∼ L
L− 1 + Sβ .
Since 1β is a measure for the magnitude of the jump for a single bond,
1
α is a measure for
the jump below a threshold S:
1
β
∼ Vt− − Vt+ , 1α ∼ S − Vt+ . (3.16)
Assuming
E[S] ' Vt− + Vt+
2
,
we get:
⇒ α ∼ 2β.
Finally, for the intensity λ ∼ 1α of the price process of the bond basket. If we assume N
bonds, β the average β of a bond and ρ the collective correlation parameter of intensity
processes we obtain:
⇒ α ∼ β
ρ+ 1−ρN
=
1
c(ρ+ 1−ρN )
Taking all multiplication factors into account9 we finally obtain:
g ' 1
α
' c(ρ+
1−ρ
N )(L− 1 + S)
2L
As an example, we assume that the bond basket consist of 5 AA or A bonds. The
average credit spread is c ∈ [6, 67] bps for AA bonds and c ∈ [13, 128] bps for A bonds.
Leverage is L = 2, ρ = 0.5 and the threshold S = 0.6. This implies the following prices
for gap risk:
9c is the average credit spread of bond basket.
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gAA ∈ [1, 16] bps
gA ∈ [3, 32] bps
With the conservative estimate ρ = 1 we get:
gρ=1AA ∈ [2, 30] bps
gρ=1A ∈ [5, 58] bps
3.5 View and Trade
View and trade is another method of investment which in some sense is the opposite
to passive investment. The investor has a clear view and wants to implement the view
efficient, effective and transparent in a trade. The investor is not driven by diversification
motivation. Contrary, often singular events create opportunities which the investor wants
to realize.
3.5.1 Butterfly
A butterfly trade, is based on an investor which believes that the underlying value will be
close to its today value and which wants to make a profit out of this believe. If the belief
turns out to be wrong, only small losses follows. A butterfly is long a in-the-money
(ITM) call , long a out-of-the-money (OTM) call and short two at-the-money
(ATM) calls, see Figure 3.21. The different strikes are ordered as KL < KM < KH .
An investor observes three call options on the same underlying value with the follow-
ing strikes and prices:
• Call with strike 45, price 8.
• Call with strike 50, price 4.
• Call with strike 55, price 1.
The investor beliefs that the underlying will not move. A butterfly strategy allows him
to implement his view. He buys the 45 and 55 call and sells the 50-call.
3.5.2 Leveraged Negative Basis
The butterfly trade was a simple example. The trade under consideration is more com-
plex. The basis in credit risk is the difference in the valuation of credit risk of a counter
party once in the bond market and once in the CDS market. More precisely the
Asset Swap Spread (ASW) is defined for a bond as the solution of
Bond price =
N∑
j=1
1
(1 + rf + ASW)j
cj
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Figure 3.21: Butterfly.
with rf the risk free rate. If we denote by CDS the CDS premium the difference
B = CDS−ASW
is called the basis. This difference is usually close to zero. This reflects that the price of
credit risk is valued the same in both markets. But in the financial crisis the difference
became strongly negative for a large number of corporates, see Figure 3.22.
The figure shows that the difference became substantially negative and that this was
a persistent fact. For this securities the cost to buy protection via the CDS was much
cheaper than the drop in bond prices due to the creditworthiness of the bond issuers
under stress. There are many possible explanations for this observation. A major role is
liquidity which became the key risk factor in the financial crisis. Since one has to pay
the notional amount in the bond market but only the risk premium CDS in the credit
derivative market the rise of the ASW compared to the CDS premium can be interpreted
as a liquidity trigger. The price shock is mostly due by large international banks which
had to shorten their balance sheet considerably in the financial crisis. That for assets
from the debt sector had to be massively sold. At the end of 2009 the value of all assets
in the Swiss banking sector was seven time the GDP. Before the crisis the difference
was given by a factor of nine. Given the importance and activity of the two big banks
UBS and CSG this reduction in the factor gives an estimate of the reduction of assets. A
different structural reason for a negative basis are funding costs above LIBOR for traders
or shorting corporate bonds means that one has to borrow the bond at a repo rate which
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Figure 3.22: Negative Basis for six bonds during the financial crisis 2008-2009. Source:
Bloomberg
is often illiquid and therefore higher than the CDS premium. In the years before the
financial crisis the basis was slightly positive (10-20bps) on average. Such a situation
occurs if (i) bonds are trading below par such that the loss of a given bond default is
smaller than the CDS payoff, (ii) LIBOR is not risk free and therefore the spreads for
very good rated entities are low or even negative and (iii) corporate bonds may have
important change clauses.
This wide negative basis can be used to structure an investment product as follows:
Basically if we can lock in the negative basis for a given period each day where the neg-
ative basis exists we will obtain a cash flow: That is we buy a portfolio of bonds and the
corresponding CDS to hedge credit risk where a the two portfolio generate a significant
negative basis. We don’t know how long the basis remains negative, i.e. when will the
significant basis vanish and the product will be terminated by unwinding the bonds and
CDS. One could also think to structure a similar trade for a positive basis. But in this
case one has to go short the instruments which is much less efficient than going them long.
Suppose that we setup a portfolio of bonds and CDS such that to each bond corre-
sponds a CDS where the reference entity is identical to the bond issuer. Assume that
the basis is significantly negative for each bond-CDS pair, say for 200 bps. Suppose that
3.5. VIEW AND TRADE 271
the issuer of a structured note is either cash rich or can borrow at a low rate. Then the
200 bps are leveraged, by a factor of 5 for example. Then, we have a gross coupon of 10
percent which can be paid annually to the investor. From these 10 percent one deduces
the cost of financing the leverage and the management fee. The risk for the investor is
the joint cross-default of a bond and the corresponding CDS - an event which has a very
low probability to occur. But if this happens, most of the capital is at risk. Suppose that
the leverage is 10 and the recovery rate is 10 percent for a bond. Then the lost capital
will be by a single joint cross-default in the whole portfolio
9× 10% = 90%
of the invested capital.
The structuring is illustrated in Figure 3.23. The issuer invests 100 in a currency
(here Euro). This investment is leveraged with a factor h = 10, i.e. 900 are borrowed
from the treasury. With the total amount of 1’000 the bond portfolio is bought (long)
and the CDS portfolio with the corresponding notional amounts and reference entities is
setup. The return from the portfolios are interest rate earnings, here 12m EURIBOR,
and the negative basis. 90 percent of interest rate earnings are used to compensate the
treasury plus a fee of 45 bps. The remaining 10 percent minus the 45 bps go to the
investor. The earnings from the negative basis are also split between the investor and
the issuer. Typically, a high percentage say 75 percent goes to the investor and 25 percent
to the issuer.
This rough structure is presented in more details next. A portfolio of bonds denom-
inated in a currency and a portfolio of CDS in the same currency are setup. There is a
cash portfolio which consists of the financing amount in a currency and the proceeds of
the bond and CDS portfolio. The Underlying consists of a bond, CDS and cash portfolio
at all times. The leveraged bond and CDS portfolios are marked-to-market. A leverage
unit equals a fixed amount liquidity, which can be theoretically borrowed by the certifi-
cate holder to finance the additional units of the Bond portfolio in order to generate the
leverage. At initial fixing, the cash portfolio only consists of the loan, i.e. (h - 1)× the
Leverage Unit, in which the Leverage Unit figure is a negative number. Through the
lifetime of the product, four additional parts accrue to the cash portfolio:
• Cash Part incoming from the Bond portfolio, which are aggregated Coupon pay-
ments and Capital redemptions of the Bonds, which have not been subject to a
default or Adjustment Event.
• Cash Part relating to the CDS portfolio, which are premium payments on the CDS
contracts and incoming payments from defaulted bonds.
• Cash Trigger Part, which are payments arising from Adjustment Events. Such
an Event occurs if the Spread + negative Basis for one of the bonds is > 0 (or
if the Calculation Agent acting in good faith and commercial reasonable matter
determines at any time between the Issue Date and Redemption Date that an
Adjustment Event has occurred), in which case a profit taking is initiated.
272 CHAPTER 3. INVESTMENT
Issuer 
MM 
Investment 
 
Investor 
 
 
 
 
Derivative 
Firm 
 
 
 
 
n
M
  
E
U
R
IB
O
R
 
 
Leverage 
Unit  
9x Notional= 900 
10x 12M EURIBOR 
 
Bond Portfolio 
 
10x Notional= 1'000 
CDS Portfolio 
10x CDS 
10x ASW  
Issuer 
Partizipation 
25% - 100% lev. neg Basis 
9x 12M EURIBOR + 45bp 
Treasury  
Portfolios 
Figure 3.23: Structuring of a leveraged negative basis trade.
• Cash Certificate Part. The Certificate cannot pay out negative Coupons. Those
are instead booked into the cash portfolio as expense surplus and charged on the
following Coupon Payment. The Coupon Payments for every period are equal to the
difference between the Return and the Financing Amount. The Return consists of
the Interest Rate Reference and the negative Basis, whereas the Financing Amount
for the period in question is enlarged with the Management Fee and a possible
expense surplus from the preceding time period.
We consider an example, see Figure 3.24, for a leveraged negative basis transaction
with capital protection. We start with a assumed negative basis of 120 basis points
(280-400). The certificate has a 5 year maturity and we consider three scenarios: S1, the
negative basis remains at 120 bps for all dates, S2 the negative basis decreases over time
which is the scenario where the financial markets normalize and S3 the negative basis
widens, i.e. the financial crisis starting in 2008 will be followed by say a double dip. If
the basis remains constant, there is no impact on the certificate value, i.e. the product
trades always at 100 percent. In all scenarios the final value of the product is 100, i.e.
the protected capital. If the negative basis decreases over time the value of the certificate
will increase over 100. The value of 114 in S2 is calculated as follows:
114 = (NegBas at 0 -NegBas at t)× BPV(t)× LevFac + NegBas at 0 .
The earnings from the negative basis in almost all scenarios equal to 900 bp per
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annum. This value is calculated as follow. If the trigger value is not reached, i.e. if the
value of the certificate at a given date divided by the initial certificate value is not below
0.3 then a positive return follows. In the other case, the coupon is zero which is the case
in scenario S3 where the basis raises very strong in year 2. The positive return of 900
bps p.a. is equal to the negative basis at time 0 times the participation rate - here 75
percent - times the leverage factor, here h = 10.
0y 1y 2y 3y 4y 5y
Spread Bonds [bps] 400
Spread CDS  [bps] 280
Neg. Basis S1  [bps] 120 120 120 120 120 120
Neg. Basis S2  [bps] 120 96 72 48 24 0
Neg. Basis S3  [bps] 120 350 240 350 800 120
MtM S1 [%] 100 100 100 100 100 100
MtM S2  [%] 100 109 114 114 109 100
MtM S3  [%] 100 13 65 55 33 100
Negative Basis Return 900 900 900 900 900 900
Negative Basis Return 900 900 900 900 900 900
Negative Basis Return 900 0 900 900 900 900
Negative Basis Scenarios
Market Value of Negative Basis Contribution to the Certificate
Negative Basis Return 
Figure 3.24: Illustration of some negatives basis trade aspect.
We refer to the Appendix 7.8.2 for a quantification of the different return and cost
components. We only consider on component in the main text - the coupon part. First,
coupons can never be negative. At all times, coupons consist of four parts: The return
for the period from the certificate, the interest on the financing amount for the period,
the fixed management fee and possible expense surplus from the preceding time period:
If during an interest rate period expenses (Financing and Fee) surmount the returns, the
result is a theoretical negative coupon, which will not be paid out. This expense surplus
will instead be charged on the following interest rate period. At a default event, the
CDS portfolio contribution is at market value. The cash portfolio consists of 3 further
components: The loan part, the coupon part of the certificate and the trigger part in case
of a trigger event. We consider the coupon part. Coupons can never be negative. At all
times, coupons consist of four parts: The return for the period from the certificate, the
interest on the financing amount for the period, the fixed management fee and possible
expense surplus from the preceding time period: If during an interest rate period expenses
(Financing and Fee) surmount the returns, the result is a theoretical negative coupon,
which will not be paid out. This expense surplus will instead be charged on the following
interest rate period. If the coupon of the last interest rate period is negative, the resulting
expense surplus will be subtracted from the redemption amount of the certificate. The
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coupon part of the certificate is defined as follows:
V Coupon Cert(t) =
∑
p
χ{t˜p<t}N
× max (E(p) + h× p×R× n¯− (h− 1)F (p)−G+ s(p− 1), 0)
where:
E(p) + h× p×R× n¯ = Earnings from the Negative Basis
−(h− 1)F (p)−G+ s(p− 1) = Total Costs
where E(p) are earnings from the interest rate reference (12m EURIBOR for example)
and h × p × R × n¯ is the return from the negative basis. The negative basis is fixed
at initial fixing as follows: For each Bond issuer, the basis is calculated, the weight for
each Bond relative to the entire bond portfolio is calculated an the sum of the weighted
negative basis for all bonds constitutes the negative basis at initial fixing. The negative
basis at initial fixing is locked in for the return calculations, except the weight of a bond
is set to 0 because of maturity, sale or default. The negative basis contributes every day
a positive amount to the return, if the trigger event has not been activated, or zero, if the
trigger event has been activated. The daily trigger event is activated if the calculation
agent observes the value of the certificate below a fixed barrier level - the trigger ratio
R - of the certificate denomination. If the trigger event is not activated, the investor
participates to the degree of p on the negative basis or any changes caused by reaching
the maturity, sale or default of the bonds.
If expenses exceed returns in one period, the following mechanism applies where a
balance account s is introduced. The balance s(p) in period p satisfies the recursion
relation:
s(1) = 0
s(p) = min (E(p)− F (p)−G+ s(p− 1), 0) , p = 2, 3, 4, 5 .
The participation part from the coupon part of the certificate belonging to the issuer -
i.e. the (1− p)/p-fraction of the earnings from the negative basis - is denoted
V Coupon Cert Issue(t) .
The contribution from the trigger event reads:
V Trigger(t) = h
n∑
j=1
χ{tjT<min(tjD,t)}w
j
(
V j,Bond(tjT )− V j,CDS(tjT )
)
D(tjT , t),
i.e. only counter parties contribute to this part of the portfolio if trigger date is before
default and maturity date of the counter party. The contribution size is then the differ-
ence between the bond and value of the corresponding counterparty at trigger date. The
portfolio contribution of the trigger part is always positive, i.e. profit taking follows in
such an event.
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The loan for one leverage unit is:
V Loan(t) = LE(h− 1)D(0, t)−1 , LE < 0 .
In summary, the cash portfolio reads:
V Cash(t) = V Bond, Cash(t) + V CDS, Cash(t) + V Trigger(t)− V Coupon Cert(t)
− V Coupon Cert Issue(t) + V Loan(t)
At t = 0, the Cash portfolio equals the loan value.
3.6 Fund Investments
3.6.1 Overview
Funds (mutual funds, investment funds) are collective investment schemes which pool
money from investors. Funds can be classified from different views:
• Open- or closed-end funds. Open end funds are forced to buy back fund shares
at the end of every business day to at the net asset value (NAV). NAV equals the
current market value of a fund’s holdings minus the fund’s liabilities. Prices of
traded shares during the day are also in term of the NAV. Total investment vary
based on share purchases, share redemptions and fluctuation in market valuation.
There is no limit on the number of shares that can be issued. Closed-end funds
issue shares only once. Shares are listed on a stock exchange and trading occurs
via the exchange: An investor cannot give back his shares to the fund but he has to
sell them to another investor in the market. Prices of traded share can be different
to the NAV, i.e. either they are higher (premium case) or lower (discount case).
The vast majority of funds are of the open-end style. The worldwide investment
fund assets in Q3 2011 were 18.6 Trillion Euros (Source: EFAMA).
Feature Open-end Closed-end
Number outstanding shares flexible fixed
Pricing daily NAV Continuous demand and supply
Redemption at NAV via exchange
Market Share >95 percent < 5 percent
US terminology Mutual fund Closed end fund
UK terminology Unit trust Investment trust
Cont. European (incl. CH) terminology SICAV SICAF
Table 3.4: Open-end and closed-end funds.
• Exchange-traded fund (ETF) are a mixture of open- and closed-end funds:
They are traded at an exchange but the prices are close to the NAV by issuing.
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• Active vs. passive. Costs for active management are higher than for passive one.
Funds which replicate an index are called index funds. These funds are mostly
considered to be passive since the replication of an index only requires a computer
model with a modest logic and no human input in decision making. ETFs are
often used to replicate indices. The replication of an index can be done in different
ways. Consider a stock index. One can physically replicate the index by investing
in the required number of stocks. The index can also be replicated using futures
instead of the stocks. Wells Fargo first offered a not successful privately placed
equally-weighted S&P 500 index fund in 1971 and a successful value-weighted one
in 1973. It required Wells Fargo
– to navigate regulatory and tax issues
– surmount systems processing requirements
– and educate potential investors.
The introduction of index funds allows investors to complete the market at much
lower transaction costs. The innovation was shaped by new technologies, was a re-
sponse to tax and regulatory factors, and was driven by the presence of information
asymmetries and transaction costs that made trading costly. The first fund was
set up 1774 in the Netherlands. The fund invested in foreign government bonds,
banks and West Indian plantations. The notion of diversification was spelled out
explicitly in the prospectus of this first fund.
• Investment classification. Funds are classified according to their principal in-
vestments. The largest ones are money market funds, bond or fixed income funds,
stock or equity funds and hybrid funds. Figure 3.25 shows the distribution the
worldwide assets in the asset classes.
• Fees and share classes. Running a mutual fund involves costs, including share-
holder transaction costs, investment advisory fees, and marketing and distribution
expenses. All of the shares classes invest in the same portfolio of securities, but
each has different expenses and, therefore, a different net asset value and different
performance results. An important figure is the Total Expense Ratio (TER).
This is a percentage ratio defined as the ratio between total business expenses and
the average net fund value. TER expresses the total of costs and fees which are con-
tinuously charged. Business expenses are fees for the fund’s board of directors, the
asset manager, the custodian bank, the administration, the distribution, market-
ing, calculation agent, audit, legal and tax authorities. Besides fees the calculation
the performance is key. The following approach is widely used. Consider a period
[0, T ].
Performance % =
(
NAVT × f1 × f2 × . . .× fn
NAV0
− 1
)
× 100 . (3.17)
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Figure 3.25: Left Panel: Worldwide Assets of Equity, Bond, Money Market, and Balanced
/ Mixed Funds. Right Panel: Distribution of investment fund assets.Source: EFAMA
International Statistical Release (2011:Q3), 2012
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fj are the adjustment factors for the payout (dividends for example)
fk =
NAVex +BA
NAVex
with BA the gross payout, i.e. the gross amount of the earning- and capital gain
payout per unit share to the investors and NAVex the NAV after the payout.
Consider a NAV at year end 2005 of 500 Mio. CHF. 2006 earnings and capital gain
payout of 10 respectively 14 Mio. CHF happened. The NAV after payments is 490
Mio. and the NAV at the end of 2006 is 515 Mio. CHF. The adjustment factor
then is
f =
490 + 10 + 14
490
= 1.04898 .
This gives the performance for 2006:
P =
515 ∗ 1.04898
500
− 1 = 8.045%
There are several reasons why is important to measure the performance of a
fund correctly. First, one wants to select the best fund. This leads to the question
to which extent are the returns of a fund predictable. If the returns follow a random
walk they are not predictable at all and the selection of the fund is a pure gamble.
Second, to the funds stock to what they promised? Third, a correctly measured
performance allows to check whether the fund manager added value.
• Legal environment. The legal environment is crucial for the development of the
fund industry. About 3/4 of all cross-border funds in Europe are sold in Luxem-
bourg. For private equity funds 2/3 has the State of Delaware as domicile and for
Hedge Funds 1/3 are on the Caymans, 1/4 in Delaware. Luxembourg for example
offers favorable framework conditions for holdings / holding companies, investment
funds and asset-management companies. These companies are partially or com-
pletely tax-exempt; typically, profits can be distributed tax-free. As of Q3 2011,
48 % of the funds had their domicile in the US, followed by 9 % in Luxembourg,
Brazil, France and Australia which each around 6 % . Luxembourg and Ireland are
also specialized in setting up UCITS compliant structures, see below.
• Distribution channel. Funds can be privately offered or publicly distributed.
The latter one is ment to sell the funds to all type of clients. The first one is
used for expert investors. Regulation to protect the investor is heavy for publicly
distributed funds.
Figure 3.26 shows the Swiss collective investment schemes. It shows that there are
funds which are regulated and governed by the Swiss law (the CISA or KAG in German).
Structured products are regulated by the CISA bus not governed. This status is likely
to be changed in the near future. On a deeper level the open-end and closed-end funds
are classified into four different subclasses. ’In the case of open-ended CIS, the CISA
now draws a distinction between retail funds open to the public and funds for qualified
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The major benefits of funds for investors are:
• Diversification: Investors can buy a broadly diversified portfolio with small invest-
ment amounts.
• Investor protection: A large part of the fund industry faces strong regulation re-
quirements.
• Access to assets: Funds allow investors investment into asset classes which would
be impossible on a stand alone basis.
• Transparency: Retail funds in Europe make the investment process, the perfor-
mance, the investment portfolio and the fees transparent.
• Default remoteness: Fund capital is treated as segregated capital.
• Investment strategy: The investor can choose between active and passive invest-
ment, can have access to short strategies, to rule based strategies, etc.
Contrary to structured products the payoff of a fund at a future date is not promised in
exact mathematical terms, i.e. investors in funds belief that the fund management will
generate a positive return due to its skills and information access.
investors. Public advertising is defined as any advertising aimed at the public. If adver-
tising is aimed at qualified investors, it is not deemed to be public. A simplified approvals
process is envisaged for both, but with different terms and conditions.’ Source: SFA, 2012
. In Switzerland qualified investors are institutional investors such as banks, insurance
companies, pension funds and private clients with wealth of at least CHF 2 million (not
including real estate and pension amounts). A SICAV (Societe d’Investissement a Capital
Variable) is an open-ended collective investment scheme. They are investment compa-
nies with a variable share capital that at all times equals the net asset value of the fund.
SICAV are the most frequent legal form used. SICAVs are cross-border marketed in the
EU under the UCITS directive, see below for UCITS. SICAF is the analogue to SICAV
for a closed-ended funds. SICAR ia s Societe d’Investissement en Capital a Risque, i.e. a
kind of venture fund and SIF, Specialized Investment Fund, are specialized vehicle funds.
The investment process for actively managed funds is a dynamic process which has
a tactical and a strategic component. The objective of the tactical and strategic
allocation is to obtain return above a benchmark return, which is often a passive
portfolio. We use the optimization framework to show under which conditions the tactical
and strategic components arise from a optimization problem, i.e. that they are not
pure ad hoc concepts, see 3.42. The strategic allocation, by definition, is based on
unconditional information whereas the tactical one is based on conditional information.
The first one is based on historical returns and the second one on prediction models
which use information today to forecast asset returns. This information processing view
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Figure 3.26: Swiss collective investment schemes.Source: SFA, 2012
3.6. FUND INVESTMENTS 281
leads for the strategic part to slowly varying portfolio weights (strategic) compared to
the dynamic weights for the tactical allocation.
Figure 3.27 shows the returns of different asset classes which form the tactical asset
allocation. The highest performing asset class of each year changes from time to time,
there is no single asset that would always be the winner and the relative performance of
asset classes vary from year to year, giving rise to return potential from asset class selec-
tion. Are these source exploitable? If markets are efficient, they are not. But linkages
between these assets classes bases on economic facts make them exploitable. The table
shows that a tactical asset allocation should be indeed dynamic and that not only the
selection of the long asset classes but the short positions is key. The difference between
the passive benchmark index and the return of the asset allocation is called the total
tracking error.
3.6.2 European Fund Industry
To obtain an impression about the size of the European fund industry, see Table 6.1.
Total Net Assets EU 27 7.6 Trillion EUR
Total No. of Funds EU 27 ∼ 50’000
Average Fund Size 1.01 Billion EUR
No. 1 Luxembourg 2 Trillion EUR
No. 2 France 1.4 Trillion EUR
No. 3 Germany 1.1 Trillion EUR
No.4 Ireland 0.97 Trillion EUR
No.5 UK 0.74 Trillion EUR
No.6 Switzerland 0.26 Trillion EUR
Table 3.5: Some figures of the European fund industry.
Luxembourg created an environment to attract different kind of funds by providing
different kinds of vehicle to pool their investments. Luxembourg offers funds a choice
of both regulated and non-regulated structures. If fund promoters establish a regulated
fund in Luxembourg two options are available: (i) Undertaking for Collective Invest-
ment (UCI) which itself distinguishes between UCIs whose securities are distributed to
the public and securities which are reserved for institutional investors and (ii) Société
d’Investissement en Capital à Risque (SICAR) Both schemes fall under the prudential
supervision of the Luxembourg financial sector regulator, the Commission de surveillance
du secteur financier. The most common legal form of UCI is SICAV. A major reason
for the Luxembourg fund industry is taxation. Luxembourg investment funds are not
subject to income / capital gains taxes in Luxembourg. For withholding tax, taxation of
capital gains also favorable taxation holds.
Figure 3.28 shows the different actors. The investor is the public with exception for
US citizens. He receives dividends, redeems his shares and votes at SICAV meetings.
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Figure 3.27: Returns of different components of a tactical asset allocation. Source:
Goldman Sachs, 2012.
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Figure 3.28: Actors in the fund industry. Source: PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2011
The Board of Director does the daily management of the fund, is responsible for
risk management, reporting and transaction authorization. The distributor is an inde-
pendent network who buys and sells shares/units and ensures marketing support. The
investment advisor provides as a professional information and recommendations for the
asset management, and creates buy and sell orders. The promotor creates as a profes-
sional of the wealth management sector in a bank the legal and administrative structure,
distributes the fund, manages and controls the structures and provides services to the
funds. The transfer agent is either the promoter or a third party. He executes autho-
rized transactions, keeps and updates the register of the share units, issues certification
of the issued shares. The paying agent is the promoter or a third party. He pays the
dividends. Finesti collects, manages and disseminates financial information related to
the Luxembourg-registered funds. CSSF is the Commission de Surveillance du Secteur
Financier. They agree on the prospectus, the identity of the managers, the manage-
ment and the custodian. A prospectus describes a the type and the risks of a security.
Before a security is publicly offered, the prospectus has to be published in the EU. Dif-
ferent units in the banking firm - tax, legal, compliance, accounting, investor relations,
risk, structuring - collaborate with external lawyers to write the prospectus. Errors,
missing information or ambiguous information in the prospectus define a liability claim.
Therefore the prospectus is an extensive document which is of little us for investment
advice. The Auditor attests the accounting data of the annual report and provides the
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supervisory body with information and weaknesses.
The world wide largest asset managers are BlackRock (US) with 3.3 Trillion USD
assets, State Street Global (US) with 1.9 Trillion USD, Allianz Group (D) with 1.9
Trillion USD, Fidelity Investments (US) with 1.7 Trillion USD and number 13 is UBS
(CH) with 0.87 Trillion USD. Custodians (about 70 actors) safe keep the assets, perform
daily managements of assets and monitor/control the operations. Leading with 467
billion of assets is JP Morgan, followed by State Street 265 billion, Dexia, Paribas,
UBS. Administrative Agent is the promotor, a third party which has to be located
in Luxembourg. They calculate the NAV, prepare the reports, contact the tax and
regulatory authorities and do the accounting. Leading is JP Morgan, followed by Paribas,
Dexia, State Street, UBS. The Domiciliation Agent is the promoter or a third party. He
provides an offices, prepares meetings, distributes documents.
UCITS is an acronym for Undertaking in Collective Investment in Transferable Se-
curities. This is the main European framework ruling investment funds. It organizes
the distribution of investment funds with the purpose to protect investors. There were 4
framework initiatives; the last one UCITS IV initiated in 2009 (UCITS I 1985).
UCITS I
• The objectives were a harmonized legal framework to facilitate cross-border offer-
ing of investment funds to retail investors and to develop an integrated European
market. The second objective was the definition of levels for investor protection
(investment limits, capital organization, disclosure requirements, asset safe keeping,
fund oversight). UCI funds do not have a passport property.
• The product passport facilitates the circulation of investment funds: Funds could
be publicly distributed on a cross-border basis without satisfying the local reg-
ulations. This initiative turned out to be not fully satisfactory: Procedures for
cross-border marketing take too long, are too costly and subject to too much su-
pervisory interference. These issues were reconsidered in UCITS IV.
UCITS III
• In UCITS III the scope of investment funds was enlarged (derivatives) which facil-
itated the growth of the European fund industry.
• Further a management company is needed for portfolio and risk management, the
administration and marketing.
UCITS IV
• UCITS IV has three main objectives: Reduce the administration burden by a noti-
fication procedure, increase the investor protection by a Key Investor Information
(KID) and increase market efficiency.
• Before UCITS IV to distribute a fund abroad faced a waiting period of 2 months.
With this new scheme the waiting period is reduced to 10 days. This facilitates the
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product passport. With UCITS IV also management company passport is possible,
i.e. a bank in France issues a foreign fund and can now distribute this foreign fund
in Italy.
• The KID describes risks, returns, fee, historical performance figures in a standard-
ized way. KID replaces the simplified prospectus, i.e. a less comprehensive form of
the prospectus which could be used for some more standard or traditional types of
funds.
• The master-feeder structures are ment to increase market efficiency. One or more
investment vehicles pool their portfolio within another vehicle, i.e. there are several
smaller feeder funds and one master to which they contribute. The asset pooling
works as follows:
– Feeder funds invest at least 85 percent of their assets in a master fonds.
– To avoid cascade effects, the master feeder is not allowed to be a feeder fund
neither to invest in feeder fonds.
– The investment strategy of the feeder fund needs approval of a domestic au-
thority.
– Feeder and master funds are in a contractual relationship.
– The structure has to be made transparent in the prospectus.
The master-feeder structure allows asset managers to capture the efficiencies of
larger pools of assets (economics of scale) although fashioning investment funds to
separate market niches.
UCITS dominate global fund distribution in more than 50 local markets (Europe, Asia,
Middle East, Latin America). This kind of global fund distribution is the preferred
business model in terms of economies of scales and competitiveness. In summary, UCITS
funds are (i) open-ended (investors can redeem shares/units), (ii) collective investment
of capital raised from the public, (iii) diversified, (iv) investment in securities or other
liquid financial assets, (v) retail oriented and (vi) product passport in 27 EU countries.
UCITS funds make 89 percent and SIF 11 percent in terms of net assets.
3.7 Modern Portfolio Theory
3.7.1 Markowitz Model
The model of Markowitz (1952) derives optimal rule for the wealth allocation across risky
assets when investors care only about the mean and variance of a portfolio’s return. In
this one period model the resulting portfolio weights are not robust, i.e. small variations
in the estimated first and second moment (mean and variance) lead to large differences
in the optimal asset allocation. More precisely often optimal portfolios depend in a spiky
kink-type way on the parameters of the model such that a small variation in the pa-
rameters leads to a large change in the optimal portfolio. This instability is related to
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estimation risk as follows. To obtain the optimal portfolio one needs estimates for the
expected return and asset covariance in the Markowitz model. It follows that the sample
estimates have a poor performance out-of-sample, i.e. there is uncertainty about the
’true’ estimated values. Furthermore small changes in the expected return estimate lead
to large changes in the portfolio weights. Data in the literature state figures that a one
percent change of the estimate leads to a 200 percent change in the weight of an asset in
the optimal portfolio. Similar effects hold for the covariance estimate.
Figure 3.29: Estimation risk for mean-variance optimization. The figures shows that for in-
creasing length of the time series the variability of estimation risk shrinks. The bold solid lines
follow by inserting the sample estimates into the optimal policies. The other lines represent effi-
cient frontiers if small parameter expected return and covariances are used.Source: M. Leippold,
Resampling and Robust Portfolio Optimization, 2010, University of Zurich.
To understand this figure, we discuss the mean-variance (MV) approach of Markowitz.
The approach is based on optimizing the trade-off between risk and return in a single
period using the variance as the risk measure. A main advantage of this approach is its
assumption that risk and return are related to each other and that a portfolio choice
should be optimal with respect to these two objectives.
Consider two dates; 0 the trading date and T the performance measurement date .
Asset prices at time 0 are known and exogenously given. Asset prices at time T are in
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general unknown at time 0. Either all asset prices at time T are random or one asset
is singled out whose future price at time T is already known at time 0. We write B
for this risk less asset and the time 0 price is normalized to B(0) = 1. The price at
T of the risk less asset is assumed always larger than 1 in order to imply a positive
interest rate. We further introduce N risky investment opportunities with known prices
Sj(0) ≥ 0, j = 1, . . . , N , at time 0. Their prices Sj(T ), j = 1, . . . , N at time T are non-
negative random variables.
A normalized portfolio at time 0 is defined by (we omit the time index since the
we consider a one period model)
φ = (φ0, . . . φN ) , φ0(0) =
ψ0
V ψ
φk =
ψkSk
V ψ
, k = 1, . . . , N .
(3.18)
with ψ0 the amount of CHF invested in the saving account, ψj the number of units of the
risky security j held in the period and the value process V ψ(t) = ψ0B(t)+
∑N
j=1 ψjSj(t).
We write Rj(0, T ) =: Rj for the linear return of a security j and the return of a
portfolio is the weighted sum
Rφ = φ0R+
N∑
j=1
φjRj . (3.19)
where
∑N
i=0 φj = 1 . Using the scalar product notation the mean return and the covari-
ance of a portfolio φ of N risky assets read:
E[Rφ] = 〈µ, φ〉 , var(Rφ) = 〈φ, V φ〉 (3.20)
where µ is the vector of expected returns and V is the returns covariance matrix:
µj = E[Rj ] (3.21)
Vij =
{
E[R2i ]− E2[Ri] if i = j
E[RiRj ]− E[Ri]E[Rj ] else .
For two risky assets the expressions read:
µφ = E[R
φ] = φ1µ1 + φ2µ2 (3.22)
σ2φ = var(R
φ) = φ21var(R1) + φ
2
2var(R2) + 2φ1φ2cov(R1, R2) .
It is convenient to work with a’normalized covariance matrix’, i.e. with the correla-
tion matrix ρ, instead of the standard one V :
ρ = (ρjk)1≤j,k≤N :=
(
Vjk√
VjjVkk
)
1≤j,k≤N
=
(
cov(Rj , Rk)√
var(Rj)var(Rk)
)
1≤j,k≤N
.
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How does the standard deviations and correlations determine the covariance matrix?
The covariance V can be written as the product V = D′CD. D is a diagonal matrix of
the variances and C the matrix of correlations. Consider two assets with σ1 = 20% and
σ2 = 15%. Correlation is assumed to be 80 percent. Then,
D =
(
0.2 0
0 0.15
)
, C =
(
1 0.8
0.8 1
)
which implies:
V =
(
0.04 0.024
0.024 0.00225
)
.
Which properties should a reasonable covariance matrix V possess? The definition
so far only implies that the matrix V is symmetric. The covariance matrix V needs to
satisfy for all portfolio strategies φ the inequality
〈φ, V φ〉 ≥ 0 , ∀φ , (3.23)
i.e. V has to be positive semi definite else variances become negative. See Ap-
pendix 7.7 for the proof.
Consider a portfolio of two equally weighted stocks with returns 2 and 3 percent and
a covariance matrix
V =
(
0.01 0.005
0.005 0.015
)
.
V is symmetric and the eigenvalues 0.150178, 0.00982166 are positive, i.e. V is a covari-
ance matrix. The expected returns are
µφ = E[R
φ] = 0.5 (0.02 + 0.03) = 0.025 .
The variance of the portfolio returns is
σ2φ = (0.5)
2 × 0.01 + (0.5)2 × 0.015 + 2× (0.5)2 × 0.005 = 0.00875 ,
which implies a portfolio volatility σφ of 9.35 percent.
We always assume that the covariance matrix is strictly positive definite, i.e. we have
for all portfolios φ
〈φ, V φ〉 > 0 . (3.24)
A basic theorem of linear algebra states that a strictly positive definite matrix is in-
vertible: V −1 exists. This will be used in the Markowitz model to solve for the desired
optimal portfolios in closed form. What does this discussion about positivity of the co-
variance matrix implies? If the matrix is constructed from historical data one has to
ensure and thus test for positivity. If this does not hold, the matrix under scrutiny is
not a covariance matrix. If we consider a market with 10 securities, how can we test for
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the strict positivity of a given matrix? A theorem of linear algebra is states that a real
symmetric matrix is strictly positive definite if and only if all eigenvalues are distinct and
strictly positive. Consider the following matrices:
V1 =
 1 0.2 0.30.2 1 0.1
0.3 0.1 1
 , V2 =
 1 −0.2 −0.3−0.2 1 −0.1
−0.3 −0.1 1

The eigenvalues of the two matrices are both strictly positive, i.e. strict positivity of a
matrix has nothing to do with the signs of the matrix entries.
How can a times series of asset prices lead to a non positive definite covariance matrix,
i.e. how is it possible that market data lead to portfolio of assets with negative variance?
One reason are data which are not synchronous. For example different geographical
regions have different holidays. Hence, correlation between two assets are matched at
different dates. Another reason is the length of the time series. At its extreme consider
a stock that has just been issued.
Example: We consider three securities, i.e. Standard& Poor’s index 500, US Gov-
ernment Bonds and a US Small Cap Index. On a monthly basis the expected returns are
over the period 1990-2004:
µ =
 0.01010.00435
0.0137
 =
Standard& PoorUS Gov. Bonds
Small Cap Index

and the covariance matrix V is
V =
 0.0032 0.0002 0.00420.0002 0.0004 0.0001
0.0042 0.0001 0.0076
 .
It follows that the bonds possess the smallest expected return but also the smallest risk.
The eigenvalues of this covariance matrix are
0.01019 , 0.00073 , 0.00045 .
Therefore, V is a strictly positive definite, symmetric matrix. The largest eigenvalue
belongs to the Small Cap Index. This eigenvalue is much larger than the two others.
This reflects that the volatility or riskiness of this stock market source dominates the two
other ones.
We derive systematically the efficient frontier, i.e. we state and solve the Markowitz
model. We assume:
1. There are N risky assets and no risk free asset. Prices of all assets are exogenous
given.
290 CHAPTER 3. INVESTMENT
2. There is a single time period. Hence, any intertemporal behavior of the investors
can not be modelled.
3. There are no transaction costs. This assumption can be easily relaxed nowadays
since a Markowitz model with transaction costs can be numerically solved.
4. Markets are liquid for all assets. This assumption, which also essentially simplifies
the analysis, is much more demanding to remove than the absence of transaction
costs restrictions.
5. Assets are infinitely divisible. Without this assumption, we would have to rely on
integer programming in the sequel.
6. Full investment holds i.e.
〈e, φ〉 = 1
with e = (1, . . . , 1)′ ∈ Rn.
7. Portfolios are selected according to the mean-variance criterion.
We note that short selling is allowed. So far we consider the optimization program
min
φ∈Rn
1
2
〈φ, V φ〉 (M)
s.t. 〈e, φ〉 = 1
〈µ, φ〉 = r .
This model is a quadratic optimization problem and the feasibility set, i.e. the two
constraints, is convex since it is the intersection of two hyperplanes. The factor 12 is chosen
for notational convenience and the solution of the program depend on the parameter
r, the excess return. Does the problem has a solution and is it unique? With the
additional assumptions, general non-linear optimization theory gives a positive answer
to both questions:
1. The covariance matrix is strictly positive definite.
2. The vectors e, µ are linearly independent.
3. All first and second moments of the random variables exist.
The Markowitz model M consists of the quadratic optimization program, the as-
sumption 1.-7. and the technical assumptions 1.-3.
The unique solution is given next.
Proposition 3.7.1. If the above assumptions hold, the solution of the model M is
φ∗ = rφ∗0 − φ∗1 (3.25)
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with
φ∗0 =
1
∆
(〈e, V −1e〉V −1µ− 〈e, V −1µ〉V −1e)
φ∗1 =
1
∆
(〈e, V −1µ〉V −1µ− 〈µ, V −1µ〉V −1e)
∆ = |W−1e|2|W−1µ|2 − (〈W−1e,W−1µ〉)2
V := WW ′ , |x| :=
√
〈x, x〉 (3.26)
where W is an N ×N matrix.
We note that φ∗0 and φ∗1 are independent of r. See the Appendix 7.7 for the proof.
We define the following expressions:
a = 〈µ, V −1µ〉 , b = 〈e, V −1e〉 , c = 〈e, V −1µ〉 .
Proposition 3.7.2. In the model M, the following bounds hold:
b ∈
[
N
λmax
,
N
λmin
]
, c ∈
[ |µ|2
λmax
,
|µ|2
λmin
]
, |a| ≤
√
N |µ|
λmin
(3.27)
with λmax (λmin) the maximum (minimum) eigenvalue of V and a, b, c are all positive.
See the Appendix 7.7 for the proof. We note that the eigenvalues of the covariance
matrix represents the volatility of the risk sources of the different assets - and not the
volatility of the assets itself. The eigenvalues are the entries of the diagonal matrix Λ,
i.e. the matrix Λ = D′V D which exists according to the Spectral Theorem of Linear
Algebra. Therefore, one eigenvalue λ1 dominates all other eigenvalues, the corresponding
risk can used as a proxy model where only this risk factor is considered. If all risk factors
are similar, i.e. λj ∼ λi holds, then the maximum and minimum eigenvalue are of the
same size too. Therefore, the intervals for b, c shrink and also the admissible values for
a become smaller. Since these three parameters describe the hyperbola of the optimal
portfolio variance, see (3.7.1) below, similar importance of risk sources shift the hyperbola
in (σ(r), r)-space, see Figure ??, as follow:
• The hyperbola is shifted to the right and upwards since increasing a means a shift
to the right (to obtain the same expected return more risk is required) and c shifts
the efficient frontier upwards (with the same risk level higher expected returns are
possible). Risk increases in this case and in particular global minimum variance is
higher. A decreasing value of b reduces the curvature of the frontier, i.e. it becomes
flatter which means that an increase of one unit of risk leads to a weaker increase
of expected return.
• If the maximum eigenvalue increases, i.e. one risk source is becomes more and more
dominant, then b, c both increase. The admissible intervals for both parameters
increase. This shifts the frontier upwards to the right.
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Figure 3.30: Mean-variance illustrations in the (σ(r), r)-space. The asymptotic line is
given by r = σ+ r∗
√〈φ∗0, V φ∗0〉. The tangency portfolio and the tangent follow from the
Markowitz problem with a risk less asset, see discussion below.
We calculate the variance for the optimal portfolio φ∗ of Proposition 3.7.1:
σ2(r) = 〈φ∗, V, φ∗〉 = 1
∆
(
r2b− 2rc+ a) . (3.28)
The locus of this set in the (σ(r), r)-space are hyperbolas (see Figure ??). Proposition
3.7.1 implies that the function
σ(r) =
√
〈φ∗, V φ∗〉
provides the minimum standard deviation and variance for any given mean r. Since V is
positive definite, the quadratic form under the root is convex and positive. Since the root
is strictly increasing on the positive real numbers, the function σ(r) is convex. Therefore,
the function has a unique minimum r∗ which is given by the solution of
σ′(r) = 0 ⇒ r∗ = c
b
.
3.7. MODERN PORTFOLIO THEORY 293
Example: We consider three stocks with the expected return and covariance matrix:
µ = (0.2, 0.3, 0.4) , V =
 0.1 0.08 0.090.08 0.15 0.07
0.09 0.07 0.25
 .
This is indeed a covariance matrix since all eigenvalues are strictly positive (0.3429, 0.1224, 0.03459).
The inverse matrix V −1 is:
V −1 =
 22.4363 −9.42877 −5.43703−9.42877 11.6311 0.137646
−5.43703 0.137646 5.91879
 .
This leads to the values a = 0.922918, b = 10.5299, c = 2.46387 and ∆ = ab−c2 = 3.6476.
The optimal portfolio components then are:
φ∗0 =
 −6.603773.20755
3.39623
 , φ∗1 =
 −2.264150.528302
0.735849
 .
The efficient frontier is:
σ(r) = 0.27415(0.92291− 4.92773r + 10.52993r2) .
Suppose that the investor wants a return of r = 30%. Sufficient is then to invest in
stock number 2. But we can obtain the same return by inserting r = 0.3 in the optimal
investment strategies:
φ =
 0.2830190.433962
0.283019
 , σ(0.3) = 0.107 .
The investor is optimally long the first stock by an amount of 28.3 percent of his wealth
and similar for the other assets. The risk of this optimal portfolio is 10.7 percent which
is much less than the 15 percent from an investment in asset 2 only.
Using the results of Proposition 3.7.1 we calculate the global minimum variance
portfolio φ∗m = φ∗m(r∗) and the global minimum variance for this strategy :
φ∗m(r∗) =
1
b
V −1e , σ(r∗)2 =
1
b
. (3.29)
The global minimum variance is independent of the return properties of the assets.
The following remarks are immediate. First, for all portfolios on the efficient frontier
there exists no other portfolio with the same mean and a lower standard deviation.
In other words the portfolios on the efficient frontier are not dominated by any other
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portfolio in A. Second, for each inefficient portfolio exists an efficient portfolio with
the same variance but a higher expected rate of return. Third, any minimum variance
portfolio is an efficient portfolio if:
r ≥ c
b
= r∗ .
Consider the case of two securities with µ1 = 1, µ2 = 0.9 and
V11 = 0.1, V22 = 0.15, V21 = V12 = −0.1 .
The expected return r is equal to r = 0.96. The two assets are negatively correlated and
if we neglect the correlation structure, asset 2 does not seems to be attractive since it
possesses a lower expected return and a larger risk measured by the variance. However,
the negative correlation will induce that it can be advantageous to invest in the second
asset too. First we consider the strategies φ1 = (1, 0), φ2 = (12 ,
1
2). We get
var(Rφ1) = 0.1 , E(Rφ1) = 1 , var(Rφ2) = 0.0.0125 , E(Rφ1) = 0.95 .
Although φ1 satisfies the expected return condition r = 0.96, the risk is much larger
than for the strategy φ2 which in turn does not satisfy the expected return condition.
As a final strategy we consider φ3 which is obtained by solving the optimization problem
without imposing any restrictions on the expected return. It follows that φ3 = (59 ,
4
9) is
the searched portfolio and
var(Rφ3) = 0.011 , E(Rφ3) = 0.955 .
Hence the risk is minimal but the expected return is smaller than r = 0.96. Finally, if
we solve the full Markowitz problem, the optimal portfolio reads φ∗ = (0.6, 0.4) and we
get
var(Rφ
∗
) = 0.012 , E(Rφ
∗
) = 0.96 .
Therefore, 40 percent has to be invested in the not very attractive asset. This is the
Markowitz phenomenon: To reduce the variance as much as possible, a combination
of negatively correlated assets should be chosen. For this portfolio, compared to the naive
one φ1, the variance is reduced drastically and the expected return is still acceptable.
Figure 3.31 shows the efficient frontier for SMI stocks in the year 2000.
Two frontiers are shown, once with short selling constraints and once without such
constraints. It follows that for a given expected return level higher risk level is needed in
cause with such constraints. This shows the fact that each constraint not only reduces
potential losses but also reduces the return potential.
So far, we considered the return restrictions 〈µ, φ〉 = r. What happen if we instead
consider the constraint 〈µ, φ〉 ≥ r? Suppose, that 〈µ, φ〉 > r holds. By the slackness
condition in the KKT theorem, the corresponding multiplier for this constraint is zero.
This simplifies the optimization problem and we get for the optimal policy
φˆ∗ =
V −1µ
c
. (3.30)
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Figure 3.31: The efficient frontiers for two Markowitz-type models are shown: The Markowitz
model without and with short selling restrictions. Data: SMI, daily, year 2000.
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With this portfolio, an arbitrary optimal portfolio φ∗(r) reads
φ∗(r) = ν(r)φ∗m + (1− ν(r))φˆ∗ . (3.31)
The function ν(r) can be determined by the representation of φ∗(r) in Proposition 3.7.1.
We already found two decompositions of the optimal minimum variance portfolio in two
portfolios. In fact, any minimum variance portfolio φ∗(r) can always be written as a
combination of two linearly independent minimum variance portfolios. Since for any
portfolio, there exists another one such that a weighted combination is equal to the
optimal portfolio, the decomposition is called the mutual fund theorem in the literature.
Proposition 3.7.3 (Mutual Fund Theorem). Any minimum variance portfolio can be
written as a combination of the global minimum variance portfolio and the portfolio φˆ∗
given in (3.30). Furthermore, any minimum variance portfolio is a combination of any
two distinct minimum variance portfolios.
The second statement means that we can replace the global minimum variance portfo-
lio and φˆ∗ by any other combination of minimum variance portfolios. See the Appendix
7.7 for the proof. The practical implication are as follows. Suppose that an investor
wishes to invest optimally according to the mean-variance criterion. A possibility is to
buy the assets such as prescribed by the portfolio φ∗(r). But if the number of assets is
large this might be impossible or impractical to achieve. The decomposition property
allows the investor to search for two funds with the characteristic of the two portfolios
in the decomposition (3.31) and which are simpler to buy. Then the investor only has to
invest in these two funds to buy the optimal portfolio. The next proposition characterizes
the efficient frontier in terms of the expected returns, variances and covariances of the
returns.
Proposition 3.7.4. Consider the Markowitz model M and r ≥ cb . A portfolio φ is
efficient if and only if a positive affine relation between the covariance of the return of
each asset Ri with the portfolio Rφ and the expected return exists. Formally,
cov(Ri, Rφ) = f
φ
1 E[Ri] + f
φ
2 , f
φ
1 ≥ 0 , i = 1, . . . , N . (3.32)
The proof is given in Appendix 7.7.
To interpret the condition (3.32) we use the following result in the Markowitz model
M:
∂σ2(r)
∂µk
= cov(Rk, R
φ∗) (3.33)
holds with φ∗ a minimum variance portfolio.
The impact of one unit more return in asset k on the optimal variance equals the
covariance of asset k with the minimum variance portfolio. If the asset k is positively
correlated with the portfolio, a unit more return of this asset increases the variance
and the contrary holds, if the correlation is negative. Hence, to reduce the variance as
much as possible, a combination of negatively correlated assets should be chosen, i.e. the
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Markowitz phenomenon. The condition (3.32) can be interpreted as follows: A portfolio
is mean-variance efficient if and only if the marginal contribution of each security to the
portfolio risk is an positive, affine function of the expected return.
We rewrite condition (3.32) in a form which is used in practice.
Proposition 3.7.5. Consider the Markowitz model M and r ≥ cb . A portfolio φ is
efficient if and only if - with expectation of the global minimum variance portfolio - there
are uncorrelated, arbitrary portfolios φ¯, such that
E[Rφi ] = E[R
φ¯
i ] + cov(Ri, R
φ)
E[Rφ]− E[Rφ¯]
σ2(Rφ)
, i = 1, . . . , N (3.34)
with E[Rφ]− E[Rφ¯] > 0.
The slope of the affine relationship between expected return and the covariance is
E[Rφ]−E[Rφ¯]
σ2(Rφ)
. One defines βi =
cov(Ri,R
φ)
σ2(Rφ)
and the vector of Betas
β = (
cov(RN , R
φ)
σ2(Rφ)
, . . . ,
cov(RN , R
φ)
σ2(Rφ)
)′
is a measure of the covariance of the assets with the efficient portfolio normalized by the
variance of the efficient portfolio.
So far all assets in the Markowitz problem were assumed to be risky. We assume
that there exists a risk less asset Bt with return µ0 apart of the N risky assets. All
other properties of the economy and of the financial market are left unchanged. The
optimization problem is stated in the Appendix 7.7. It follows, that in σ(r), r)-space the
locus of the minimum-variance frontier is a straight line, see Figure ??. The next propo-
sition characterizes minimum variance portfolios and specifies a natural representation
of minimum variance portfolios.
Proposition 3.7.6. 1. All minimum variance portfolio are combinations of any two
linearly independent minimum variance portfolios.
2. The minimum variance portfolio in the modelMR with zero investment in the risk
less asset (φ0 = 0) is given by
φT =
1
c− µ0bV
−1µ− µ0
c− µ0bV
−1e . (3.35)
This portfolio is called the tangency or market portfolio. The tangency portfolio is
also an efficient portfolio in the modelM.
3. The efficient portfolios of the modelMR on the branch r = µ0 +σ
√
∆R are tangent
to the efficient frontier of the modelM.
The proof is omitted.
We note without further comments:
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• Assume the models M and MR given and µ0 6= r∗. Then the tangency portfolio
is element of the efficient frontier if and only if µ0 < r∗.
• The tangency portfolio is element of the inefficient part of the minimum variance
locus if and only if µ0 > r∗.
• If µ0 = r∗, the tangency portfolios does not exists for any finite risk and return.
The portfolios are then given by the intersection of the asymptotic portfolios and
the efficient set at infinity.
We know that any minimum variance portfolio is a linear combination of two distinct
minimum variance portfolios. Contrary to the risky-asset only case, there is a natural
choice of the mutual funds: The risk less asset and the fund with no risk less asset, i.e.
the tangency portfolio φT . A necessary and sufficient condition for portfolio efficiency -
analogous to the risky asset only case - can be given.
Proposition 3.7.7. Consider the model MR. For a portfolio φ being an efficient port-
folio necessary and sufficient is
E[Rφi ] = µ0 + cov(Ri, R
φ)
E[Rφ]− µ0]
σ2(Rφ)
, i = 1, . . . , N (3.36)
with E[Rφ]− µ0 > 0.
The proof is omitted.
3.7.2 CAPM
So far, portfolio theory considered investors’ asset demand given asset returns. How
investors’ asset demand determines the relation between assets’ risk and return in a
market equilibrium, i.e. when demand equals supply? We ask for a model which prices
the assets. We consider the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) and the main question
is to price the assets in equilibrium is: What is the expected return of the assets? That for
we recall that the risk less asset and the tangency portfolio φT are the natural investments
to hold and that an asset’s risk premium is proportional to its systematic risk:
E[Rφi ]− µ0 = βi,T [E[RT ]− µ0]
with E[RT ] the expected return of the tangency portfolio, µ0 the risk free return and βi,T
the Beta between i and the tangency portfolio. If we can identify the tangency portfolio,
we obtain the asset pricing model. In the CAPM we also need the market portfolio, ie
the portfolio of all traded securities. The market capitalization Mi of asset i equals the
price multiplied by the outstanding title. M denotes total market capitalization and φMi
the weight of title i in the market portfolio. The CAPM assumes:
• Investors have the same opinions about the distribution of returns.
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• Investors have the same fixed investment horizon.
• Investors hold efficient frontier portfolios.
• There is a risk-free securities in zero net supply.
• Demand for the securities is in equilibrium equal to the supply (market clearing).
• All information is available at the same time to all investors.
• Markets are perfect: There are no trading costs, lending and borrowing is not
limited under the risk free rate.
Proposition 3.7.8. In the above model we have in the equilibrium:
• Each investor is investing in two classes: The risk less asset and the tangency
portfolio.
• The tangency portfolio is the market portfolio.
• All investors hold the same portfolio of risky securities.
• For each title i we have:
µi − µ0 = βi(µT − µ0) , (3.37)
with µi = E[R
φ
i ].
If the risk-free rate and the Betas are known the expected returns follow. The proof
is simple. Consider I investors each endowed with wealth ej . Investor n is invested with
en0 in the risk less asset, the rest is invested in the tangency portfolio. The sum of this
risk less positions over all investors is zero due to the zero net supply assumption. The
second equilibrium condition states that wealth invested in the tangency portfolio of all
investors is equal to the market portfolio weighted by the market capitalization, i.e.∑
n
(en − en0 )φT = MΦM .
Since the second sum is zero, we have
∑
n e
n = M . This implies φT = ΦM : Hence
total wealth is invested in the risky assets and the tangency portfolio equals the market
portfolio.
Consider an economy with three risky securities A,B,C and three investors, see Table
3.6. The tangency portfolio is φT = (0.2619, 0.3095, 0.4286), investors endowment is
250, 300, 500 and the portfolios of the investors are given in the table. Since in equilibrium
the value of each security is equal to its Market value. Thus, the last line in the table
summarizes the market capitalization of 1050. The market portfolio then reads.
φM = (275/1050, 325/1050, 450/1050) = (0.2619, 0.3095, 0.4286) = φT .
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Investor risk less A B C
1 50 50 50 100
2 -150 150 200 100
3 100 75 75 250
sum 0 275 325 450
Table 3.6: Portfolios of investors.
Relation (3.37) represents the expected return µ as a function of the Betas. The
graph of this map is called the Security Market Line (SML). The relation (3.37)
allows to decompose the asset return in three components:
µi − µ0 = αi + βi(µT − µ0) + i ,
with the noise term  a standard normal one which is not correlated to the market port-
folio. The Alpha should be zero according to the CAPM.
Some assumptions of the CAPM are criticized. The Markowitz model assumes
quadratic utility functions (mean and variance). It can be shown that the result of
Markowitz holds for general utility function but then the asset returns need be normally
distributed. But some asset returns are not normally distributed - they show fat tail be-
havior for example and the assumption of quadratic preferences is a very specific choice
to hold true for all investors. Several effects, such as the size or value effect cannot be
explained by CAPM. This led the factor models initiated by Fama and French. Variance
is often criticized to be a meaningful measure stick of risk since it punishes the upside and
fails to measure drawdowns. We comment below on a drawdowns risk measure (Value-
at-Risk). There is a lot of critique from a behavioral finance point of view. CAPM
assumes that the probability beliefs of active and potential shareholders match the true
distribution of returns. Behavioral finance studies the possibility that active investor’s
expectations are biased, causing market prices to be informationally inefficient. CAPM
does not appear to adequately explain the variation in stock returns. Empirical studies
show that low beta stocks may offer higher returns than the model would predict. A
final remarks concerns the market portfolio. This portfolio should include all types of
assets that are held by anyone as an investment - from liquid assets to illiquid ones as
real estate or even more opaque one as art. Such a market portfolio is unobservable.
One substitutes a stock index as a proxy for the true market portfolio. Unfortunately,
Roll (1977) showed that this substitution can lead to false inferences as to the validity of
the CAPM. The CAPM might not be empirically testable. This is referred to as Roll’s
critique.
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3.7.3 Equivalent Formulation of Markowitz Model, Tactical and Strate-
gic Asset Allocation
We always minimized the portfolio variance under return and other constraints. One
could equivalently maximize the return under a risk constraint. A possible model is
min
ψ
1
2
〈ψ, V ψ〉 − δ〈µ, ψ〉 , (M1) (3.38)
s.t. 〈ψ, e〉 = 1, ψ ∈ RN ,
with δ an exogenous parameter. The solution of this model is
ψ∗ = V −1(δµ+ λe) , λ =
1− δc
b
. (3.39)
The two portfolios ψ∗ and φ∗ (i.e. the solution of the original model) are equivalent, iff
〈ψ∗, µ〉 = 〈φ∗, µ〉 , σ2φ∗(r) = σ2ψ∗(δ) , (3.40)
where in the risk measure the explicit dependence on the respective model parameters
are shown. A short calculation shows that the variance condition is always satisfied iff
r =
δ∆ + c
b
. (3.41)
To prove this, we calculate
〈ψ∗, V ψ∗〉 = ρ2 ∆
b
+
1
b
and compare it with
〈φ∗, V φ∗〉 = 1
∆
(r2b− 2rc+ a) .
The linear relation between r and δ in (3.41) guarantees that the expected returns and
the variances in both models agree. Therefore, for any choice of desired expected return
r there exist a value δ such that the modelM1 leads to the same outcome. This proves
that the two models are equivalent.
Although the two models are mathematically equivalent they may not be equivalent
from a behavioral point of view. Consider an investor which plans to find out its optimal
one-period investment according to the mean-variance criterion. In the model M he
needs then to fix the desired rate r, whereas in the modelM1 he has to determine the
trade-off between risk and return by selecting the parameter δ. The equivalence of the
models designs an experiment for a laboratory to test peoples rationality in decision
making under uncertainty. Another equivalent formulation is:
max
φ
(
〈µ, φ〉 − γ
2
〈φ, V φ〉
)
with γ the investor’s risk aversion.
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We consider the transition from the Markowitz model to the Capital Asset Pricing
Model (CAPM). This allows us to provide a rational foundation for the tactical and
strategic asset allocation. We recall that the tactical asset allocation considers short-
term investments. The difference between the return on the benchmark index and the
return on the tactical asset allocation is the total tracking error. We start with the
quadratic optimization:
max
ψ
〈µ, ψ〉 − γ
2
〈ψ, V ψ〉 s.t. 〈ψ, e〉 = 1 . (3.42)
The solution of this problem (Mutual Fund Theorem) can be written as a combination
of the global minimum variance portfolio φ∗m =
V −1e
b and a second portfolio φˆ
∗ = V
−1µ
c
That is,
ψ∗ = (1− ν(r))φ∗m + ν(r)φˆ∗
holds with the weight ν(r) = c/ρ. Rearranging this is equivalent to
ψ∗ = φ∗m +
V −1
γ
(µ− b/c× e)
where e is the vector with 1 in each component. The equilibrium model CAPM delivers
a vector of equilibrium returns µ˜. By adding and subtracting this vector in the last
expression and rearranging we get:
ψ∗ = φ∗m +
V −1
γ
(
µ˜− b˜/c× e
)
+
V −1
γ
(
µ− µ˜− (b− b˜)/c× e
)
where b˜ = 〈1, V −1µ˜〉. Rearranging further we get:
ψ∗ = φ∗m + φ
∗
S + φ
∗
T
with
φ∗S =
1
γ
(
V −1(µ˜e− eµ˜)V −1
c
)
× e (3.43)
φ∗T =
1
γ
(
V −1((µ− µ˜)e− e(µ− µ˜))V −1
c
)
× e (3.44)
We end up with three components, a global minimum variance component, a strategic
component, and a tactical component. Note that µ˜e − eµ˜ is a matrix with zero in the
diagonal and µ˜j− µ˜i as entry in the cell ij - i.e. it is the equilibrium excess return of asset
i versus asset j. Similarly, the cell in the matrix for the tactical allocation represents
the deviation of expected excess return of asset i versus asset j from equilibrium excess
return in the cell ij.
If the asset returns in equilibrium are all the same the strategy component is zero
and hence irrelevant. In this case only tactical bets and the global minimum variance
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portfolio matter. The size of both the tactical and the strategic components also depend
on the risk aversion degree and the covariance matrix. The tactical strategy is a strategy
of pairwise bets which are weighted by the inverses of the covariance matrices, i.e. bets
between less volatile assets are larger in size than between more risky assets.
3.7.4 Mean-Value-at-Risk Portfolios, Risk Measures
A critique of the mean-variance criterion for optimal portfolio selection often concerns the
variance. First, the variance is a symmetric measure of risk. But why penalize the upside
in the portfolio selection. Second, the variance is often not seen as a true measure of
risk. That is, the measure fails to detect the states which reflect a economic distress. To
improve the situation, one extensively considered mean-value-at-risk (VaR) portfolio
optimization. The VaR VaRα at a level 1− α is defined for the portfolio return Rφ by:
P (Rφ ≤ −VaRα) ≥ α .
It is the minimum amount an investor can loose (in dollars) with a confidence interval of
1−α. The bigger the VaR, the more risky the portfolio is. The definition has implicit a
time horizon assumption: For trading portfolios the portfolios are left unchanged for 10
days, i.e. the VaR is calculated on a ten day basis. This reflects the idea that the risk is
calculated by assuming that the portfolio positions are unchanged for 2 trading weeks.
For credit risk, the time horizon is often one year due to the lower liquidity to change
say mortgage positions. A new efficient frontier can be calculated using the mean and
the VaR. For normal (more general elliptical) distributions the efficient frontier and the
optimal portfolios can be calculated explicitly although the VaR risk measure is defined
only implicitly.
Proposition 3.7.9. The portfolio returns Rφ are normally distributed with mean µ and
volatility σ. The VaR then reads
−VaRα = σkα + µ .
The critical figure k depends on the confidence level 1− α and is tabulated.
The proof is given in Appendix 7.7. Given the simplicity of the VaR under normality
it is no longer a big surprise that one can solve the optimization problem explicitly.
In fact, the optimization is again the maximization of a quadratic function under linear
constraints. Why? The portfolio variance σ2 = 〈φ, V φ〉 is inserted in the VaR-expression.
That for, one takes the square of the VaR constraint in order to switch from the volatility
to the variance. This produces the quadratic term. Doing a lot of algebra one derives the
optimal mean-VaR portfolio and finds that the mean-VaR efficient frontier in a mean-
standard deviation framework is given by a mean-variance efficient frontier: Under the
assumption of multivariate distribution for assets’ returns, one can find for every mean-
variance efficient portfolio, which differs from the global minimum variance portfolio a
confidence level (if it exists) such that this portfolio corresponds to the global minimum
Value-at-Risk portfolio, see Figure 3.32.
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Mean-
Variance 
Frontier 
Global 
Minimum 
Variance 
Portfolio 
Minimum 
VaR Portfolio 
VaR(low) VaR(high) 
A 
Figure 3.32: Mean-variance and mean-VaR portfolios. The Figure shows (Point A) that for every
mean-variance efficient portfolio there is a confidence level which leads to the same portfolio. The
figure indicates that with a decreasing confidence level the VaR is moving to the left, i.e. the
lower risky portfolio follow in the equivalent mean-variance setup. It also follows that there is
a lower bound on the confidence level such that for lower levels no equivalent mean-variance
optimal portfolio exists. Besides the confidence level also the VaR amount level matter.
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As in the mean-standard deviation framework, one can derive the minimum VaR port-
folio the tangency portfolio which is the e portfolio that maximizes the ratio mean/VaR.
It gives the portfolio with maximal return per unity VaR.
As an applications of VaR consider an Euro investor. The investor has the following
portfolio:
Position Type Market Price Currency
1 10 Equity Funds Shares DAX 1’000 Euro
2 5 Equity Funds Shares DJ 5’000 USD
31 200 Novartis Stocks 50 CHF
4 10 US Treasury, 10y, Zero Coupon Bonds 800 USD
Table 3.7: Initial value of the investor’s portfolio.
There are three equity risk sources (DAX, DJ, Novartis), two FX risks USDEUR
(actual 1.05) and CHFEUR (actual 0.8) and interest rate risk for the bond, i.e. 6 risk
factors. We calculate the weekly VaR on a 95% level. To calculate the VaR we need
the variance and covariance information, see Figure 3.33, the calculation of the exposure
in Euro and the allocation of the EUR exposure to the risk factors. The portfolio variance
σ2p = X
′CX is the product of the vector X of the EUR exposure allocated to the risk
factors times the covariance matrix C (the entry ij in this matrix is σiσjρij). Calculating
these matrix products gives σ2p = 160′804′032. This is the value on an annual basis. To
obtain the result on a weekly basis, we obtain for the variance
σw =
√
160′804′032/52 = 1′758 .
The critical value on the 95% level is k95% = 1.644853. This implies the 1w EUR VaR
of:
VaR = 1′758× 1.644853 = 2′892 EUR .
If we consider the VaR expression −VaRα = σkα
√
T =
√
X ′CXkα
√
T , where we neglect
the drift and insert the time-scaling, we get the VaR contribution:
∂VaR
∂X
= kα
√
T
CX√
X ′CX
= k2αT
2 CX
VaR
.
This implies the contribution rule:
VaR =
∑
j
Xj
∂VaR
∂Xj
= kα
√
T
∑
j
Xj
(CX)j√
X ′CX
=
∑
j
VaRj . (3.45)
If we apply this in the example we get the VaR contributions for the risk factors. The
contribution of the US Treasury bond is negative, i.e. due to its negative correlations to
the other factors the VaR is reduced by 6 percent. The largest VaR contribution is from
the DAX risk factor with 31 percent, although the exposure is only 10.5 percent. The
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Variances & Covariances C           
              
  DAX DJ Novartis USDEUR CHFEUR US 10y Treasury 
DAX                 0.090000                 0.030000            0.045000            0.018000            0.008250           -0.006000  
DJ                 0.030000                 0.040000            0.027500            0.023100            0.006600           -0.008000  
Novartis                 0.045000                 0.027500            0.062500            0.008625            0.009000           -0.005500  
USDEUR                 0.018000                 0.023100            0.008625            0.022500            0.005475           -0.007350  
CHFEUR                 0.008250                 0.006600            0.009000            0.005475            0.002500           -0.001050  
US 10y Treasury                -0.006000                -0.008000           -0.005500           -0.007350           -0.001050            0.010000  
Market Data   Correlations 
  
Standard 
Deviation DAX DJ Novartis USDEUR CHFEUR US 10y Treasury 
DAX 30% 1 0.5 0.6 0.4 0.55 -0.2 
DJ 20% 0.50 1 0.55 0.77 0.66 -0.4 
Novartis 25% 0.60 0.55 1 0.23 0.72 -0.22 
USDEUR 15% 0.40 0.77 0.23 1 0.73 -0.49 
CHFEUR 5% 0.55 0.66 0.72 0.73 1 -0.21 
US 10y Treasury 10% -0.20 -0.4 -0.22 -0.49 -0.21 1 
First Calculations     Allocation of the EUR Exposure to the risk factors 
Position Type Market Price Euro Exposure DAX DJ Novartis USDEUR CHFEUR 
US 10y 
Treasury 
1 
10 Equity Funds 
Shares DAX                     1'000               10'000  
             
10'000    
2 
5 Equity Funds 
Shares DJ                     5'000               26'250                 26'250               26'250    
3 200 Novartis Stocks                          50                 8'000                   8'000                 8'000    
4 
10 US Treasury, 
10y, Zero Coupon 
Bonds                        800                 8'400                   8'400                 8'400  
      Sum (Vector X) 
             
10'000               26'250                 8'000               34'650                 8'000                 8'400  
Figure 3.33: Data and calculations for the VaR example.
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contribution of USDEUR is 19 percent to VaR whereas the factor exposure is the largest
one of 36 percent.
We conclude with some remarks on general risk measures. This field of research
starts with a number of properties a risk measure should have and then they prove
whether a function, the risk measure, exists which satisfies the properties, whether the
function is unique and important for practitioners if and how the risk measure can be
explicitly constructed. In the last decade the focus was on coherent and convex risk
measures. We discuss verbally the former one which was initiated by the work of Artzner
et al. (1999).
The model starts with the following assumptions. First, the risk of holding no assets is
zero. This is a normalization assumption. If a portfolio takes better values than another
one in (almost all) states then the better portfolio risk should be less than the risk of the
worse portfolio. Hence, the risk measure should be monotone. The risk of a portfolio is
not larger than the risk of individual components. This is the diversification principle.
Next, if one double the portfolio value then one doubles portfolio risk. Finally, if one
adds risk less cash to a portfolio, the difference between the portfolio with cash minus
the portfolio itself equals cash. A risk measure which satisfies these assumptions is called
a coherent risk measure. The authors proved the existence of such a measure. It follows
that VaR is only coherent if returns are normally distributed. More precisely VaR fails
to honor diversification for general return distributions. An often used measure which
is coherent is expected shortfall. This measure is based on the general not coherent
VaR-measure. Expected shortfall measure the risk of a portfolio, given that the loss
exceeds VaR. I.e. it is the expected loss value given that the loss exceed VaR. If the loss
distribution under consideration is heavy tailed expected shortfall will be substantially
larger than VaR since there is probability mass far away from VaR level. Contrary if a
loss distribution is rapidly decreasing, expected shortfall and VaR are close together. The
former case is that one considered in loan portfolios the other one in trading portfolios
of liquid shares.
3.7.5 Resampling, Robust Optimization
The Markowitz model of last section is plagued by estimation risk. As market conditions
change, portfolios need to be rebalanced to keep them optimal. In the mean-variance
approach frequent rebalancing of the portfolio is necessary. The cause of the apparent
need for rebalancing are not better investment opportunities, but statistical instability
of some underlying estimates. This instability and ambiguity are a major problem in
practical applications of mean-variance theory. By instability and ambiguity we mean
that small changes in input often lead to large changes in the optimized portfolio.
In mean-variance analysis the mean µ and the covariance matrix V are estimated
from time series. These estimates µ̂, V̂ are different from the true population values:
estimation errors result. As Scherer (2002) states: ’The optimizer tends to pick those
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assets with very attractive features (high return and low risk and/or correlation) and
tends to short or deselect those with the worst features. These are exactly the cases
where estimation error is likely to be highest, hence maximizing the impact of estimation
error on portfolio weights. The quadratic programming optimization algorithm takes point
estimates as inputs and treats them as if they were known with certainty (which they are
not) will react to tiny differences in returns that are well within measurement error.’
This is the reason that mean-variance optimized portfolios suffer from instability and
ambiguity. To reduce estimation risk, resampling is used. An algorithm is as follow:
1. Let x̂0 = (µ̂0, V̂0) be the historical estimates.
2. Sample from multivariate normal distribution with the input x̂0 = (µ̂0, V̂0).
3. Compute the new sample mean and covariance. Use them to create the efficient
frontier.
4. Save portfolio weights that are on the new efficient frontier.
5. Repeat the steps 1. to 4. m times.
6. Average over saved portfolio weights to obtain final portfolio weights that lie on the
resampled efficient frontier. Since averaging means smoothing, the saved average
portfolio weights will be more smooth.
These sampled portfolio mean-variance pairs are below the theoretical efficient fron-
tier which is the optimal one satisfying the mean-variance criterion. A plot shows that
considerable variations follow unless the length of time series is very long (under iid
returns). Figure 3.34 shows 8 asset weights in the mean-variance approach, the mean-
variance frontier and the resampled frontiers.
The resampled efficient frontier is visually superior to the theoretical mean-variance
efficient frontier. It is better diversified, i.e. allocation to all asset classes is present
and transition between portfolios is continuous and smooth, no sharp changes follow.
Resampled portfolio weights change in a smooth way as risk tolerance changes. Large
differences may arise to the mean-variance weights. However, the efficient frontiers are
very close.
Robust mean-variance optimization is another approach to control for estimation
risk. The model is similar to the considered robust Merton problem of optimal consump-
tion and investment. That is, one solves the problem
max
φ
(
min
µ∈Sµ,V ∈SV
(
〈φ, µ〉 − γ
2
〈φ, V φ〉
))
. (3.46)
The set S· defines the sets of allowed model misspecification, one for the return and one
for the covariance matrix. As in the Merton model, nature chooses the worst model
for the investor. This leads to very conservative optimal investments, i.e. one is mostly
invested in cash. To see this, assume that short positions are not allowed. Then the worst
return vector in the set of all returns is that one with the lowest expected returns, i.e.
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Figure 3.34: Left Panel: 8 asset weights in the mean-variance approach, the mean-variance
frontier and the resampled frontiers. Right Panel: Resampled efficient frontier. The red dots
represent the eight assets. Source: M. Leippold, Resampling and Robust Portfolio Optimization,
2010, University of Zurich.
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Figure 3.35: Smoothness of resampled portfolio weights. The weights are smoother in the
resampled case. Source: M. Leippold, Resampling and Robust Portfolio Optimization, 2010,
University of Zurich.
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it is the smallest element in §µ measured by its norm. For the covariance the worst case
means little diversification. But little diversification means that V is the matrix which
is closest to the diagonal one or with the largest determinant. Therefore, the min-max
problem reduces to a max-only problem where the return is replaced by the lowest one
and the covariance by the largest one in the above sense. If we would allow for short
positions, the argumentation breaks down since for example low returns become optimal
for a short position. For any optimization with both risky assets and cash, we will end
up with a 100 per cent cash holding as long as we look deep enough into the estimation
error tail. This is overly pessimistic. This formulation is furthermore equivalent to very
narrow Bayesian priors where investors would get the same result by putting a 100 per
cent weight on the two above extremal return and covariance. Although there are several
extension of the above robust decision problem, analysis shows that it adds not much to
traditional mean-variance.
3.7.6 Optimal versus Naive Investment
The discussions of the last sections allow us to consider optimal versus naive investment.
DeMiguel et al. (2009) ask under which conditions mean-variance optimal portfolio mod-
els can be expected to perform well even in the presence of estimation risk. They evaluate
the out-of-sample performance of the sample-based mean-variance portfolio rule together
with 13 model extensions which are designed to reduce estimation error relative to
the performance of the naive portfolio 1/N diversification rule, i.e. the rule which allo-
cates a fraction 1/N of wealth to each of the N assets at each rebalancing date. In other
words, 1/N is a rule which does not care about statistical dependence. The sample-
based mean-variance portfolio simply plugs in the estimated mean and variance in
the optimal allocation rule. This portfolio strategy completely ignores the possibility of
estimation error. The 13 model extensions include Bayesian approaches to estimation
error, moment restrictions, portfolio constraints and optimal combinations of portfolios.
The mixture portfolios are constructed by applying the idea of shrinkage directly to the
portfolio weights. The out-of-sample performance relative to 1/N is compared across 7
different data sets of monthly returns using three performance criteria:
• the out-of-sample Sharpe ratio, i.e. the ratio of return per one unit of volatility.
• the certainty-equivalent (CEQ) return for the expected utility of a mean-
variance investor, i.e. the risk free rate that an investor is willing to accept rather
than adopting a particular risky portfolio strategy.
• the turnover (trading volume) for each portfolio strategy.
They show that of the 14 models evaluated (Markowitz plus 13 extensions), none is
consistently better than the naive 1/N benchmark in terms of all three performance
measures.
The authors apply the following method to evaluate the performance. The use a
’rolling-sample’ approach. For a data set of asset return of length T , they choose an
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estimation window M of length 5 or 10 years. DeMiguel et al. (2009): In each month t,
starting from t = M + 1, we use the data in the previous M months to estimate the pa-
rameters needed to implement a particular strategy. These estimated parameters are then
used to determine the relative portfolio weights in the portfolio of only-risky assets. We
then use these weights to compute the return in month t+1. This process is continued by
adding the return for the next period in the data set and dropping the earliest return, until
the end of the data set is reached. The outcome of this rolling-window approach is a se-
ries of T−M monthly out-of-sample returns generated by each of the portfolio strategies.’
The authors find:
• Bayesian strategies do not seem to be very effective at dealing with estimation
error.
• Constraints alone do not improve performance sufficiently.
• Combined portfolio constraints with some form of shrinkage of expected returns
are usually much more effective in reducing the effect of estimation error.
• In only two cases are the CEQ returns from optimizing models statistically superior
to the CEQ return from the 1/N model.
• No single strategy always dominates the 1/N strategy in terms of Sharpe ratio. The
1/N strategy has Sharpe ratios that are higher relative to the constrained policies,
which have Sharpe ratios that are higher than those for the unconstrained policies.
• Only the passive strategy where the investor holds the market portfolio and does
not trade at all is better than the 1/N strategy in terms of turnover.
• The simulation results show that for reasonable parameter values, the models of
optimal portfolio choice reduce only moderately the critical length of the estima-
tion window needed to outperform the 1/N policy. Long estimation windows are
required before the sample-based mean-variance policy achieves a higher out-of-
sample Sharpe ratio than the 1/N policy. For 10 risky assets, the Sharpe ratio of
the sample-based mean-variance policy is higher than that of the 1/N policy only
for the case of M = 6000 months; for 25 and 50 assets it does not achieve the
same Sharpe ratio as the 1/N policy even for an estimation window length of 6000
months.
The intuition for their findings are: First, the vector of expected excess returns over
the risk-free rate and the variance-covariance matrix of returns have to be estimated.
This needs very long time series to estimate them precisely. Since the strategies are
sensitives to the input parameters, small errors in the estimates yet leads to weights that
are far from optimal. Hence, the error due to the naive 1/N can be smaller than the
optimized model ones. Second, the 1/N rule performs well in the data sets because wealth
is distributed across portfolios of stocks rather than individual stocks. Portfolios of stocks
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have lower idiosyncratic risk than individual stocks, i.e. the loss from naive as opposed to
optimal diversification is much smaller when allocating wealth across portfolios. Optimal
diversification policies dominate the 1/N rule only for very high levels of idiosyncratic
volatility.
Tu and Zhou (2011) continue the analysis of the former authors. Using new data
sets all tested sophisticated strategies not only under perform the 1/N, but also have
negative risk-adjusted returns. Investors are worse off by using the rules than hold-
ing cash. The authors analyze whether a combination between the 1/N rule and with a
sophisticated rule yields a better rule. The combination of two investment rules exactly
obtains the average performance of two if one rule is good in some scenarios and bad
in others and the other rule may do the opposite. Statistically, the combination can be
interpreted as a shrinkage estimator with the 1/N rule as the target. A shrinkage defines
a tradeoff between the bias and variance. The 1/N rule is biased, but with zero variance.
A sophisticated rule is usually asymptotically unbiased, but has sizable variance in small
samples. When the 1/N is combined with the sophisticated rule, an increase of the weight
on the 1/N increases the bias, but decreases the variance. An optimal weight must make
the combination better than either of the two rules on a stand alone basis. They show
that the Kan and Zhou (2007) model coupled to the 1/N rule performs consistently
well across models and data sets. It performs as well as or better than all other sophisti-
cated rules on a consistent basis. It also outperforms substantially the 1/N across almost
all models. Moreover, this combination rule never loses money (on a risk-adjusted basis)
across models and data sets. Kan and Zhou (2007) propose a ’three-fund’ portfolio rule,
where the third fund minimizes ’estimation risk’. The intuition is that estimation risk
cannot be diversified away by holding only a combination of the tangency portfolio and
the risk-free asset. Hence with estimation risk an investor also benefits from holding
some other risky-asset portfolio - a third fund. Kan and Zhou search for this optimal
three-fund portfolio rule in the class of portfolios that can be expressed as a combination
of the sample-based mean variance portfolio and the minimum-variance portfolio.
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Chapter 4
Swaps and Financial Markets
Swaps are one of the most successful financial innovations in the last decades. Due to
the importance of swaps and the moderate complexity we consider different aspects in
swap innovation:
• Rationale.
• Pricing.
• Construction of the time-value of money curve.
• Standard documentation innovation (ISDA).
We also give a broad overview of capital markets, money markets and the classification
of derivatives.
4.1 Introduction to Swaps
We introduce to the vast swap topic focussing on vanilla Interest Rate swaps (IRS)1.
These bilateral contracts generalize Forward Rate Agreements (FRAs), see Figure 4.3.
Most often fixed versus floating rate are exchanged. The reference rate for the floating
leg is typically LIBOR or EURIBOR. The notional amount is not exchanged it serves
only as a calculation figure. In USD or Euro the maturity range starts with 2 years
up to 30 years. To enter such a contract an ISDA agreement is necessary and counter
party risk limits are needed. The contractual size differs for different currencies. In Swiss
Francs the minimum size is CHF 2 Mio. The day count conventions are different for the
fixed and floating leg. For the fixed payments the day count convention of bond markets
1The notion vanilla is used for basic derivatives. Vanilla products on equity are call and put option.
More complicated products are labelled exotic.
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30/360 is used and act/360 is used for the floating leg, the money market basis.2 The
counter party paying the fixed rate is called the ’payer’, the other one the ’receiver’. The
payer (receiver) is by convention long (short) the swap.
Originally, IRS were introduced for interest arbitrage reasons. Consider two firms
A and B. A has a high creditworthiness, B a low one. Both firms can borrow at a fixed
or floating rate given in Table 4.1.
A B Difference
Fixed 5% 6 % 1 %
Floating LIBOR LIBOR + 0.75 % 0.75 %
Table 4.1: Rates for firms A and B.
The two firms can both benefit if they enter into a IRS, since the differences in the
fixed rate borrowing is different from the floating rate one. There is a mispricing of credit
or liquidity risk or both of them in the market. Both parties can realize and divide the
difference of 0.25% among them using an IRS as follows. To lock in the profit, each party
borrows where they have an advantage. A borrows fixed and B floating. B agrees to
pay A floating rate LIBOR plus 0.75 percent and A agrees to pay B fixed 5.9 percent.
A gets floating rate funding at LIBOR minus 0.15 percent and B gets an advantage in
fixed funding of 0.1 percent, Figure 4.1 illustrates the transaction.
The first swap was designed 1981 between the World Bank and IBM. The motivations
of the two parties are shown in Figure 4.2:
IBM received DM and CHF from its funding program (we skip CHF). IBM used
this money to finance project in the US, i.e. IBM exchanged DM debt in 1979 for dollar
funds. That for IBM needed to change periodically USD in DM to serve the coupon pay-
ments. Since USD became stronger in that period compared to DM, IBM made currency
gains. To realize these gains IBM needed to get ride of its DM-liabilities.
The World Bank borrowed in the capital markets and lent to developing countries
for project finance. The costs of the loans were the same than the financing cost of
the World Bank in the markets. US interest rates were at 17 percent in this period.
The comparable rates in Germany and Switzerland were 12% and 8%. World Bank was
raising funds in low interest rate currencies, such as the DM. Since the World Bank was
constraint to borrow in Germany and Switzerland the bank needed to find another party
which owed DM and which wanted to exchange them against USD - IBM.
An investment banker at Salomon Brothers realized that a currency swap would
solve the problems of both parties. One party agrees to make interest payments in cur-
rency A at a fixed rate on a notional amount N and to pay that notional amount in
2’30/360’ means that each month has 30 days and each has 360 days. The convention ’act’ means
that the actual calender dates are summed. The reset frequency is the frequency of floating payments.
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A B Swap Bank 
Pays LIBOR + 0.75% 
Pays 5.9% fixed 
Balance for A 
-  5% fixed 
+ 5.95% fixed 
-  LIBOR + 075% 
Net: LIBOR – 0.15% 
Balance for B 
+ LIBOR + 075% 
-  5.95% fixed 
-  LIBOR + 075% 
Net: Fixed – 0.1% 
Figure 4.1: Interest rate arbitrage using IRS.
currency A at maturity of the swap to a counter party in exchange for receiving from
it all interest rate payments in currency B on a notional amount N and receiving N in
currency B at maturity. The notional amounts are chosen to have a value in a common
currency at initiation, so that they do not have to be exchanged. Salomon Brothers
managed the trade on a back-to-back basis where IBM could change their DM-liabilities
into USD and the World Bank could buy DM at favorable rates: The World Bank lent
IBM over notional amounts and coupons denominated in DM and received from IBM
notional and coupons in USD. The success of this transaction was necessary to overcame
skepticism against such a product innovation. The World Bank got out of its USD
debt. The end result for IBM was as if it did not have DM but dollar debt.
After this trade in a second period in the 80’s banks started to enter into own-name
transactions. I.e. swap counter parties discussed directly with the bank as intermedi-
ary their desired risk and return profile. Entering between the two parties the bank
faced twice counter party risk. One also stared to develop standardized documentation
documents which allowed to process this taylor made transaction effectively, see ISDA
agreements below. The third period was characterized by the beginning market making.
Banks started to trade swaps with several counter parties. Market and counter party
risk increased due to this wider activities - large investment in risk management followed.
Market risk was often compensated with transactions in other markets. For example, due
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World Bank 
Pays DM & CHF 
IBM 
Pays USD 
Existing Loans 
DM & CHF   
Clients 
of 
World Bank 
     Swap 
DM & CHF 
Coupons & Nominal 
USD 
Coupons & Notional DM & CHF 
Coupons & Notional Loans 
DM & CHF 
Pay back of Loans  
DM & CHF 
USD 
Trade Income 
FX Market 
Exchange USD in DM & CHF 
Bond Market 
Pays  
DM & CHF 
Borrow USD Pay Coupons and Debt in 
USD from the Swap  
Figure 4.2: Swap between the World Bank and IBM.
to their liquidity government bonds were preferred.
We report some swap market figures in the Section Capital Markets.
4.2 Swap Pricing
To illustrate how the fixed rate is determined, designate the current date as time zero
and the final maturity date of the swap as time T . The fixed rate at which a new swap
with maturity T can be executed is the constant par swap rate s0,T (0). This rate by
definition sets the value of the swap at initiation to zero, i.e.
PVSwap(0, s0,T (0)) = 0 .
The argument (0) refers to calendar time, the first subindex denotes the start date of the
swap and T is the maturity date of the swap. Once a swap is executed, fixed payments of
s0,T (0) are made annually. We assume that the difference between two consecutive fixed
dates is equidistant. Floating payments are made quarterly. They are equal to act/360
times the 3m LIBOR rate at the beginning of the quarter. This is called setting in
advance and paying in arrears. A floating rate note paying 3m LIBOR quarterly
must be worth par at each quarterly LIBOR reset date, see below for a proof. Since
the initial value of a swap is zero, the initial value of the fixed leg must also be worth
4.2. SWAP PRICING 319
par. Figure 4.3 shows this using a graphical decomposition of a swap into par fixed and
floating rate bonds. Solving for the swap rate in the above equality
The fixed and floating leg are both at par at initiation. We have
PVSwap, fixed(0, s0,T (0)) = PVSwap, floating(0) .
s0,T (0) =
1− p(0, T )
A0,T (0)
=
PV Floating
Annuity
(4.1)
where A0,T (0) =
∑T
j=1 p(0, j) is the present value of an annuity with first payment six
months after the start date and final payment at time T . This annuity is called the level
of the swap. We prove (4.1). The fix part is simply the present value of a fix rate bond,
i.e.
∑
j
s0,T (0)p(0, Tj) where the swap rate is by definition constant. More interesting is
the floating part.
Proposition 4.2.1. The value of the LIBOR leg of a swap with constant notional amount
is equal to the notional times the difference of the first and last discount factor. The PV
of a floating rate note is equal to the notional.
If the first-time discount factor is 1, i.e. D(0, 0) = 1, the PV of the floating leg equals
PV(Float) = (1− p(0, T ))N .
To prove this, we price a Floating Rate Note (FRN), i.e. a fixed maturity bond with
LIBOR-floating coupons. We set Lj = L(tj−1, tj) for the LIBOR forward rate fixed at
tj−1 with payment at tj . The cash flows of the floating leg are not known at time 0
except the first one L0. Although the cash flows are random, the claim is that the PV of
the floating rate note is deterministic. To prove this, we replicate the random cash flow.
Consider the period where we have to replicate the payoff Lj = L(tj−1, tj), i.e. to obtain
at tj the payoff Lj . We need one unit of a currency at time tj−1, which can be invested
at the rate Lj such that we get in tj the payoff 1 + Lj . To obtain this we buy a zero
p(0, tj−1) and sell a zero p(0, tj). The long bond picks up the rate Lj at tj−1 and the
balance of both bonds at tj is Lj - i.e. the replication is accomplished. Consider the next
cash flow Lj+1. Then the short bond p(0, tj) for the former cash flow will enter also as
a long bond: He cancels. Therefore, considering a series of cash flows Lj , the replicating
bonds cancel but the last one. This proves:
FRN(0) = N
and hence PV(Float) = (1− p(0, T ))N for the floating leg of the swap.
Consider a 2y FRN with reset date each 6m, with notional 1′000 and given spot rates.
Setting the day count fraction to 1/2 for simplicity we get the following values, see 4.2:
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Maturity Spot Rate Forward Rate Cash Flow FRN PV FRN
0.5 2.45% 2.45% 12.25 -
1 2.62% 2.76% 13.78 -
1.5 2.80% 3.08% 15.40 -
2 3% 3.45% 1017.37 -
- - - - 1000
Table 4.2: Valuation of a FRN. The forward rates are calculated using simple compounding
F (0, S, T ) =
1+T×R(0,T )
1+S×R(0,S)−1
T−S . The FRN cash flows are derived from CF(T ) = 1
′000× F (0,S,T )2 and
the PV follow from PV(CF(T )) = CF(T )1+T×R(0,T ) .
t0 
t1 t2 t3 
Swap 
Fix 
Variabel 
t0 
Trick 
t0 t1 t2 t3 
Fixer 
Bond 
t0 t1 t2 t3 
Floating  
Rate Note 
(FRN) 
= 
+ 
t1 t2 t3 
Fix 
1 1 
1 1 
1 
Figure 4.3: Graphical representation of a payer swap replication (payer means the party which
pays the fixed rate and obtains the floating one). Dotted lines represents floating cash flows.
Replication is obtained by virtually adding and subtracting notional amounts at the beginning
and maturity of the swap. We assume for simplicity the same periodicity for the floating and
fixed leg. The figure shows an important property of risk structuring: To obtain the cash flow
profile of a new product one can add to an existing profile new products and add them vertically.
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4.3 IRS and Forward Rate Agreements
IRS can be considered as a sequence of forward rate agreements (FRAs): A FRA
is a swap with a single floating and single fixed leg. We discuss the rationale for FRAs
first and then the relation to swap pricing. Consider a client which would like to obtain
a loan of CHF 10 Mio. starting in 6m with 6m maturity. The terms are fixed in 6m,
i.e. LIBOR spot L(6m, 6m) is the rate. The client believes that 6m LIBOR starting in
6m will be higher than present 6m LIBOR. He would like to freeze the loan term on the
actual interest rate level, i.e. on the fixed forward LIBOR rate K = F (0, 6m, 6m): The
clients wants to swap the floating rate L(6m, 6m) against the fixed rate F (0, 6m, 6m). A
FRA contract achieves this client’s need:
• At initiation time 0 no cash flows are exchanged.
• At time 12m the client has to pay CHF −10(1+L(6m, 6m)) Mio. without an FRA.
But the client would like to pay CHF −10(1 + F (0, 6m, 6m)) Mio.
• To achieve this he buys a FRA. Such a contract pays/receives an amount A in 6m
and A(1 +F (6m, 6m)) in 12m such that A balances the payments in 12m between
the unwanted risky payment without a FRA and the wanted fixed payment: A
solves in 12m the equation:
A(1 + L(6m, 6m))︸ ︷︷ ︸
Balance
− 10(1 + L(6m, 6m))︸ ︷︷ ︸
Without FRA
= −10(1 + F (0, 6m, 6m))︸ ︷︷ ︸
Desired Payment
.
Solving for A, inserting the year-fraction α = Hedging period360 and K = L(0, 6m, 6m) we
get:
A =
10α(L(6m, 6m)−K)
1 + αL(6m, 6m)
.
Choosing spot rates R(0, 6m) = 6.5%, R(0, 12m) = 7% and considering three interest
rate scenarios A,B,C, we illustrate how the FRA provides an interest rate risk hedge.
The no arbitrage relation between spot rates R(s, t) and forward rates F (s, t, u) (see
notes after the example for details)(
1 +R(0, 6m)
183
360
)(
1 + F (0, 6m, 6m)
182
360
)
=
(
1 +R(0, 12m)
365
360
)
(4.2)
implies
K = F (0, 6m, 6m) = 7.26%.
Note that a violation of (4.2) leads to a money machine. That is, assuming without loss
of generality that the left hand side is larger than the right hand one, borrowing at the
cheaper rate and investing at the higher one leads to a risk less profit.
The 6m LIBOR in 6m can
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• be equal to the strike F (0, 6m, 6m) = 7.26 (scenario A),
• higher: L(6m, 6m) = 8% (scenario B);
• lower: L(6m, 6m) = 7% (scenario C) than the forward rate.
Table 4.3 summarizes the situation for the client.
Client Balance Sheet in Mio. CHF
0 0 6m 6m 6m 12m 12m 12m
A FRA Loan FRA Loan Total FRA Loan Total
Scenario A 0 0 0 0 10 10 0 -10.37 -10.37
Scenario B 0.036 0 0 0.036 10 10.036 0.037 -10.404 -10.37
Scenario C -0.013 0 0 -0.013 10 9.987 -0.013 -10.354 -10.37
Table 4.3: FRA under different scenarios. The figures are calculated as follows. For the payment
A in Scenario B we have 0.036 = 10(8%−7.26%)
182
360
1+8% 182360
. The loan at maturity is calculated as: 10.404 =
10× (1 + 0.08× 182/360).
This shows that with a FRA the client can completely hedge interest rate risk related
to the loan. He pays in each scenario CHF −0.37 Mio. This corresponds to an interest
payment on the loan using the forward rate of 7.26%, i.e. 10.37 = 10(1+0.0726∗182/360).
In summary a FRA is based on three dates:
• Current time t,
• expiry time S > t,
• maturity time T > S.
FRA contracts allow to fix interest rates up to one year. Due to this short time to
maturity they are classified as money market instruments. Instruments with a longer
maturity are called capital market products.. They can be fixed 1 month up to two
years in advance and the notional amount is not exchanged. The contract is settled two
days before the starting date and the difference between the reference rate and the fixed
forward rate is exchanged between the two parties. There are minimum sizes for FRA
depending on the currency. In USD minimum sizes are one million or more.
Returning to swap pricing and using the no arbitrage relationship between zero bonds
and forward rates we get
s0,T (0) =
T∑
j=1
wjL(0, Tj−1, Tj) , wj =
p(0, j)
A0,T (0)
.
The sum over all weights wj equals 1. This shows that the IRS is a weighted sum of
FRA’s.
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4.4 Constructing Time-Value of Money Curves
We construct the discount function starting from the par swap rates (’stripping the curve’,
’bootstrapping’). Why is this meaningful? Discount factors are basic to value payoffs
but they are not observable. We derive them using observable swap rates. This exercise
is a formal innovation: Input are the par swap rates for maturities longer than 1 year.3
We start with a 1y swap with the par swap rate s0,1(0) and 6m LIBOR for the floating
leg. With Proposition 4.2.1 for the valuation of the floating leg and
SwapFloat = SwapFix
we get
N(D(0, 1)− 1) = s0,1(0)D(0, 1)α0,1 .
Solving for the discounting factor as a function of the swap rate:
D(0, 1) =
1
1 + s0,1(0)α0,1
.
To obtain D(0, 2) we have to consider a 2y swap with swap par rate s0,2(0). We have
N(D(0, 1)− 1) = s0,2(0) (D(0, 1)α0,1 +D(0, 2)α1,2) .
This shows that to determine D(0, 2), we need to know D(0, 1) (Bootstrapping, curve
stripping). Solving, we have
D(0, 2) =
1− s0,2α0,1D(0, 1)
1 + s0,2α1,2
.
An immediate recursion gives
D(0, n) =
1− s0,n(0)
n−1∑
i=1
αi−1,iD(0, i)
1 + s0,n(0) .αn−1,n
. (4.3)
So far, we assumed that the discount factors or zero bonds as well as the forward rates are
known. What if there are holes, i.e. times were no observable instrument exists? Then
we have to construct the expressions, i.e. we have to interpolate. Such a construction
should satisfy several requirements:
• Mark-to-market. The value of a dollar at a future date should be determined by
liquid securities. This minimizes the risk that cash flows, are misspecified.
• Stability. The constructed term structures should be stable when switching from
one structure to another one. Switching from a meaningful discount curve to a
forward curve should also provide a meaningful forward curve.
3We do not consider shorter maturities here where we would use money market instruments.
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Period SARON Period LIBOR % Period Swiss Gov. Bonds
o/n 0.04
1m 0.13833
3m 0.17
6m 0.24
12m 0.52
2y 0.605
3y 0.811
4y 1.029
5y 1.229
7y 1.538
8y 1.651
10y 1.818
20y 2.162
30y 2.278
Table 4.4: CHF interest rates as of January 2011. SARON (Swiss Average Rate
Overnight) is an overnight interest rates average referencing the Swiss Franc interbank
repo market. Source: Swiss National Bank.
• Smoothness. Curves should not be ragged unless a sound economic explanation
exists.
• Consistency. Estimated term structures today should be consistent with the
dynamics of interest rate models. More precisely which parameterized families
used to estimate the forward rate curve are consistent with arbitrage free interest
rate models? We do not consider this issue and refer to Filipovic (2009).
We only discuss some basic ideas and do not consider advanced mathematical issues.
Different institutions generate different curves. The government term structure is
generated using government bonds. The interbank term structure is constructed using
money market instruments, futures and swaps, see Table 4.4. Finally the corporate
term structure is constructed relative to a ’risk less’ curves such as the government term
structure. Consider the data for CHF in Table 4.4 using money and capital market in-
struments. This table shows that different instruments are used for different maturities
and that for all cash flows not on the grid an interpolation procedure is necessary. The
data in the table are blended: There is for example no overlap, i.e. for 3m maturity one
could use LIBOR rates or prices of 3m futures contracts. Which one should one choose?
The answer depends on several factors such as liquidity, economic considerations, market
constraints. Suppose that a transaction is on-balance sheet and time value of money is
constructed using off-balance sheet FRAs. This can turn out to be not a sound choice.
There are several methods to find a curve which interpolates the observed data.
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Figure 4.4: Smooth yield curve and the associated forward rate curve. The jagged forward
curves arises in the swap region where linear interpolation is used. Source: Filipovic (2009)
The first one is to use a full cash flow view. This means that the vector of the n
market instruments ~X (LIBOR, futures, swaps, etc.) is represented as
~X = C ~D + 
with C the cash flow matrix and ~D the N discount factors for the searched term struc-
ture. The error term  allows to treat statistically bid and ask differences or outliers in
prices. One needs to transform all bond and money market instruments into this format,
i.e. one builds a cash flow matrix C for the bonds, futures, LIBOR rate products and
the swaps. The term structure ~D is found by minimizing the quadratic distance between
~X and C ~D. This optimization has some serious drawbacks. First the number of market
instruments n is much smaller than N since each cash flow of each instrument generates
a column in the C matrix. This leads to an optimization problem with many possible
solutions. Furthermore, the matrix C has many entries which are zero since most cash
flows appear only once. There is nothing in this approach which prevents one to obtain
a ragged term structure curve.
The next methods use parametric curve representations. The first guess is to linearly
interpolate between existing rates. Suppose the zero rate curve is constructed in this
way. Then the forward rate curve follows. Since the forward rate is basically a deriva-
tive of the zero rate curve4 errors or kinks in the linear approximation lead to jagged
4The no arbitrage relation 1 + f(0, S, S + ∆) = p(0,S+∆)
p(0,S)
, we get f(0, S, S + ∆) = p(0,S+∆)−p(0,S)
p(0,S)
∼
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forward rate curves, see Figure 4.4. The goal is to therefore to use higher order polyno-
mials. Three approaches are the so-called B-splines or cubic splines, smoothing splines
and exponential-polynomial (Nelson-Siegel, Svensson) approaches. We consider the last
approach which is used by most central banks to construct the term structure. These
approaches estimate the forward curve by minimizing the distance to bond prices. This
is a non-linear optimization problem since the estimated forward curve is a sum of terms
Polynomial× Exponential function .
The coefficients in the polynomial and in the exponential function are estimated by
calibration in the non-linear optimization program to bond market prices. Figure 4.5
shows curves for the Nelson-Siegel family.
Figure 4.5: Smooth curves for the Nelson-Siegel family defined by F = z1 + (z2 + z3T )e−z4T .
The parameters z1, z2, z4 are kept fix and different value for z3 are used in the figure.
The figure shows that the curves F for the forward rate estimate is smooth and flat-
tens out towards the long end of maturity. The approach is flexible in choosing the degree
of the polynomial terms and it is consistent with the dynamics of the chosen interest rate
model. For T to infinity the estimated curve becomes equal to the constant z1 which is
interpreted as the long term rate. The second term z2 represents the short term rate due
to the exponential decay and z3 is the intermediate rate term representation.
We illustrate the bootstrapping method for the construction of a government term
structure using the data given in Table 4.5. To obtain the interest rate for 14m using
∂p(0,S)
∂S
.
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Period Zero Coupon Rate
o/n 3%
1m 3.1%
2m 3.2%
3m 3.3%
6m 3.5%
9m 3.9%
12m 4%
Maturity Bond
14m 3.5% coupon, price 102
21m 5% coupon, price 100.5
22m 4.5% coupon, price 99
Table 4.5: Hypothetical zero coupon rates for a government term structure.
the 2m rate one solves:
102 =
3.5
(1 + 0.032)(1/6)
+
103.5
(1 + x)7/6
The result is the rate 4.318% for 14m. In the same way one obtains for 21m and 22m
using the 9m and 12m rates the zero rates 5.479% and 5.062% which shows that the zero
rate curve is inverse after 12m.
Zero coupon rates at intermediate dates can be obtained by linear interpolation of
known rates. We noted that this approach often leads to jagged forward rate term
structures. Interpolation by higher order polynomials is more adequate. We consider
interpolation by 3rd order polynomials, i.e. the spot rate R(0, t) is given by
R(0, T ) = at3 + bt2 + ct+ d
with the constraint that the curve matches known rates at dates t1, t2, and so on. Suppose
that we are given 4 rates at the dates
• t1 = 1y, t2 = 2y, t3 = 3y, t4 = 4y with
• values 4, 4.5, 5, 5.3 percent, respectively.
Using the cubic interpolation we search for the intermediate rate R(0, 2.5y), i.e.
R(0, 2.5) = a(2.5)3 + b(2.5)2 + c(2.5) + d =? .
The condition that this unknown rate matches the 4 given ones is equivalent to a linear
system:
Mx = y , x = (a, b, c, d)′ , y = (4%, 4.5%, 5%, 5.3%, )′ , M =

1 1 1 1
8 4 2 1
27 9 3 1
64 16 4 1

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where the matrix M has the time index powers as entries. Then x = M−1y provides the
unknown parameters and gives R(0, 2.5). The inverse matrix is:
M−1 =

−1/6 1/2 −1/2 1/6
3/2 −4 7/2 −1
−13/3 19/2 −7 11/6
4 −6 4 −1
 .
This implies for the vector
x = (−0.00033, 0.002, 0.00133, 0.037)
which gives
R(0, 2.5) = −0.00033(2.5)3 + 0.002(2.5)2 + 0.00133(2.5) + 0.037 = 4.762% .
We next consider interpolation using exponential weighting. Consider the discount
factors in Table 4.6. To calculate the par rate at a = 1.5 months we search for a discount
Grid O/N 1w 1m 2m 3m 6m 1y 2y
Date 18/5/90 24/5/90 18/6/90 17/7/90 17/8/90 19/11/90 17/5/91 ...
Par Rate 14.25 14.75 15 15.125 15.15625 15.375 15.55 ...
Table 4.6: Par Rates of the British pound.
factor for a intermediate date a of the form
D(0, a) = e−Ra(ta−t0) ,
where t1 < a < t2. The unknown rate Ra is the weighted average
Ra = λR1 + (1− λ)R2
of the known factors. The weight λ ∈ (0, 1) is given by the relative position of the date
ta between t1 and t2, i.e.
λ =
t2 − ta
t2 − t1 .
We get
D(0, a) = D(0, t1)
λ(ta−t0)
t1−t0 D(0, t2)
(1−λ)(ta−t0)
t2−t0 .
Using this approach we search the discounting factor for 6, June 1990. The date lies
between the 1m and 2m dates in the Table 4.6. The par rates are transformed into
discounting factors as:
D(0, 6m) =
1
1 + Par Rate6mα0,6m
= 0.9273 .
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There are 31 days between the calendar date for the 2m and 1m factors and the weighting
factor λ is equal to 4. This gives the intermediate discounting factor:
D(0, 20/6/90) = 0.9870
34×27
31×30 0.9753
34×4
31×61 = 0.9854 .
We apply the methods to swap pricing. Table 4.7 shows how different rates are derived
from the given swap rates. We note:
• The forward curve is a function t→ F (t, T ).
• The zero or discount curve is a function T → p(0, T )
• The par swap rate curve is vector of spot starting swap rates for all maturities.
Maturity Swap Rate Discount Factor Spot Rates Forward Rates
1y 4.50% 0.95638 4.5615% -
2y 4.95% 0.90647 5.0324% 5.55%
3y 5.39% 0.85158 5.5015% 6.57%
4y 5.57% 0.80151 5.6872% 6.28%
5y 5.68% 0.75409 5.8071% 6.31%
Table 4.7: Rates and their transformation. To obtain the discount factors from the swap rate
we use (4.3). To get the spot rates from the discount factor we use R(0, T ) =
(
1
D(0,t)
)1/T
−1 and
the forward rates are calculated as F (0, S, T ) = D(0,T )
T
D(0,S)S
. The day-count factor reads act/360/100
=1/36000*365=0.0101388.
Using these rates we price a non-forward starting 5y swap with a notional of 50 Mio.
in a given currency. Table 4.8 summarizes the floating leg pricing. The PV of the floating
1y 2y 3y 4y 5y
Rates 4.5615% 5.5518% 6.5750% 6.2827% 6.3128%
Cash flows -2’280’743 -2’775’921 -3’287’486 -3’141’361 -3’156’409
PV of cash flows -2’181’246 -2’516’291 -2’799’551 -2’517’843 -2’380’228
Table 4.8: Floating leg pricing. Up to 1y spot rates are used for longer maturities forward rates
apply.
leg is −12′395′159. This is one method of pricing. We could use the trick by inserting
the notional amounts, see Proposition 4.2.1. We then immediately get
−12′395′159 = −50′000′000(1− 0.75409) .
We price the fixed leg using 1% as an ad hoc fixed rate. The result is given in Table
4.9. The PV using 1% fixed is 2′135′015. To make the value of the swap zero at time 0,
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1y 2y 3y 4y 5y
Fix 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1%
Cash flows 500’000 500’000 500’000 500’000 500’000
PV of cash flows 478’188 453’235 425’789 400’757 377’047
Table 4.9: Pricing with a fixed 1% rate.
the fixed swap rate s follows:
s = − PVFloating(0)
PVfix at 1%(0)
= 5.806 .
We consider the pricing of the IBM-Worldbank Swap. IBM had to make the
following payments:
• 12’375 million CHF p.a. on March 30 from 1982 through 1986 when it also had to
repay the principal of CHF 200 Mio.
• 30 million DM p.a. on the same dates and the principal payment was DM 300 Mio.
Through the swap, IBM wanted to receive these payments from the World Bank. What
are the equivalent USD payment for IBM to the above World Bank payments? We need
the present value of the foreign currency payments the World Bank had promised to
make. Suppose a flat term structure with the interest rates at transaction settlement
date August 11, 1981 of 8 percent (CHF)and 11 percent (DM). The settlement date of
the swap was August 25, 1981. We then have for the PV of the fixed CHF payments
PVfix, CHF in CHF = 191′367′478 =
12′375′000
(1 + 0.08)x
+
3∑
i=1
12′375′000
(1 + 0.08)i+x
+
212′375′000
1 + 0.08)4+x
as of August 25, 1981. Here x are 215 days instead of 360 days for the subsequent years
since the first payments were due March 30, 1982. The terms of the swap were agreed to
weeks before i.e. August 11. Using the 2w forward contracts for August 25 for conversion
where 1 USD was worth 2.18 CHF, we get
PVfix, CHF in USD = 87′783′247
as of August 25, 1981. With the same procedure one gets:
PVfix, DM in USD = 117′703′153
as of August 25, 1981 (with FX of 2.56). The total USD payments of the World Bank
were then Z = 205′485′000. The World Bank could borrow a present value of USD
Z with a payment schedule matching the payment schedule of the IBM debt. The
World Bank had to issue the debt and had to pay commissions and expenses of 2.15%
of par. Consequently, to get a net present value of Z it could issue debt at par for USD
210′000′000 with a coupon of 16 percent. The World Bank would receive 97.85% of USD
210′000′000, i.e. which amounts to Z.
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4.5 Swaps and Asset Liability Management (ALM)
The treasury of bank is responsible for interest rate risk of the bank’s balance sheet. We
consider a simple balance sheet in order to understand some aspects of the risk:
• 1 asset A with price 100, for example a loan.
• 1 liability L with price 60.
• The difference 40 is the capital E.
We assume a duration of DA = 5y for the asset, an duration of DL = 17.7y for the
liability. Hence, an interest rate increase of 1 percent leads to a loss of 5 percent on the
assets. Assume that the treasurer fears that the flat interest rate curve falls from actual
6 to new 5 percent. We assume the same rates for the assets and liabilities.
Was is the impact of such a change on the capital? Using the duration concept we
get for the asset side (with PA the price of the asset):
PA(5%)− PA(6%) = − 1
1 + r
DA × δr × PA(6%) = 1
1 + 0.06
5× (−0.01)× 500 = +23.6 .
Similarly, for the liability:
PL(5%)− PL(6%) = − 1
1 + 0.06
17.7× (−0.01)× 400 = +66.6 .
This induces a change on the capital of
100 + 23.6− 66.8 = 56.8 ,
i.e. a loss follows if the treasurer applies the duration concept independent on the asset
and liability side.
But the goal of the treasurer is that the duration of capital DE remains unchanged if
the interest rate change happens. To achieve this, one first needs to know DE . We have
from the balance sheet and the linearity of the duration concept:
PE(r + δr)− PE(r) = PA(r + δr)− PA(r)− (PL(r + δr)− PL(r))
i.e.
PE(r + δr)− PE(r) = − 1
1 + r
DAδrPA(r) +
1
1 + r
DLδrPL(r) .
From the definition of the duration we have on the other hand
PE(r + δr)− PE(r) = − 1
1 + r
DEδrPE(r) .
Equalizing the expressions, we get
DE =
PA
PA − PLDA −
PL
PA − PLDL ,
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i.e. the duration of the capital is equal to the weighted sum of the asset and liability
duration. We get with our figures
DE = −45.8
i.e. the duration is strongly negative. To achieve neutrality DE = 0 we need
PADA = PLDL .
Hence, the treasurer needs a financial product
• with a strong positive duration,
• which has a PV of zero, i.e. does not change the present value of the balance sheet.
In order that a product has a PV of zero, it needs two CF streams, i.e. a swap. He
enters into a contract where he sells the fixed part and gets the floating one since the
floating one with 3m LIBOR has a duration of 3m and the fixed one has much longer
duration. He exchanges long duration against short term duration. This makes IRS a
favorite product for treasurers. This is a payer swap, i.e. the buyer of the swap pays the
fixed CF.
4.6 Total Return Swaps
The concept of a swap is much broader than the above IRS examples. Basically any
transaction which exchanges cash flows or assets is a swap. One can exchange currencies,
commodities, stocks, and so on. The exchange may remain within one asset class but
can also cross them, such as cross currency swaps. Third, swaps can be used to structure
retail structured products.
We consider Total Return Swap (TRS). A TRS swaps the total return of a single
asset or basket of assets in exchange for periodic cash flows, typically a floating rate such
as LIBOR plus/minus a basis point spread and a guarantee against any capital losses.
Contrary to a plain vanilla swap in a TRS the total return, i.e. cash flows plus capital
appreciation/depreciation, is exchanged, not just the cash flows. TRS do not transfer
actual ownership of the assets, as in a repurchase agreement (Repo), i.e. the sale of secu-
rities together with an agreement for the seller to buy back the securities at a later date.
A TRS allows for greater flexibility, reduces up-front capital and allows for higher lever-
aging. Market Participants include investment banks, commercial banks, funds (mutual,
hedge, private equity, pension), insurance companies, governments, non-governmental
(NGO) organizations and treasury departments of large multinational corporations.
The two parties in TRS are the Total Return Payer (TRP) and the Total Return
Receiver (TRR). The TRP pays the total return from a reference asset and receives
LIBOR plus a spread. The TRR receives the total return and pays LIBOR plus a
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spread. TRS are (still) off-balance sheet transactions, i.e. the TRR obtains the cash
flows of a reference asset without actually owning it. Figure 4.6 shows the diagram of a
TRS.
Payer 
TRP 
Receiver  
TRR 
Libor + Spread 
Total Rate of Return 
Reference 
Asset 
Total Rate 
of Return 
TRP 
• Legal owner of reference asset 
• Reference asset on balance sheet 
• Short market and credit risk 
TRR 
• Not owner of reference asset 
• Off-balance sheet instument 
• Long market and credit risk 
Figure 4.6: Total Return Swap (TRS).
If the reference asset defaults, the TRR bears the burden of the default. The TRR
must then either pay the TRP the difference of the reference asset at inception of the
swap and at the time of default or take delivery of the defaulted asset and pay the TRP
the price of the reference asset at inception of the swap. The TRP has exchanged credit
risk of the reference asset for credit risk of the TRR. The TRP demands collateral from
the TRP to mitigate credit risk.
Hedge funds and special purpose vehicles (SPVs) used TRS for ’leveraged balance
sheet arbitrage’. A hedge fund wants an exposure to a particular asset to earn high asset
returns but do not wants to raise the capital to buy the assets. ’Leasing’ them via a TRS
is less costly. The bank generates additional cash flow by charging a spread above the
market returns it receives from lending and receives a guarantee against depreciation of
the assets. The synthetically transferred asset can range from single stocks to complex
derivatives.
A TRS somewhat resembles a Credit Default Swap (CDS). Both a TRS and CDS are
off-balance sheet and relate to the potential for default if the TRS reference asset is a
loan or bond. But while a CDS only protects against loss caused by specific credit default
events a TRS protects also against creditworthiness migrations. TRS has non-standard
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terms, whereas a single name CDS normally follows standard ISDA documentation. The
greatest benefit and risk of a TRS is leverage. This means that up-front capital to execute
a trade can kept low. This makes TRS a favorite of hedge funds. Other possible benefits
are lower financing costs using a TRS. Such benefits exists if the same risks are priced
different in different markets. Figure 4.7 shows the impact of leverage from TRS. The
difference between a direct or cash investor in the reference asset and a hedge funds
investing in the TRS is shown. If the funding costs of the hedge funds largely increase,
in the example above 7 percent, then there will be a negative net swap spread and the
return generating leverage become a bad for the hedge fund. Typically due to the high
leverage of hedge funds such a situation leads to bankruptcy of the vehicle.
Comments HF A HF B Cash Investor 
Libor 4% 4% 
Ref. Asset Yield Libor + 300 bps 7% 7% 7% 
Funding Cost 
Libror + 100 bps 
for HF 5% 5% 
Net Swap Spread 2% 2% 
Collateral Amount 5% 10% 
Leverage 20 to 1 10 to 1 1 to 1 
Leverage Swap 
Return 40% 20% 
Net Interest on 
Funding 1% 1% 5% 
Net Return 39% 19% 2% 
Figure 4.7: Leverage in TRS investment for two hedge funds. The figure compare these two
investors with a cash investor. If funding costs exceed the reference asset yield, say they are up
to 8 percent, then also the losses react to leverage. Using a leverage factor of 20 the losses are
20 percent in this scenario.
The investment return risk is born by the TRP. While the Total Return Payer retains
the reference asset on its balance sheet, the Total Return Receiver assumes the risk of
capital losses by making guarantee payments to the TRP that offset any drop in asset
value. Both parties face interest rate risk in a TRS. Interest Rate Risk is typically higher
to the investor who does not necessarily have direct access to LIBOR financing, whereas
the TRP does. Liquidity risk may exist if the TRS terms specify physical delivery of
assets between the parties. For example, if the TRS requires the TRP to deliver specific
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high yield bonds at expiration, and these bonds defaulted during the life of the TRS, it
may be difficult to acquire them at reasonable valuation in the open market if the bank
does not have them in its inventory. Counter party risk is a significant factor in certain
transactions. If a hedge fund makes multiple TRS investments in similar assets, any
significant drop in the value of those assets would leave the fund in a position of making
ongoing coupon payments plus capital loss payments against reduced or terminated re-
turns from the asset. Since most swaps are executed on large notional amounts between
10 and 100 Mio. USD, this could put the TRP at risk of a hedge fund’s default if the
fund is not sufficiently capitalized. Hedge fund counter party risk is accentuated due to
secrecy and minimal or nonexistent balance sheet reporting obligations. Bankruptcy risk
may exist where the reference asset is a single large capital asset, such as a industrial
building mortgage or airplane loan. If the borrower defaults or files for bankruptcy, the
loan payments may terminate, effectively eliminating the asset returns to the Total Re-
turn Receiver and requiring large capital loss payments to the TRP.
4.7 Documentation - ISDA Agreements
We introduce to the ISDA agreements, i.e. the innovation of documentation stan-
dards. These agreements apply to Over-the-Counter (OTC) derivatives, i.e. derivatives
which are not exchange traded and which are tailored to the specific requirements of
customers, see Figure 4.8 for an overview of derivatives.
Figure 4.9 shows the size of OTC derivative markets world wide for different risk
factors.
• The OTC markets are much larger in size than their stock exchange counter parts.
OTC markets face a strong change in regulation and transparency requirements,
see the Section Financial Crisis.
• The Notional Amount and Gross Positive and Negative Market Values are shown
in Figure 4.9. The first one is significantly larger than the second ones. Notional
amounts are pure size measures. They are weak indicators for risk figures since risk
of derivatives depends on volatility, correlation, interest rates and other parameters.
The gross market value is equal to the sum of absolute value all contracts with a
positive or negative replacement value. ’Gross’ means that contracts with the same
counter party are not netted, nor is a positive and negative replacement value within
the same risk category netted. Replacement values reflect the marked to market
values of all receivables of the open derivative positions of clients and proprietary
positions of the banks at fixed date. That is, a positive replacement value is the
non-defaulting party would receive if the contract were to be terminated today.
Positive replacement values are assets of a bank and negative ones are liabilities.
• The column Gross Credit Exposure summarizes all gross values of contracts with a
positive replacement value after all allowed netting operations. Netting implies a:
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Derivatives 
Swaps Forwards Options 
Exchange 
Traded OTC 
Exchange 
Traded OTC OTC 
Futures 
Financial 
Futures 
Forwards 
FRA 
FX 
Interest 
Rate 
Cross Asset 
Figure 4.8: Derivatives classification. Warrants and Structured Products are not contained in
this list. Swaps and forwards are called linear derivative contracts, options are non-linear ones.
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– Reduction of credit risk
– Reduction of settlement risk
– Reduction of liquidity risk
– Reduction of systemic risk
• The figures are classified according to the risk factors: FX, Interest Rates, Equity,
Commodities, Credit Risk in the form of Credit Default Swaps (CDS). Within
each class non-conditional derivatives (Forwards, Swaps) and conditional deriva-
tives (Options), credit derivatives on single-name and on an index of several names
are distinguished.
The documentation of OTC derivatives uses standard forms of documentation devel-
oped by the International Swaps and Derivatives Association (ISDA) which represents
more than 700 Participants in the OTC derivatives market. The documentation consists
of Master Agreement, Definitions, Templates and User’s Guides. The goal of the Mas-
ter Agreement is to document bilateral derivative transactions in a standard form. The
Master Agreement consists of several parts: a body, a schedule, transaction confirmation
and optionally a credit support annex (CSA). A major concern of ISDA is counter party
risk, i.e. how can this risk mitigated and how can this risk properly priced in bilateral
derivative transactions? Credit risk of derivative transactions such as FRA and swaps
differs from credit risk of bonds or loans. For linear derivatives in general no funds are
exchanged between the parties at initiation. Therefore, the notional amount is a poor
measure of credit risk, i.e. the market value of the derivatives is in general much smaller
than the notional amount of its underlying. On the other side the derivative contract
depends on an underlying value and large fluctuations during the life time, i.e. the future
exposure is different from current exposure.
If a counter party defaults prior to settlement of the contract the non-defaulting party
will try to replace the defaulted contract with an economic new contract. If the market
value is positive, the loss is equal to the replacement costs. Counter parties possess
many bilateral contracts among each other. In case of default each contract is treated
as a unique legal contract unless there is a netting provision specified in the Master
Agreement. Netting means that the gross claim between counter parties is replaced by
a single net claim. Two types of netting are of particular importance: Payoff netting
and close-out netting, see Figure 4.10.
Payment netting means that positions in the same currency and the same date are off-
set. This mechanism reduces settlement risk of derivative transactions. Close-out netting
refers to a bilateral arrangement where both parties agree to terminate all obligations,
i.e. even if they are not yet due, if default or another termination event occurs. The gross
market value is added up and a single payment is obtained by the party with a negative
net portfolio value. If there is at least one transaction with a positive market value then
close-out netting reduces credit risk. To see this effect, let Et(i) be the exposure at time
t of transaction i. Without any netting agreement the overall credit exposure between
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Figure 4.9: OTC Derivatives Statistics. Source: BIS, Basel, 2011.
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Since in option-type contracts the exposure is always positive for the option buyer and
negative for the writer it is only the buyer who faces the risk of counter party default.
If forward-type products such as swaps are considered, the exposure can be positive or
negative, i.e. both parties face counter party risk.
$10 $35 $40 $30 
$20 
$25  
$60 
$40 
$10 
$30 
$20 
$30 
$10 $35 $40 $30 
$25  
$60 
$40 
$10 
$10 
$20 
$30 
$25 $10 
$15  $20 
$10 
$10 
$15 $10 
$15  $20 
$10 
$10 
$10 
$15  
$40 
Start First Bilateral Netting 
All Bilateral Nettings Done 
First Multilateral Netting 
End 
All Multilateral  
Nettings Done 
Figure 4.10: Netting examples. In the first transition a bilateral netting of USD 20
and USD 30 between a Canadian and an US counter party with an ISDA Agreement
is performed. In the next chart all bilateral nettings are executed. In the next step
multi lateral netting applies. This means that the liability of 25 USD form the German
firm to the US one is split into a 15 and 10 USD flow. Since the German firm obtains
10 USD from the British firm, the British firm can directly hand the 10 USD to the
US firm leaving a claim of 15 USD between the German and US firm and no claim
between the German and British firm. This procedure is continued leading to the final
two claims.Source:McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc., 2001.
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two parties is ∑
i
max(0, Et(i)) .
With close-out netting we have max(0,
∑
iEt(i)) and
max(0,
∑
i
Et(i)) ≤
∑
i
max(0, Et(i))
shows the credit risk exposure reduction due to close-out netting. This is present time
view.
What is the exposure at a future date?
The positive value of a contract with value Vt at time t is the exposure Et:
Et = max(Vt, 0).
This is the loss in case of default for a bank. Negative values possess no loss potential
from the bank’s view. The Potential Exposure PEt|s equals the 95%-quantile of the
discounted exposure at time t ≥ s:
P
(
D−1(s, t)Et ≤ PEs|t
)
= 95%.
with D the discount factor. The probability P depends on the risk factors. We assume
that the value driving market parameters affect the future exposure up to time t in the
same way they did up to time s, i.e. there is no regime switch. Maximal Potential
Exposure (MPE) at s is then the maximum over all PEs|t with s ≥ t:
MPEs = max
t≥s
PEt. = max
t≥s
{
PEt|s
∣∣∣P(D−1(s, t)Es ≤ PEt|s) = 95%}.
The goal is to find a standardized calculation of MPE for all types of derivatives. That
for one decomposes MPE in a sum of a Replacement Value (RV) and a Risk Premium
(RP), see Figure ??
MPE = RV + RP. (4.4)
The risk premium is set equal to the maximum over all 95%-quantiles of the future
exposures. We refer to the literature for technical details.
4.8 Capital and Money Markets
Swaps are one instrument of the capital markets. These markets are a part of financial
markets which we compare with real (goods) markets. In the latter one, goods and
services are traded. These objects are generated by the input factors labor and income.
The production function acts on them and produces the output. But on the input factor
capital another market acts which maps capital into capital - the financial markets. A
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Potential Exposure 
PE(t) MPE 
Maturity 
Figure 4.11: Illustration of the MPE decomposition.
second difference to the real markets is that financial markets are not presently oriented
but they exchange future cash flows. A hybrid market are commodity markets were
both spot and future markets exist. The financial market is in some sense acts on
capital before the real market does: The financial markets allows to transform capital
in the real market in the desired form: The input factor capital is transformed using
financial markets. Derivative markets act on financial markets - they consider inputs
of the financial markets and transform them into new financial markets products.Since
there are different types of participants, different maturities and different legal setups
the financial market is divided in sub markets:
• Money market,
• Capital and loan market,
• Foreign exchange market (FX),
• Derivatives market.
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This division is not free of redundances. Forward rate agreements are derivatives and
money market instruments. Roughly, money market instruments have a maturity up to
one year and capital market ones of more than one year. On the loan market are traded
all types of loans which are not traded in the capital market. Derivatives are financial
instruments where the price depends on an underlying instrument, goods or reference
rates (interest rates, indices). They are divided in:
• Contingent derivatives or option. In these contracts at least one party has the right
(optionality) to do something, i.e. to buy say a stock at a prespecified price at a
future date.
• Unconditional derivatives do not have any optionalities. Examples are FRA and
swaps.
Contrary the so-called cash products - stocks, bonds, FX spot rates - derivatives have
a time dimension, i.e. the contracts are about future prices. Another way to categorize
derivatives is: Are they regularly traded at an exchange or are they OTC? Figure 4.12
shows a possible characterization of financial markets.
Financial Market 
Money Market (MM) Capital Market Loan Market 
Not organized. 
Market 
Organized 
Market 
Commercial Paper 
Treasury Bills, MM funds 
Repo, Certificate Deposit 
Central Banks 
MM 
Derivatives 
Bonds Stocks 
Primary Market 
Secundary Market 
Primary Market 
Secundary Market 
Derivatives 
Not Contingent 
Derivatives 
Swaps 
Forwards & 
Futures 
Contingent 
Derivatives 
OTC 
Exchange 
Figure 4.12: Financial markets. Source: Wikipedia and own representation.
The figure shows some products of the money markets (MM). These markets exist
in almost all economies in the world. They are a first step towards the capital markets
where maturities longer than 1 are traded. Actors in the MM are central banks, banks,
governments, money market fonds and large corporates. The daily volume in CHF is in
the two digit billion area. Figure 4.13 shows some figure of the MM.
The volume in the MM doubled in the 90s. The growth after 2000 until the start
of the financial crisis 2007 was by a factor of seven. Before and after the outbreak of
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Figure 4.13: Money Market. Source: BIS, 2011.
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the financial crisis both the growth and decline where more pronounced than before.
The driver of these observation were financial institutions. The more marginal role of
governments in this markets was only interrupted in autumn 2008. The money markets
primary serves the banks to exchange liquidity, i.e. either to borrow or to invest excess
capital. Large corporate use the MM to raise short term financing.
4.8.1 Secured Banking - Repo and SLB
An important instrument in MM are Repo Transactions. Reps business is part of
Prime Finance:
• Lending and borrowing of securities, the (SLB) business.
• Repos, i.e. sale and repurchase agreements, are short term funding instruments.
• Synthetic Finance such as synthetic SLB or synthetic Repo. These transactions
combine a SLB with a derivative where the underlying is the security of the SLB
transaction.
Prime finance business changed a lot in the last years and is still in a transformation
modus. There are several reasons:
• Transition to collateralized banking. Repo business can be considered as secured
banking were collateral serves as a creditor protector for savings for non-retail in-
vestors. I.e. it is the counterpart to creditor protection on banking deposits.
Creditors are bank, insurance companies, governments, firms or pension funds.
Collateralization was always important in OTC transactions. The global finan-
cial crisis starting in 2008 showed that one has to fully understand credit risk and
collateralization in OTC derivative transactions. Markets which are widely collater-
alized are for example fixed income repo, equity finance, exchange traded securities,
OTC derivatives, securities lending, banks loans, asset backed securities. Collateral
banking requires some specific functions within the bank. First, one needs a collat-
eral management team. They run collateral operations, issue and receive margin
calls, speak with clients or counter parties, provide services. The credit risk of the
counter parties needs to be assessed and revalued by a credit analysis team. Sales
are responsible for the onboarding process for new accounts and traders execute
the trades. Collateral, in particular if it less liquid or complicated (exotic) needs
to be valued by an independent valuation team. Other functions comprise legal,
middle office, accounting functions. An important property of collateral is its eli-
gibility, i.e. the extend how collateral can be converted into an economic value if
the counter party defaults. Liquidity, quality in terms of embedded credit risk and
the possibility to settle the collateral define the collateral eligibility. Cash is by far
the most used collateral followed by government bonds, large-cap shares. Of lower
eligibility are ETFs, mutual funds or guarantees.
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• Cost reduction in the custody of securities. The administration of securities is
costly. Lending and borrowing securities generates earnings which lower these
costs.
• To cover short positions one has to borrow securities. Short positions can be
the results of market making, the hedging of derivative positions or part of an
investment strategy.
• Risk management. Collateral is an effective instrument to reduce credit risk.
• Increasing regulatory requirements. Risk weighted assets in the regulatory capital
charge are reduced if one switches from unsecured to secured transactions.
A repo transaction can be cash or security driven. It is security driven if the investor
wishes to lend a security. Repo transactions are bilateral trades between the Seller
(security seller, i.e. loan receiver) and the Buyer, i.e. the security buyer or loan provider.
These transactions can be described with two dates:
• At 0: Assignment of the securities from the Seller to the Buyer.
• At 1: Redemption of the loan and interest rate payments to the Buyer and reas-
signment of the security from the Buyer to the Seller.
The purchase price in 0 equal the market value (dirty price) of the underlying security
minus an add on (Haircut). The haircut provides a restricted protection against falling
security prices. The payback price equals the purchase price plus an agreed interest pay-
ment (repo rate), which depends upon the quality of the security. If the security losses
value, a margin call follows. An economic incentive for a repo transaction for the Buyer is
to obtain favorable rates compared to an unsecured loan and the Seller receives collateral.
Example:
While investors trade bonds on a stand alone basis, trading desks use repo jointly with
bond trading: Buying a bond is completed immediately by selling the bond in a repo,
i.e. one finances the bond. If a bond is sold short, the additional trade is a reverse repo.
We consider an US Treasury Bond at the following dates:
• T trading day to buy the bond.
• T1 = T + 1 settlement day for the bond. Start/opening the repo.
• T2 = T + 2. Closing of the 1-day repo.
At the trading day T the trader buys the bond for the price B(T ) from a counter
party A. The bond is settled at T + 1. At T + 1 the repo transaction starts to finance
the bond. To achieve this
• the repo desk delivers the bond for 1 day, i.e. the period of the repo transaction is
overnight from T1 to T2 for a price B(T
Repo
1 ), to the repo counter party and
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• the repo desk agrees to buy the bond back at T2 for the price
B(TRepo1 )(1 + r/360)
with r the repo rate.
The prices B(T ) and B(TRepo1 ) can differ at T1. The difference is a residual cash position
with a cash rate rcash. This rate is in general different from the repo rate. At T2 the repo
desk pays the amount B(TRepo1 )(1 + r/360) to the counter party, receives the bond back
and delivers the bond for the price B(T1) to the buyer. The P& L of this transactions
over 1 day has the following components:
P&L = P (T1)−B(T ) Price Change Bond (4.5)
− B(TRepo1 )r/360 Repo Costs
+ (B(TRepo1 )−B(T ))rCash/360 Difference Repo vs. Cash Market.
We consider the following numbers:
• Notional 100 Mio. USD, coupon 4 percent.
• T is Oct 2 for trading the bond and settlement is Oct 3.
• Clean Price of the bond is 100’078’125 USD (= 100−02+ in US Treasury notation).
with accrued interest the settlement price 100’110’911 follows. Accrued interest rate
3
183 × 0.04/2, i.e. the bond accrues interest since Sept 30 and a half a year has 183
days.
• The repo rate r equals 3.4 percent, the cash rate is 3.5 percent.
Before the bond settles Oct 3, the repo desk finances the bond. The bond price changes
from Oct 2 to Oct 3 by (100-05), i.e. the value of the position in dirty prices increased
to
100′189′036 = (1 + 5/32 +
3
183
× 0.04/2)× 100Mio. USD .
Oct 3 the following payments/transactions are made:
• Bonds are received with value USD 100′110′911 and exchanged for a secured loan
of USD 100′189′036 with the repo counter party.
• They deliver cash payments of 78′125 USD.
Oct 4 the following payments/transactions are made:
• The repo counter party hands back the lent bond and obtains the repo rate interest:
100′198′499 = 100′189′036× (1 + 0.034/360) .
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• The bond is sold from the repo desk to the buyer. The price equals the clean price
of Oct 3 with Oct 4 settlement plus accrued interest. If the bond increased to
100-08, we have
100′293′715 = (1 + 8/32 +
4
183
× 0.04/2)× 100 Mio. USD .
The P&L components are:
• Change in bond price: 100′293′715− 100′110′911 = +182′803 USD.
• Repo costs : −100′189′036× 0.034360 = −9462 USD.
• Difference Repo vs. Cash Market: 78′125× 0.035360 = +7.7 USD.
A 1-day P&L of 173’349 USD follows.
Contrary to the SLB business, repo is always of the type ’cash against security,
whereas in SLB ’securities vs securities or cash’ are exchanged. Both types face the same
market risk. Settlement risk can be different and the rational can be either liquidity or
security possession.
In fixed income repo one distinguishes between ’Repo Specials’ and ’Repo General
Collateral’ (GC) markets. In Repo Special, similar to SLB, a specific security is con-
sidered which the buyer wants to possess to cover for example a short position in the
security. In a GC Repo the rationale is borrow or invest money for a short time. The
interest rate is derived from the actual MM rates and the quality of the collateral. If a
repo is due one includes the interest into the payback price of the collateral. GC business
is much larger than the Special one. Equity similar to FI repo. A main motivation is
to finance equity or stock positions in the trading books or a short-term money market
investment.
In a TriParty Repo a third party to the Buyer and Seller is responsible for adminis-
tration and operations. The largest providers TriParty Repo programs are Clearstream
and JP Morgan Chase which is large custodian bank (see Asset Management). TriParty
Repos are designed for professional market participants. They allow to settle flexible
baskets of securities as collateral in an efficient form. Repo transaction are used by cen-
tral banks for the management of liquidity. Banks use repos to reduce credit risk, i.e.
unsecured money market transactions are replaced by repos. For security dealers repo
offer funding at favorable rates.
Eurex is a stock company hold in equal parts by SIX Swiss Exchange and Deutsche
Börse AG. Eurex is one of the world wide largest exchange for futures and option trading.
But Eurex also offers platforms for bond trading and for repo (Eurex Repo). This
platform is open to all financial institutions. The Eurex Repo platform is a TriParty
platform with integrated trading and settlement functionalities. Legal documentation is
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different to traditional OTC-Repo TriParty programs, since the Eurex platform integrates
trading, settlement and legal documentation. Participants at Eurex Repo can choose
from a broad menu of repo transactions. First, Eurex Repo operates in Swiss Franc and
the Euro Repo Market. In the first market, the participants can trade directly in the
Swiss interbank market as well as in the daily SNB repo auctions. An advantage of the
Eurex Repo platform is that the securities which are received as collateral can be used
immediately for a new repo transaction. This allows the banks to raise cash if they need
to do so. Such a possibility does not exist in OTC-Repo transactions. The fraction of
GC repo is 80 percent at Eurex-Repo. One expects that this amount will still further
increase due to the increasing market standards for baskets which are not there for single
securities: There are for example safety standards and term structures in GC business.
The SNB-eligible baskets are a concrete example. The Eurex market consists of four
links for the participants in CHF repos:
• Trading is via the Eurex Repo platform.
• Clearing, Settlement and Collateral Management takes place at SIX SIS.
• Cash Clearing is done via SIX Interbank Clearing.
• There is a link to SNB which publishes the SNB-eligible securities.
As an example, consider a bond trader (Seller) which wishes to borrow CHF 20 Mio. to
finance for one week an investment of CHF 18 Mio. in Eidgenossen (Swiss Government
Bonds) with 3 percent coupon. A repo buyer offers a repo rate of 2 percent. The seller
accepts the rate. He delivers CHF 18 Mio. nominal against CHF 20 Mio. cash. At the
same day he pays the buyer CHF 20 Mio. in exchange of the CHF 18 Mio. bonds. After
one week the buyer gives back the bond to the seller. The seller pays back the loan of
CHF 25 plus accrued interest:
20′000′000× 0.02× 7
360
= 7′777.8 CHF .
The repo market played an important role in the financial crisis 2008. To understand this
we discuss the difference between traditional and collateralized banking. The following
discussion is based on Gorton und Metrick (2011). Traditional banking is characterized
by a short chain of intermediation: Banks are in simplified way in between mortgage
borrowers and depositors. Furthermore, depositors face a depositor protection. Such a
protection serves as a buffer against bank runs. But this protection is limited in size
for depositors and it also does not apply to non-retail clients. For them a possibility
of protection for an investor is to obtain collateral from the bank using a repo. Hence,
the repo rate corresponds to the interest rate in secured banking. The bank sells the
collateral for a lower value - haircut - than its market value. If the collateral market
value is CHF 1, the bank sells it for CHF 0.9 and buys it back for 0.95. This gives a
repo rate of 5/95 × 100 = 5.2 percent and a haircut of 10 percent. Hence haircuts play
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the role of reserves in traditional banking.
The dependence between secured banking and the financial crisis follows from the
value chain in loan banking. In traditional banking, it is the bank itself which decides
about to whom a loan is given. In secured banking this function is outsourced. In the US
creditors handed the loans or mortgages to the end users and the creditors immediately
sold the mortgages to banks. The banks pooled the mortgages and defined new products
for investor. This defines structured finance or securitization. Whereas in traditional
banking the bank itself keeps the counter party risk of the borrower in secured banking
this credit risk is passed from the direct creditor to the bank and from there via the
newly structured product to the investors - which in the last crisis to a large extend also
were banks. During the financial crisis there was no bank run on deposits in the US
but a bank run on repo happened. To show this the authors consider the behavior of
haircuts for securities in repo business: The construct a repo index. This index went up
from low one digit percentage values before the crisis to almost 50 percent during the
crisis. Some securities which would no longer to be considered as a collateral in effect
faced a haircut of 100 percent. Such an increase of the collateral buffer in a hugh market
as the repo market is gives basically two alternatives to the banks. Either they issue new
securities and create new collateral or they sell the collateral which they can use only with
high haircuts. This then leads to a price pressure on collateral, to even higher haircuts,
etc. At some point liquidity and solvency of the market participants is triggered. But
this destroys trust in the interbanking market to lend money - at some point there is a
stand still or equivalently a break down if there is not a liquidity provider which can act
differently than the banks trapped in the repo run channel: The central banks.
4.8.2 Bond and Stock Market
4.8.3 Swiss Bond and Stock Market
For equity we observe the volatility of market capitalization due to the events bust of
dot.com bubble, 9/11, financial crisis 2008 and the boom period before this crisis. SMI
comprises the most liquid titles of Swiss stocks. Adding smaller firms the SPI follows.
Market capitalization of the bonds shows an almost linear growth. The picture becomes
more detailed if one considers the number of products and issuers (Source: SIX-Group).
We have for the last decade:
• The number of listed Swiss stocks and issuers is almost constant (about 70 stocks,
250 issuers).
• The number of foreign listed stocks fell from 172 in 2000 to 52 in 2010. The number
of foreign issuers similarly dropped from 164 to 50 in the same period.
• For bonds, the number of domestic bonds almost halved (523 Bonds in 2010) and
also the number of issuers fell by 40 percent to 117 issuers in 2010. In the foreign
bond segment the number of bonds raised by 20 percent to a number of 943 in the
year 2010.
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Figure 4.14: Market capitalization of stocks and bonds at Swiss Stock Exchange SIX-
Group. ’Foreign’ Bonds are bonds issued by foreign companies in CHF Source: SIX-
Group.
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Table 4.10 shows the evolution of the number of trades and volume for different products
at SIX-Group.
2001 2003 2005 2007 2008 2009 2010
Total Trades 11’456 13’927 17’954 35’339 45’186 34’772 34’978
Stocks 9’475 12’136 16’086 32’076 42’048 32’115 32’228
ETF, Funds 58 97 155 263 369 567 833
Bonds 783 674 531 461 559 592 521
Structured Products 1’139 1’020 1’185 2’539 2’211 1’498 1’396
Total Volume 868 693 927 1’780 1’653 924 967
Dom. Stocks 732 595 823 1’644 1’518 797 823
For. Stocks 22 10 18 12 5 3 3
ETF, Funds 4 7 14 26 34 42 60
Dom. CHF Bonds 31 20 12 14 21 19 18
For. CHF Bonds 46 42 34 24 25 28 26
Structured Products 33 18 27 61 51 34 37
Table 4.10: Trades and Volume at SIX-Group. Trades are in thousand; volume in Billion
CHF. Source:SIX-Group.
The table shows the impressive growth of number of stock transactions which is
mostly driven by Swiss stocks trading. Comparing this with the volume it follows that
the average size of a trade significantly dropped. This observation, which is not only
faced by SIX Group, and increasing demand for service functions are responsible for the
pressure to lower the transaction costs. Finally, the table also shows the growth of ETF
and the stand still of retail structured products (RSP).
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Chapter 5
Retail Structured Products (RSP)
5.1 Definition and Structuring Idea
Retail Structured Products are in some sense an opposite investment vehicle to funds
since most of them do not rely on the discretionary power of an asset manager but the
final payoff is promised ex ante to the investor. This implies that banks have to generate
with the initial investment amount the final payoff in any market circumstances: Trading,
structuring, pricing and hedging are key disciplines for RSP.
Retail structured products offer investments into various asset classes, with many
different payoff types and a fast time to market. These products represent contractual
obligations from the issuer to the investor to pay out at maturity what is defined in the
formulae on the term sheets. Contrary to funds, the obligation is related to the issuer
non-defaulting, i.e. if the issuer defaults the (full) investment amount is lost (Lehman
Brothers). Therefore, if a client buys a product from bank X which is only the distributor
of the issuing bank Y it is the creditworthiness of Y which matters and not that one of
X. For retail structured products the investment amounts are not treated as segregated
capital. Retail structured products are much less regulated in some jurisdictions than
investment funds. But this situation is changing. RSP are just called structured prod-
ucts in German speaking regions whereas structured products means in the anglo-saxon
world products of structured finance, i.e. products which are derived from pooling assets
in a special purpose vehicle and restructuring the pooled risks. This type of products is
discussed in the Section Financial Crisis.
How are RSPs defined? The definition varies for different jurisdictions, sometimes a
proper definition is missing but only a description exists. In the UK for example they
differentiate between capital-at-risk and non-capital-at-risk products. In the former one
conditional on the issuer non-defaulting the investor gets payed back a fixed amount of
his initial investment at maturity as a minimum amount. A capital-at-risk product is
defined as ... a product, other than a derivative, which provides an agreed level of income
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or growth over a specified investment period and displays the following characteristics:
• (a) the customer is exposed to a range of outcomes in respect of the return of initial
capital invested;
• (b) the return of initial capital invested at the end of the investment period is linked
by a pre-set formula to the performance of an index, a combination of indices, a
’basket’ of selected stocks (typically from an index or indices), or other factor or
combination of factors;
• (c) if the performance in (b) is within specified limits, repayment of initial capital
invested occurs but if not, the customer could lose some or all of the initial capital
invested.’ Source: FSA Handbook.
Point (c) defines that capital repayment is contingent on realization of events. A
typical event are breaches of barriers by the underlying value.
Using this definition we consider risk structuring for an investor with the following
preferences and views: He wishes a financial contract such that two investment motiva-
tions are jointly satisfied: Capital protection at maturity of the contract and participation
in the performance of an underlying asset. More precisely, the investor’s objectives are:
• Redemption of the investment capital at a minimum guaranteed percentage of the
invested capital at maturity of the investment contract.
• Participation in the performance of an underlying asset.
Several issues arise in this context: First, how important are the two investment mo-
tivations for investors? Second, what means "capital guarantee" exactly? Third, how
can the protection and participation seller make sure that she can fulfill the contractual
obligations (hedging)? What is the fair price of such a contract (pricing)? How is "Par-
ticipation" defined?
The main economic idea to structure a Capital-Guaranteed Product (CP) or a Struc-
tured Note is to exploit that the present value of say CHF 100 in 5 years is a lower
amount today - the difference is used for participation. Then the seller of the guarantee,
i.e. the issuer of the structured product, acts as follows:
• Suppose that in a given currency the annual interest rates are 2% where we do not
specify what this rate is at, the moment. The PV of the guaranteed CHF 100 in 5
is
90 = (1− 5× 0.02)× 100 CHF
using linear compounding. If the issuer invests today CHF 90 in a zero-bond, then
the capital guarantee promise in 5 years can be satisfied - if the issuer does not
defaults.
• The amount of 10% is used to define participation for the investor.
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Therefore, the investment product Vt consists of at least two products: A zero bond
with price p(t, T ) at time t and maturity T and a participation product whose price
depends on the price of the underlying asset St. In the simplest variant, the value of the
product VT at maturity T (the payoff profile or redemption amount) is determined as
the product of the face value and the percentage change in the underlying asset’s price
during the term of the product:
VT = N ×
(
1 + max(0, b
ST − S0
S0
)
)
with N the face value and b the participation rate, see Figure 5.5 for the payoff diagram.
Rewriting, we get
VT = N +
bN
S0
max(0, ST − S0) . (5.1)
We note:
A ’+’- sign in a payoff value formula in front of an financial instrument represents a long
position and a ’-’-sign a short position. The payoff formula (5.1) is written from a buyer’s
perspective.
Equation (5.1) shows that the payoff of the CP at maturity equals an investment in a
zero bond and a long position in a European call option C(S,K, T ) with strike K = S0.
The number of options is equal to the face value divided by the initial price. Suppose
that the call option is tradeable and liquid. Then, (5.1) is a replication of the payoff at
maturity fixed in the contract. No arbitrage implies for the fair value of the contract V0
V0 = p(0, T ) +
bN
S0
C(0, S,K) (5.2)
with p(0, T ) the zero bond and C(S,K, 0) the arbitrage free option price
C(0, S,K) = EQ[D(0, T ) max(ST − S0, 0)]
under a risk neutral measure Q.
Consider an investor with different preferences:
• He beliefs that UBS stock is likely to raise over the next year.
• He believes that the stock will not raise strongly. He also prefers a partial capital
protection if UBS stocks falls. He is in turn willing to give up the upside potential
of the stock.
• He prefers a coupon which is larger than the UBS stock dividend.
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Figure 5.1: Structuring of the investor’s preferences.
A structured product is able to match these investor preferences, see Figure 5.1.
The figure shows the payoff at maturity of a Barrier Reverse Convertible (BRC).
The investor gets independent of UBS stock price movements a coupon, say 10 per-
cent. The investment amount is fully payed back unless the underlying value dropped
below a barrier level during the life time of the product: The repayed capital amount
is contingent on an event of a barrier hit. If the underlying value UBS once hits the
barrier, the capital protection is knocked out and the payback at maturity is the UBS
stock value at this date plus the 10 percent coupon. A BRC delivers a higher coupon
than the stock dividend plus a contingent capital protection. The risk is the same as
buying the UBS stock if risk is considered to be an adverse event which leads to a breach
of the barrier. Why does anybody still buys stocks and not BRC? The investor gives up
the stocks upside: The coupon is the maximum return.
How is it possible to pay a coupon which is larger than the stock’s dividend and have
also a partial capital protection? The answer is structuring. First, the investor gives
up the upside potential and second, he sells an option. This makes a higher coupon value
than the expected dividends possible. To understand this in more details, consider the
replication of the BRC in Figure 5.1. The BRC payoff at maturity is replicated with two
products:
• a long zero coupon bond position and
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• a short down & in put (DIP). I.e. the investor sells a DIP - a barrier option on
UBS. This money is used to generate the coupon value.
A barrier put option is characterized by a strike K and a barrier B. In our case
B < K - this leads to the expression ’down’, see Figure 5.2. The payoff is: If UBS is
for the whole time to maturity not breaching B, the option is worthless. Contrary if at
any date the barrier is at least hit once the put option becomes active - the option is
’in’. In the BRC the investor is short the DIP - he sells it. If the barrier is hit a loss follows.
Time 
Stock Price 
Strike 
Barrier 
In-Zone 
Trigger Event 
Figure 5.2: Down& In Put (DIP). The path which never hits the barrier never activates des
DIP, i.e. the barrier option is worthless. The path which hits the barrier at least once gives to
the barrier option a positive value.
Contrary to the problem to classify innovations in general, for RSP successful classifi-
cation schemes exist. One of them is the Swiss Derivative Map from the Swiss Derivative
Association. With minor adaption this map is also used in the European Structured
Product Association. The Swiss map defines main categories:
• Capital protection.
• Yield Enhancement. BRC are a prominent product in this class.
• Participation, i.e. product which globally have linear payoff profile. ’Globally’
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means that for some bounded region in the underlying value the payoff can be
non-linear.
• Leverage Products. This is the class of warrants and mini futures.
• Reference Entity Products. In addition to the credit risk of the issuer, redemption
is subject to the solvency (non-occurrence of a credit event) of the reference entity.
In each category there a sub categories, see Figure 5.3. The products are then represented
in a single poster where for each product the payoff is graphically shown, the investment
motivation and the risk and return characteristics are described.
Figure 5.3: An excerpt of the Swiss Derivative Map for capital protection products. Source:
Swiss Structured Product Association, 2012.
5.2 Structuring Capital Protection RSP
We reconsider the first example, i.e. equation (5.1) which shows that the payoff of the
CP at maturity equals an investment in a zero bond and a long position in a European
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call option C(S,K, T ) with strike K = S0. The number of options is equal to the face
value divided by the initial price. Suppose that the call option is tradeable and liquid.
Then, (5.1) is a replication of the payoff at maturity fixed in the contract. No arbitrage
implies for the fair value of the contract V0
V0 = p(0, T ) +
bN
S0
C(0, S,K) (5.3)
with p(0, T ) the zero bond and C(S,K, 0) the arbitrage free option price. Not all struc-
tured products can be decomposed into a sum of basic products - stocks, forwards, bonds
and vanilla options. If such a decomposition is not possible, different taxation rules can
apply. In Switzerland such non-decomposable products are classified as not-transparent
and taxed different than transparent products.
Figure 5.4 shows the evolution of a 5 year CP in two extreme scenarios: Once the
underlying value is simulated with a strong negative drift and in the other scenario the
drift is strongly positive. The negative scenario shows that value of capital protection
compared to a long position in the underlying. In the positive scenario the price of capital
protection follows: Participation is capped to 120 percent and the investor gives up any
further upside.
There are many variation of the so far discussed CP product. Figure 5.5 shows the
case with a variable capital protection level a and participation rate b. The CP payoff
reads:
VT = aN +
bN
S0
max(0, ST − S0) . (5.4)
Example
Consider a 5y, a = 100%-level CP product with underlying value the Swiss Market Index
(SMI) of Swiss Blue Chips. The product is issued October, 28 2005. The closing value
of SMI at issuance date is 6’874 points which is also the strike value of the call option in
the replication. The face value is CHF 5’000. Using Black and Scholes with a volatility
of 18%, risk free rate of 3 percent leads to a participation of b = 58%. To see this, we
note that the Black and Scholes Price of the option is
C(0) = S0Φ(d1)−Ke−RTΦ(d2)
with
R = 1.03 , d1 =
ln(S0/K) +RT
σ
√
T
+
σ
√
T
2
, d2 = d1 − σ
√
T =
ln(S0/K) +RT
σ
√
T
− σ
√
T
2
.
In our example d1 = 0.60981, d2 = 0.20732 and Φ(d1) = 0.72901,Φ(d2) = 0.58212. This
implies for the option the price C0 = 1′640. Solving
5′000 =
5′000
(1 + 0.03)5
+
b× 5′000
6874
1′640
implies the participation rate. Replication from the buyer’s view gives the following
redemption at maturity:
VT = 1× 5′000 + 0.58× 5
′000
6′874
max(0, ST − 6′874) . (5.5)
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Underlying 
CP 
Figure 5.4: Capped CP with capital protection 100 percent, participation 100 percent
and cap level 120 percent. The figure shows that the CP may well value below the
capital protection level before maturity. Left Panel: Drift of the underlying value of −5
percent p.a. Right Panel: Drift of the underlying value of +5 percent p.a.Source: Zurich
Cantonal Bank. Dynamic Derivatives Education Tool.
The opposite position of the market makers is as follows. Suppose that a total amount
of CHF 100′000 is invested in the product, i.e. the market maker is short a notional
amount of 100′000 zero bonds with 5y maturity. The difference between the notional
amount and the present value of the bonds is used to sell call options, i.e. the market
maker is short
8.4367 =
0.58× 5′000
6′874
100′000
5′000
5y calls on the SMI. Conditional on the terminal SMI-value, different return calculations
follow. If SMI is up by 10% at maturity, i.e. ST = 1.1 × 6′874 = 7′562, redemption
equals
VT = 1× 5′000 + 0.58× 5
′000
6′874
max(0, 7′562− 6′874)
= 5′000 +
0.58× 5′000
6′874
(7′562− 6′874) = 5′290 .
This is equivalent to a 5.80% five-year return of the invested amount. Contrary, assume
that SMI is down by 10%. Then the call is out-of-the-money, i.e. worthless. Redemption
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Figure 5.5: Payoffs for CP products. Left panel: CP product with 100% capital guarantee
and 100% participation. Right panel: CP product with a% capital guarantee and b%
participation rate.
then equals the capital protected amount of 5′000. Many people speak about a opportu-
nity loss in this scenario since the investor could have invested the CHF 5′000 in bond
with the same credit risk as the CP product issuer with a corresponding interest rate
return. This is an odd argument since it compares the performance of two products for
two different types of investors: An investor which seeks both capital protection and
participation in a stock market compared to an investor which prefers to participate in
an interest rate product. Such a comparison makes little sense.
5.2.1 Variations of the Payoff
If interest rates are low, only a few is left to buy the call option and to participate. A low
participation rate follows. This rate can be increased if the capital protection level a is
lowered. In an environment with low interest rates the above structures are hard to sell
since participation is too low and/or people require full capital protection. A possible
solution in this case is to give up the high return region, i.e. to cap the payoff as shown
in Figure 5.6.
The investors give up the gain surface B in order to finance the loss protection zone
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Figure 5.6: Capped payoff for CP product.
A. We get the desired payoff if the investor is long a call with strike K1 and short a call
with a higher strike K2, see Figure 5.6. Therefore, the investor is long a zero bond, long
a call with strike K1 and short a call with strike K2 where K1 < K2. This long-short
strategy is a call-spread strategy.
Example
Pricing of a capped CP using Black and Scholes for different parameters, see Table
5.1. The table shows in particular how an increasing volatility makes the options more
expansive.
Price of σ = 20%, r = 2% σ = 30%, r = 2% σ = 20%, r = 3%
Zero bond 81.52% 81.52% 77.36%
All coupons 9.42% 9.42% 9.15%
Long Call option 22.02% 30.04% 24.33%
Short Call option -12.96% -20.97% -11.11%
CP 100% 100% 100%
Table 5.1: Price of a capped CP with capital protection 90 percent, 2 percent annual
coupon payments, 5 years maturity and 100 percent participation.
Consider an investor which not only wishes full capital protection, a = 1, but also
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requires a minimum guaranteed payoff or return. This minimum return f is called the
floor or floor rate. The payoff of the CP reads
VT = N
(
1 + max
(
f, b
IT − I0
I0
))
=: N +OT (5.6)
for an index I as underlying value. OT is the option payoff which is equivalent to
OT = N
(
f + max
(
0, b
IT − I0
I0
− f
))
(5.7)
where we used max(a, b) = a+ max(0, b− a). Using max(0, ab+ c) = amax(0, b+ c/a)
if a > 0, we get
OT = N
(
f +
bN
I0
max
(
0, IT − I0(1 + f
b
)
))
. (5.8)
The payment is equal to a fixed amount plus an index-linked amount. The latter one is
the same as the payoff of b/I0 vanilla calls with strike I0(1+ fb ). This strike is higher than
in the case with floor zero. The floor raises the option price or lowers the participation
rate if the capital protection level is kept fixed. Using the put-call parity, the payoff is
equivalent to
VT =
bN
I0
(IT − I0) + bN
I0
max
(
0, I0(1 +
f
b
)− IT )
)
. (5.9)
The issuer can choose the valuation formula which is more suitable, i.e. the replication
with the more liquid options for example.
So far the issue price of a structured products was set equal to the sum of fair prices of
the replication portfolio. But there are cost components. In practice, there is a margin.
The investor pays 100 and the replication portfolio or product has a value of say 98. The
amount of the margin, 2 units in the example above, depends on several aspects. First,
for mass products margins are generally lower than for a tailor-made products or for a
product with a complex payoff. In the latter case trading will ask for buffer against hedge
risks. Also the more exotic the underlying value is the higher is the margin. Besides a net
profit, the margin has to cover the production costs (trading, sales, quants, mid-office,
back-office, risk function, compliance), has to cover the capital-at-risk costs (the costs
for the risk capital needed to run the business) and marketing costs. We consider this in
the Section Dark Side of Innovation in more details.
5.2.2 Increasing Participation
There are several ways to increase the participation rate in CPs. We follow in some parts
closely Kat (2008).
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5.2.2.1 Higher Base and Longer Maturity
We allow for a different base rate g which is not necessarily equal to one. The option
part of the payoff
VT = N
(
1 + max
(
f, b
IT − gI0
I0
))
(5.10)
is equivalent to
OT = N
(
f +
bN
I0
max
(
0, IT − I0(g + f
b
)
))
. (5.11)
This shows that the call has a higher strike for g > 1 than for g = 1. The call becomes
cheaper with an increasing base rate g. To obtain the same value VT as for the case
g = 1, one has to increase the participation rate b. If an investor wishes to participate
at a higher degree he has to accept a higher base rate: The index level has to raise to a
higher level before participation starts.
If an investor chooses a longer maturity two effects follow. First, there is more money
left to invest into the option since the present value of bond for capital protection de-
creases. Second, the options are more costly if maturity increases if one assumes a flat
volatility term structure. The longer maturity is, the further away can the underlying
value deviate from strike value. This increases the expected option payoff both for calls
and puts since the investor. Furthermore, the martingale property of the discounted un-
derlying value sets its drift equal to the risk free rate: The longer maturity is the more is
a call in the money. This results in a strong growth of call option premium with increas-
ing maturity. For put options the option premium drops quickly close to zero. But the
term structure of volatility is not flat. If long-dated volatility is higher than short dated
volatility then option prices will increase faster. If the volatility term structure is steep
enough, the net effect on the bond and option part may favor shorter maturities. This
holds for uncapped participation. If participation is capped, the opposite holds since the
bank is writing options.
Summarizing, an increase of maturity date has ambiguous effects on the participation
rate. While the time value of the capital protection leads to an increase for increasing
maturities, the value of the options depends on the volatility structure and its evolution
over time.
5.2.2.2 General Piecewise Payoff
Once an investment idea is setup, it becomes important in to fine tune the payoff. A
linear payoff is for example replaced by a piecewise linear one such that in different
payoff regions different participation rates follow. This leads to the following exercise:
Construct a piecewise linear payoff with kinks 0 < K1 < K2 < K3 and participation
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Figure 5.7: Constructing a piecewise linear payoff.
rates b1, b2, b3 and b3 where the rate applies in the intervals b1 in [0,K1], b2 in (K1,K2],
b3 in (K2,K3] and b4 in (K3,∞), see Figure 5.7.
The piecewise linear payoff at maturity then reads
VT = b1 min(IT ,K1) + b2 min(max(0, IT −K1),K2) (5.12)
+ b3 min(max(0, IT −K2),K3) + b4 max(0, IT −K3) .
To make this plausible, for IT < K1 we get b1IT . For K1 < IT < K2 follows
b1K1 + b2(IT −K1) .
For K2 < IT < K3
b1K1 + b2K2 + b3(IT −K2) .
and finally K3 < IT
b1K1 + b2K2 + b3K3 + b4(IT −K3) .
This is a plausibility check for the formula (5.12). This formula is readily generalized to
the case of n kinks.
As an application, consider the piecewise segmentation of the following capped CP:
VT = N(1 + min(c,max(f, b
IT − I0
I0
)) = N +OT
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with c > 0 the cap value. The option payoff can be rewritten as
OT = fN + b
N
I0
(max(0, IT − I0(1 + f/b))−max(0, IT − I0(1 + c/b))) .
This is a call spread. Again, an increase in the floor rate f lowers participation and an
increasing cap rate c makes the option cheaper - since it is short position participation
then also drops. This shows the rationale for capped capital protection: Selling an option
the investor restricts the upside potential which in turn leaves more money for partici-
pation.
5.2.3 Barrier Options
One can increase the participation rate by replacing the call option by a up& out call
barrier option: If the underlying instrument never reaches a barrier value, which is above
strike, the investor participates. If the barrier is at least once touched, participation
becomes worth-less and the capital protected amount is repaid or a rebate value follows.
Such an option is an up-and-out call option which is cheaper than a vanilla call. Com-
bining such options with capital protection leads to Shark Notes SRP, see Figure 5.8 for
a replication. A Shark Note is replicated with long positions in a zero bond, an up& out
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Figure 5.8: Replication of a Shark Note.
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ATM call barrier option and an OTM digital barrier call. This is not a vanilla replica-
tion. A specification of such a contract is given in Table 5.2. Table 5.3 summarizes some
Maturity 1 year
Issue Price 100 percent
Underlying DAX
Reference Value Underlying 6’100 points
Strike 100 percent
Knock-out-Level 140 percent
Participation Rate 100 percent
Rebate 5 percent
Capital Guarantee 100 percent
Table 5.2: Specification of a Shark Note contract.
sensitivities of the Shark Note.
Factor Zero Up-and-out Call Digital Shark Note
Underlying up - ambiguous up mostly up
Strike up - down - down
Knock-out level up - up down mostly up
Time to maturity increasing down ambiguous ambiguous ambiguous
Implied volatility up - ambiguous up ambiguous
Table 5.3: Sensitivities of a Shark Note contract. In the first column are the risk factors.
The remaining columns indicate the impact if a risk factor is shocked in the indicated
direction.
We consider barrier options in more details. Barrier options are the oldest as well
as the most successful type of all exotic options. They were traded in the US OTC mar-
ket before the Black and Scholes pricing method was known since 1967. Barrier options
are exotic options since their payoff is path-dependent, i.e. the payoff at a given date
depend on whether or not the underlying asset has reached some barrier price during the
life of the option. Barrier options can have three possible features. First, the position
of the barrier relative to the strike (up if B > K or down else). Second, whether the
option becomes worthless once the barrier is touched (out) or whether the option has a
value (in). Third, whether the option is OTM once a barrier is reached (regular) or ITM
(reverse). The path dependency gives European barrier options a flavor of an American
option. Since the critical exercise boundary - the barrier - is known in advance, they
are simpler to price than pure American options. Rubinstein and Reiner (1991) derived
a closed-form analytical solution following the dynamic hedging approach of Black and
Scholes. This pricing formula can in principle be used to hedge barrier options continu-
ously. But the dynamic Delta-hedging in a Black-Scholes framework leads to difficulties.
The Delta of the barrier options is very sensitive to changes in the price of the underlying
close to the barrier. Hence, traders need to rebalance the hedge very often. This leads
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to large transaction costs and is a challenge for the operations of large barrier option
portfolios. Figure 5.9 compares the a down-and-in put barrier (DIP) and a vanilla option
and shows the Delta and Vega of the barrier option. The plot shows that near the barrier
Figure 5.9: DIP and vanilla put. Source: N. Dolgova, MAS Finance Univ. of Zurich and
ETH Zurich, 2008
the Delta becomes very sensitive - small changes in the underlying lead to large changes
in the Delta. If furthermore the option is close to maturity the Delta in the region where
the underlying is close to the barrier becomes a discontinuous function. This makes
continuous time hedging difficult. Alternative hedging approaches were developed. We
consider them in the Barrier Option Section.
A barrier option is cheaper than the vanilla counterpart since a barrier options acti-
vates the payoff contingent on an event. This is true in general and is a major rationale
to buy barrier options.
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We consider some facts about barrier options. Combining a knock-in barrier option
and a knock-out barrier option with the same characteristics produces an European plain
vanilla option. This is because as soon as the barrier is reached, the knock-out options
disappears, but the knock-in option immediately appears. A similar arguments holds if
the barrier is not reached.
It is in general more complicated to hedge barrier options than their corresponding
vanilla options and hedging results are normally less intuitive than for vanilla options.
An exception are barrier options with strike equal to the barrier, see below. Changes
in implied volatility affect plain vanilla options in a uniform manner: an increasing
volatility increases the option price. With barrier options, increasing volatility can affect
the premium in two opposing ways. Increasing volatility increases the probability
• that the option will be in-the-money and therefore increases its value;
• that the barrier will be reached, thus decreasing the value of a knock-out option
and increasing the value of a knock-in option.
Therefore, an increase in implied volatility has a double effect on a knock-in option and
two opposing effects on a knocked-out option.
There are many variations of barrier options:1
• Daily versus continuous monitoring of the barrier. A knock-out option where
the barrier is monitored only daily will be more expensive than the equivalent
continuously monitored barrier, since an observation with the barrier being hit is
less likely to occur. Typically the difference in price will be around 5 percent of
the option premium.
• Multiple barriers: There can be more than one barrier on any option, and one
barrier can be contingent on another barrier being breached (or not). A ’double-
out’ option with barriers above and below spot will be knocked out if either of the
barriers is hit. An ATM call knocking out at 110 percent and 95 percent will be
cheaper than a ATM call knocking-out at 110 percent.
• Early exercise: Barrier options are typically traded as European with no early
exercise possible. An early exercise feature will make knock-out options more ex-
pensive.
• Resetting barriers: This is a barrier option which turns into another barrier
option with a different barrier level when the initial barrier is hit. It can be con-
structed from sequences of regular barriers with rebates.
• Forward starting and early-ending barrier options: The barrier may only
exist for part of the lifetime of the options.
1The list is an abbreviated form of JPMorgan, European Equity Derivatives Stratgey, 2007.
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• Soft barriers: A soft barrier allows a contract to be gradually knocked in or out.
Such a contract specifies an upper or lower barrier level and knocks the option in or
out proportional to the point reached in the range. For example an up-and-out call
with strike 100 and soft barrier 110-120 will have half its intrinsic value knocked
out if the maximum level reached over the lifetime is 115 and will be completely
knocked out if the underlying ever reaches 120.
• Rebates could be paid as a form of compensation, if a knock-out barrier is reached.
This feature increases the premium of the barrier option.
• Ratchet or Cliquet Options. Suppose an investor buys an ATM index put to
protect a portfolio. If the index rallies the investor wants to roll up the protection
by selling the original put and buying a new ATM put. However, at this time
the new ATM put will naturally be much more expensive than the existing, now
OTM put. The investor could pre-position himself for this situation by trading
in barrier options. For example suppose the investor bought an ATM up-and-out
put with knockout at 105 and a 105-strike put knocking in at 105. This structure
will then automatically ‘ratchet’ the protection up to an ATM put as soon as the
underlying reaches 105. This sequence can be further extended to lock in protection
at regular intervals. Such structures provide downside protection with a significant
upside potential. Since this options lead to resetting the strikes forward starting
options matter. A forward starting call is defined in a two period model
CFwS(T ) = max(
I2
I1
−K, 0) (5.13)
as opposed to the ordinary call
C(T ) = max(
I2
I0
−K, 0) .
If we take out I1 of the maximum it follows that in the forward start case the
strike becomes time dependent whereas in the ordinary call case the strike is fixed
and constant at time 0. The investor therefore pays at 0 for an option with a
strike known only at time 1. Hence, forward start options are used for investors
which want exposure to an underlying asset starting at a future date but they
prefer to pay or receive an amount today at 0. To price such options one needs to
use the volatility at a future date. This makes the use of the Black and Scholes
model cumbersome since it provides no model of how the present volatility structure
evolves over time. Local volatility models, which are commonly used for barrier
options, also turn out to be not adequate but instead a SABR model is used Given
the forward start calls and puts the cliquet options are simply floored and capped
variations of these options. The mechanism can be quite complicated as we have
seen in the pension fund example. Cliquet are typically defined on indices and the
usual variations such as the worst-off structure, reverse cliquet applies. Cliquet
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option payoff’s are of the form
Vcliquet(T ) = min
Cglob,max
Fglob, M∑
j=1
min
(
Cj ,max
(
b
(
Ij
Ij−1
−Kj
)
, Fj
))
(5.14)
with Fglob the global floor, Cglob the global cap, Cj and Fj the local cap and floor
respectively and M the number of legs. If we consider
Vcliquet(T ) = min
∞,max
0, 2∑
j=1
min
(
5%,max
(
b
(
Ij
Ij−1
− 100
)
, 0
))
the price of the options at time zero in a 2y product with 100 percent participation
is given by:
Vcliquet(0) = e
−rTEQ
(
Vcliquet(T )
)
= e−rTEQ
(
min
(
5%,max
(
I1
I0
− 100, 0
)))
+ e−rTEQ
(
min
(
5%,max
(
I2
I1
− 100, 0
)))
= e−rTEQ
(
max
(
I1
I0
− 100, 0
)
−max
(
I1
I0
− 105, 0
))
+ e−rTEQ
(
max
(
I2
I1
− 100, 0
)
−max
(
I2
I1
− 105, 0
))
,
i.e. the cliquet option can be decomposed into two forward starting call spreads
with deferred settlement.
• Ladders. Closely related to the ratchet structure is a ladder. A ladder option
is a call or put option on a index, which periodically resets when the underlying
trades trough specified trigger levels called “rungs”, at the same time, knocking in
the profit between the old and new strike. At maturity, it pays the maximum of the
index and the underlying itself minus the strike floored to zero for the call version.
The name comes from the fact that the trigger strikes play the same role as rungs on
a ladder. The ladder option can be structured to have its strikes reset in either one
or both directions, allowing a great flexibility in the payoff. For example, suppose
we require a structure which locks in profits each time the underlying increases 10
points – starting from 100. We can buy a sequence of knock-out calls with strike
and barrier 10 points apart, each paying a rebate of 10, ending with a vanilla call.
E.g. an ATM call with KO (knock-out) at 110 with rebate of 10, a 110-call with
KO at 120, with a rebate of 10 and a vanilla 120 call. Once the underlying reaches
110, the first call knocks out with rebate of 10 – locking in the profit up to this
point, and the 110-call is now in the money, continuing the upside exposure.
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• In the limit with the rungs arbitrarily close together the ladder structure becomes
a lookback call option – paying the maximum value reached by the underlying
over the lifetime of the option. A lookback call typically costs twice the price of
the corresponding vanilla call – and places an upper bound on the cost of a ladder.
Typically with rungs around 10% apart a ladder would cost around 1.5 times the
equivalent European.
• Range notes. A range note is simple structure paying a coupon each day whilst
an underlying remains in a range and ceasing when it moves outside. It is just a
one-touch double American digital option. A similar structure is a range-accrual
which pays a fixed amount for each day an underlying remains in the range, but
pays zero outside the range. The difference is that the range-accrual will continue
paying when the underlying re-enters the range. Such a structure is constructed as
a strip of double European digitals, one maturing each day.
We consider the hedging of simple down-and-out calls - i.e. B = K - using the underlying.
Without loss of generality B < S0. This option has no optionality or time-value. To see
this, suppose we sold the knock-out call and that we wish to hedge. We simply charge
the intrinsic value as a premium S0−K and hedge by buying one unit of the underlying.
Then:
• The barrier is never hit. In this case the call ends in-the-money, costing us ST −K.
We make ST − S0 from holding the underlying and retain the S0 − K premium
charged. Total profit and loss is zero, i.e.
−ST +K + ST − S0 + S0 −K = 0 .
• If the barrier is hit we liquidate the position in the underlying. We realize a loss of
S0 − B. Since B = K, this equals the premium we charged for the knock-out and
total profit and loss is zero.
In theory the hedge is perfect. This option hedge is simpler than for the corresponding
vanilla option since the barrier/strike can only be crossed once. This allows us to com-
pletely liquidate our position at the barrier without worrying about having to buy it back
if it re-crosses – and hence avoiding further hedging. We have assumed that as soon as
the underlying crosses the barrier we can sell our position. But in reality if the underlying
gaps through the barrier we will make a loss. To compensate for this we should increase
the premium charged by this expected slippage multiplied by the probability of hitting
the barrier. This defines gap risk.
5.2.4 Changing the Reference Index: Dividend Yields and Correlation
An index can be changed for several reasons: Higher dividend yields, introducing corre-
lation to raise participation or changing to foreign indices. Dividends lower the upward
trend of stocks since the stock price drops at the ex-dividend dates. Therefore higher
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dividend yields make calls cheaper and puts more expansive. To raise the participation
rate one switches to indices or stocks which pay higher dividend yields.
We derive the price of a dividend paying call. Suppose that the stock pays dividends
at continuous rate d. This is similar to the interest rate effect, i.e. 1 CHF grows with
er(T−t) under continuous compounding and 1 share grows with ed(T−t). Therefore, the
fair price of a call is not based on 1 share but on e−d(T−t)S-shares - else the Black and
Scholes formula remains the same. Thus the change
S → e−dτS
in the Black and Scholes formula provides us with the correct option price for a dividend
paying stock. If dividend are paid the underlying value jumps. But since dividends goes
to the holder of the stock not to the holder of an option on the stock the value of the
option is continuous over the dividend paying date. The option value shortly before and
after dividend payments is the same. If t− and t+ are the two dates close to the dividend
date this means
C(S, t−) = C(S −D, t+)
for a dividend value D. Although the value of an option is invariant, the Delta changes
since the a dividend payment defines a new time value curve for a call option, see Figure
5.10.
Using baskets instead of single stock underlyings one introduces correlation as a new
parameter and one alters the volatility. The volatility of an index is in general lower than
the volatility of the constituents. This is due to the imperfect correlation of the basket
constituents. But lower volatility means cheaper call options which leads to a higher
participation rate. To raise participation one searches for low correlated underlyings or
even negatively correlated ones. Although a significant increase in the participation rate
is possible, in practice the effects are small. This has two reasons. First, the search for
uncorrelated constituents makes the prices goes up. That is derivative firms raises the
prices for baskets with a low correlation. Second, correlation risk is not straightforward
to deal with. This means that only highly professional derivative firms offer options on
baskets and in particular on less liquid ones. But his makes the supply side stronger
which leads to higher pricings.
5.2.5 Changing the Reference Index: Foreign Reference Index
No arbitrage implies that the drift of the risky asset is equal to the risk free rate. Ex-
changes rates have a trend upwards or downwards at a rate which is equal to the interest
rate differential. If we replace the domestic index by a foreign index, which is denomi-
nated in a currency with a lower interest rate than the domestic one, we can raise the
participation rate. A possible design is the payoff
VT = N
(
1 +
ET,D-F
E0,D-F
max(f, b
IT − I0
I0
)
)
.
374 CHAPTER 5. RETAIL STRUCTURED PRODUCTS (RSP)
Jump Stock Value 
Unchanged Call Value 
Option Payoff 
Figure 5.10: Impact of dividends on option prices.
The index I is measured in the foreign currency, the floor f floors a foreign currency
amount, Et,D-F is the spot exchange rate in units of DOM (domestic currency) per unit
of FOR (foreign currency) and ET,D-FE0,D-F converts the foreign amount at maturity into a
domestic one. Investors are in this case exposed to exchange rate risk due to he conversion
factor. To check the dimensions let I be in EUR and the exchange EURCHF:
VT ' EUR
(
1 +
EURCHF
EUR/HF
max(%)
)
' EUR .
Separating the option part in the above payoff, the budget equation at time 0 implies
the participation rate:
PV (OT ) = e
−TrD fN + bNf/I0 × CF (0, I0(1 + f/b), T )
with CF (0, I0(1 + f/b), T ) a foreign currency call. We assume in the following discus-
sion that all parameters except those under discussion are the same in either currency.
If the foreign and domestic interest rate agree, the same participation rate follows. If
foreign rates are lower than domestic ones, an increasing participation is obtained. The
equation determining the participation rate is solved numerically. We know that already
small differences in the rates lead to substantial differences in participation rates since
the call is sensitive to the interest rate.
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Before we continue the discussion it is worth to introduce to some concepts of the
FX asset class.
Definition 5.2.1. The FX rate is the price of one currency in terms of another currency.
Two currencies make a pair. For example, if we take Euro and USD as an exchange rate,
the default quotation is EURUSD. EUR is the base currency and USD the numeraire
one. FX is the price of the base currency EUR in terms of USD. Equivalent is to call the
numeraire currency the domestic currency (DOM) and the other one the foreign currency
(FOR).
FX rates are expressed as five-digit numbers, say 1.2245 for CHFEUR. The fifth digit
(5) is called a pip, 100 pips make a figure. A spot contract is a bilateral contract to
exchange the base currency amounts against an amount of the numeraire currency equal
to the spot FX rate. An European plain vanilla FX option USD call CHF put is a
spot contract where the buyer of the contract has the right to enter at expiry into a spot
contract to sell (buy) the notional amount of USD (CHF) at the strike FX rate level K.
The notional amount N in the USD base currency is exchanged against NK units of the
numeraire currency. The buyer pays at contract initiation a premium.
Example
An investor wants to buy 1 Mio. EUR call CHF put struck at 1.3000 with the reference
rate CHFEUR 1.200. The notional amount in CHF is 1.2 Mio. The option premium can
be stated in different forms: Either as a unit or as a percentage and either related to the
base or numeraire currency. Therefore, four possible quotations follow. If the premium
is quoted in units of the numeraire currency, i.e. the fair price is 0.0075 EUR per one
CHF, the premium of the contract is 7’500 EUR. Using percentage of the numeraire
the premium is 0.0075/1.200 × 100 = 0.625% for one unit of CHF. Total premium is
0.625× 1′200′000/100 = 7′500 EUR.
Quotations of FX options are not in term of the premia but in terms of the implied
volatility. Strikes are quoted in terms of the option’s Delta. Hence the strike level is not
fixed before the deal is closed. More precisely, the two parties agree on the FX spot rate
and the implied volatility. Then the strike level is fixed at the level such that the Black
and Scholes formula yield the Delta value which the two parties are considering. The
trades often include the Delta hedge, i.e. a spot trade which offsets the Delta exposure
is closed for the transaction. For example a ’6m CHF call EUR put 20D 10’ means
that a trader asks for a CHF call EUR put with 6m expiry, 10 Mio. CHF notional and
a Delta CHF of 20 percent. In FX option markets different structures are liquid. A
common structure or strategy is the ATM straddle: The sum of a call and a put in
a base currency. This reflects that an investor’s believes in a strong move but is not
certain about the direction. ATM has a multiple meaning. ATM spot means that the
strike is set equal to the FX spot rate. ATM forward means that is set equal to the
forward rate. A zero Delta Straddle has by definition a Delta value zero at maturity:
the Delta of the call and put are equal with different sign. An other liquid strategy is
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the 25D risk reversal. Such a strategy consists of a long OTM call and a short OTM
put in the same base currency. Since traders quote the volatility, the 25 risk reversal is
equal to the difference of a 25 Delta call and a 25 Delta put option, i.e. a put where the
strike is chosen such that a Delta of -25 percent follows. If the risk reversal is positive
the volatility for the call exceeds the put volatility. Therefore the distribution of the
expected returns is skewed.
Example
We consider a call spread for FX CHFEUR underlying, i.e. how many CHF are needed
to buy EUR. The call spread entitles a company to buy an agreed amount of a EUR at
maturity for the given long strike, see Figure 5.11, i.e.
• Company buys CHF call EUR put with lower strike.
• Company sells CHF call EUR put with higher strike.
1.20 1.23 1.17 
Spot 
at 
Maturity 
Profit 
0 
0.06 
0.03 
1.20 1.23 1.17 
Spot 
at 
Maturity 
 
Final Exhange  
Rate 
1.15 
1.17 
0.03 
1.17 
Figure 5.11: Payoff and final exchange rate diagram for a call spread.
If the exchange rate is above the short strike at maturity, the holder’s profit is limited
to the spread as defined by the short and long strikes. Buying a call spread provides
protection against a rising EUR with full participation in a falling EUR. If the under-
lying value is at maturity below the lower strike value the option is not exercised and
the maximum loss, i.e. the loss of the option premium, follows. In this case EUR can
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be bought at a lower spot in the market. If the underlying value lies between the two
strikes, the option is exercised and EUR are bought at the lower strike. If the underlying
is below the higher strike, the EUR are bought at a rate K2 −K1 < ST , i.e. at a rate
below the final underlying rate. To be more specific, consider a Swiss company which
wants to hedge receivables from export transaction in USD which are due in 6 months.
The company expects the Swiss Franc to become stronger compared to the USD. The
company wishes to buy CHF at a lower spot rate compared to the USD if the CHF should
become weaker and the company also wishes to be protected against a stronger CHF.
A pure call position in CHFUSD is too expensive. Therefore, the company enters in a
call-spread position: She buys CHF call USD with a lower strike than the spot reference
which we assume to be 1.2000 USDCHF and she sells CHF call USD at a higher strike
than the reference spot. She could for example choose 1.1700 for the long call and 1.2300
for the short one.
Consider a CP product for a German investor. The zero bond is denominated in
Euro and the participation is on NIKKEI 225 Index in Japanese Yen. It is natural to
denominate the whole product in Euro. Different approaches are possible to achieve this.
Either the price of the underlying asset is translated at the current spot rate both at
issue date and maturity date or the change in price is measured in the original currency
but then paid out in the bond’s issue currency.
Case 1:
CEuro/Share(t) = max
(
EEuro/Y en(t)SY en/Share(t)−KEuro/Share, 0
)
(5.15)
with EEuro/Y en the YENEUR spot exchange rate. Hence, the foreign equity options are
struck in the domestic currency. The payoff of a call option for the German investor
in the domestic currency Euro reads ( ’F’ means ’Foreign’, ’D’ means ’Domestic’):
CD(t, T ) = ED-F(t)SF(t) Φ(d1)− e−rτKD Φ(d2) (5.16)
where:
d1 =
ln(ED-FSF/KD) + rτ +
1
2τσ
2
ED−FSF
σED-FSF
√
τ
d2 = d1 − σED-FSF
√
τ , τ = T − t
ED-F = Spot exchange rate in units of Dom per unit of FOR
σED-FSF =
√
σ2ED-F + σ
2
SF
− 2ρED-FSF σED-FσSF
Volatility of the underlying ED-F and SF (annualized) .
(5.17)
The payoff of a call option for the German investor in the foreign currency JPY reads:
CD(t, T ) = SF(t) Φ(d1)− EF-De−rτKD Φ(d2) (5.18)
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where the changes are the use of EF-D instead of ED-F in all parts of the formula. The
derivation is based on the change of measure technique developed by Margrabe in 1978.
Case 2:
The next variation is so-called Quanto options (quantity adjusting option), i.e.
a fixed exchange rate foreign equity option which are denominated in another currency
than the underlying equity exposure. Such products are attractive for investors who
wish to have exposure to a foreign asset without the corresponding exchange rate risk.
Quantos shield the German investor from EURJPY exchange rate fluctuations. If he
invests directly in the NIKKEI, he is exposed to both fluctuations in the NIKKEI index
and the EURJPY exchange rate. Essentially, a quanto has an embedded currency forward
with a variable notional amount. This variable notional amount gives quantos their name.
For the German investor with a call on NIKKEI 225 we have
CEuro/Share = EP,Euro/Y en max
(
SY en/Share −KY en/Share, 0
)
(5.19)
with EP,Euro/Y en the predetermined exchange rate specified in units of the domestic
currency per unit of the foreign currency. The Quanto call option price reads in Euro:
CD(t, T ) = EP,D-F
(
SF (t)e
xτ Φ(d1)− e−rτKF Φ(d2)
)
(5.20)
where:
d1 =
ln(SF/KF) + (rF − rD)τ − (ρσSFσSD − 12σ2SF)τ
σSF
√
τ
d2 = d1 − σSF
√
τ
σSF = Volatility of the underlying SF (annualized)
ρ = Correlation between asset and DOM exchange rate
x = rF − rD − ρσSFσD
EP,D-F = Predetermined exchange rate units of DOM per units of FOR .
We compare the quanto call (5.19) with the struck-call (5.15). We assume consider
EURCHF. The spot rate ED-F = 0.9 and the predetermined exchange rate EP,D-F = 0.8
are given. The stock S in CHF per share is CHF 60 and the strike is EUR 50. We get
in the case of a call which is struck:
C = max(0.9× 60− 50, 0) = 4 .
For the quanto call we have.
C = 0.8 max(60− 1/0.8× 50, 0) = 0 .
Example
Consider a Quanto call with 6 months to expiration. The stock index is 100, strike 105,
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predetermined exchange rate is 1.5, rD = 8%, rF = 5%, volatility of the stock is 20%,
volatility of the currency is 10% and the correlation between stock and currency is 0.3.
It then follows:
d1 = 0.18711 , d2 = 0.04569 .
Hence,
Φ(d1) = 0.42578 , Φ(d2) = 0.48177 ,
and the price of the call is
C(0) = 1.5
(
100e0.05−0.08−0.3×0.2×0.1Φ(d1)− 105e−0.08×0.5Φ(d2)
)
= 1.5 (100× 0.98216× Φ(d1)− 105× 0.67032× Φ(d2))
= 11.8646 .
It is worth to understand quanto modelling. Consider a gold contract in XAU-USD
quotation. The goal is to quanto this contract into EUR (=DOM) using Black and
Scholes. EUR is the numeraire currency. Gold and USD rates versus EUR are modelled
as:
XAU-USD : S1 = S3/S2
(
=
XAU
EUR
EUR
USD
)
XAU-EUR: dS3/S3 = (rEUR − rXAU)dt+ σ3dW 3
USD-EUR: dS2/S2 = (rEUR − rUSD)dt+ σ2dW 2
dW 3dW 2 = −ρ23dt where a minus sign in front of the correlation follows because both
processes have the same base currency, see Figure 5.12. The goal is to find the dynam-
ics of dS1/S1. The dynamics follows from Itô’s formula. It follows that for triangular
FX-markets, i.e. the two currencies XAU and USD have EUR as common currency in
our example, correlations between currencies can be expressed in terms of volatilities.
Consequently we do not need to estimate correlation coefficients and we can hedge cor-
relation risk merely by trading volatility. If we calculate the variance of the logarithm
for S1S2 = S3 we get
ρ12 =
σ23 − σ21 − σ22
2σ1σ2
.
But this is the content of the cosine theorem:
c2 − a2 − b2 = −2ab cos γ .
This calculation can be visualized using elementary geometry, see Figure 5.12. The
label of the triangle are the currencies. If volatilities are represented as edge vectors with
the length of the vectors equal to the value of the volatility, the law of cosine states that
the cosines of angles are the correlations.
The elementary geometry also applies to currency pairs which do not have a common
currency. We use this interpretation in our example. Applying Itô’s formula one gets2
dS1/S1 = (rUSD − rXAU + σ22 + ρ23σ2σ3)dt+ σ3dW 3 + σ2dW 2 .
2dS1/S1 = d(S3/S2)S2/S3. But
d(S3/S2) = dS3/S2)− S3dS2/(S2)2 + dS3/d(S2).
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XAU 
USD EUR (DOM) 
s1 
s2 
s3 
f12 p-f12 p-f23 f23 
Figure 5.12: XAU-USD-EUR Quanto Triangle. The arrows point in the direction of the
respective base currencies. The length of the edges represents the volatility. The cosine of
the angles cosφij = ρij represents the correlation of the currency pairs i and j, if the base
currency (DOM) of Si is the underlying currency of Sj (FOR). If both Si and Sj have
the same base currency (DOM), then the correlation is denoted by cos(pi − φij) = −ρij .
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Since S1 is a geometric Brownian motion with volatility σ1, we introduce a new Brownian
motion W 1, i.e.
dS1/S1 = (rUSD − rXAU + σ22 + ρ23σ2σ3)dt+ σ1dW 1 .
The geometry in the Quanto Triangle in Figure 5.12 and the cosine law imply
σ23 = σ
2
1 − 2ρ12σ1σ2 , σ21 = σ22 + 2ρ23σ3σ2
with ρ12 the correlation between XAU-USD and USD-EUR. These equations imply
σ22 + ρ23σ2σ3 = ρ12σ1σ2 .
Inserting this in the dS1/S1-dynamics gives
dS1/S1 = (rUSD − rXAU − ρ12σ1σ2)dt+ σ1dW 1
which is the drift adjusted process leading to the pricing formula (5.16). More precisely,
we have the correspondence:
• rF − rD  rUSD − rXAU.
• ρσSF σSD  ρ12σ1σ2.
• σSF  σ1.
Case 3:
A different motivation is obtained by using composite options instead of quanto
options. Whereas in quanto options the investor gets a return regardless of the exchange
rate the buyer of composite option has an exposure to exchange rate. The reason to use
composite options is for example to protect a value in the investor’s own currency on
a foreign investment. To specify this consider a US investor which owes Nestle stocks
denominated in CHF.
• The price of the stocks today is CHF 50 and the exchange rate is 0.8 USD for 1
CHF. Hence the dollar value of one Nestle share is USD 40.
• After one year Nestle went down in Swiss currency to CHF 45 and the exchange
rate decreased to 0.5 USD for 1 CHF, i.e. the dollar became stronger relative to
the Swiss Franc. The dollar value of a Nestle share has gone down from USD 40
to USD 22.5.
The last expression is equal to:
dS3/d(S2) = − 1
(S2)2
dS3dS2 = − 1
(S2)
ρ23σ2σ2dt.
Inserting the dynamics proves the formula.
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• To protect the dollar value the investor buys ATM composite put options, i.e. the
strike price is USD 40. The share price loss is offset by the composite put option
which is worth the difference USD 40-22.5. The holder of the option therefore pro-
tected his Nestle investment both from exchange rate and stock price movements.
Example:
To summarize, we compare three types of cross currency options: Quanto, composite
and foreign currency options. The underlying values are gold (XAU) measured in USD
and CHF. The option payoff reads:
1. Quanto: N max
(
XAUUSD(T )
XAUUSD(0)
−%K, 0
)
.
2. Composite: N max
(
XAUUSD(T )/CHFUSD(T)
XAUUSD(0)/CHFUSD(0)
−%K, 0
)
.
3. Foreign Currency: N CHFUSD (T ) max
(
XAUUSD(T )
XAUUSD(0)
−%K, 0
)
.
We assume
• at time 0: XAU = 1500 USD, CHF=0.9 USD, a notional N of 1 Mio. CHF and an
ATM option.
• at time T : Consider rising gold prices and the Swiss Franc gets stronger compared
to the USD, i.e. XAU(T ) = 1700 USD and CHF=1 USD at time T .
Consider rising gold prices and the Swiss Franc gets stronger compared to the USD,
i.e. XAU(T ) = 1700 USD and CHF=1 USD at time T . We get for the three options at
time T :
Quanto : 1×max
(
1700
1500
− 1, 0
)
= 133′333 CHF
Composite : 1×max
(
1700/1
1500/0.9
− 1, 0
)
= 0 CHF
and
Foreign Currency : 1× 0.9/1×max
(
1700
1500
− 1, 0
)
= 120′000 CHF .
If gold falls and the Swiss franc gets weaker against the USD, i.e. XAU(T ) = 1300 USD
and CHF=0.75 USD at time T . We get for the three options at time T :
1×max
(
1300
1500
− 1, 0
)
= 0 , 1×max
(
1300/0.75
1500/0.9
− 1, 0
)
= 40′000 ,
and
1× 0.9/0.75×max
(
1300
1500
− 1, 0
)
= 0 CHF .
The foreign currency option are not very common (why?). In this case Quanto style is
meaningful for an investor with a view on XAU without carrying about FX movements.
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The composite case is suitable for a CHF investor who already has an XAU exposure
and who wants to protect the CHF value of his portfolio.
We described several possibilities to increase the participation rate. The results so
far were only qualitative. Table 5.4 gives some quantitative figures.
Change in Impact on Part. Rate Approx. increase in Participation
Dividend yield Almost linear 10% per 1% change in div. yield
Basket correlation Almost linear 2% per 0.1 change in pos. correlation
Foreign reference index Almost linear 7% per 1% change in rF
Cape Rate Piecewise linear 2% per 10% change in cap rate from 90%− 140%
" Piecewise linear 10% per 10% change in cap rate from 70%− 90%
" Piecewise linear 120% per 10% change in cap rate from 50%− 60%
Table 5.4: Approximative quantitative impact of variations in the CP design on the
participation rate. Values for the volatility used is 20% and interest rate p.a. of 3
percent.
5.2.5.1 Returns and Indices
Investor typically think in terms of return on investment. The notion of quanto and
composite options allow us to defines several return types. The simplest return for an
investment starting at time 0 up to time T is given by the simple return
R0,T =
IT − I0
I0
. (5.21)
Suppose that the index is denominated in a different currency than the investor is used
to and we have to do a currency conversion. The first method, called quanto, uses the
known exchange rate E0 at time 0 to convert all cash flows we get the return on a
quantoed index
Rq0,T =
E0IT − E0I0
E0I0
=
IT − I0
I0
. (5.22)
If we instead use the spot exchange rates we get the return on a composite index:
Rc0,T =
ET IT − E0I0
E0I0
. (5.23)
Consider the DAX with values I0 = 6′000 and IT = 7′000. The currency pair is EURCHF
with E0 = 1.2 and ET = 1.3. Then,
R0,T = R
q
0,T = 1/6 = 16.6% , R
c
0,T =
1.3× 7′000− 1.2× 6′000
1.2× 6′000 = 26.4% .
So far we considered a single index. If we use a domestic basket, i.e.
Bt =
n∑
j=1
wjIj(t)
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of n indices the simple return on domestic basket BR0,T is equal to the weighted sum of
simple index returns:
BR0,T =
n∑
j=1
xjRj,0,T . (5.24)
with xj = wjIj(0)/B(0). The same holds true for a basket of quantoed indices. If one
uses the basket as a reference index, i.e. the basket value Br(0) = 100 is set equal to 100
at time zero, the basket value at time t reads
Br(t) = Br(0)
n∑
j=1
xj
Ij(t)
Ij(0)
.
The simple return on the basket is given by
BR0,T =
Br(T )−Br(0)
Br(0)
. (5.25)
The same applies to the quanto or composite basket case, see Figure 5.13.
So far the only dates which matter for the return where initial date and a future
date T . We next want a return which is based also on intermediate values of the indices.
Consider a single index. Suppose that there are m index values which matter for the
return calculation. The average index value is
AT =
1
m
m∑
k=1
I(m)
and the average return on a domestic index is defined by:
R0,T =
AT − I0
I0
. (5.26)
Algebra gives us
R0,T =
1
m
m∑
k=1
R0,k , (5.27)
i.e. the average return on a domestic index is equal to the average of simple returns.
The same holds true for the two currency conversion types. We note that the basis is
always I0 which is compared to I(1), I(2), . . . , IT . If we generalize to baskets of indices
the above results carry over. Figure 5.13 shows the impact of averaging. The index is
assumed to increase in the first time steps and then to drop in the last step back to its
initial value. The average index value and the average return are then calculated. The
average return on the index is 22.9 percent compared to the zero return for the whole
period if we use simple return calculation. This shows the stabilizing effect of averaging -
risk for an investor that a drop at the end of the contract destroys the former performance
is reduced at the price that a bust at the end of the period also has a small impact.
5.2. STRUCTURING CAPITAL PROTECTION RSP 385
Return on Domestic Basket 
  Index 1 Index 2 Index 3   
Weight w                    0.5                   0.25                   0.25    
Time 0 100 100 100   
Time 1 120 130 90   
Time 2 115 140 70   
          
  Return Index 1 Return Index 2 Return Index 3 Return Basket 
Time 1 20% 30% -10%                  0.15  
Time 2 -4% 8% -22%                 -0.06  
Average Index Values 
  Index Value 
Time 0 100 
Time 1 110 
Time 2 120 
Time 3 130 
Time 4 145 
Time 5 155 
Time 6 100 
Average Index Value 122.9 
Average Return 
 Index Value 22.9% 
Total Period Return 0% 
Figure 5.13: Examples for returns on a domestic basket and average index values. The basket
is not equally weighted but the first index has double weight compared to the two other ones.
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Proposition 5.2.2. The average return on a basket of domestic indices
BR0,T =
B(T )−B(0)
B(0)
(5.28)
with
B(T ) =
1
m
m∑
k=1
Bk(T )
is equal to the weighted sum of the average returns on the component domestic indices
m∑
k=1
xkRk,0,T
with Rk,0,T the average return on the domestic index k.
The content of the proposition also holds for the currency conversion cases.
Instead of averages one can use extreme values to calculate returns. Let
I∗ = max(I(1), . . . , I(m))
be the maximum of an index at fixed dates 1, 2, . . .m. The maximum simple return
MR0,T is defined as:
MR0,T :=
I∗ − I0
I0
= max(R0,1, R0,2, . . . , R0,m) . (5.29)
An extension of the extreme value returns is as follows: Compare the index value with
prefixed set of reference values H1, . . . ,H l (ladders) at fixed monitoring points instead
with the index value itself. To obtain the cash flows at a maturity date T and a return
formula we use the indicator function:
χj =
{
1, if there exists a monitoring date t ∈ T : I(t) ≥ Hj ;
0, else. (5.30)
with T the set of monitoring dates. A cash flow at time T is given by
CF (T ) = max(I0, χ1H
1, . . . , χlH
l) .
The stepwise maximum return SR0,T then reads:
SR0,T =
max(I0, χ1H
1, . . . , χlH
l)− I0
I0
= I0
max(1, χ1H
1
I0
, . . . , χlH
l
I0
)− I0
I0
= max(1,
χ1H
1
I0
, . . . ,
χlH
l
I0
)− 1
= max(0,
χ1H
1
I0
− 1, . . . , χlH
l
I0
− 1)
= max(0, χ1
H1 − I0
I0
, . . . , χl
H l − I0
I0
) . (5.31)
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5.2.6 Approximation Formulae
We consider some approximation formulae in derivative and RSP pricing. The approxi-
mations allow one for quick estimation of prices and Greeks of options. The formulae are
based on the approximation of the standard normal distribution, i.e. we assume Black
and Scholes as pricing tool.
We start with zero interest rates and zero dividend yield: r=d=0. Then ATM call
and put prices are the same and approximated by
Capp(0, S, S, T ) = Papp(0, S, S, T ) = 0.4σS
√
T
where 0.4 ∼ 1√
2pi
. The equivalence of put and call prices follows from the Put-Call parity:
P = e−rTK − S + C = S − S + C .
The approximation follows from Black and Scholes formula. We have
C = SΦ(
σ
√
T
2
)− SΦ(−σ
√
T
2
) .
Since Φ(−σ
√
T
2 ) = 1− Φ(σ
√
T
2 ) we get
C = 2S
(
Φ(
σ
√
T
2
)− 1/2
)
.
A Taylor series expansion for the normal distribution reads
Φ(x) = Φ(0) + Φ′(0)x+O(x2) = 1/2 +
x√
2pi
+O(x2) .
Thus
C = 2S
(
Φ(
σ
√
T
2
)− 1/2
)
∼ 0.4σS
√
T .
This approximation allows us also to solve for approximative implied volatility instead.
The approximation of an European call option ATM in the Black and Scholes model
with r, d 6= 0 is derived in the same way and reads:
Capp(0, S, S, T ) = σS
√
T
2pi
(1− (r + d)T
2
) +
(r − d)T
2
S . (5.32)
In the same way approximate Greeks can be derived. The Delta of a ATM call with
r = d = 0 is
∆app(C) = 1/2 + 0.4d1 = 1/2 + 0.2σ
√
T
and the Vega is
Vegaapp = Capp(0, S, S, T )/σ .
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What is the sensitivity of a call if interest rates are not zero and if they increase by
one percent? If rates increases borrowing will become more expansive and therefore the
price for the amount needed to buy the Delta for the call increases. But option prices
are also discounted prices. Therefore an increase of the interest rates reduces the option
prices due to discounting. The extra costs from borrowing are
∆app × Change Interest Rate
and the reduction in discounting is given by
Change Interest Rate× Time to Maturity×Option Priceapp
Example
Consider a ATM call with maturity one year and implied volatility σ = 32%. Then
approximative Vega is equal to 0.4
√
1 = 0.4, i.e. 40 bp, for a one percent movement
in volatility. The approximative call price is 0.4 × 32% = 12.8%. The approximative
Delta then follows: ∆app = 0.564. The approximative impact of an one percent interest
increase is
∆app × Change Interest Rate = 56.4× 1% = 56.4 bp
minus the discounting effect
Change Interest Rate×Time to Maturity×Option Priceapp = 1%× 1× 12.8% = 12.8bp
i.e. 43.6 bp is the impact of a one percentage increase of the interest rate. This is the
approximative Rho sensitivity. The new price of the call, which is by Taylor Series
CITM/OTM, app = CATM, app + Sensitivity × δParameter,
is given by
C = 12.8% + 0.436× 1 = 13.236 .
Note that in this approximation of an OTM call using the ATM call as zeroth order
starting point no volatility smile and volatility skew is used.
We use these approximations to derive approximative formulae for capital protected
products. In general we have for a CP the decomposition
VT = afprot(a, b, · · · ) + bfpart(a, b, · · · )
into a capital protection and participation part. The participation part, i.e. sloppy
the options, are non-linear functions of the participation rate b and other parameters.
Therefore, it is not possible in general to solve the above equation explicitly w.r.t. to
participation b or other variables of interest rate such as a coupon value or a capital
protection level a. Using the above approximation of the normal distribution we are able
to say obtain explicitly a participation rate as a function of all other parameters.
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Using the replication formula for a CP product without coupon and without cap we
have for the approximative participation rate:
bapp = S
100%− KL
(1+r)T
Capp(0, S, S, T )
with KL the capital protection level. The last equation can also be used to write the
approximate capital protection level as a function of the participation rate. Table 5.14
shows the approximative participation rate.
T=1 r=2%
KL 100 97.5 95 92.5 90 87.5 85 82.5 80
Vol 20% 22% 50% 77% 105% 132% 160% 187% 215% 242%
Vol 30% 15% 34% 53% 72% 92% 111% 130% 149% 168%
T=3 r=2%
KL 100 97.5 95 92.5 90 87.5 85 82.5 80
Vol 20% 35% 50% 64% 78% 93% 107% 121% 136% 150%
Vol 30% 25% 35% 45% 56% 66% 76% 86% 96% 107%
T=3 r=4%
KL 100 97.5 95 92.5 90 87.5 85 82.5 80
Vol 20% 58% 70% 82% 94% 105% 117% 129% 140% 152%
Vol 30% 44% 52% 61% 70% 78% 87% 96% 105% 113%
Figure 5.14: Relationship between different parameters for a CP product without cap
and without coupons. The table shows the approximative participation rate. Dividend
yield is d = 0.
We apply the approximation method to the case where the CP product has a cap. In
this case an option OTM is needed. If volatility is constant, this would be not problem-
atic. But in fact, there is a volatility smile and/or a skew. A simple method to account
for this is as follows. Given an underlying value - here the SMI - we use a regression in
the variables moneyness and maturity. That is, we estimate the ratio
Ratio =
Price OTM
Price ATM
for a volatility constant at 20%. The regression implies
Ratio = 2.93− 2.22Moneyness + 0.067Maturity .
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The estimate has an R2 = 0.953. Using this estimate we get
bapp = S
100%− KL
(1+r)T
Capp(0, S, S, T )(1− 2.93− 2.22Cap + 0.067T )
with Cap the cap level. Contrary to the case with no cap this approximation is market
dependent. That is for a given underlying the validity of the ratio has to be tested before
one uses the approximation.
Example
We test the quality of the above approximations. For a CP product without cap on SMI
we have the parameters: σ = 18%, r = 1.61%, d = 2.00%, T = 5,KL = 95%. Using the
approximation formula we get
bapp = 90.16%
compared to the Bloomberg participation rate of 90.60%. For a CP product with cap on
SMI we have the parameters: σ = 21%, r = 1.14%, d = 2.5%, T = 3, Cap = 115%, b =
110%. Using the approximation formula we get
KLapp = 98.36%
compared to the Bloomberg value 98.84%, see Figure 5.15 for a screen shot.
Figure 5.15: Bloomberg solution for a CP product with cap on SMI we have the param-
eters: σ = 21%, r = 1.14%, d = 2.5%, T = 3, Cap = 115%, b = 110%.
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5.3 Trading, Market Making
Since RSP are contracts about futures payoff profiles, traders play a key role in the ful-
fillment of the contracts. They determine the price of the product and offer a secondary
market. The price of a SRP can be posted in two ways. Either the price is given per
share, like for stocks, or the price is given in a percentage value of the notional amount.
The first method is used for discount-, bonus- and tracker products and also for warrants.
The second one, which corresponds to the pricing of bonds, if used for barrier reverse
convertibles and capital protected products.
After issuance, the issuer faces market risk in the option parts of the products. There
are two ways to handle them.
Buy the components
The issuer buys the components of the product from derivative houses, i.e. firms which
are specialized to deal with risks of derivatives which the issuer does not want to manage
or is not able to do so. Investment banks are such specialized derivative firms. The
contract between the issuer and the derivative firm is an OTC-contract. The advantage
of this method, also called white-labelling, for the issuer is the elimination of market risk.
But the issuer faces credit risk of the derivative house and a part of the value of chain is
lost to the specialized firm.
Management in the own trading book
This approach allows to keep the whole value chain in-house. The disadvantage are the
need for a proper risk management process together with the costs for such a process
(know how and IT are the key cost drivers). In practice one observes two different orga-
nization forms of the trading units. Either they are organized according to the product
categories or they are organized following the underlying values. Trading desk which
are specialized on their products cover many underlying values. The advantage is that
pricing is coherent for a comprehensive trading unit and people have a clear focus on the
products. A disadvantage is an only superficial knowledge about underlying values and
basis risk of the products, i.e. the risk that the same product has different prices and
different risk sensitivities on different markets.
How does a trader hedges the risks? Often one encounters two type of traders - flow
traders and back-book traders. Flow traders act as market maker in the secondary mar-
ket. They hedge the simplest risks such as the Delta exposure. More complicated risk
factors are considered in the back books. Traders are measured how they manage their
risk and also their earning objectives. How does traders generate profits? First, if the fair
value of SRP is say 98 percent of the notional amount an issuance margin of 2 percent
is earned if the product is issued at par. Theoretically, if a perfect hedge exists traders
could lock in this 2 percent. Often such perfect hedges are not feasible and the initial
margin is at risk. Furthermore, traders are not forced to perfect hedge - they can play
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their view within the top-down allocated risk limits. Today, trading based on client flow
is dominating proprietary trading where trading is not based on any client transactions,
i.e. trading is based on the bank’s own equity.
We consider how volatility trading on equities can generate profit and loss (P& L). We
have to distinguish between vanilla derivatives such as warrants and exotic options such
as DIP in barrier reverse convertibles. The goal is to hedge the DIP using also vanilla
options. There are different methods to do this - static and dynamic ones. We assume
that a DIP can be written as linear combination of vanilla options. Hence, the trader
of structured products buys vanilla options from the vanilla option trader for clients
buying barrier reverse convertible. The structured product trader therefore sell DIPs.
The warrants trader sells the same type of options to vanilla option investors. At this
point one observes that the structured product trader buys the option at a lower pricer
then the warrant trader is selling the same option, where the difference is larger than
the bid-ask spread. How is this possible? To understand this, we recall that implied
volatility σim is the key parameter value which put into the theoretical pricing formula
equalizes the market price:
TheoPrice(σim) = MarketPrice .
This requires an option pricing model such as the Black and Scholes model for example.
We know that implied volatility is not constant: There is a smile and a skew.
The traders use the calculated volatility curves from say Eurex options prices. Given
the mid-curves between bid and ask, the structured product trader will value the volatil-
ity below the mid-curve and the warrants trader above this curve. This defines a risk less
profit for both trading desk on a stand alone basis and integrated for the whole trading
floor. Arbitrage, i.e. a risk less strategy to exploit this fact, is not possible since it is not
possible to be short the SRP. The market is in this sense incomplete. Therefore the SRP
trader can sell the SRP with a lower volatility than the Eurex-induced value. Is there
a guarantee that the SRP is not priced way-off its fair value? Competition between the
issuers, which is strong in particular in Switzerland, and the existence of online tools to
price the SRP force the issuer to a competitive price behavior.
If we consider Black and Scholes pricing for barrier option a problem with this model
shows up. Consider a vanilla option DAX and a Down& In Put (DIP) barrier option,
see Figure 5.16.
In panel A suitability of the Black and Scholes model for the vanilla option is shown.
For a Put with ATM strike we would use a volatility of 25 percent. The price would be
in-line with the market. Panel B shows the difficulty if we consider the same model for
the DIP: What volatility to use for a Down& In Put with ATM strike and barrier say 50
percent of the strike? A huge volatility range follows. If one considers the price of the
DIP using the two extreme volatilities, one gets prices of 23 respectively 369. Extensions
of the Black and Scholes models such as the Local Volatility (LV) or stochastic volatility
models address these issues.
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A B 
C 
Figure 5.16: Local volatility: The problem of Black and Scholes. Source: K. Navaian,
Zurich Cantonal Bank, 2012.
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Chapter 6
Less Traditional Asset Classes /
Investments
6.1 Real Estate (RE)
6.1.1 Economics, Products
Real estate is in terms of value one of the largest asset classes. In most countries the
value of the houses is a multiple of the value of all listed stocks. But one also observes
very poor financial markets where real estate risk can be restructured and transferred.
We show how financial innovation can overcome the problem that each house is unique in
the sense that no meaningful index for the market price of real estate can be constructed.
The value of all Swiss building is about five times larger than the value of all listed
Swiss stocks. Contrary to the size proportion liquidity behaves: The turnover of the
broad Swiss stock market index SPI is on average around 100% per annum of its value.
The turnover on the residential housing market in Switzerland is around 1 − 2 percent
per year. Similar figures hold for many other countries too.
The real estate asset class has many characteristics which make it a difficult to define
financial markets similar to equity or FX markets. Real-estate (derivatives) markets are
still in most countries in a state of infancy. One also observes a great deal of variation
across countries (or even within countries) in prices, market trends, institutional settings,
market practice regulation and taxation. Why is property illiquid? First, real estate is a
durable good, i.e. no frequent trading is needed. Second, property is heterogeneous, i.e.
it is difficult to trade since a normalization is needed which makes the different assets
comparable. Third, property is indivisible, i.e. the size of the trades are large. This
makes trading costly because of the search costs (heterogeneity), transaction costs (legal
costs, taxation) and financing costs. Transaction costs of privately held housing are be-
tween 8 and 10 percent in Switzerland. Real estate is heavily taxed in most jurisdictions.
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Reasons are the simplicity to monitor the real estate assets and the inelastic demand
for housing. In many countries, taxation is skewed in favor of owner-occupied housing
to the disadvantage of renting (CH as an exception). But real estate markets are also
heavily regulated, i.e. rent controls, land use planning, zoning, preservation of historical
buildings, etc.
How are house prices determined? First, prices are not readily available although this
is changing. Second, prices depend on size, quality and locational considerations which
is a rational for experts in the housing markets: valuators, buying agents, selling agents,
structural engineers etc. reduce the uncertainty costs of real estate transactions. In the
US and the Netherlands the agents act on both sides of the markets, in Australia auctions
mechanism apply and in Switzerland the major rule is direct bargaining. Many practi-
tioners follow the wrong belief that segmentation in the real estate market is complete,
i.e. each object defines a market due to the differences in quality and locations. But
there exists a well-defined relationship between the house price and it’s attributes even
though theses attributes are bundled in the house and cannot be traded separately. That
is one can evaluate the expectation of the price of a house conditional on its attributes.
This is called the hedonic valuation method.
A first classification in the RE asset class is to differentiate three basic types of
property.
• Residential property. This consists of condominium apartments and single fam-
ily houses.
• Rental property.
• Commercial property.
The three types possess different risks, cash flows and return properties. We consider
only residential property in the sequel.
A different classification of RE in the dimensions ’markets’ and ’asset type’ is shown
in Figure 6.1.
Investment in real estate can be further classified into direct, indirect and deriva-
tive investments. While direct investments choose a specific building, indirect invest-
ments invests are of a fund or a Real Estate Investment Trust (REIT) type. REITs (Real
Estate Investment Trusts) offer publicly traded common stock shares in companies that
own properties and mortgages. REITs are exempted from corporate income tax under
certain conditions. They can be closed, open or semi-closed as in CH, where they are
quoted on the stock exchange. REIT’s are the counter part to mutual stock funds. Fig-
ure 6.2 gives an overview over the risk, return and liquidity characteristics of direct and
indirect investments. Derivatives are based on real estate indices, see Figure 6.3: The
risk and return profile of such an index is structured.
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Public markets Private markets 
Equity assets • RE funds 
• RE stocks 
• REITs 
 
• Real property 
• House equity 
• Private RE equity 
Debt assets • MBS 
• Bonds of RE 
companies 
• Money instruments 
• Bank loans 
• Whole mortgages 
• Venture debt 
Figure 6.1: Real estate assets. Source: Geltner and Miller, 2001
Direct Indirect 
In-house portfolios 
Non-listed 
Closed-end funds 
Non-listed 
Open-end funds 
REITs 
Risk Middle High Low Middle 
Return Low High Low Middle 
Liquidity  Low Low Middle High 
Figure 6.2: Direct and indirect investments.
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Properties 
Funds, REITs/REOCs 
Index 
Derivatives (Swaps, Futures, 
Certificates) 
Fund of funds, Certificates, Mandates 
Synthesize it 
Wrap it 
Pool it Pool it 
Create it 
Figure 6.3: Scheme for the fund and derivative structuring of real estate. Source: Helmuth
Aberer, UBS, Swiss Finance Institute Annual Meeting, 2006.
The three different types of investment described above - direct, indirect, deriva-
tive - have different characteristics. Transaction, tax and administration costs are high
for direct investments. They are lower in the indirect approach and the lowest one for
derivatives. Time to market is long if one considers direct investments and considerably
shorter for the two other types. Hedging and short selling is not possible using the di-
rect or indirect approach. Derivatives at least partially offer this - the extend depends
on how mature and liquid the derivative markets are. Cherry picking is best achieved
following a direct investment, less in indirect ones and almost not possible by applying
derivatives. The premium over net asset value is advantageous for direct investments,
less for derivatives and a disadvantage if one buys funds or REITs. Model risk is highest
at present in the non liquid derivative markets.
Risks of RE investments consists of
• Market risk, i.e. systematic real estate risk which cannot be diversified away within
the RE asset class. This risk has several components among them are price -, rent
- and vacancy risk. This risk can be measured by housing price indices.
• Idiosyncratic or specific risk. This risk is diversifiable within portfolios. ). This
risk is difficult to measure. Evidence from repeated-sales indicates that this risk is
twice as big as systematic risk.
• Liquidity risk which is at least partially systematic. Low liquidity means also that
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information is scarce. This risk is also difficult to measure. The risk becomes
substantial during downturns.
From a risk perspective the three approaches behave different. Direct investment
means to search for the alpha. The focus is on idiosyncratic risk and not on systematic
real estate market risk. Such investments are often of a buy-and-hold type due to the
missing liquidity, lack of transparency and the high transaction costs. Derivatives on
the other extreme focus on systematic real estate risk - that is risk which is directly
and exclusively related to the real estate and tenant’s market. The underlying value
reflects systematic price risk, vacancy risk or rental price risk. The rationale that deriva-
tives do not focus on idiosyncratic risk are moral hazard, monitoring costs and that in
larger portfolios idiosyncratic risk diversifies to a certain extend. Indirect investments
are somewhere in between the two extremes. They face neither pure idiosyncratic risk,
since they are based on a portfolio of buildings, neither pure market risk since business
and operational risk of the real estate firms in the portfolio interfere.
6.1.2 Hedonic Indices
We consider real estate indices. We observe two type of indices, appraisal based and
transaction based indices. The first one, such as the IPD indices, are based on the
appraisal of a large sample of price appraisers. The second one, such as the Halifax
indices for UK together with its sub-indices or the ZWEX for the greater Zurich Area,
are based on real transactions. We consider the ZWEX.
This index is generated by thousands of transactions each year. The houses as un-
derlying assets are of different quality. Quality means the number of rooms, the
geographical location of the house, the construction standard etc. These quality factors
need to be separated from real estate market risk, i.e. the price of risk which is indepen-
dent of the quality factors. On therefore discriminates in the definition of transaction
based real estate indices between price changes which are due to quality changes and
pure real estate market price changes. To achieve this goal one constructs a hedonic
index.
A hedonic index collects the price information of all transactions as follows. The
contribution of the different price-sensitive characteristics of a residential property on the
property price is estimated using multiple regression analysis. Quality factors are age,
substance, distance to public transport, etc. ZWEX uses 24 characteristics. Each factor
price is estimated using a regression. Once the factor prices are known, the heterogeneity
problem of the sample of the houses is solved: The pure real estate price inflation can be
separated from price variations which are due to the different characteristics. Let sjt be
the price of the j-th residential property transaction at time t. We set
ln sjt = β0 + δtχ
j
t +
K∑
k=1
β∗k lnx
jk + jt , t = T − 40, T − 39, . . . , T − 1, T , (6.1)
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with xjk the k-th characteristic of object j, χjt an indicator variable which takes the value
1 if a transaction took place in period t and zero if the object was sold in the period
t = 0 and where the measurement takes place quarterly, i.e. one uses 40 quarters in the
regression analysis.  is the Gaussian noise term which is not correlated with the housing
characteristics. The parameter δ measures the systematic growth of the real estate price
level. The vector of coefficients β is assumed to be time independent, i.e. a price increase
of an additional square-meter living space is assumed to be constant between the periods.
Empirical tests show that the hedonic function and therefore also the index are better
estimated if we use quarterly transactions from several periods and not only say the last
periods. This indicates that real estate prices are strongly driven by a drift component
compared to other assets classes where the volatility is the dominant price factor. The
parameters are estimated using ordinary least square. The estimated hedonic function
(6.1) can relate 85 percent of the house price differences between different objects to the
considered characteristics. The standard error of the regression is at 14 percent. The
hedonic method needs many data. Since the commercial real estate market is much
more illiquid than the residential market one applies for the former one the discounted
cash flow method with rents being the cash flows. Aggregating the DCF one obtains a
so-called appraisal-based index.
We illustrate the method. Consider the factor ’distance from Zurich City Center’.
Figure 6.4 shows a plot of house prices as a function of this distance.
We use the above method in a simplified form to estimate the different parameters
and values. Write HB for the price of land for construction in CHF we have:
HB = β0 + β1 ∗Dist .
An OLS estimate implies
HB = 1220− 14.37 ∗Dist .
Therefore for each kilometer more distant to the center the square-meter price falls by
14.37 CHF. The R2 is 0.7, i.e. at most 30 percent of the price variation is due to other
factors.
Figure 6.5 shows the evolution of the transaction based ZWEX and Halifax Greater
London Area indices. The index values are drawn without any modifications.
Although the index methodology are not exactly the same the main message is clear:
While Zurich - and London area show a similar behavior in their property price devel-
opment in the 80s up to the mid 90s of last century, the two areas faced a different
evolution afterwards. The London area prices sharply increased compared to the Zurich
prices. This reflects the increasing importance of London as the financial center. This
increase was followed by a sharp correction during the financial crisis whereas Zurich
showed still weakly increasing house prices. The interesting question is, how much be-
tween the price difference Zurich-London is due to a change in fundamentals and how
much is bubble?
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Figure 6.4: Scatter plot of house prices as a function of the distance to the Zurich City Center.
Source: Financial Engineering Immobilien, ZKB.
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Figure 6.5: ZWEX and Halifax Greater London Area residential real estate price indices. Quar-
terly data.
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6.1.3 Real Estate Derivatives and Mortgages
Having defined an underlying value one can structure derivatives. In principle, struc-
turing of property derivative and pricing follows the same logic say as an equity deriva-
tive. But in practice several difference appear. First, the market for property derivative
is mostly non-existing or at its best in a pre-mature state. Therefore, transactions take
place in a back-to-back or, if the derivative firm has risk capacity and risk appetite, in a
warehousing type. What makes the evolution of derivative markets for property difficult
is the often observed homogeneity of beliefs - either there is a common belief that house
price will raise or that they will fall. Compared to many other market a heterogeneous
view on future property prices is less pronounced which makes back-to-back trading diffi-
cult and which drives the derivative house in their risk warehousing function fast towards
its risk capacity limits. The most mature property derivatives market is the U.K. IPD
derivatives market. At the end of 2008 some GBP 19.3 billion of swaps referenced IPD
indices. Trading in IPD derivatives has decreased significantly by almost 80 percent from
the 2008 figures. However, trading Eurex futures on IPD started in 2009 and is growing
fast although it is still on a low absolute level of 250 million pound after Q1 2012. Prop-
erty derivatives markets in France and Germany are also still very small.
An example of a property derivative are index mortgages. That is, a traditional
mortgage with a protective put option on a residential property underlying index, such
as the Halifax Index or ZWEX. The rationale to enter into such a contract for a home
owner is to buy protection against falling house prices which will eventually force him to
inject substantial fresh capital in the future. We assume:
• House price today of 1 Mio. CHF.
• Mortgage of 800’000 CHF., i.e. the LTV (loan-to-value) degree is capped at 80
percent of the house price.
• Therefore, the owner hat to inject 200’000 CHF equity to finance the house at the
beginning.
• Suppose that the mortgage is of a fixed rate and fixed maturity type, say 5 years.
Assume that after 5 years house prices are down by 15 percent. The house is then worth
850’000 CHF. Eighty percent of this new value is 680’000 CHF. The bank is likely to
reduce the mortgage notional to this value. This forces the owner to raise another CHF
120’000 of capital. The put option is designed to finance such a drop in house prices.
That is, it reduces default risk of the home owner by smoothing his capital. The put
option has the following payoff:
max(K − ST , 0)
after T = 5y with S the value of the index and K the strike value. How do we price
this option and how do the bank hedges the product? Since markets are incomplete
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pricing is a delicate matter and hedging is (almost) impossible. The traditional method
in pricing is to use Black’s model - although several assumptions are not satisfied. This
model is used because of its often observed robustness: Although model assumptions are
violated the use of more complicated models leads to prices which are not too far away
from Black’s model. The crucial input parameter in this model is the volatility of the
underlying value. Mere observation of real estate indices shows that price dynamics of
these indices is different than for more liquid, ’faster’ markets such as equity, interest
rates or commodities. Real estate indices show a kind of inertia. That is, if price raise or
fall they gain a momentum which lowers volatility. This behavior is at least in line with
the observed homogeneity of the beliefs. Using such a model, we obtain a fee between
50 and 80 bp per annum for the ZWEX. That is, if say interest rates are 2 percent for
the mortgage, the client pays 2.5 to 2.8 percent p.a. and if a price decline of property
follows the put option protects the clients’ capital as explained above.
We consider the pricing of an index-linked mortgage with an embedded put option
such that the notional is directly reduced by a potential negative index performance. We
follow Syz et al. (2008). We are also interested in comparing the prices of index-linked
mortgages with their traditional counterparts and in particular the valuation of collater-
alized and uncollateralized mortgages. To achieve this, we represent each loan as a linear
combination of an unsecured loan, a credit derivative and, for the index-linked mortgage,
a put option. This division follows the logic that an index-linked mortgage equals an un-
secured loan plus a credit enhancement through a collateral, i.e. a credit derivative, plus
an index put option. From a risk perspective, the risk factor in the unsecured loan is given
by the default risk of the borrower, the risk factors of the credit derivative and of the put
option are a combination of default risk and house price risk. We assume that the pricing
of the put option in the index-linked mortgages and the rating of the borrowers are given.
We first consider a loan with a maturity of 5 years and fixed interest payments,
secured by a collateral. The contract date is t = 0. The fixed maturity of the loan
is T . The creditworthiness of the borrower is captured in an annual, constant default
rate PD and PD(0, T ) is the cumulative probability of default in the period [0, T ], i.e.
PD(0, T ) = 1 − (1 − PD)T . Therefore, we assume for simplicity that the creditwor-
thiness of the obligor is stable over the whole lifetime of the contract. We consider the
calculation of the default rate of a specific obligor and the valuation of a loan to the
same obligor in two steps. First, we calculate the probability that the obligor defaults
using several information sources: we use obligor, loan, and market-specific information
to model the probability of default until time T using an internal based rating model.
In the second step, we use the default probability to value all future cash flows of the
financing contracts, i.e. the cash flows of the unsecured loans and the cash flows of a
possible collateral for a situation in which the obligor might default at any time. Hence,
the default probability enters in the discount factor of the cash flows.
Since default only takes place at maturity of the loan and that cash flows from the
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collateral are realized instantaneously at maturity. Therefore, the complicated and typi-
cally long-lasting recovery process following a default state shrinks to a single point, the
maturity T . The annual refinancing rate with maturity t is the spot rate rt. The discount
factor for maturity t and for a compounding frequency of n is defined byDt =
(
1 + rtn
)−nt.
The notional loan amount is denoted by F. Coupon payments occur with a frequency
n each year and A(T) is the cumulative amortization rate up to time T. The effective
loan amount after T years of amortization is FT = F (1 − A(T )). We use Z to denote
the periodic coupon payments including any amortization. We distinguish between three
different interest payments: risk-free payments ZRf , payments from unsecured loans Zu,
and secured payments Zs. rc denotes the expected recovery cost due to a default. These
costs consist for example of remitted risk costs or lowered rates for the mortgage coupons.
Moreover, there is a probability 1 − γ that the collateral of a defaulted debtor will not
be realized, e.g., if the debtor leaves the default state after a financial reorganization.
This probability varies between five and thirty percent in loan portfolios depending on
the type of borrower, i.e. there are significant differences between private and corporate
borrowers. Hence, the default state is not an absorbing state. If the collateral is realized,
costs β follow, which we set proportional to the value of the collateral. These costs are
incurred in trying to liquidate the collateral.
We write the value of the unsecured loan BZu(0, T ) as the sum of a zero-coupon
bond B0(0, T ) and a coupon part GZu(0, T ):
BZu(0, T ) = B0(0, T ) +GZu(0, T ) (6.2)
with
B0(0, T ) = DT [(1− PD(0, T ))F− PD(0, T )rc] (6.3a)
GZu(0, T ) = Zu
nT∑
t=1
(
1− PD
n
)nt
Dt (6.3b)
The value of the secured loan is given by
BZs(0, T ) = B0(0, T ) +GZs(0, T ) +DTPD(0, T )γE [min (C,F)] (6.4)
The second term represents the credit derivative, i.e. the credit enhancement. C is
the effective collateral which reads C = min (N,max ((1− β)HT + aC − v, 0)) with v the
value of any senior debts, H the value of the property object, β the average estimated
costs in the recovery workout, N the value of the borrowers note and aC the value of
collateral other than property. If the collateral is realized, the bank receives the smaller
of C and F, i.e. min(C,F). Using min (C,F) = F −max (F−C, 0), the present value
of the loan reads
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BZs(0, T ) = B0(0, T ) +GZs(0, T )
+DTγPD(0, T ) [F− exp(rTT )Put (F, T, r, σC, µC)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
=:CD(0,T )
. (6.5)
with CD(0, T ) the credit derivative written on the collateral, Put(·) a European put
option, σC the volatility of the effective collateral, and µC the annual growth rate of
the effective collateral. The value of this put option can be determined following the
approach of Schiller and Weiss (1994). Their formula is similar to the Black-Scholes
formula except that the underlying asset grows at a rate other than the risk-free rate.
This difference is due to the fact that the collateral is not necessarily a liquid asset, hence
it can not be effectively used to hedge the option. Assuming that the effective collateral
is log-normally distributed the put option is worth
Put = exp(−rT )
[
FN(d1)−C exp
(
µC +
1
2
σ2C
)
N(d2)
]
(6.6)
where d1 =
ln(F/C)−µCT
σC
√
T
, d2 = d1−σC
√
T and N is the standard normal distribution
function.
The no-arbitrage argument implies that the rates for all types of financing - risk less,
unsecured, and secured - are such that their present values are the same. In other words,
the equation
F = BZrf (0, T ) = BZu(0, T ) = BZs(0, T ) (6.7)
determines the coupons, which can be calculated analytically. For instance, Zu follows
from (6.2) as
Zu =
F −DT [(1− PD(0, T ))F− PD(0, T )rc]
nT∑
t=1
(
1− PDn
)nt
Dt
. (6.8)
Zs is calculated in the same way except that, due to the put option, there will be an
additional term in the numerator of (6.8). The model is applied to the pricing of the
loan contracts for 8 different rating classes, with class 8 the defaulted class, see Figure
6.6.
The upper panel shows that the lower the creditworthiness of a borrower, the more
expensive the terms for the unsecured loan. Second, the lower the creditworthiness of the
borrower, the more the bank (as protection buyer) is willing to pay for collateral. shows
that uniform in the borrower’s creditworthiness the terms of the index-linked mortgage
are more expensive than for the classical one. But one observes that the bank’s willing-
ness to pay for the credit enhancement depends on the creditworthiness of the borrower:
the higher the creditworthiness, the lower the compensation for the credit enhancement.
The difference in the final terms between the two mortgages for the rating class 7 is 0.94%
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Figure 6.6: Upper Panel: Pricing of interest rate type mortgages. The final price consists of
the unsecured loan and the collateral enhancement for the bank as a protection buyer. We have
chosen the following parameters: β is CHF 20′000 / CHF 625′000 = 3.2 percent, probability of
recovery 1− γ is 30%, volatility of the collateral σC is 6% and the growth rate of the collateral
µC is 1.5%. For the risk free interest rates we used CHF Swap Rates as of October 25, 2005
and Moody’s default statistics to obtain the credit risk dependent discount factors. Lower Panel:
Pricing of interest rate type mortgages and index-linked mortgages. Index-linked mortgages
are always more expensive than interest rate type mortgages. But the lower a homeowner’s
creditworthiness, the less are the relative additional costs for the put option compared to the
interest rate case. Data are the same. For the best two rating categories 1 and 2, the put
premium is approximately 0.7% p.a. for a 5 year term, correlation between the index and the
collateral is estimated 75 percent and the strike of the index put is set equal to the initial value
of the index, i.e. at 100 percent. Source: Syz and Vanini (2008).
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whereas the put premium is 1.09% . This result is due to the following ideal assumptions:
the loan makes 80% of the estimated house price and the borrower’s note equals the value
of the mortgage’s principal. However, if the loan policy is tight, index-linked mortgages
reduce refinancing risk essentially.
How does a bank hedges such a put option, i.e. how is a portfolio of instruments set
up such that the portfolio value matches the value of the put option and where the price
of such a portfolio is given by the paid premia of 50 to 80 bp per annum? Given the
pre-mature state of the real estate market, there is no simple standard hedging by going
long or short the respective products. In fact, the bank can take a bet that real estate
price will raise and not fall and keeping the position open. This is a dangerous game
which requires an appropriate risk capacity and risk capital of the bank. A proxy can
be constructed cross business units as follows. The put option is issued by the trading
unit; the mortgage is a retail banking unit business. Therefore, if the put option is in
the money, house prices are falling. The bank then faces the risk that the premia paid
for the put option are less than the value of the option after 5 years, i.e. the bank faces a
trading loss. The retail banking unit on the other hand side faces less counter party risk
due to the protective put option. That is, everything else the same, the margin gained
by the retail banking is higher due to lower risk costs. Since risk costs in Switzerland for
residential house financing are low - 50 bp per annum is yet a large figure - the value of
the option premia of say 50 bp p.a. and the lower counter party risk premia of the same
size add to a 5 percent figure over five year. Therefore, if the drop in house prices is not
larger than 5 percent, the integrated view across the business units provides a hedge. If
house prices drop more, the hedge becomes only approximate and net losses follow. Since
a 5 percent decrease in house price over five years is only a moderate amount, this proxy
hedge is not effective to cover more extreme events. In Switzerland, at the beginning
of the 90s house prices in the Zurich area dropped by 14 percent. In some districts of
Miami after the financial crisis 2008 prices were down by 30 percent or more.
There were in total 2 transactions of these protected mortgages since the issuance of
the products in 2006. A major reason is that although each house is unique, beliefs about
house price evolution is homogeneous. One can think hardly about a different market
where people are either all bullish or all bearish. It is an open issue to show why this is
the case.
We conclude this section with an innovation of an investment in a retail structured
product. The product is defined by:
• Underlying value: ZWEX
• Maturity: 5y
• Currency: CHF
• Issuer: AAA bank
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• Size of issuance CHF 50 Mio.
• Issuance price: 100 percent.
• Payoff: 100 + max(0,min(ZT , 5.5%)) with ZT the ZWEX performance over 3y.
This product therefore pays pack in the worst market case 100 percent of the invested
capital at maturity. The return is capped at 5.5 percent. To price the option payoff
max(0,min(ZT , 5.5%)) one should apply methods of incomplete markets. But in prac-
tice one use the robust Black model. Although the models assumption are violated for
property derivatives on the ZWEX one often uses this model. First, it is not clear whether
violating some assumptions in a model is more severe than using a more sophisticated
model were many assumptions are finally needed to calibrate the larger model. Second,
finance is not a natural science. That is, if many market participants apply a model
which in principle could not be applied but if the usage of this model is common knowl-
edge then demand and supply can emerge and match in such a setting.
6.1.4 Pricing of Property Derivatives
Prices of real estate indices show an inertia property: Van Bragt et al. (2009) state: ’ ...
autocorrelation can occur in appraisal-based indices because appraisers slowly update past
prices with new market information. Transaction-based indices can also exhibit a positive
autocorrelation because private real estate markets are less informationally efficient than
public securities markets. As a result, the price discovery and information aggregation
functions of the private real estate market are less effective. This can cause noisy prices
and inertia in asset values (and returns).’ See also Fabozzi et a. 2009, Geltner and
Fisher (2007) for other work on pricing.
We consider two approaches. The model of van Bragt et al. (2009) and the approach
of Syz and Vanini (2011). Van Bragt et al. (2009) state: ’ ... Geltner and Fisher
(2007) note that a 2006 survey of (potential) market participants identified a lack of con-
fidence in how real estate derivatives should be priced. They also note that this concern
is understandable, since the underlying asset cannot be traded in a frictionless market.
This makes it impossible to use classic pricing formulas for derivatives (such as the re-
lationship between spot and forward prices), since these formulas only apply under strict
no-arbitrage assumptions. Geltner and Fischer (2007) argue, however, that the valuation
of real estate derivatives is still possible using equilibrium pricing rules, provided that the
dynamic behavior of the underlying real estate index is properly taken into account.’
Bragt et al. (2009) take the next step by proposing a quantitative risk-neutral valua-
tion model which can be used for actual pricing purposes. Their model is a discrete time
model for the observed real estate index in combination with continuous-time models for
the efficient market process of real estate and for interest rates. They first consider the
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real-world price process. They assume that the following first order dynamics represent-
ing auto-regression of a real estate index holds:
At = kSt + (1− k)(1 + pi)At−1 (6.9)
with A the current price, S the unobservable true market price, 0 ≤ k ≤ 1 a constant an pi
the expected (annual) return of the index which accrues the value At−1. Solving this first
order difference equation shows that it is equivalent to an exponentially weighted moving
average. The solution delivers the index return rA based on A and the unobserved market
return based rS on S. They then assume that the underlying market returns follow a
random walk process with drift, i.e. rS = pi+ t is the market return with the normally-
distributed, serially-uncorrelated noise term with zero mean and variance σ2 . The model
can be extended by (i) considering more than one leg and by (ii) using seasonality. The
authors then consider risk-neutral pricing. In risk-neutral world all individuals expect to
earn on all securities a return equal to the risk-free rate. This simplifies the valuation
of options since the option payoffs can simply be discounted along the path of the short
rate for each scenario. The authors choose a short rate interest rate model - the Hull-
White model. This model is used to price the expected return pi. That is we have the
same formula for the index updating (6.9) but pi is equal to the value of a money market
account in one period times a correction for the direct return g associated with real estate
investments:
pi(t) = exp
(∫ t
t−1
r(s)ds
)
e−g
with r(s) the nominal short rate satisfying the Hull-White model dynamics. The authors
considers whether in their model arbitrage is excluded. That for they have to verify that
the discounted tradeable asset A is a martingale under an appropriate measure. The
analysis shows that:
• If all direct returns g are reinvested in the index. Then the price index becomes a
total return index. For such an index the martingale property holds for the efficient
market process S with numeraire the money market account. If returns are paid
out, the martingale property does not hold: A price index is thus not a tradable
asset if direct returns are paid out.
• Consider the realization of the real state index A normalized by the money market
account. Only when k = 1, i.e. the At = St, the martingale property holds.
Arbitrage opportunities thus exist in case of a complete market when trading an
autocorrelated real estate index, i.e. k < 1. The reverse also holds: the index value
may well be different from the efficient market price, but active trading in the index
is not possible in this case: otherwise arbitrageurs would quickly force the index
value toward the efficient market price.
We consider Syz et al. (2011). Their starting point is that market frictions inhibit
perfect replication of property derivatives and they define the property spread as a price
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measure in the incomplete real estate market. Syz et al. (2011): ’In a swap that pays
the total return of a property index, the rate that balances the swap can deviate signifi-
cantly from LIBOR. We call this difference between the property swap rate and LIBOR
the property spread, quoted on an annual basis. The swap payer pays property perfor-
mance and in return gets LIBOR plus the property spread. If the spread is negative and
its absolute value exceeds LIBOR, the swap payer pays on the interest leg of the swap
but expects to receive the negative performance of the property leg. In the UK, property
derivatives were traded at a substantially positive spread until the end of 2006. However,
the spread fell in 2007 and quickly turned negative. Quotes obtained from market partici-
pants who trade swaps on property indexes differ considerably from prices computed using
models based on arbitrage arguments. In contrast to property returns, equity returns are
swapped against LIBOR without a spread. The reason is that a no-arbitrage argument
is sufficient to price equity derivatives. A trader can sell short equities at virtually no
transaction cost and invest the proceeds in an instrument returning LIBOR. It would thus
be a free lunch to receive a rate higher than LIBOR.’
However, a no-arbitrage argument alone is not sufficient to price property derivatives
because the underlying market exhibits frictions. The index and its components cannot
be traded continuously and instantly at the prevailing spot price without transaction
costs. This leads to a property spread. Observed property spreads vary with the maturity
of the swap. The cause of the shape of the term structures of property spreads is not
obvious. As liquid and cost efficient instruments, property derivatives are beneficial to
both investors and hedgers. Given the significant transaction cost advantages, it is clear
that market participants looking for a short-to-medium term property exposure or hedge
can benefit from the use of property derivatives. For long-term investment horizons, the
impact of one-one transaction costs is less significant, making a physical purchase or
sale a viable alternative to a property swap. Thus the short end of the term structure
of property spreads is expected to be more volatile than the long end. The common
explanation of a cash-and-carry arbitrage1 fails since it implies an inverse spread curve
against maturity. Such a qualitative shape was observed in bullish markets 2007 but not
in bear markets 2008, see Figure 6.7.
Since we observe severe frictions that inhibit perfect replication all explanations such
as the cash and carry arbitrage will always be of limited value to explain pricing behavior.
The property spread exists because property derivatives cannot be perfectly replicated
by trading actual property. These frictions define arbitrage free price bounds for the
property spread. The authors consider (i) transaction costs, (ii) transaction time and
(iii) short sale constraints. For the US, aggregate agent’s fees for housing transactions
range from 3% to 6% as in DiPasquale and Wheaton (1996), in OECD countries, round
trip transaction costs are generally estimated to range from 6% to 12% as in Quigley
(2002). However, technologies such as online marketplaces have already begun to reduce
1A cash-and-carry arbitrage occurs when a trader borrows money, buys the goods today for cash
and carries the goods to the expiration of the futures contract. Then, delivers the commodity against a
futures contract and pays off the loan. Any profit from this strategy would be an arbitrage profit
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Figure 6.7: The term structure of property spreads. The lines show the property spreads of
Halifax HPI contracts against maturity, based on ask prices, in February 2007 and one year later.
Source: Syz and Vanini (2011).
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some of these costs for homeowners. It is not only costly but also time consuming to
trade physical property (transaction time). It is a fact that the property market is not
quite transparent. In many regions and for some sub-markets, very few comparable
transactions can be observed to indicate a price level. Consequently, uncertainty about
demand and price for an individual object is high. Transaction time reflects market
illiquidity. In the UK, it takes on average three months to find a counter party and
another three months to finalize a transaction. Derivatives in contrast can be traded
almost instantly. To be able to sell an asset short one must borrow it. The borrower
pays a lending fee to the lender. Because of the short sale constraint, arbitrageurs can
only refrain from buying overpriced assets but cannot exploit mispricings. These frictions
define an incomplete market - the risk neutral probability is not unique, or bid and ask
prices are not unique but define a possibly infinitely bounded interval of arbitrage free
prices are the same statements. Given the frictions, bounds of arbitrage free prices follow
rather than one single arbitrage free price for property derivatives. The arbitrage free
price bounds are a function of the price of the underlying instrument and of market
frictions. For any given property spread, there is an upper arbitrage free price bound p¯
and a lower arbitrage free price bound p. The upper bound is the maximum spread an
investor is willing to pay for a derivative instead of buying actual property and is only
affected by buyer and seller transaction costs and by transaction time. If the property
spread lies above the upper arbitrage free price bound, it is more attractive to buy actual
property than to buy derivatives. Unlike the upper bound, the lower bound also reflects
the value of the short sale constraint. The authors determine the upper and lower bounds
in term of the friction parameters, i.e. the cost factors of the three friction types. They
then estimate these cost parameters. Fig. 6.8 plots the historical trajectory of the Halifax
HPI and the arbitrage free price bounds for its forward prices, using the obtained values
for the market frictions.
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Figure 6.8: Arbitrage free price bounds. The figure plots historical levels of the Halifax HPI
(1983=100) and the arbitrage free price bounds for forward prices of Halifax HPI index contracts
(dashed lines). Source: Syz and Vanini (2011).
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6.2 Green Banking
The climate change is one of the major threats and opportunities in this century. We first
provide an overview about some key facts of the climate change including its potential
impact on society, bio diversity and the economy. Different examples are given where
the interplay of financial innovation and technological progress leads to ecological and
economic meaningful solutions. Summarizing, technologies are developed such that there
are alternative solution to the government’s approach of command & control.
Although there are still some controversies, data show that humankind is facing some
challenges. Energy demand will further increase due to population growth, progressing
industrialization and increasing wealthiness. This will without any countermeasures in-
crease CO2 emissions. But climate change requires the opposite, i.e. drastic reduction
of CO2.
We show in this section how solutions based on technological and financial innovation
can create situation, where it pays economically to reduce CO2 emission and to invest in
energy efficiency. The results depend on the following facts:
• There is enough clean energy, i.e. energy which can be used to replace CO2 emitting
energy.
• The technology to transport energy efficiently exists.
• There exist financial market solution which match investor’s demand for sustainable
investment with the demand for energy project finance.
6.2.1 DESERTEC
To highlight the first point, we consider the DESERTEC concept. The bottom line of
the project is that a 300 times 300 kilometer thermal solar energy plant in a desert
is sufficient to generate enough energy to cover the world wide electricity demand.
DESERTEC includes energy security and climate protection as well as drinking water
production, socio-economic development, security policy and international cooperation.
DESERTEC is a German foundation. So far, the DESERTEC Foundation has already
made significant progress in the Mediterranean region. We comment on some risks and
facts of this project.
• Political risk. One could argue that some countries such as Algeria, Libya, Saudi
Arabia, the VAR state given their natural oil resources have no interest in a solar
energy project. This is not the case due to the following reasons. First, the solar
energy project will be beneficial for employment and job creation in these countries
to a far larger extent. Second, due to the excess solar energy these states will
be able to create new farming land. What indeed is a risk is the comeback of
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colonization emotions and feelings. Why should these countries help European
or general Western countries? This is a delicate issue which asks for prudential
and earnest negotiation. Another risk factor is political instability. The events
starting in 2011 demonstrate that this risk is there. But since the project intends
to generate a win-win situation for the Sahara related countries and the others this
risk is best minimized by considering the socio-economic development seriously. A
political risk is prominent in Europe - where will the energy enter the continent?
The Northern European states do not want become dependent on a single point of
entry in the Mediterranean region.
• Technology and financing risk. Since thermal solar energy and not photovoltaic
defines the technology the concern that sand and sand storms can heavily damage
the energy production is not relevant. Also losses in the transport of electricity
are with today’ energy standard no longer relevant. The status of the energy
infrastructure together with the financial weakness of many European countries
rises a significant risk since new infrastructure needs to be build up and existing
one has to be renewed. At this point it becomes evident that financial innovation
is necessary to bridge potential financing gaps.
DESERTEC is an initiative in the context of climate change. Figure 6.9 shows the impact
of potential climate changes on different dimension of humanity and the ecosystem.
We first note that the climate is already changing. The increase in CO2 over the
last 100 years has lead to a measurable change in climate. The question is therefore not
if this will happen but to what extent. The data from researchers show that climatic
change less related to risk but more to uncertainty: There is lack of knowledge about the
speed, the irreversibility, possible feedback effects and some hidden non-linearities. The
impact of the worst case scenarios on GDP forecasts a drop between 5 and 20 percent.
Estimates of Credit Suisse state that investment flows of at least USD 700–850 billion
per annum will be required over the next decade to limit warming to 2 degrees Celsius
and to adapt to the effects of changes that cannot be avoided. This is a conservative
estimate. Other estimates range up to USD 2’000 billion. The majority of the required
capital investment is concentrated in low carbon energy, energy efficiency, and low carbon
transport infrastructure. Low carbon energy is primarily linked to investment in renew-
ables, electricity infrastructure like grids and transmission and storage. The opportunity
is concentrated in China, the US and the EU27. They represent nearly 60 percent of
the mitigation cost. Figure 6.10 shows the distribution of the investments necessary to
achieve the 2 percent pathways. The matrix has the dimensions geographical location
and area of investment. The authors WWF and Credit Suisse (2011) state different type
of barriers affecting the current decarbonization efforts. They state that ’low carbon
investment is directly linked to government intervention, and still falls short of what is
needed.’ WWF and Credit Suisse, 2011. Since regulatory mechanisms do not exist yet
which price the externalities of carbon emissions technical and financial barriers can ex-
ist. Simply, the economics of low carbon projects are often less attractive than those
of their high carbon alternatives. Structural barriers include network effects (consumers
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Figure 6.9: Impact of potential climate change. Sources: Stern Review, IPCC, 4th Assessment
Report, Climate Change 2007, WWF and Credit Suisse 2011.
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will not buy electric cars unless there are workable and available charging solutions, but
no private investor will build a charging network unless there is sufficient demand from
electric vehicle users) , agency problems (the party making the low carbon investment
is under existing structures often not the one which will benefit from the savings) or
the status quo bias (strong bias towards maintaining the status quo instead of making
changes). The last point is often called ’change resistance’ behavior.
Figure 6.10: Annual investment required to achieve 2 degrees Celsius pathway is USD 650–700
bn. Sources:Credit Suisse/WWF analysis based (2011) on McKinsey’s Climate Desk tool.
When it comes to financial innovation, several directions can be considered. First,
banks need to understand the new types of risk. This together with the demand for
such risk allow them then to define new products and services (risk structuring and risk
transfer). Banks can next use their experience to raise new capital. This can follow
traditional paths such as bonds or direct placements. Other forms can be more in the
form of Structured Finance or Securitization. This form of risk structuring and risk
transfer came heavily under fire in the last financial crisis. But it could well be that the
principle mechanism of these innovation will be very fruitful in the future to raise capital.
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6.2.2 Failures and Examples
Although the above description seems optimistic large projects may fail. The Lisbon
Strategy, adopted in 2000, which it is generally agreed largely failed in its grand attempt
to turn the EU into ’the world’s most dynamic knowledge-based economy by 2010’. The
approach was founded on three pillars: An economic pillar to prepare the ground
for the transition to a competitive, dynamic, knowledge-based economy. A social pil-
lar designed to modernize the European social model by investing in human resources
and combating social exclusion. An environmental pillar recognizing that economic
growth must be decoupled from the use of natural resources. The Lisbon process estab-
lished a lengthy list of targets, most of which fell out of the control of EU institutions. In
2005, the strategy’s failures were already very visible: an overly complex structure with
multiple goals and actions, an unclear division of responsibilities and tasks and a lack of
political engagement from the member states. A report led to the 2005 re-launch of the
strategy, focusing almost exclusively on growth and jobs, and with a slight adaptation
of the governance model to enhance the partnership between the European Commission
and the member states. The 2007 financial and economic crisis was then the final blow
to the Strategy.
Meanwhile, the EU faces serious competitive threat of the upcoming economic power-
houses such as China and India. Furthermore, the environmental agenda has also moved
on. Under the imperatives of climate change, the new thinking had to take a broader
view and bring together the economic, social and environmental agendas of the EU in
a more structured and coherent way. At the Spring Summit 2010 EU leaders endorsed
the European Commission’s proposal for a Europe 2020 strategy, replacing the heavily
criticized Lisbon Strategy, and this Europe 2020 Strategy is now the centrepiece of the
Commission’s mandate. This new strategy puts knowledge, innovation and green growth
at the heart of the EU’s blueprint for competitiveness and proposes tighter monitoring
of national reform programmes, one of the greatest weaknesses of the Lisbon Strategy.
The basic proposal is to continue to promote EU growth based on knowledge and inno-
vation, alongside high employment and social cohesion, while promoting a sustainable
perspective (both in competitive and environmental terms).
Another example concerns water pollution in Switzerland in the 60s of last century.
Defining incentives and providing finance start up help by the Swiss government a new
industry emerged (clarification plants) and treatment of farming land was changed. After
some decades water from Swiss lakes or rivers is potable.
Other examples of market based solutions are from the US experience with curtailing
acid rain via the sulfur dioxide allowance market to the implementation of the Clean Wa-
ter Act. Market-based solutions have proven consistently more effective in protecting
the environment than government regulation alone. Project financing, public/private
partnerships, and tradable permits have come to supplement or replace conventional
command-and-control regulation and purely tax-based instruments.
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This approach can minimize the aggregate costs of achieving environmental targets
while providing dynamic incentives for the adoption and diffusion of greener technolo-
gies. Market-based financial and public policy instruments emerged in the 1980s and
have steadily gained momentum. In fact, the United Nations Environment Programme
has launched a Finance Initiative as a formal mechanism for mobilizing the financial
sector to take a more active role in protecting the environment. For many years, the US
financed environmental improvements such as sewage treatment plants with substantial
one-time grants made by the federal government to localities. But as the demand for
funding grew, policymakers and capital market experts began to think creatively about
how to leverage finances: to generate, for example, USD 2 million of pooled capital
from a one-time USD 500,000 grant. In 1987 the Federal Clean Water Act replaced
its aging grants program with state revolving funds. Under this model, each state ap-
plies for a federal capital grant, which requires a 20% local match; this pool of funding
is then supplemented with capital market investment and possibly ’seed money’ from
philanthropies. The states then make low-interest loans to local municipalities and orga-
nizations, which repay the loans from project revenue and local taxes. States may provide
loans to communities, individuals, nonprofit organizations, and commercial enterprizes.
Their repayments recapitalize the state fund, creating a sustainable resource for funding.
This model maximizes the impact and longevity of government grants.
The most practical solution for building a greener economy is to correct faulty pric-
ing by making consumers and firms pay for the environmental damage they cause. Once
these negative externalities are internalized, they will be incorporated in the prices
of goods and services, creating real incentives for the creation and adoption of clean
technologies. One of the most compelling examples of using these principles to fix bro-
ken markets is that of cap-and-trade pollution markets. In such markets, the cap (or
maximum amount of total pollution allowed) is usually set by government. Businesses,
factory plants, and other entities are given or sold permits to emit some portion of the
region’s total amount. If an organization emits less than its allotment, it can sell or trade
its unused permits to other businesses that have exceeded their limits. Entities can trade
permits directly with each other, through brokers, or in organized markets.
A further example are Debt-for-Nature Swaps (DNS), i.e. to relate a country’s
external debt and its ability to protect bio-diversity. Debt-for-nature Swaps involve the
purchase of a developing country’s debt at a discounted value in the secondary debt
market and cancelling the debt in return for environment-related action on the part of
the debtor nation. By relieving the foreign debt burden carried by developing nations,
it is possible to secure their commitment to invest in local conservation projects and
save ecosystems. The concept of debt-for-nature swaps was first conceived by Thomas
Lovejoy of the World Wildlife Fund in 1984 as an opportunity to deal with the problems
of developing-nation indebtedness and its consequent deleterious effect on the environ-
ment. Lovejoy called for building an explicit link between debt relief and environmental
protection.
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The DNS is a system in which international NGOs take the lead in swapping foreign
debt accumulated in developing country’s for nature protection project in the country’s
own currency: International NGOs will purchase some of developing countries’ debts
from private banking institutions and invest their own currency so that those countries
may work for nature protection in return for a lapse of the debts.
The first swap happened in 1987 between the Bolivian government and Conserva-
tion International (CI). The government agreed to protect 4 million acres of forest and
grassland in the Beni Biosphere Reserve with maximum legal protection. The deal took
eight months to complete, because of the lack of open participation by organizations
in Bolivia and some misplaced perceptions about DNS and how it would work. Many
Bolivians originally believed that land from Bolivia was being transferred to Conserva-
tion International. Another important note to make is although Bolivian government
could have bought back its own debt on the secondary market, the money would not
have stayed within the country (for environmental projects) without the DNS. Debt-for-
Nature swaps gained momentum and support when President George Bush included DNS
in his ’Enterprize for the Americas’ initiative. Several countries have participated in at
least one debt-for-nature swap. These countries include: Madagascar, Zambia, Bolivia,
Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, Poland, Nigeria, the Philippines, Brazil, Panama,
and Cameroon. Three international conservation organizations, all of which are based
in the U.S., have been the most active: Conservation International (CI), The Nature
Conservancy (TNC), and the World Wildlife Fund (WWF). Measured by either the face
value of the debt or by the amount of funds to the conservation organizations, Costa
Rica, Ecuador, the Philippines, and Madagascar, have been most heavily involved the
countries.
Some critics of DNS suggest that the debts in many 3rd World countries are so large
that these buyback schemes are of very little value. By 1992, 17 countries had signed
DNS agreements and while donors spent USD 16 million to buy back USD 100 million in
debts, the nominal reduction barely touched these country’s debt burdens. When Bolivia
spent USD 34 million to buy back USD 308 million in bonds in 1988, the price of the
remaining bonds rose from 6 cents on the dollar to 11 cents on the dollar. As a result,
the real value of the outstanding debt declined from USD 40.2 million dollars (USD 670
million at 6 cents on the dollar) to USD 39.8 million (362 million at 11 cents on the
dollar).
6.2.3 Energy Contracting and Structured Finance
We consider energy contracting solutions. Such contracts are defined between the
following parties:
• Energy efficiency searching institution. An institution - public entity, a corporate
- in our case wants to reduce energy costs in an existing building or a new project.
To be specific we consider a large city administration.
• Energy solution provider. A corporate provides the technology to realize the energy
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cost gains. The energy solution should lead to a substantial reduction in energy
costs.
• Financial solution provider. A bank offers different possibilities to finance the
project. The financial solution should reflect the particular financial and political
needs of the city administration.
As an overview the following figures hold as rough rules in case buildings are made energy
efficient. The data are from Siemens AG.
Type of Optimization Energy Saving Amortization Period
Measure & Visualize ∼ 10% ∼ 1− 2y
Optimizing Operations ∼ 10− 25% ∼ 2− 3y
Building Services Eengineering ∼ 25− 35% ∼ 3− 7y
Renew ∼ 30− 45% ∼ 6− 12y
Table 6.1: Rough figures for building energy efficiency measures.
Measure and Visualize means that a firm makes transparent its energy consumption
at well-chosen location within the firm. Elevators are often used since most people in
an elevator search for a fix point to focus on or the entrance lobby is also well suited.
It has by now been reported in several studies that simple transparency or monitoring
without any other actions leads to an approximate energy reduction of about 10 percent.
It seems that such a transparency changes behavior of some employees leading to this
reduction.
When it comes to financing the project a major requirement is that the project also
makes economic sense. That is, we require Gain > 0. The gain is a sum of investment
costs I and the savings of energy costs over time. Saving of the energy costs has four
risk sources:
• Investment risk. The amount I = I¯ + dI is equal to the expected costs I¯ and
possible deviations dI.
• Volume risk. I.e. the amount of saved energy ct is given by
ct = c¯+ dct
with c¯ the expected amount of saved energy once the project is finished and dct
the risk of deviation from the expectation.
• Energy price risk. I.e. the price pt of saved energy (oil, electricity, a mixture of
them) is equal to
pt = p¯+ dpt
with p¯ the forward/futures prices and dp the deviation risk from the forward prices.
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• The last risk is counter party risk of the energy solution user - here the city admin-
istration. Depending on type of financing the project the counter party risk matter
for the investors or not, see below for details. We write default risk is in the form
u = 1− dk with 1 for not-defaulting and dk for the expected default rate.
The gain of the project can be written symbolically - i.e. without using summation and
discounting notation, but focussing on the different parts in the gain function - as follow:
Gain =

I¯ , expected investment costs;
dI, investment risk;
c¯× p¯, estimated savings (costs and volume);
dc× p¯, volume risk;
c¯× dp, energy price risk;
dc× dp, cross risk;
dk × c× p, default risk.
This defines the risk profile for the city without any structuring of risk. Therefore, the
next question is: Who bears which risk? Professional technology provider keep the
investment and volume risk due to their experience and their large project portfolio.
That is variation in these two factors are absorbed in a large project portfolio. Consider
an investor. The investor is willing to pay the expected investment costs I¯ in exchange of
participating at the future energy saving. That is, the city and the investor share future
energy savings: The city participates with c¯× p¯×a and the investor with c¯× p¯×(1−a) at
future energy savings. This defines the performance contract. The function a defines
as function of time future participation. Since the investment has to be paid back to the
investor, he will participate stronger at the beginning than the city. Else, the payback
time increases. In this setup the whole investment is risk free for the city. The only risk
which is not attributed is default risk of the city. Either it is passed and compensated to
the investor or the bank keeps this risk. This type is a structured product solution.
Other possible solutions are:
• City pays the project cash.
• City issues a bond.
• City issues a green bond.
• Bank issues a structured product (solution above).
• A special purpose vehicle is setup.
Before we consider some of these solutions we provide an example for the structured
product. Assume a project which payback time 4y. Then the amount of saved energy
c¯ = 25%. Assume that the project costs 100 in a currency, that a increases linearly from
10 to 40 percent, 1 − a decreases linearly from 90 to 60 percent, that energy price risk
is ±2 percent per annum, that default risk of the city is 10 bps, that fees in structuring
the deal are 1 percent per annum and that interest rates are flat at 2 percent.
Then,
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• After 8y the whole energy savings belong to the city.
• After 5 years the investment amount is amortized, i.e. the years 6-8 generate return
for the investor.
• The return for the investor is in case of constant energy prices equal to 6.3 percent,
5.3 percent if energy price fall by 2 percent each year and 7.1 percent in monotone
increasing case. This return has to be corrected by the possible default of the city.
If the investor does not want to take this default risk, the returns are lowered by
the credit risk costs for the city.
Finally, if an investor wishes to get ride-off energy price risk the structuring delivers him
fix energy prices or prices which are kept within a bandwidth.
From the other financing possibilities we only mention the green bond. This bond
is issued by the city as an ordinary bond. The difference to such a bond is the coupon
payment. The value of the coupon each year is determined by the price of the saved
energy amount, i.e. it is a coupon derived from the underlying value ’energy price ×
saved energy volume’.
Clearly such a construction requires heavy legal and documentation work for and
between the different parties. Furthermore, more hazard issues exists: The energy solu-
tion provider can change an excessive price I for the investment to cover possible price
risk dI or the energy solution provider can predict biased low saved energy amounts to
reduce its energy volume risk. To avoid such potential disincentives, a simple solution
is let the energy firm itself invest into the project, i.e. to take a part of the investor’s
stake. This then both reduces moral hazard related to the investment amount and also
to the expected energy volume savings since systematic deviations reduce the return of
investment.
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6.3 Demographic risk
6.3.1 Pension Economics
Pension funds face multiple requirements from different fields which are likely to be
conflicting.
• Risk capacity. This capacity is determined for example by the age structure of the
fund contributes, the actual asset and liability profile, the coverage ratio.
• Risk taking willingness. This follows from the investment goals, the expectations,
the portfolio structure of the asset and liabilities.
• Risk-carry-duty. Depending on the jurisdiction and the type of the pension fund
(defined benefit or defined contribution) the pension fund carries different risk such
as a minimum guaranteed interest rate payment or a minimum return guarantee.
• Law and regulation. The depth and complexity of laws and regulations concerning
pension funds differ for different jurisdictions. Pension funds are heavily regulated
which can be understood as a precautionary measure to protect the savings of em-
ployees. But this hinders innovations in the pension scheme system and the whole
retirement provision. Given the demographic change which many western countries
face and the limited possibilities to intervene on a non-financial and contractual
level, for example immigration, increasing the retirement age, increasing produc-
tivity, the need for financial innovations to adjust the risk- and return profiles in
the retirement provision is evident.
A pension fund acting under these different forces should be (i) successful on a long
term basis and (ii) the different parts of a fund - governing body, strategic committee,
fund managers, controlling and audit units - should always be aware of the fact that the
capital is entrusted to their care. The second point follows from the fact that although
the fund itself does not faces a timing risk, the individual contributor is exposed to this
risk, i.e. the date of retirement where labor income stops.
6.3.2 Capital Protected Investment
A main strategy to manage the fund capital is by direct investing into stocks, bonds or
other basic financial instruments. The advantages of direct investments in stock markets
are the full participation in rising markets and the flexibility. The disadvantages, which
will lead to the risk transfer solution below, are that market volatility carries over to the
pension fund assets. This affects earnings and risk budgeting, i.e. reactive behavior in
the following sense is often observed. If markets boom, the earnings budget is increased
which makes it more difficult to fulfill the budget in a sustainable way. If markets crash,
the risk budget is often reduced which makes it more difficult to participate adequately
if markets recover. Another drawback are investment decisions which depend heavily on
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market sentiments. First, media often exaggerate the sentiment, i.e. investment decisions
are possibly exaggerated too. Second, diversity of opinion is lost, i.e. herding behavior
is likely to follow. A final disadvantage are due to economic cycles. These cycles have a
periodicity of several years and a rough rule of thumb is that on average two-third of the
cycle is expansion and the rest contraction. On the other side, the board of directors of a
pension fund expects a steady growing cover ratio or at least a constant one, low volatility
of pension fund income and an appropriate interest yield. These expectations and the
cyclically of the economic cycle lead to the conclusion that the investment earnings should
be decoupled from the economic cycle. Figure 6.11 illustrates the discussion.
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Figure 6.11: Income volatility due to a long-only position (Left Panel) and desired income
volatility of a new solution (Right Panel).
In the left panel the income statement is volatile due to the direct investment in the
risky assets without any risk transformation. The right panel shows a possible smoothing
of income due to a risk transformation applied to the stock investment. The right panel
cash flows lock like a floater. So why do we not simply consider a floater? The reason
is that transforming volatility risk of stock markets into a floater-like cash flow stream
the expected floating coupons are higher than using say LIBOR as underlying value.
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How can such a positive cash flow stream obtained? Given the disadvantages of direct
investment the solution is based on the following main issues:
• Rule based solution. This eliminates sentiment in decision making. The pension
fund selects the underlying value.
• Long time to maturity to become independent of the economic life cycle, i.e. 10y
or longer.
• Strategy
– Full capital protection at maturity. It is difficult to argue given the importance
of retirement capital to the contributors how avoiding capital protection can
be justified.
– Annual payment of coupons, this provides liquidity.
– Risk transformation: Guarantee a minimum and a maximum coupon payment.
Excess returns over the maximum coupon in specific years are kept in a reserve
account - save in good years for possible bad years to come. Liquidate the
reserve account at maturity which provides an additional coupon payment.
How can we achieve the desired risk transformation? Assume that we have n = 0, 1, . . . , T
equidistant periods. At initiation, the reserve account K0 = 0 is zero and the first coupon
paid c1 = c¯ is equal to the maximum coupon c¯, the cap level. Consider the second
period. The driver which allows us to pay out coupons and to build reserves is the return
Rn =
In−I0
nI0
of the underlying index I. Note that the return is always calculated with
respect initial index value. We compare the return at date n = 2, i.e. R2 with the cap
coupon. If the return is larger than the cap, R2 > c¯, we are in the comfortable situation
to pay out the maximum coupon c2 = c¯ for the second time to the client and to take the
excess to build up a reserve, i.e.
K1 = K0 + (R1 − c¯)
where K0 = 0. The above dynamics of the reserve account holds for all dates until
maturity where Rn > c¯, i.e.
Kn = Kn−1 +Rn − c¯.
If the return is smaller than the cap, R2 ≤ c¯, we face a more interesting situation.
Suppose that we pay out simply the return, i.e. c2 = R2 if R2 is positive and zero else.
Then we cannot build up a reserve in this period and we are still depending fully on the
performance of the index in the next period. To get a more sensible rule we consider an
arbitrary date n. At this date we face the following state variables, see Figure 6.12:
• The value of the reserve Kn−1.
• The return Rn.
• The cap level coupon c¯.
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Figure 6.12: Case for the coupon in period n if the return of the index is lower than the
cap value c¯.
• Rn is not larger than c¯.
The figure shows three cases A,B,C. In the case A the return Rn is close to the cap
level but the reserve Kn−1 are not very large. In B the return is still positive but close
to zero. The reserve is still small. In C the difference is to B that we have collected a
large reserve in last periods. Since Rn ≤ c¯ to fix the new coupon cn we have to know how
much we can take out of the potential reserve. Since Rn − c¯ ≤ 0 we compare this figure
with the reserve Kn−1. Suppose that Rn − c¯ > −Kn−1, i.e. either the return is close to
the cap or there is large reserve account. Then we can take out Rn − c¯ from the reserve.
If this is not the case, we can only charge −Kn−1 to the reserve account. In summary,
we charge at time n
Bn = max(Rn − c¯,−Kn−1) ≤ 0
to the reserve account if the return is smaller than the cap. In this case the coupon is
cn = max(Rn +Bn, 0)
and the new reserve account value is
Kn = Kn−1 +Bn .
The strategy so far contains a risk for the structuring firm that they fail to have enough
capital at the end of the solution to cover its liability. Suppose that the index return is
always lower than the cap coupon. Then Bn = 0 for all dates and the coupon payments
are the full cap coupon after the first period and then the return is payed out in each
period unless the return is negative. In this case, the derivative firm fails to finance the
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first, guaranteed cap coupon. Therefore, one introduces a condition that cn = max(Rn+
Bn, 0) is the new coupon in a period n only if the return and the charge of the reserve
account are larger than a threshold value acn−1 of the last coupon payment, i.e. if
Rn −Bn > acn−1
with a < 1. If this condition is not met, the payment is cn = acn−1 and the reserve
account is reset to zero, i.e. Kn = 0. Summarizing, the coupon payments and the new
reserve account values at date n are given in next table:
If Rn > c¯ If Rn ≤ c¯& Rn −Bn > acn−1 If Rn ≤ c¯ & Rn −Bn ≤ acn−1
Coupon cn = c¯ cn = Rn +Bn cn = acn−1
Reserve Kn = Kn−1 +Rn − c¯ Kn = Kn−1 +Bn Kn = 0
Table 6.2: Coupons and reserve account formation.
In the final period, a fraction of the reserve account is payed out to the investor, i.e.
he get the additional payoff
c˜T = min(KT , c¯) .
Example
Consider the data of Table 6.3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Index It 100 85 95 130 148 145 142 142 136 145 98
Rt -15 -2.5 10 12 9 7 6 4.5 5 -0.2
Min. Coupon 5 2.50 10 12 9 7 6 4.5 5 2.5
Max. Coupon 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5
Reserve In-flow 0 5 7 4 2 1 0 0 0
Reserve Out-flow 0 0 0 0 0 0 -0.5 0 -5
Balance Reserve 0 0 5 12 16 18 19 18.5 18.5 13.5
Coupon paid 5 2.5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5
Table 6.3: Date for the example. Except for the first line all figures are in percentage.
The index first drops in the first period. It then recovers and even booms up to the
second last period where it heavily drops from 145 to 98 in the last period. This paths
defines the returns Rt. The maximum coupon is 5 percent. The first coupon paid is the
maximum coupon - independent of realized returns. Since the index drops in the first
and second period the reserve account cannot be raised, i.e. it is zero. The minimum
coupon in period 2 of 2.5 percent is calculated as follows
cminn = max(Rn, 0.5cn−1)
i.e. the contraction factor is a = 0.5. In period 3 a coupon of 4 percent is paid since
R3 = 4% > 0.5 × 2.5%. At the end of period 4 for the first time the return is larger
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than the maximum coupon, i.e. we pay the maximum coupon an the excess is used to
feed the reserve account. In period 5 we can pay the maximum coupon although the re-
turn is lower than the maximum coupon by taking 1 percent out of the reserve account.
Although there is a heavy drop in the last period, the maximum coupon is paid thanks
to the filled reserve account. This defines the logic and at the end of period 10 there
is an additional coupon of 5 percent since the reserve is 5.5 percent and the minimum
between the reserve and the maximum coupon is paid. The total value of the coupons is
46.5 percent.
The flow dynamics of the reserve account is as follows. The reserve inflow Kin at date
n is given by
Kin = max(Rn − cn, 0) ,
the reserve outflow R0n reads
Kon = min(Kn−1,min(c
min
n , c
min
n −max(Rn, 0))) .
The balance reserve account Kn is given by
Kn = Kn−1 +Kin +K
o
n .
The coupon paid at date n are given by
cn = max(c
min
n , Rn)−Kin −Kon . (6.10)
cn is a complicated recursion depending on Rn, cn−1, a and Kn−1. The last dependence
on the state variable K induces a path dependence, i.e. the coupon at date n depends
on all former returns and all former paid coupons. The value of this cash flows is given
by the expected value under a risk neutral probability. This cash flows defines option
which belong to the cliquet family, i.e. option with a payoff
Vcliquet(T ) = min
Cglob,max
Fglob, M∑
j=1
min
(
Cj ,max
(
b
(
Ij
Ij−1
−Kj
)
, Fj
))
(6.11)
with Fglob the global floor, Cglob the global cap, Cj and Fj the local cap and floor re-
spectively and M the number of legs.
Figure 6.13 shows the coupon payments for the described structure of the product.
The underlying value is SMI and the period from 1960 up to 2000 is considered. The
maximum coupon is equal to 5 percent. The structure is assumed to have a maturity of
10 years. It follows that the only period with significant low cash flows are the seventies
of last century. In this phase stock markets showed very low volatility. There existed no
source to generate large cash flows.
We compare the following pension fund investments:
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Figure 6.13: Backtesting of coupon payments for SMI. Source: Zurich Cantonal Bank.
• Direct investment in SMI versus
• a structured product which defines coupon payments as described above and where
100 percent capital protection is promised.
Consider Figure 6.14 in the sequel. The left panel shows the volatility of SMI during
the last ten years as well the dividend yield. The right panel compares the two solutions.
We us the cover ratio defined for the asset and liability value. We assume that the
pension fund starts with a cover ratio of 100 as of December 1998. We assume that the
stock quota is kept constant equal to 35 percent during the backtesting period and that
dividends are reinvested. The other fraction of wealth is invested in other asset classes
where fixed income is the dominant one. We assume that interest rate earning is equal
to zero on all other asset classes than on SMI. This allows us to single out the difference
between the two solution omitting interference with other factors.
The figure shows the stability of the cover ratio in the structured product solution,
i.e. the effect of using a reserve account. This can also be seen as a strong decoupling
of the economic life cycle. In the direct investment case volatility of the stock market
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Figure 6.14: Historical SMI performance and dividend yield (Left Panel). Cover ratio for
the direct investment and the structured product investment. Source: Zurich Cantonal
Bank.
shows up directly in the cover ratio.
6.3.3 Risk Transfer: Intragenerational Cross Country Swaps and Longevity
Risk
Countries at different stages of economic development face different long-term challenges.
On the one hand, take a country such as Switzerland, which faces the challenge of being
able to provide for the pensions and long-term care of its ageing population without jeop-
ardizing its economic competitiveness. On the other hand, take Egypt, which faces the
challenge of being able to attract sufficient funds and encourage new businesses to foster
its economic development; Egypt is not constrained by longevity-related expenses, and
higher longevity due to better health and living conditions may actually signify higher
work productivity and faster economic growth. So Switzerland faces longevity risk, while
Egypt faces growth risk. Rather than bear those risks, stakeholders in the two countries
may benefit from transferring them to the financial markets. Yet the question is how.
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Is there a possibility that rich and developing countries can exchange their risks such
that a win-win situation follows? We show how such a swap functions which exchanges
demographic risk and economic growth risk. This is a theoretical approach where we do
not consider the many practical difficulties and risk in implementing such a swap.a
aThis part is based on Padovani and Vanini (2010).
We delineate the structure of a potential future financial innovation enabling one
party - the rich country - to mitigate its longevity risk and the other - the poor country
- to widen its pool of funding options. This intergenerational cross-country swap would
mirror the different timing of needed funds of the two countries and the funding capaci-
ties of each generation.
This swap permits risk management to be extended far beyond its former realm, cov-
ering a new class of risk: in this case, population ageing. It also changes the assumptions
about what can be insured and hedged - take the old-age dependency ratio - and has
a potential major impact on human welfare. A crucial aspect in this framework is the
interrelationship between longevity and growth risks, since inadequate management of
the high costs associated with an ageing society may lead a country to economic de-
terioration. The Standard & Poor’s study documents how ageing-related government
liabilities may result in downgrades of sovereign ratings if no adjustment in government
budget occurs: Australia with AAA in 2005 is estimated to be non-investment grade in
2040. The same holds for France, US, UK.
The financial innovation we present is an agreement between a rich country’s govern-
ment and a poor country’s government to exchange a sequence of cash flows at specified
settlement dates. Its structure is designed in such a way to capture the temporal asym-
metry between the two countries:
• the richer country needs funds in the future when it will have to cover expenses for
the elderly,
• while the poorer country needs funds today to pay for educational, technological,
and other infrastructure services.
The swap has a long-term duration, say 30 years as for available government debt. The
rich country represents the fixed leg, the poor country the floating leg. The net cash
flows from rich to poor are much higher in the first years of the contract’s life, but this
asymmetry is reversed over time, mirroring the different timing of needed and available
funds stated above.
The swap’s structure begs the question of how far ahead one can forecast growth
and whether 30-year-ahead growth and longevity forecasts can be sufficiently reliable.
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Given the actual difficulty in forecasting growth and longevity over a period exceeding
18 months, the swap is rolled over every 10 years. This also allows the parties to take into
account sovereign default risk: If country creditworthiness declines, then the swap spread
can be raised at the time the contract is rolled over. But as with any rolling strategy, it
is important to account for possible rolling or tracking errors and their severity.
The main advantage for the rich country in this fixed-for-floating swap is to trans-
form future cash-outs at a floating rate - its elderly-related expenses which depend on a
stochastic population ageing rate - into payments at a fixed rate, thus locking in a ’sus-
tainable’ population ageing rate. As for the poor country, its main advantage is to hedge
against adverse changes in the development aid it receives due to population ageing in
the donor country. A long-term contract as this 30- year swap entails, though, the risk of
significant fluctuations in exchange rates and interest rates. These risks may be hedged
together by adding a (fixed-for-floating) cross-currency interest-rate swap, to be rolled
over during the 30-year lifetime of the swap.
A couple of benefits of this intergenerational cross-country swap over a simple de-
velopmental loan from rich to poor are particularly relevant. One first benefit is the
possibility for both parties to spread the cash out- and in flows over time. Secondly,
the swap provides the possibility of including a rebate in case the contract is interrupted
because of sovereign default or economic recession in either country. But this swap also
offers advantages over a longevity derivative between two counter parties based in the
rich country. The problem of finding a counter party willing to take on the long-longevity
side of the transaction is often cited by practitioners as the main problem currently hin-
dering the take-off of longevity derivatives. The issue of identifying the variable on which
to base the swap’s cash flows is not trivial, given that no existing measure to date serves
our purpose fully and satisfactorily. We need a rate that reveals the strength with which
longevity trends impact each country’s wealth endowments. Gross domestic product
(GDP) is by far the most widely-used indicator of economic growth, but it does have
its shortcomings, too. A crucial shortcoming of GDP measures is that they do not take
into account life expectancy or other demographic variables such as fertility, which are
important indicators of a country’s well-being. What is important for the purpose of
this study, however, is to quantify the burden of elderly-related expenses on an economy.
These expenses tend to actually raise GDP figures through an increase in government
expenditures; but, as discussed above, longevity is forecast to negatively affect the econ-
omy of the more advanced economies. Several studies in growth theory attempt to come
up with a growth measure reflecting the welfare gains from both quality and quantity
of life. The aim of longevity-adjusted growth rates is to quantify the extent to which
national economic growth is affected by population age structure. One major study in
this field is that by Becker et al. (2006) who develop a statistical model that accounts for
the impact of longevity on the evolution of welfare across almost 100 countries from 1960
to 2000. Their model measures the growth of individual income plus the value placed
on the growth of an individuals life expectancy. A common result of all these studies is
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that, by not taking into account increases in longevity, GDP underestimates the extent
to which developing countries are gaining relative to developed countries.
We follow a utility-based valuation approach, which relies on the individual ratio-
nality requirement of the agent’s expected utility from participation in the contract to
(weakly) exceed his reservation utility. We take the exponential utility function, which
implies constant relative risk aversion and linear risk tolerance. This utility function
is widely employed in the literature because of its mathematically tractability. In an
incomplete market, to every contingent claim is associated an interval of arbitrage-free
prices and arbitrage arguments alone are not sufficient to lead to a unique price, i.e. to
a replication strategy. As the lower and upper endpoints of this interval coincide with
the sub- and super-replication costs of the contingent claim, respectively, any price in
the middle will lead to a possible profit & loss at maturity. Hence, the choice of an
arbitrage-free price must be made with respect to another criterion. The pricing of the
swap is based on the condition of individual rationality for both parties to enter the deal.
The participation constraints allow us then to determine an interval of prices acceptable
to both seller and buyer. The indifference valuation criterium demands that the investor
valuing a contingent claim should achieve the same expected utility both in case he does
not possess the claim and in case he does possess the claim but his initial capital is
reduced by the amount of indifference value of the claim. In this framework, rich and
poor country must be made indifferent between bearing longevity and income growth
risks without entering a swap agreement under a medium population projection variant
and no longer bearing these risks after entering the swap agreement.
IfWt denotes the wealth endowment of the rich government at timet - national budget
set aside for pensions and long term health care - adjusted for reference population
size and in inflation and W˜t denotes the wealth endowment of the poor government
at time t - national budget set aside for infrastructure projects - adjusted for reference
population size and in inflation, u are the utility functions,D the discount factors, PW the
probability law of the wealth dynamics, P a the probability law of the old-age dependency
ratio2 dynamics and sbid/ask respective fixed swap rates, the indifference values of the
swap to the rich and the poor country are defined through (V is the value function)
V (W0, sbid, ao) ≥ V (W0, 0, 0) , V˜ (W˜0, sask, ao) ≥ V˜ (W˜0, 0, 0) .
Using exponential utility, explicit bound for the swap rates follow.
2The old-age dependency ratio is the fraction of the population over 65 years old to the fraction of
the population between 15 and 64 years old.
436 CHAPTER 6. LESS TRADITIONAL ASSET CLASSES / INVESTMENTS
Chapter 7
Mathematical Appendix
7.1 Optimal Decision Making (Merton’s Model)
The Principle of Optimality states: Let 0 < S < T with [0, S] the initial condition. Then
for all S selections, the control is optimal on [S, T ] with the starting value W (S) which
follows from the choice of c over [0, S].
We first split the integral in two parts for small dt:
J(t0, w0) = max
c
E
[∫ t0+dt
t0
u(t, c,W )dt+
∫ T
t0+dt
u(t, c,W )dt+ f(W (T ), T )
]
dWt = g(t, c,W )dt+ σ(t, c,W )dBt , W (t0) = w0 . (7.1)
Using the Principle of Optimality, the control function in the second integral should be
optimal for the problem beginning at t0 + dt in the state W (t0 + dt) = w0 + dW . Hence,
J(t0, w0) = max
c
E
[∫ t0+dt
t0
u(t, c,W )dt+ max
c
E
[∫ T
t0+dt
u(t, c,W )dt+ f(W (T ), T )
]]
dWt = g(t, c,W )dt+ σ(t, c,W )dBt , W (t0) = w0 , (7.2)
or written with the value function (skipping the dynamics):
J(t0, w0) = max
c
E
[∫ t0+dt
t0
u(t, c,W )dt+ J(t0 + dt, w0 + dW )
]
. (7.3)
We next approximate the second value function since dt is small. This also allows us to
assume that the control c is constant over a time interval with length dt. We get:
J(t0, w0) = max
c
E[u(t, c,W )dt+ J(t0, w0) + ∂tJ(t0, w0)dt
+ ∂wJ(t0, w0)dW + 1/2∂
2
wwJ(t0, w0)(dW )
2] + o(dt) . (7.4)
This looks like a second order expansion in the state variable - but the square of Brownian
motion (dB)2) is linear in time (see the part and appendix on continuous time finance),
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i.e. (dW )2 = (g(t, u,W )dt+σ(t, u,W )dB)2 = σ2dt. The only random component in the
above value function expression is therefore the term ∂wJdW . Since E[dB] = 0, we get
E[∂wJdW ] = ∂wJgdt .
Dividing by dt we finally get the fundamental partial differential equation (PDE)
0 = max
c
[
u+ ∂tJ + ∂wJg + +1/2∂
2
wwJσ
2
]
. (7.5)
Therefore,
• Taking formally the derivative w.r.t. to c in the above PDE gives us optimal
decision making c as a function of the unknown value function J .
• Reinsert this candidate into the fundamental PDE (7.5) solve the resulting J-
equation with the boundary and initial conditions (if any).
• Use this explicit solution J to obtain the fully specified optimal policy c∗t and the
optimal controlled state dynamics W ∗t .
We apply this to a specific model which was considered by Merton. The choice variable
is a vector (c, ω) with the consumption rate and ω the fraction of wealth invested in the
risky asset. The state variable Wt represents wealth. Utility index is
u(t, c, w) = e−rt
ca
a
, 0 < a < 1 .
We set the bequest motif f(W (T ), T ) = 0 equal to zero and assume that the individual
optimizes his utility to infinity, i.e.
V (w0) = max
c,ω
E
[∫ ∞
0
e−rt
cat
a
dt
]
.
This infinite time problem leads to a slightly different fundamental PDE. To derive
this, we set J(t,W ) = e−rtV (W ). Inserting this into the fundamental PDE leads after
cancelling of the exponential function to
0 = max
c,ω
[
ca
a
− rV + ∂wV g + +1/2∂2wwV σ2
]
.
(7.6)
The wealth dynamics Wt follows from the asset dynamics and the consumption rate.
There is a risky asset with dynamics dS/S = µdt+σdB where the drift and the volatility
are constant and a so-called risk less asset with dynamics dB = Brdt. The growth rate of
wealth is the equal to the weighted sum of the asset growth rates minus the consumption
rate, i.e.
dW/W = ωdS/S + (1− ω)dB/B − c/Wdt .
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The weight ω is equal to the number of risky assets times their price S divided by total
wealth. Inserting the asset dynamics in the wealth growth rate equations gives the final
wealth dynamics:
dW = (ωµW + (1− ω)rW − c)dt+ σωWdB .
Inserting this dynamics in the fundamental PDE gives:
0 = max
c,ω
[
ca
a
− rV + (ωµW + (1− ω)rW − c)∂wV + +1/2(σωW )2∂2wwV
]
.
(7.7)
Taking the derivative w.r.t. to the two choice variables, setting them to zero gives the
candidate solutions (First Order Conditions):
c∗ = (∂wV )
1
a−1 , ω∗ = ∂wV
(
r − µ
σ2
1
W∂2wwV
)
. (7.8)
This candidate optimal choice solution possess a drawback - they depend on the yet
unknown value function. One has to determine the value function V . To achieve this,
we reinsert the optimal candidate functions into the fundamental PDE. This gives an
equation for the unknown value function V :
V = (∂wV )
1
a−1
1− a
a
+ rW∂wV − (r − µ)
2
2σ2
(∂wV )
2
∂2wwV
. (7.9)
This is a highly non-linear equation and to find an analytical solution seems almost
impossible. But we note that the value function V (w) is proportional to the expected
value of ca. Therefore, a guess is to try V (W ) = αW a as a candidate solution with α a
constant. Testing this guess in the PDE we see that all terms are proportional toW a: We
can factor out this power function times a complicated function which does not depend
on the state variable W . Since this product has to be zero for all W , the complicated
function has to be zero which gives us a value for the constant α and we obtained in this
way a solution for the unknown value function. To carry this out we insert this guess
into (7.9):
0 = W aα
(
1− a
a
α
1
a−1 − 1 + ra− (r − µ)
2
2σ2
a
a− 1
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
=:F (α)
.
That is, the state variable dependence W a appears in each term of the original PDE
and can be factored out. Therefore V (W ) = αW a solves the PDE if F (α) = 0. This
equation can be solved explicitly, leading to a constant α∗. Hence we found a solution
for the value function PDE which then provides us an explicit solution for the choice
variables:
V (W ) = α∗W a , c∗ = W (aα∗)
1
a−1 , ω∗ =
µ− r
σ2
1
1− a .
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7.2 Volatility
We prove Dupire’s equation (1.12).
Proof. The unknown density ϕ satisfies the Fokker-Planck equation:
1
2
∂2
∂S2T
(
σ2S2Tϕ
)− ∂
∂ST
(rSTϕ) =
∂ϕ
∂T
.
Differentiating (1.11) w.r.t. K twice gives
∂C
∂K
=
∂
∂K
∫ ∞
K
ϕ(ST −K) dST
= ϕ(K −K)−
∫ ∞
K
ϕdST
= −
∫ ∞
K
ϕdST
and
∂2C
∂K2
= − ∂
∂K
∫ ∞
K
ϕdST
= ϕ(K,T ).
Hence we can recover the risk neutral density ϕ from option data. Differentiating (1.11)
w.r.t. T gives
∂C
∂T
=
∫ ∞
K
[
∂
∂T
ϕ(ST , T )
]
(ST −K) dST
=
∫ ∞
K
[
1
2
∂2
∂S2T
(
σ2S2Tϕ
)− ∂
∂S
(rSTϕ)
]
(ST −K) dST
where we used the backward Fokker-Planck equation for the density function. Integrating
by parts twice proves Dupires’s equation.
We prove the representation of local variance in terms of Black-Scholes implied vari-
ance, i.e. 1.14
Proof. Starting with the Black-Scholes implied volatility definition
C(S0,K, T ) = CBS(S0,K, I(K,T ), T ),
and using the definitions x, y, the Black and Scholes formula becomes:
C(F0,T , x, y) = F0,T (Φ(d1)− exΦ(d2)) ,
with
d1 = − x√
y
+
1
2
√
y, d2 = − x√
y
− 1
2
√
y.
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The Dupire equation (1.12) becomes
∂C
∂T
=
σ2Loc
2
[
∂2C
∂x2
− ∂C
∂x
]
+ rC, (7.10)
where σ2Loc = σ
2
Loc(S0,K, T ) denotes the local variance. The derivatives of the Black-
Scholes formula are
∂2CBS
∂y2
=
(
−1
8
− 1
2y
+
x2
2y2
)
∂CBS
∂y
,
∂2CBS
∂x∂y
=
(
1
2
− x
y
)
∂CBS
∂y
,
and
∂2CBS
∂x2
− ∂CBS
∂x
= 2
∂CBS
∂y
.
We may rewrite (7.10) in terms of implied variance by making the substitutions
∂C
∂x
=
∂CBS
∂x
+
∂CBS
∂y
∂y
∂x
,
∂2C
∂x2
=
∂2CBS
∂x2
+ 2
∂2CBS
∂x∂y
∂y
∂x
+
∂2CBS
∂y2
(
∂y
∂x
)2
+
∂CBS
∂y
∂2y
∂x2
,
and
∂C
∂T
=
∂CBS
∂T
+
∂CBS
∂y
∂y
∂T
=
∂CBS
∂y
∂y
∂T
+ rCBS.
Now (7.10) becomes
∂CBS
∂y
∂y
∂T
=
σ2Loc(K,T )
2
[
−∂CBS
∂x
+
∂2CBS
∂x2
− ∂CBS
∂y
∂y
∂x
+ 2
∂2CBS
∂x∂y
∂y
∂x
+
∂2CBS
∂y2
(
∂y
∂x
)2
+
∂CBS
∂y
∂2y
∂x2
]
=
σ2Loc
2
∂CBS
∂y
[
2− ∂y
∂x
+ 2
(
1
2
− x
y
)
∂y
∂x
+
(
−1
8
− 1
2y
+
x2
2y2
)(
∂y
∂x
)2
+
∂2y
∂x2
]
.
Simplifying,
∂y
∂T
= σ2Loc
[
1− x
y
∂y
∂x
+
1
4
(
−1
4
− 1
y
+
x2
y2
)(
∂y
∂x
)2
+
1
2
∂2y
∂x2
]
.
Finally, inverting this expresses the local variance as a function of the Black-Scholes
implied variance y = I2BS , i.e.
σ2Loc =
∂y
∂T
1− xy ∂y∂x + 14
(
−14 − 1y + x
2
y2
)(
∂y
∂x
)2
+ 12
∂2y
∂x2
.
Inserting the original variables and after some algebra the proof follows.
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7.3 Riesz-Fischer Theorem, Separating Hyperplane Theo-
rem, Fundamental Theorem of Finance
To prove the fundamental theorem of finance, we need the separating hyperplane theorem.
We first state and prove theRiesz-Fischer theorem which states that any linear function
on a vector space can be represented by an inner product.
7.3.0.1 Riesz-Fischer Theorem
Proposition 7.3.1 (Riesz-Fischer in Rn). Let M ⊂ Rn be a linear subset, 〈•, •〉 be the
scalar product on Rn, and l : Rn → R a linear map. Then there exists a unique vector
z ∈ Rn, such that l(y) can be represented for all y ∈M by the scalar product 〈z, y〉, i.e.
l(y) = 〈z, y〉 , ∀z ∈M. (7.11)
Proof. We recall some facts from linear algebra first:
Let M and M ′ be subspaces of Rn. Then M ′ is the complement of M iff each vector
x ∈ Rn can be written as the sum of two vectors z ∈M and z′ ∈M ′ i.e.
x = z + z′ .
We write Rn = M ⊕M ′. Then M ′ is the complement of M iff M and M ′ have only the
zero vector in common and the two spaces span Rn, i.e.
dimM + dimM ′ = dim Rn = n .
If M is a linear subspace of Rn, we define the orthogonal complement M⊥:
M⊥ = {x ∈ Rn| 〈x, y, 〉 = 0 , ∀y ∈M} .
Then,
Rn = M ⊕M⊥ .
If two vectors x, y are orthogonal, i.e. 〈x, y, 〉 = 0, the law of Phytagoras follows:
||x+ y||2 = ||x||2 + ||y||2 ,
where the norm || • || = √〈•, •〉 is induced by the scalar product. Considering the orthog-
onal decomposition of Rn in M ⊕M⊥, the vector y ∈M defined by
x = y + y′ , y′ ∈M⊥ ,
is the orthogonal projection of x onto M . This vector has minimal distance to x, i.e.
y = arg min
w∈M
||x− w|| , if x = y + y′ , y′ ∈M⊥, y ∈M .
The last definitions from linear algebra are the kernel and the image of a linear map
f : Rn → Rm:
ker f := {x ∈ Rn| f(x) = 0} ⊂ Rn
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and
imf := {y ∈ Rm| y = f(x), x ∈ Rn} ⊂ Rm .
The dimension formula
dim Rn = dim ker f + dim imf
holds.
We start to prove the theorem:
If l(y) = 0, we set z = 0. Suppose that l(y) 6= 0. Since iml ⊂ R, we have
dimM = dim ker l + dim iml = dim ker l + 1 = dim ker l + dim(ker l)⊥ .
Since the kernel is a subspace it follows dim(ker l)⊥ = 1. Let e ∈M be a basis of (ker l)⊥.
We decompose orthogonally the vector y ∈M , i.e.
y = y′ + λe, y′ ∈ ker l, λ ∈ R .
Since e and y′ are orthogonal, we have:
〈e, y〉 = 〈e, y′〉+ λ〈e, e, 〉 = λ〈e, e, 〉
and therefore the multiple of λ equals
λ =
〈e, y〉
〈e, e, 〉 .
For all y ∈M we get:
l(y) = l(y′ + λe) = l(y′) + λl(e) = λl(e) ,
where we used the linearity of l and that y′ ∈ ker l. But this implies
l(y) = λl(e) =
〈e, y〉
〈e, e, 〉 l(e) = 〈e˜, y〉, e˜ =
l(e)e
〈e, e, 〉 .
This proves, that each linear functional can be represented in the claimed form by a scalar
product. The uniqueness is trivial by taking two different vectors e˜ and e˜′ which lead to
the same representation of y and checking that the vectors have to be the same.
7.3.0.2 Separating Hyperplane Theorem
We first define the notion of a hyperplane. The intuition is the following: Let U ⊂ Rn a
sub vector space, i.e. zero is in U . Translating this subspace produces a hyperplane H.
Straight lines in R2 or planes in R3 which do not contain the zero vector are hyperplanes.
They can be written in the form
〈x, a〉 = d .
Subspaces of Rn are kernels of linear maps l. The Riesz-Fischer theorem implies
l(x) = 〈x, a〉 = 0
for the kernel. Since each affine subspace is representable by l(x) = d we define:
444 CHAPTER 7. MATHEMATICAL APPENDIX
Definition 7.3.2. The hyperplane Hx through the vector x is defined by:
Hx = {a ∈ Rn|〈x, a〉 = d} , (7.12)
and the half spaces H+,−x are defined by:
H+,−x = {a ∈ Rn|〈x, a〉
≥
≤ d} . (7.13)
Let U, V be two subsets of Rn. The hyperplane H separates the sets U, V ⇐⇒ U and
V are in different half spaces. The hyperplane H separates the sets U, V strictly ⇐⇒
Hx separates the sets and the sets are disjoint.
Proposition 7.3.3 (Separating hyperplane theorem). Let C and K be two disjoint and
convex subsets of Rn. Let C be compact and K be closed. Then there exits a hyperplane
H, which separates C and K strictly.
The compactness of one set is necessary:
U = {(x, y) ∈ R2| x > 0, y ≥ 1
x
} , V = {(x, y) ∈ R2| x > 0, y ≥ −1
x
} .
The sets are disjoint and convex. But they are not compact and therefore they cannot
be strictly separated (draw a figure).
We show that there exists a hyperplane through z0, which is perpendicular to y0x0
and which does not intersect U, V . Let
d(C,K) = inf
x∈C,y∈K
||x− y||
be the shortest distance between C and K. It is proven in analysis courses that for C
compact and K closed such minimizing points x0, y0 exist, i.e.
d(C,K) = ||x0 − y0|| > 0 .
Let Hx0 be the hyperplane through x0, which is perpendicular to y0x0. We write Hx0 as
follows:
Hx0 = {z ∈ Rn|〈y0 − x0, z − x0〉 = 0} .
Let φ(λ) be the function, which measures the distance between y0 and x:
φ(λ) := ||y0 − (x0 + λ(x− x0))||2
= 〈y0 − x0, y0 − x0〉 − 2λ〈y0 − x0, x− x0〉+ λ2〈x− x0, x− x0〉.
This function is continuously differentiable and we have φ(λ) ≥ φ(0), ∀λ ∈ [0, 1], since
x0 is closest to y0. Therefore, φ′(λ) = −2〈y0 − x0, x− x0〉+ 2λ〈x− x0, x− x0〉 and
φ′(0) = −2〈y0 − x0, x− x0〉 ≥ 0 ,
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Proof.
Figure 7.1: The hyperplane separates the two convex sets A and B in R2. A set is convex if
any ’line with end and starting point in the set remains fully in the set’.
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i.e.
〈x0 − y0, x− x0〉 ≤ 0 , ∀x ∈ U,
since C is convex. In the same way one shows that for Hy0 the inequality
〈y0 − x0, y − y0〉 ≤ 0 , ∀x ∈ U
holds. Since, for all y ∈ V
〈y0 − x0, y − y0〉 = 〈y0 − x0, y0 − x0〉+ 〈y0 − x0, y − y0〉 ≥ 0
holds. It follows that Hx0 separates the sets C, V and the same is true for Hy0 . Therefore,
Hz0 separates the sets strictly.
7.3.1 Proof of the First Fundamental Theorem of Finance
We prove the Proposition 2.3.8
Proof. ⇒. The first step is to prove the following claim: Let ψ be a vector where all
components are strictly positive. This is a state vector, if each attainable claim or payoff
V = Pφ implies 〈ψ, V 〉 = 〈S0, φ〉 (we omit the time index T ). V = Pφ implies with the
use of transposition rule for matrices
〈ψ, V 〉 = 〈ψ,Pφ〉 = 〈P′ψ, φ〉.
If ψ is a state vector we have S0 = P′ψ, i.e. 〈ψ, V 〉 = 〈S0, φ〉 follows. If 〈ψ, V 〉 = 〈S0, φ〉,
we get 〈P′ψ, φ〉 = 〈S0, φ〉, i.e. S0 = P′ψ. This proves the claim.
Using this, we know that for each attainable payoff V = Pφ the identity 〈ψ, V 〉 = 〈S0, φ〉
holds. Therefore, if all components of V are positive, also 〈S0, φ〉 ≥ 0 holds. If all compo-
nents of the payoff are strictly positive, the same applies to 〈S0, φ〉. Therefore, arbitrage
is not possible.
⇐. This part of the proof needs the Separating Hyperplane Theorem: For K,M be
to closed, disjoint convex sets in Rd where K is also compact sets there exists a non-zero
vector z and a real number b such that for all x ∈M,y ∈ K the inequality
〈z, x〉 < b < 〈z, y〉
holds. We apply this result and set
M = {(x, xK+1) ∈ RK+1| x = Pφ, xK+1 = −〈S0, φ〉 = −V0}
and
K = {x ∈ RK+1| xi ≥ 0,
∑
i
xi = 1} .
M is an augmented space of payoffs. It consists of all payoffs at date T plus the price
of the portfolio −〈S0, φ〉 at time zero. K is a simplex (the boundary of a pyramid in
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three dimensional space). Both sets are closed and K is compact. M is a subspace of the
corresponding Euclidian space, i.e. convex and closed. Since the compact set lies in the
positive orthant the definition of no arbitrage implies that M and K are disjoint. The
Separation Theorem then applies:
There exists a vector z ∈ RK+1 such that 〈z, x〉 < b < 〈z, y〉 for all x ∈M,y ∈ K.
Since M is a linear space, this inequalities can only hold if the vector z is element
of the orthogonal complement M⊥. But then the number b is strictly positive. Since
also 〈z, y〉 > b > 0 for y ∈ K, all components of the vector z are strictly positive. This
allows us to define the state price density as: ψk = zkzK+1 for all k. We show that this is
indeed a state price vector, i.e. each component is strictly positive (which follows from
the property of the vector z) and that ψ solves S0 = P′ψ. To prove this recall that z
is element of the orthogonal complement of M and therefore for each strategy vector
φ ∈ RN we have:
0 = 〈zK+1ψ,Pφ〉 − zK+1〈S0, φ〉 = zK+1(〈P′ψ, φ〉 − 〈S0, φ〉) .
Therefore, 〈P′ψ, φ〉 = 〈S0, φ〉, i.e. P′ψ = S0, holds for all strategies φ. This proves the
claim.
7.4 Proofs of the Cox-Ross-Rubinstein (CRR) Model
We prove Proposition 2.4.4
Proof. We first show that the Xk’s are i.i.d. under Q. We know
EQ[Xk+1|Fk] = 1 + r.
which is equivalent to
EQ[Xk+1|Fk] = EQ[Xk+1χ{Xk+1=1+u}|Fk] + EQ[Xk+1χ{Xk+1=1+d}|Fk]
= (1 + u)EQ[χ{Xk+1=1+u}|Fk] + (1 + d)EQ[χ{Xk+1=1+d}|Fk] = 1 + r
with the indicator function χ{Xk+1=1+u} = 1 if Xk+1 = 1 + u and else χ is zero. Since
Xk can assume either 1 + u or 1 + d, we have
EQ[χ{Xk+1=1+u}|Fk] + EQ[χ{Xk+1=1+d}|Fk] = 1.
We set qk := EQ[χ{Xk+1=1+u}|Fk] and 1−qk := EQ[χ{Xk+1=1+d}|Fk]. Then qk+1−qk = 1
follows and also
uqk + d(1− qk) = r .
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Since this equations hold true for all k, qk does not depend upon k. Hence, we set q := qk
and 1− q := 1− qk. Solving this equations
q =
r − d
u− d , 1− q =
u− r
u− d .
Therefore,
qk = q0 = q = E
Q[χ{Xk+1=1+u}] = Q[Xk+1 = 1 + u]
and
Q[Xk+1 = 1 + u|Fk] = Q[Xk+1 = 1 + u] = q
Q[Xk+1 = 1 + d|Fk] = Q[Xk+1 = 1 + d] = 1− q.
This shows that the Xk’s are identically distributed. To show independence, we
calculate the law for x1, x2 ∈ {1 + u, 1 + v}:
pˆi[X1 = x1, X2 = x2] = pˆi[X1 = x1]Q[X2 = x2|X1 = x1]
= pˆi[X1 = x1]Q[X2 = x2] .
This is inductively generalized to
pˆi[X1 = x1, X2 = x2, . . . , XT = xT ] = pˆi[X1 = x1]Q[X2 = x2] · · ·Q[XT = xT ],
which implies independence of Xk+1 under Q.
Assuming conversely, that the random variables Xk are i.i.d. with
Q[Xk = 1 + u] = q =
r − d
u− d , Q[Xk = 1 + d] = 1− q =
u− r
u− d ,
it follows E[Xk] = 1 + r and
EQ[Xk+1|Fk] = EQ[Xk+1] = 1 + r =⇒ EQ[Sk+1|Fk] = (1 + r)Sk .
This proves that S˜k is a Q-martingale, since
EQ[S˜k+1|Fk] = S˜k .
Proof of Proposition 2.4.5
Proof. We use the following trick for t < T
ST = St
St+1
St
· · · ST
ST−1
= St
T∏
i=t+1
Xi .
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The reason to do this is the conditional expectation we have to calculate for pricing the
call option, i.e. since the random variables Xk are i.i.d. under Q, this will considerably
simplify the calculations. We get
C˜t = (1 + r)
−TEQ[(ST −K)+|Ft] = (1 + r)−TEQ[(St
T∏
i=t+1
Xi −K)+|Ft] .
Consider the random variables
∏T
i=t+1Xi are known, i.e.
T∏
i=t+1
Xi = (1 + u)
m(1 + d)(T−t)−m
where m is the number of upwards move in (t, T ]. The probability that exactly m(≤
(T−t)) upwards moves are realized is under Q independent of Ft and equals the binomial
distribution
Q[
T∏
i=t+1
Xi = (1 + u)
m(1 + d)(T−t)−m] =
(
T − t
m
)
pˆmqˆ(T−t)−m ,
where we used the i.i.d. property1. We get
C∗t = (1 + r)
−TEQ[(ST −K)+|Ft] = (1 + r)−TEQ[(St
T∏
i=t+1
Xi −K)+|Ft]
= (1 + r)−T
T−t∑
m=0
(St(1 + u)
m(1 + d)(T−t)−m −K)+
(
T − t
m
)
pˆmqˆ(T−t)−m.
Hence, Ct can be written as a function of St and t: Ct = c(St, t) with
c(x, t) = (1 + r)−(T−t)
T−t∑
m=0
(x(1 + u)m(1 + d)(T−t)−m −K)+
(
T − t
m
)
pˆmqˆ(T−t)−m.
The term (x(1 + u)m(1 + d)(T−t)−m −K)+ increases with m, and is positive, i.e.(
1 + u
1 + d
)m
>
K
x(1 + d)(T−t)
,
has to hold. Setting
m0 :=
ln(Kx )− (T − t) ln(1 + d)
ln(1 + u)− ln(1 + d) ,
1The best way to think about
(
T−t
m
)
is the following one: How many different possibilities are there
to put m indistinguishable balls into T − t boxes? Well, (T−t
m
)
possibilities. In the CRR model, the balls
are the upwards move in (t, T ] when it order of the moves is irrelevant.
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and denoting with dm0e the next larger natural number of m0, we get
c(x, t) = (1 + r)−(T−t)
T−t∑
m=dm0e
(x(1 + u)m(1 + d)(T−t)−m −K)
(
T − t
m
)
pˆmqˆ(T−t)−m
= x(1 + r)−(T−t)
T−t∑
m=dm0e
(
T − t
m
)
(pˆ(1 + u))m(qˆ(1 + d))(T−t)−m
−K(1 + r)−(T−t)
T−t∑
m=dm0e
(
T − t
m
)
pˆmqˆ(T−t)−m
= x
T−t∑
m=dm0e
(
T − t
m
)(
pˆ(1 + u)
1 + r
)m( qˆ(1 + d)
1 + r
)(T−t)−m
−K(1 + r)−(T−t)
T−t∑
m=dm0e
(
T − t
m
)
pˆmqˆ(T−t)−m
= xB¯(T, p∗, dm0e)−K(1 + r)−(T−t)B¯(T, pˆ, dm0e)
where p∗ := pˆ(1+u)1+r and pˆ =
r−d
u−d . Denoting with B(T, p,m) the cumulative distribution
function of a binomial distributed random variable with parameters T and p evaluated
at m, we then have B¯(T, p,m) := 1−B(T, p,m− 1).
It follows that the price at time zero of a call is (C0 = c(S0, 0)):
C0 = S0B¯(T, p
∗, dm0e)−K(1 + r)−T B¯(T, pˆ, dm0e).
This proves the Binomial Option-Pricing Formula.
We prove Proposition 2.4.7.
Proof. We calculate the expectation and the variance of ln(S
∗
T
S0
) under Q.
In the m-period model
ln(
S˜T
S0
) = ln(
m∏
i=1
X˜i) =
m∑
i=1
ln X˜i ,
where
X˜i =
S˜i
S˜i−1
∈
{
1 + um
1 + rm
,
1 + dm
1 + rm
}
(i = 1, . . . ,m)
andQ[X˜i = 1+um1+rm ] = qm. TheXi’s are underQ i.i.d. and (S˜k)k=0,...,m are aQ-martingale.
For ln(X˜i) follows
ln(X˜i) ∈
{
+σ
√
T
m
,−σ
√
T
m
}
,
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EQ[ln(X˜i)] = (2qm − 1)σ
√
T
m
and
EQ[(ln(X˜i))
2] = σ2
T
m
.
We next calculate the expected value EQ[ln(X˜i)]. Writing
(1 + um) = (1 + rm)e
σ
√
T
m , (1 + dm) = (1 + rm)e
−σ
√
T
m ,
it follows
um − dm = (1 + rm)(eσ
√
T
m − e−σ
√
T
m )
rm − dm = (1 + rm)(1− e−σ
√
T
m )
qm =
rm − dm
um − dm =
1− e−σ
√
T
m
e
σ
√
T
m − e−σ
√
T
m
.
This implies
EQ[ln(X˜i)] = (2qm − 1)σ
√
T
m
=
2− 2e−σ
√
T
m − eσ
√
T
m + e
−σ
√
T
m
e
σ
√
T
m − e−σ
√
T
m
σ
√
T
m
=
2− e−σ
√
T
m − eσ
√
T
m
e
σ
√
T
m − e−σ
√
T
m
σ
√
T
m
.
Developing the fraction in a Taylor series, we get
(2qm − 1) =
−σ2 Tm
2σ
√
T
m
+ o(1/m) = −σ
2
√
T
m
+ o(1/m) .
The expression o(1/m) is the Landau o-Symbol’s from analysis. Therefore,
EQ[ln(X˜i)] = −σ
2
2
T
m
+ o(1/m3/2)
and
V ar(ln(X˜i)) =
σ2T
m
− σ
4T
2m2
+ o(1/m2) .
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Independence implies
EQ[ln
S˜T
S0
] =
m∑
i=1
EQ[ln(X˜i)]
= mEQ[ln(X˜1)] = −σ
2T
2
+ o(1/
√
m)
V ar(ln
S˜T
S0
) =
m∑
i=1
V ar(ln(X˜i)) = mV ar(ln(X˜1))
= σ2T + o(1/
√
m).
Form large, the expected value of ln(S∗T /S0) approaches the constant −σ
2T
2 and the vari-
ance of ln(S˜T /S0) tends towards σ2T . The proof uses characteristic functions (Fourier
transform). The characteristic function ΨX(t) := E[eiXt] uniquely determines the prob-
ability distribution of the random variable X (i.e. there is a one-to-one relation between
probability distributions and characteristic functions) and if the sequence ΨXn(t) con-
verges point wise in t to ΨX(t), then Xn converges in probability to X. We calculate the
characteristic function of ln(S˜T /S0):
Ψln(S˜T /S0)(t) = E[e
it
∑m
k=1 ln(X˜k)] = E[
m∏
k=1
eit ln(X˜k)] =
m∏
k=1
E[eit ln(X˜k)]
=
(
E[eit ln(X˜1)]
)m
=
(
E[1 + it ln(X∗1 )−
t2 ln(X˜1)
2
2
+ o(1/m)]
)m
=
(
1 + itE[ln(X˜1)]− t
2E[(ln(X˜1)
2]
2
+ o(1/m)
)m
=
(
1 +
it−σ
2T
2 − t
2σ2T
2
m
+ o(1/m)
)m
−→ eit−σ
2T
2
− t2
2
σ2T (m→∞).
But this is the characteristic function of a normally distributed random variable with
mean −σ2T2 and variance σ2T where we used twice independence of ln(X˜k).
We proof proposition 2.4.8.
Proof. We calculate the price of a put option in the m-model first. We know that
P
(m)
0 = E
Q[
(
K(1 + rm)
−m − S˜T
)
+
] = EQ[
(
K(1 + rm)
−m − S0eln(S˜T /S0)
)
+
] .
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To take the limit m → ∞ in the put option formula means to interchange the integral
limit (expected value) with the m→∞ limit. Since the function under the expectation
is bounded, we can interchange the limits, i.e.2
lim
m→∞P
(m)
0 = E[(Ke
−RT − S0eY )+] ,
where Y is a normally distributed random variable with mean −σ2T/2 and variance
σ2T . Setting X = Y+σ
2T/2
σ
√
T
implies that X is standard normally distributed with density
function f(x) = 1√
2pi
e−
x2
2 . This implies
limP
(m)
0 = E[(Ke
−RT − S0eσ
√
TXe−
σ2T
2 )+]
=
1√
2pi
∫ ∞
−∞
(Ke−RT − S0eσ
√
Txe−
σ2T
2 )+e
−x2
2 dx
=
1√
2pi
∫ a
−∞
(Ke−RT − S0eσ
√
Txe−
σ2T
2 )e−
x2
2 dx
= Ke−RT
1√
2pi
∫ a
−∞
e−
x2
2 dx− S0 1√
2pi
∫ a
−∞
eσ
√
Txe−
σ2T
2 e−
x2
2 dx
= Ke−RTΦ(a)− S0 1√
2pi
∫ a
−∞
e−
1
2
(x2−2σ√Tx+σ2T ) dx
= Ke−RTΦ(a)− S0 1√
2pi
∫ a
−∞
e−
(x−σ√T )2
2 dx
= Ke−RTΦ(a)− S0 1√
2pi
∫ a−σ√T
−∞
e−
u2
2 du
= Ke−RTΦ(a)− S0Φ(a− σ
√
T ) .
The constant a is determined by the equation:
Ke−Rt = S0eσ
√
Tae−
σ2T
2
which implies a = ln(K/S0)−RT
σ
√
T
+ σ
√
t
2 . Φ denotes the distribution functions of a standard
normally distributed random variable , i.e.
Φ(z) =
1√
2pi
∫ z
−∞
e−
x2
2 dx .
The put-call parity implies C(m)0 = P
(m)
0 + S0 − K(1 + rm)−m and we get for the fair
price
lim
m→∞C
(m)
0 = S0(1− Φ(a− σ
√
T ))−Ke−RT (1− Φ(a))
= S0Φ(−a+ σ
√
t)−Ke−RTΦ(−a)
Denoting d1 := −a+ σ
√
t and d2 := −a we proved the claim.
2The conditions of the Lebesgue dominated convergence theorem are satisfied.
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7.5 Brownian Motion
We define and prove the quadratic variation property of Brownian motion.
Proposition 7.5.1. The quadratic variation of Brownian motion satisfies:
[W,W ](t) := lim
n→∞pin(W ) = t
in the square-integrability (L2) sense, where
1. pin(W ) =
∑
ti∈pin
(
Wti+1 −Wti
)2 with (pin)n a refining sequence of partitions of
[a, a+ t], i.e. pim ⊂ pin for m > n, and
lim
n→∞ |pin| = limn→∞maxi (t
n
i+1 − tni ) = 0 .
Proof. We get from the definition
pin(W )− t =
∑
ti∈pin
(
Wti+1 −Wti
)2 − (ti+1 − ti) = ∑
ti∈pin
Yi
with (Yi) a sequence if independent random variables with mean zero. Taking expec-
tations we have
E[(pin(W )− t)2] =
∑
ti∈pin
E[Y 2i ] .
Since
Wti+1−Wti
ti+1−ti has the distribution of Z
2 ∼ N (0, 1) we obtain:
E[(pin(W )− t)2] =
∑
ti∈pin
E[Y 2i ] = E[(Z
2 − 1)2]
∑
ti∈pin
(ti+1 − ti)2
≤ E[(Z2 − 1)2]|pin| → 0 (n→∞)
since the partition norm tends to zero. This proves L2-convergence.
Consider as an example a continuous deterministic function f instead of the Brownian
motion. The quadratic variation [f, f ] = 0 follows, since (fti+1−fti)2 vanishes if |pin| → 0.
The first variation of a continuous function is also always zero. For a stochastic process
the first variation is defined as follows.
Definition 7.5.2. The first variation VA(ω) of a stochastic process X on a interval
A = [a, b] for a path ω is defined by
VA(ω) = sup
pi∈P
∑
ti∈pi
|Xti+1(ω)−Xti(ω)| (7.14)
with P the set of all finite partitions of [a, b].
The next property shows a crucial property of the Brownian motion.
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Proposition 7.5.3. For almost all ω ∈ Ω, the path t→ Wt(ω) of the Brownian motion
are of unbounded variation.
Proof. Suppose P (VA < ∞) > 0. Let (pin) a refining sequence with norm tending zero.
From the proof of the last theorem we have on the set {ω| VA(ω) < 0} where the variation
is finite:
b− a = lim
n→∞
∑
ti∈pin
(Wti+1 −Wti)2
= lim
n→∞ supti∈pin
|Wti+1 −Wti |
∑
ti∈pin
|Wti+1 −Wti |
= lim
n→∞ supti∈pin
|Wti+1 −Wti |VA → 0 (n→∞)
since supti∈pin |Wti+1 −Wti | → 0 for |pin| → 0 by continuity of the paths of the Brownian
motion. Hence, b− a < 0 follows which is absurd.
7.6 Geometric Brownian Motion, Ornstein-Uhlenbeck, In-
tegration by Parts, Black and Scholes
We first solve the geometric Brownian motion dynamics, i.e. we prove (2.83). For Xt 6= 0,
we have ∫ t
0
dXt
Xt
= rt+ σWt . (7.15)
The problem is that we do not know how to integrate
∫ t
0
dXt
Xt
. If the equation would be
ordinary differential equation, than the logarithm would be a solution. We use this as a
guess for Itô’s formula. That is, we set f(t, x) = lnx . Using the multiplication rule we
get
d(lnX) =
1
X
dXt +
1
2
(− 1
X2
)(dX)2
=
1
X
dX − 1
2
1
X2
(rXdt+ σXdW )2 =
1
X
dX − 1
2
1
X2
σ2X2dt.
This implies dXX = d(lnX) +
1
2σ
2dt. Integrating,∫ t
0
dXt
Xt
= x+ rt+ σWt = lnXt +
1
2
σ2t.
Finally the solution of (??) reads
X(t) = X0e
(r− 1
2
σ2)t+σWt . (7.16)
To check that this is indeed the solution, apply Itô’s formula and verify that (??) is
satisfied.
456 CHAPTER 7. MATHEMATICAL APPENDIX
We next calculate the expected value of the solution Xt, i.e. what is
EP [Xt] = X0e
(µ− 1
2
σ2)tE[eσWt(ω)]? (7.17)
To calculate the integral, we use Itô’s formula for the function Yt := eσWt . We get
dYt = σe
σWtdWt +
1
2
σ2eσWsdt
and therefore
Yt = Y0 + σ
∫ t
0
eσWsdWs +
1
2
σ2
∫ t
0
eσWsds.
Taking expectations of this last equation implies
E[Yt] = E[Y0] + σE[
∫ t
0
eσWsdWs] +
1
2
σ2E[
∫ t
0
eσWsds],
where the middle term is zero. We get
E[Yt] = Y0 +
1
2
σ2
∫ t
0
E[Ys]ds,
which is an ordinary differential equation
d
dt
E[Yt] =
1
2
σ2E[Ys]
with the solution
E[Yt] = e
1
2
σ2t.
Hence, we obtain for the expected value of the geometric Brownian motion
E[Xt] = X0e
µt. (7.18)
This prove ??. The proof of the variance is similar.
We solve the Ornstein-Uhlenbeck SDE
dXt = −cXtdt+ σdWt , X0 = x, (7.19)
with σ, c constants. To find a solution we use the partial integration formula. We guess
that Yt = Xtect leads to a solution since this would be a guess for the deterministic
equation without a Brownian motion part. We use the partial integration formula to
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determine the differential dY :
dYt = dXte
ct + cXte
ctdt+ cectdXtdt︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0
= dXte
ct + cXte
ctdt = (−cXtdt+ σdWt)ect + cXtectdt
= ectσdWt
=⇒
Yt = Xte
ct = Y0 +
∫ t
0
ecsσdWs
=⇒
Xt = e
−ctY0 + e−ct
∫ t
0
ecsσdWs .
Since Y0 = X0 = x we finally have
Xt = e
−ctx+ e−ct
∫ t
0
ecsσdWs . (7.20)
Since the expected value of the Itô Integral w.r.t. to the Brownian motion is zero we get
E[Xt] = e
−ctx→ 0 (t→∞) (7.21)
and we get for the variance:
var(Xt) = E[(Xt − E[Xt])2] = E[(e−ctx+ e−ct
∫ t
0
ecsσdWs − e−ctx)2]
= E[(e−ct
∫ t
0
ecsσdWs)
2]
using the Itô isometry we get
= E[e−2ct
∫ t
0
(ecsσ)2ds] = σ2e−2ctE[
∫ t
0
e2csds]
= σ2e−2ct(e2ct − 1) 1
2c
=
σ
2c
(1− e−2ct) .
We prove the integration by parts formula (2.69):
Proof. We set: f(X,Y ) = (Y + X)2, f1(X) = X2 and f2(Y ) = Y 2 and we apply Itô’s
formula to this functions:
df = ∂XfdX + ∂Y fdY +
1
2
(∂2XX(dX)
2 + ∂2Y Y (dY )
2 + 2∂2XY dXdY )
= 2(X − Y )dX + 2(Y +X)dY + 1
2
2dX2 +
1
2
2dY 2 + 2dXdX
= 2(X + Y )(dX + dY ) + σ2dt+ σ′2dt+ 2σσ′dt
= 2(X + Y )(dX + dY ) + (σ + σ′)2dt .
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Since df1(X) = dX2 = 2Xdx+ σ2dt and similar for f2 we get
df − df1 − df2 = 2d(XY ) = 2XdY + 2Y dX + 2σσ′dt
i.e. the claim is proven.
We check that:
dV˜ ξt = ψtdS˜t . (7.22)
Proof.
dV˜ = d(
S
B
) =
1
B
dV − V
B2
dB
=
1
B
(φdB + ψdS1)− φB
B2
dB − ψS
B2
dB
=
ψdS
B
− ψS
B2
dB = ψdS˜ .
We prove the call option price formula in Black and Scholes model.
Proof. Consider X = f(St) = (St−K)+. Starting from the representation of the payoff,
we get
Vt = EQ[e
−r(T−t)f(ST )|Ft]
= EQ[e
−r(T−t)f(Ser(T−t)eσ(W˜T−W˜t)−
1
2
σ2(T−t))|Ft].
Since St is known for Ft and the increment W˜T − W˜t is under Q a centered Gaussian
with variance T − t we get
Vt = e
−r(T−t) 1√
2pi
∫
R
f(Se(r−
1
2
σ2)(T−t)+σy√T−t)e−
1
2
y2dy .
Using the definition of the call and defining d2 = d1−σ
√
τ , d1 =
log S
K
+(r+ 1
2
σ2)τ√
τ
we get
Vt =
1√
2pi
∫ ∞
d2
(xe−
1
2
σ2τ+σ
√
τy − e−rτK)e− 12y2dy
=
1√
2pi
∫ d2
−∞
(xe−
1
2
σ2τ−σ√τy − e−rτK)e− 12y2dy
=
1√
2pi
∫ d2
−∞
xe−
1
2
z2dz − 1√
2pi
∫ d2
−∞
e−rτK)e−
1
2
y2dy, (z = y + σ
√
τ)
= x Φ(d1)−Ke−r(T−t) Φ(d2).
But this is the same expression we derived for a call option considering the limit of the
Cox-Ross-Rubinstein model.
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7.7 Markowitz
Proof of positive definite property 3.23:
Proof. Consider a model with only two risky assets and let φ = (φ1, 1−φ1) be a normal-
ized portfolio. Suppose further that for V
〈φ, V φ〉 < 0 (7.23)
for some portfolio φ. This is equivalent to
φ21var(R1) + (1− φ1)2var(R2) + 2φ1(1− φ1)cov(R1, R2) < 0 .
Rearranging this last expression in powers of the portfolio strategy, the following equiv-
alent condition is obtained
0 > φ21 (var(R1) + var(R2)− 2cov(R1, R2))︸ ︷︷ ︸
=:x
+ 2φ1 (cov(R1, R2)− var(R2))︸ ︷︷ ︸
=:y
+ var(R2)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=:z
.
The RHS of this inequality is a parabola in φ1. Since x > 0 the parabola obtains the
minimum at φ∗1 = − yx . Inserting this last result in the RHS of the above inequality the
equivalent inequality is obtained:
−y
2
x
+ z < 0 .
Since x > 0, this condition is equivalent to
y2 > zx .
Reinserting the definition of x, y, z, we get
cov(R1, R2)
var(R1)var(R2)
> 1 ,
i.e. a contradiction to the properties of the correlation coefficient. Therefore, condition
(7.23) cannot be true and the covariance matrix V needs to satisfy for all portfolio
strategies φ the inequality
〈φ, V φ〉 ≥ 0 , ∀φ ,
i.e. V has to be positive semi definite.
Proof of Proposition 3.1.3:
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Proof. To prove the statement we have for an equally-distributed portfolio strategy φi =
1
N :
〈φ, V φ〉 =
N∑
i=1
φ2i var(Ri) +
N∑
i,j=1,i 6=j
φiφjcov(Ri, Rj)
= (
1
N
)2N
1
N
N∑
i=1
var(Ri)
+(
1
N
)2(N2 −N) 1
N2 −N
N∑
i,j=1,i 6=j
cov(Ri, Rj)
=
1
N
σ2N + (
1
N
)2(N2 −N)covN
=
1
N
σ2N + (1−
1
N
)covN ,
where we introduced the mean variance σ2N and the mean covariance covN .
Proof of Proposition 3.7.1:
Proof. With the Lagrangian
L =
1
2
〈φ, V φ〉+ λ1(1− 〈e, φ〉) + λ2(r − 〈µ, φ〉),
the first order conditions
0 =
∂L
∂φ
:=

∂L
∂φ1
∂L
∂φ2
...
∂L
∂φN
 ,
are a set of N equations. From
1
2
∂〈φ, V φ〉
∂φ
= V φ ,
∂〈φ, µ〉
∂φ
= µ
we get
0 = V φ− λ1e− λ2µ (7.24)
1 = 〈e, φ〉 (7.25)
r = 〈µ, φ〉 . (7.26)
The optimality conditions are therefore N + 2 linear equations in the N + 2 variables
φ, λ1, λ2. To solve this system, we proceed as follows. Since V is strictly positive definite,
V −1 exists and (7.25) implies
φ = λ1V
−1e+ λ2V −1µ .
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Multiplying this last equation from the left with e and µ, respectively, and using the
normalization condition and the return constraint, we get a linear system for the two
Lagrange multipliers:
1 = λ1〈e, V −1e〉+ λ2〈e, V −1µ〉
r = λ1〈µ, V −1e〉+ λ2〈µ, V −1µ〉 .
If we set τ = (λ1, λ2)′ and y = (1, r)′ the last system reads
y =
(〈e, V −1e〉 〈e, V −1µ〉
〈µ, V −1e〉 〈µ, V −1µ〉
)
τ =: Aτ . (7.27)
If A is invertible, we are done since then y = Aτ can be trivially solved for τ . This
determines the Lagrange multipliers λ∗i and inserting this result in φ
∗ = λ∗1V −1e+λ∗2V −1µ
gives us the optimal portfolio and proves the proposition. We prove that within the given
model, the matrix A is invertible, i.e. we claim that detA = ∆ > 0. To prove this we
use the Cauchy-Schwartz inequality: For two arbitrary vectors x, y we have
|x|2|y|2 ≥ 〈x, y〉2 ,
where the strict inequality holds if the two vectors are independent. To rewrite the
determinant in the form needed for the Cauchy-Schwartz inequality, we first define the
vectors x, y. That for, we use the decomposition V = WW ′, which always exists for
strictly positive definite, symmetric matrices. Using this, we get
〈e, V −1e〉 = 〈e, (WW ′)−1e〉 = 〈e, (W ′)−1W−1e〉 = 〈W−1e,W−1e〉 =: 〈x, x〉 ,
where we used
〈x,A′Ax〉 = 〈Ax,Ax〉
and properties of the matrix inverse. Proceeding in the same form with the other elements
of A and defining 〈µ, V −1e〉 = 〈y, x〉 we get
detA = 〈x, x〉〈y, y〉 − 〈x, y〉2 .
Using the Cauchy-Schwartz inequality detA ≥ 0 follows. Since µ and e are linearly
independent, the same holds for x = W−1e and y = W−1µ too. This proves detA >
0 and the prove of the proposition is completed. For reference, we note the optimal
multiplier values:
λ∗1 = (A
−1y)1 =
1
∆
(−〈µ, V −1µ〉+ r〈e, V −1µ〉) (7.28)
λ∗2 = (A
−1y)2 =
1
∆
(−〈e, V −1µ〉+ r〈e, V −1e〉) .
Proof of Proposition 3.7.2:
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Proof. Since V is strictly positive definite, 〈e, V −1e〉 > 0 follows. We next use the spectral
theorem of linear algebra:
Proposition 7.7.1. If V is a positive definite, symmetric matrix, there exists and or-
thogonal matrix3 U such that U ′V U = Λ, with Λ a diagonal matrix and the eigenvalues
of V as its entries.
Using this proposition, we set e = Uy with U a N ×N orthogonal matrix and we get
b = 〈e, V −1e〉 = 〈y, U ′V −1Uy〉 =
∑
i
λ
(V −1)
i y
2
i
≤ λ(V −1)max 〈y, y〉 = λ(V
−1)
max 〈e, U ′Ue〉 = λ(V
−1)
max |e|2
=
1
λmin
N,
where U ′V −1U is a diagonal matrix and where for the last step we used the following
calculation. Consider the two-dimensional case, i.e.
U ′V −1U =
(
λ1 0
0 λ2
)
.
Using the definition of orthogonal matrices,
U ′V −1U = U−1V −1U ′−1 =
(
λ1 0
0 λ2
)−1
=
1
λ1λ2
(
λ2 0
0 λ1
)
=
( 1
λ1
0
0 1λ2 .
)
Similar, a lower bound follows for the smallest eigenvalue which proves
〈e, V −1e〉 ∈ [λ(V −1)min |e|2, λ(V
−1)
max |e|2] = [
N
λmax
,
N
λmin
] .
The proof of the second claim is analogous. To prove the last inequality, we first note
that the matrix
A = (e, µ)′V (e, µ) =
(〈e, V −1e〉 〈e, V −1µ〉
〈e, V −1µ〉 〈µ, V −1µ〉
)
is invertible due to the independence of the vectors e and µ. The Cauchy-Schwarz
inequality implies that detA > 0 which is equivalent to
|〈e, V −1µ〉| ≤
√
〈µ, V −1µ〉〈e, V −1e〉 ≤
√
N |µ|
λmin
.
Proof of the Mutual Fund Theorem (Proposition 3.7.3).
3A real matrix U is orthogonal, if and only if U ′ = U−1 and detU = ±1.
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Proof. The KKT (Karush-Kuhn-Tucker= conditions in the proof of Proposition 3.7.1)
imply that any solution of the optimization problem is of the form
φ = λ1V
−1e+ λ2V −1µ .
The first term is proportional to the global minimum variance portfolio; the second one
is proportional to φˆ∗. This proves the first claim. To prove the second claim, assume
that φ1 and φ2 are two minimum variance portfolios. Then, they can be spanned by
the global minimum variance portfolio and the portfolio φˆ∗ due to the first part of the
proposition as follows
φi = (1− ai)φ∗m + aiφˆ∗ , i = 1, 2 .
A solution φ∗ of the minimum-variance problem can then be written as
φ∗ =
λ1b+ a
2 − 1
a2 − a1 φ
1 +
1− a1 − λ1b
a2 − a1 φ
2 (7.29)
where the multiplier λ1 is given in (7.28). The coefficients of the above representation
add up to 1.
Proof of Proposition .
Proof. To prove this, note that the vector of the covariances of the returns with the
portfolio is obtained by calculating V φ. To prove necessity, we assume that the portfolio
φ is efficient. It follows from (3.26
V φ =
rb− c
∆
µ+
a− rc
∆
e
i.e.
cov(Ri, Rφ) =
rb− c
∆
µi +
a− rc
∆
=
bE[Rφ]− c
∆
E[Ri] +
a− cE[Rφ]
∆
. (7.30)
We verify bE[R
φ]−c
∆ ≥ 0. Linear independence of the vectors µ, e and the Cauchy-Schwarz
inequality imply ∆ > 0. Since E[Rφ] ≥ cb , necessity is proven. For the minimum variance
portfolio we note E[Rφ∗min ] = cb . To prove sufficiency, we assume that (3.32) holds true.
In vector notation this reads
V φ = fφ1 µ+ f
φ
2 e , f
φ
i ≥ 0 . (7.31)
The weights fφi of this portfolio are obtained by multiplication from the left with V
−1
and using the restriction 〈µ, φ〉 = E[Rφ] and the normalization condition. Solving the
two equation with respect to fφ1 , f
φ
2 and inserting the results into (3.32) implies that
(3.26) is satisfied with E[Rφ] ≥ cb .
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The Markowitz optimization problem with a risk less asset reads:
min
φ
1
2
〈φ, V φ〉 MR (7.32)
s.t. 〈e, φ〉 = 1− φ0
〈µ, φ〉 = r − µ0φ0 .
The solution of this problem together with some properties are summarized in the next
proposition.
Proposition 7.7.2. If the same assumptions as in Proposition 3.7.1 hold, then the model
MR possesses the solution
φ∗ = λ∗V −1(µ− µ0e) (7.33)
λ∗ =
r − µ0
a− 2µ0c+ µ20b
=:
r − µ0
∆R
.
The locus of minimum variance portfolios is given by
σR(r) = ±r − µ0√
∆R
. (7.34)
Proof of Proposition 3.7.9.
Proof. The V aRα for the level 1− α satisfies by definition
P (Rφ ≤ −Varα) ≤ α .
If P is a normal distribution with mean µ and variance σ the definition reads:
1√
2piσ
∫ −VaRα
−∞
e−
(x−µ)2
2σ2 dx ≤ α .
The change of coordinates z = x−µσ leads to
1√
2piσ
∫ −VaRα−µ
−∞
e−
1
2
z2σdz ≤ α ,
with σ the Jacobian, i.e.
1√
2pi
∫ −VaRα−µ
σ
−∞
e−
1
2
z2dz ≤ α .
The upper integral limit depends on α, µ, σ. If we set the variance to 1 and the mean to
zero, for a given α the critical value or VaR follows. For α = 0.01, i.e. a VaR on the 99
percent confidence level, a numerical solution of the equation
1√
2pi
∫ kα
−∞
e−
1
2
z2dz ≤ 0.01
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delivers the critical value kα = −2.33. Increasing the confidence level to 99.9 percent
increases the critical level to kα = −3.09. We use this in our calculation. From
1√
2pi
∫ −VaRα−µ
σ
−∞
e−
1
2
z2dz ≤ α .
follows
−VaRα − µ
σ
≤ kα .
In other words, the V aRα under normality assumption is
−VaRα ≤ σkα + µ .
Since the VaR constraint binds, we have
−VaRα = σkα + µ .
This is the VaR for a given period. If we calculate the VaR for a different period, the
square-root-rule applies. That is, for a period T the VaR reads:
−VaRα = (σkα + µ)
√
T .
7.8 Investments
7.8.1 CPPI
Proof of Proposition 3.4.1.
Starting with ct = Vt − F we get with the associated dynamics
dct = ct (hdSt/St − (h− 1)rdt) .
Inserting the S-dynamics we get a geometric Brownian motion dynamic for the cushion
with the solution given in the proposition. To prove the second claim we use the first
one
dct/ct = ((r + h(µ− r))dt+ σhdWt)
and the solution of the S-geometric Brownian motion. That is, solving the S-solution
w.r.t. to Wt we get
Wt =
1
σ
(
ln(St/S0)− (µ− 1
2
σ2)t
)
.
We insert this in the cushion dynamics solution
ct = c0e
(h(µ−r)+r)− 1
2
hσ2)t+hσWt .
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We get
ct = c0
(
St
S0
)h
exp
(
(r − h(r − 1
2
σ2)− 1
2
h2σ2)t
)
=: atS
h
t
with
at = c0/S0e
bt , b = r − h(r − 1
2
σ2)− 1
2
hσ2 .
This proves the second claim.
We consider the cushion process in discrete time:
cntk+1 = V
n
tk+1
− Ftk+1 .
cntk+1 = V
n
tk+1
− Ftk+1 (7.35)
= max
(
0,
hcntk
Stk
)
Stk+1 +
(
V ntk −max
(
0,
hcntk
Stk
)
Stk
)
Btk+1
Btk
− Ftk+1
=
 Ftk
Btk+1
Btk
+ (V ntk − Ftk)
(
h
Stk+1
Stk
− (h− 1)Btk+1Btk
)
− Ftk+1 , if V ntk − Ftk > 0;
V ntk
Btk+1
Btk
, else.
The risk free asset dynamics Ftk
Btk+1
Btk
= Ftk+1 implies
cntk+1 =
{
(V ntk − Ftk)
(
h
Stk+1
Stk
− (h− 1)erT/n
)
, if V ntk − Ftk > 0;
(V ntk − Ftk)erT/n, else .
If we write t∗ for the first discrete trading time where the cushion/investment account is
negative the discrete time portfolio value at maturity T becomes
V nT =
{
V nt∗e
r(T−t∗), if t∗ ≤ tn−1;
G+ (V ntn−1 − Ftn−1)
(
h StnStn−1
− (h− 1) BtnBtn−1
)
, else .
Summarizing, the discrete time cushion process can be written at a time k + 1 as:
cntk+1 = e
r(tk+1−min(t∗,tk+1))(V nT0 − Vt0)
min(k+1,t∗)∏
j=1
(
h
Stj
Stj−1
− (h− 1)erT/n
)
(7.36)
This process converges toward the continuous time process.
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7.8.2 Leveraged Negative Basis
The following notation is used.
tjk = Coupon date tk for Bond j, annual basis
or premium payment date for CDS j, quarterly basis
T j = Maturity of bond (CDS) j
N j = Nominal amount of bond (CDS) j
c(tjk) = Coupon of bond j at date tk
CDS = CDS Premium
n = Number of bonds (CDS) in the bond portfolio at date t
wj = Weight of bond j at time t = 0 in the bond portfolio
LE = Leverage Unit, for example Euro 50′000
h = Leverage Factor
n¯j = Negative Basis relative to bond issuer j at issuance date of the certificate
n¯ = Negative Basis of all bond issuer at issuance date of the certificate =
n∑
j=1
ωjn¯j
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χZ =
{
1, if event Z realizes;
0, else.
D = for Default event
T = for Trigger event
E(p) = 6m Euribor starting in period p
A = Financing spread
D(t, T ) = exp(−(T − t)(r + ASW)) Discount factor of future Bond Cash Flows
D(t, T ) = exp(−(T − t)(r + f)) Discount factor of past Bond Cash Flows
r riskless interest rate, f funding rate
ASW = Asset Swap rate
f = A+ E
t˜j = min(tjD, t
j
T ) Default- vs. Trigger Event date comparison
p = Semi-annual period for interest rate earnings resp. costs.
R = Trigger Ratio
Y = Year, 365 days (366 for leap years)
s(p) = Balance in period p, s(p) ≤ 0
E(p) = Earning in period p
F (p) = Funding costs in period p, F (p) ≥ 0
G = Annual fee for certificate
p = Participation rate at the negative basis
The portfolio V (t), which represents both the underlying value and the value of the
certificate, consists at each date t, 0 ≤ t ≤ T , of three sub portfolios:
V (t) = V B(t) + V CDS(t) + V Cash(t)
with V B(t) the bond portfolio, V CDS(t) the CDS portfolio and V Cash(t) the cash portfolio.
The value of the bond portfolio at time t reads:
V B(t) = h
n∑
j=1
χ{t˜j>t}
∑
tjk>t
wjc(tjk)D(t, t
j
k) +
∑
T j>t
N jwjD(t, T j)

︸ ︷︷ ︸
=wjV (t)j,Bond
where
χ{t˜j>t} = Default or Trigger event after time t∑
tjk>t
wjc(tjk)D(t, t
j
k) = PV of coupons at t for each bond j
with weights wj fixed at 0.∑
T j>t
N jwjD(t, T j) = PV of notional .
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The value V (t)j,Bond is a mark-to-market value. All earnings of the bond portfolio
up to time t are defined by:
V˜ B(t) = V B(t) +
n∑
j=1
∑
tjk<t
χ{tjk>t˜j}
wjc(tjk)D(t, t
j
k)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
=V (t)B,Cash
where
wjc(tjk)D(t, t
j
k) = PV of all coupons < t which did not defaulted .
The CDS portfolio is similarly split into a mark-to-market value at time t and past
cash flows which enter the cash portfolio, i.e.
V˜ CDS(t) = −h
n∑
j=1
χ{t˜j>t}w
jN j
∑
tjk>t
CDSRjkD(t, t
j
k)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
=V CDS(t)
+ h
n∑
j=1
χ{t˜j<t}w
jN jD(t, tjD)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=V CDS, Cash (t)
.
At a default event, the CDS portfolio contribution is at market value. The cash
portfolio consists of 3 further components: The loan part, the coupon part of the cer-
tificate and the trigger part in case of a trigger event. We refer to the main text for the
discussion.
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